Yugoslavia

Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation and myself I would like to offer you our sincere congratulations, on your election as President of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. This election is particularly important owing to the fact that this is the first time the highest United Nations office has been assumed by a representative of one of the countries of Africa, a continent which already has twenty-six Members in our Organization and from which new nations expect to take their place soon by our side, free and with equal rights. 2. The work of the sixteenth session is going forward in a situation fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. This situation has been strongly marked by the tragic disappearance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold. 3. What has happened in the course of the past year, and how has the present deterioration in international relations come about? I do not want, here, to recapitulate all the events and facts, with which we are all familiar. I shall mention only a few of them, those which I regard as basic. 4. There has been a worsening of relations between East and West which has revealed itself notably in connexion with the German problem, and more particularly the problem of Berlin. The arms race has continued and has been consistently intensified, without there being any hope of an early agreement. The Soviet Union has brought to an end the moratorium which France had not respected on nuclear tests, after which the United States, for its part, has proceeded to make underground tests. At the same time, the Geneva talks have been suspended. The war continues in Algeria, for which France is to blame. In Angola, the fight for liberation, in the face of brutal repression by Portugal, is becoming ever fiercer. The Laos crisis has not been settled owing to foreign interference. For the same reason it has been impossible to normalize the situation in the Congo, the alleged Katanga problem being nothing but an instrument of subversion in the hands of foreign colonizers. Lastly, the negotiations between East and West, which have been conducted on different levels on various subjects, have yielded no appreciable results. 5. What, in our opinion, are the reasons for the negative development of international relations? We think that there are two fundamental causes at work. In the first place, the colonial Powers, aided to various degrees by their allies in the same bloc, are seeking in various ways to maintain for as long as possible their position in Africa and elsewhere. The second cause lies in the ever more inflexible tendency of the major Powers in the two blocs to demonstrate and apply a policy of force, which in fact amounts to a policy of placing the world on the brink of war. The entangling of these two factors further complicates the situation and prevents the real causes of the disputes and crises from being identified. 6. During this same period we have witnessed a powerful statement of position by the so-called "non-aligned" countries. A large number of the highest representatives of these countries met at the Belgrade Conference from 1 to 6 September. On that occasion they gave expression, in a clear and detailed manner, to their judgements and views on the international situation and the major world problems. Several important documents were issued as a result of their fruitful work. 7. Even before the Conference met, its objectives and the line of its work gave rise to various forms of preoccupation. After its conclusion, the most varied and contradictory judgements were passed on its value and its true meaning. 8. Some reproach us with not having been sufficiently practical and with having let slip the opportunity to play our role — by which, of course, is meant a role that would suit the particular interests of one or the other bloc. Others, on the contrary, reproach us with having been too definite in our action, in a manner corresponding, as they say, neither to our material strength nor to our international influence. Others again suspected us of trying to create a third bloc, and announced, when their- predictions were not fulfilled, that we had failed because we had not succeeded in that aim. 9. Yet others, both before and after the Conference, posed the problem in completely erroneous terms. Would the Conference, they asked, be more favourable to the East or to the West? We do not in any way consider that a given standpoint is pernicious or is to be rejected simply because it is endorsed either by the Soviet Union or by the United States. Quite the contrary — it gives us sincere pleasure when the number of such common positions is increased. 10. Next — and this seems to me quite obvious — it is in the first place for the countries espousing a policy of non-alignment to define and apply their own policy. Otherwise — that is, if we adopted the criteria of blocs — we should find it impossible to pursue a genuinely independent policy. 11. Again, when some say that we must be regarded as anti-Western because of our attitude on the colonial question, we can only reply: on this point we have nothing to change. We can only cease to be anti-Western if you yourselves, in the interests of the colonial peoples and of world peace and in your own interest, radically change the colonial policies which you have so far followed. 12. We persist in our belief that every people has the right freely to choose its own ideology or social ay stem. That is entirely its own affair. We are furthermore convinced that the existence of different ideologies and social systems is not in itself a factor which causes, or must necessarily cause, a worsening of international relations. What brings about this worsening is the policy of placing other peoples in a position of inequality, the policy of interfering in their internal affairs — in short, the policy of force. Such a policy cannot be justified on ideological or any other grounds. We likewise consider, as was clearly stated in the Belgrade Declaration, that the way to peace lies solely in action designed to reduce the area of antagonism between the blocs, to overcome the resulting division of the peoples and to weaken the hold fastened by such antagonism on the rest of the world. 13. We tried, at Belgrade, to consider calmly and objectively the present state of international relations and its causes. In setting out our observations and conclusions, we did not claim that we were able, or were the only ones competent, to propose the best solutions for international disputes. We stated that reliance on force and war as a means of settling international problems has never been more absurd than it is today, and that never more than today have force and war constituted a threat to the very existence of mankind. At the same time we stated that never be"! ,re has there been, in the world, so great an awareness of this absurdity or so strong a resistance to the policy of threats and war preparations. 14. It was in this spirit that we sent a special message to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev — leaders of the two greatest Powers, on whom the general state of international relations so largely depends — asking them to resume contact in order that, by negotiations, further aggravation of the international situation might be prevented and a way out of the crisis found. It is encouraging to note that, in their replies, both statesmen reacted positively to our appeal. 15. I do not wish to restate my Government's views on the major international problems. They are well known. Besides, we also have the Belgrade Declaration, in which the common positions of the non- aligned countries are clearly set forth. My delegation will make more detailed statements on all these questions in the various Committees. 16. On 20 September the Joint Statement on disarmament made by the United States of America and the Soviet Union [A/4879] was published here. To this we should be happy if the twelve-Power draft resolution submitted at the fifteenth session^ had in any way contributed. We listened very closely to what President Kennedy said yesterday on the subject of disarmament [1013th meeting]. We shall study his proposals most carefully. We are particularly happy to share his opinion that the risk entailed by disarmament pales beside the risk involved in an unlimited arms race. The fact that, an agreement on principles should have been reached is certainly positive and encouraging. Nevertheless, I think it would be naive to believe that this itself constitutes a decisive step in this field. The experience of recent years is the best evidence to that effect. We then had negotiations without a common platform. No progress was made. Now we have a common platform, but as yet we have no negotiations. We hope they will soon begin. However, even if negotiations should be started on a common platform and within the framework of a jointly designated body, that would not in itself guarantee rapid success. The reason is that the nature of the relations between the great Powers, one basic feature of which is the intensified arms race, militates against the rapid conclusion of an agreement. In other words, so long as the arms race — which in itself is simply the manifestation of a policy based on force — continues and grows more intense, the prospects of arriving at a state of affairs where this policy is really and truly renounced will remain remote. 17. - I am not saying that the great Powers do not desire disarmament. But the question is whether, in present circumstances, they are capable of desiring it. In this context, we should not underestimate the influence of specific groups which explicitly favour^ the arms race. 18. So what can we do? That is the way things are. Must we postpone disarmament negotiations until conditions favourable for them arise? Of course not. Our conclusion must be that in the course of disarmament negotiations it will be very difficult to arrive at an effective solution if we do not, at the same time, make every effort to settle existing questions and disputes by peaceful means, by negotiation. The problem is therefore both a long-term and simultaneously a very urgent one, because of the direct effects which the arms race and the policy on which it rests have on international relations as a whole. 19. We are well aware that there can be no improvement in international relations without direct agreement between the great Powers themselves. Yet the question of war "and peace is one which concerns and interests the peoples to the highest degree. Peace is today, more than ever before, one and indivisible. It is therefore essential that all countries should participate in efforts to safeguard and strengthen peace, while pressing the great Powers ever more intensively to negotiate and agree, on the basis of general interests which are, at the same time, the interests of peace. The exerting of such a positive influence in the field of disarmament must also be made possible through the composition of the negotiating body. It is essential that that body include representatives of countries not belonging to any bloc. The experience of the last few years has amply demonstrated that the blocs cannot, by themselves, reach any solution. 20. Here J must make it quite clear that we are not in the least convinced by the objection that this — what I have just said — would mean adopting the so-called "troika" principle. It is absurd to demand the application of the "troika" system to all international bodies; but it is equally unjustified to claim that, in order to avoid approval of such a system, the non- aligned countries must in all fields be treated in a discriminatory manner. 21. We still believe that the disarmament negotiations must be conducted exclusively under United Nations auspices. For all these reasons, we continue to insist that a special session of the General Assembly, or a special world conference, should be convened to consider the question of disarmament, as proposed in the Belgrade Declaration. 22. At present we are all agreed on the principle of general and complete disarmament, accompanied by strict international' control. The joint Soviet-American statement has enunciated other vital principles. Effective negotiations must therefore be started as soon as possible, with a view to making this common platform effective. 23. Since we know that many more difficulties have to be overcome before general and complete agreement is reached, my delegation. considers that a formula must be found which will hinder or prevent, from now on, the continuation of the arms race. If we are already tackling this major task of achieving general and complete disarmament — which we rightly regard as realistic — why should it be less realistic to try immediately to prevent the extension, at least, of -he existing arm race? It is for this purpose that we again submit, here, the urgent proposal that an agreement be reached as soon as possible to freeze military budgets at a level fixed by common consent, and to set aside, as a guarantee, a fixed percentage of the funds thus obtained for special international purposes — preferably, in all probability, for the establishment of a fund to aid the less developed countries. We must not forget that the world is spending about $14 million on armaments every hour — which makes $336 million a day and $120,000 million a year. 24. As for nuclear tests, France has committed a very serious offence by carrying out tests during the moratorium. This responsibility cannot but be shared, to a considerable, extent, by the other Western and allied Powers. This in our opinion is, of the reasons advanced by the Soviet Government in explanation of its decision to resume nuclear testing, the only valid one. If it is true, as it seems to be, that a series of nuclear explosions has recently been undertaken in the Soviet Union, such action is very disturbing and the Soviet Government, in taking it, is assuming an extremely grave responsibility. 25. We have always been and we remain in favour of a moratorium — which this time would be compulsory, on pain of severe penalties — for all types of nuclear testing and for all countries without exception. We also advocate the urgent resumption of negotiations on the definitive prohibition of tests, which, likewise on pain of severe penalties, would be obligatory for all. Moreover, we are convinced that the problem of adequate control is not insoluble, if the parties concerned show mutual good will. 26. in the case of problems whose present and future repercussions may weigh so heavily on the fate of mankind as a whole, we think that no Power should be entitled, simply because it possesses the technical and other necessary material resources, to take decisions as it thinks fit. 27. in the light of these views, we favour the urgent resumption of negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests, either within the framework of disarmament talks, or separably. As in every other case, we have always been opposed to attempts to make the solutions of different problems interdependent. 28. One of the problems at present weighing most heavily on international life is that of Germany and Berlin. 29. We all know what makes the Berlin situation abnormal, so to speak, on the material, geographical and political level. The arguments of the main parties to the dispute are also, largely, familiar to us. They naturally reflect those parties' different interests. My Government's position with regard to the Berlin problem and problem of Germany is likewise well known. We take, as a starting-point, facts which are themselves the result of a state of affairs established after the Second World War — namely, that the Berlin situation is in a certain sense abnormal, that there exist two German States, incorporated in mutually conflicting alliances, and that the Oder-Neisse frontier is definitive. At the same time we recognize that an agreement must guarantee the freest possible access by the Western countries to West Berlin, as well as the right of the West Berlin population to choose its own political and social system. We also regard it as abnormal that a peace treaty with Germany has not yet been signed. 30. The fact that we are led to wonder how we are to find a way out of the present Berlin situation proves that the problem exists. Nevertheless, we think the main reason why it has assumed its present importance and acuteness is that the interests of the two great contending Powers are directly committed there. And this can prejudice a proper evaluation of the importance of other situations, no less serious, outside Europe. 31. I say this as representative of a European country for which, geographically and politically, this problem is neither remote nor unimportant,, It nevertheless seems to us that, objectively, by their real content and specific weight — that is, by the way in which they concern the basic interests of peoples committed to independence and freedom — problems such as those of Algeria, Angola, the Congo, Laos and Cuba are certainly more serious. 32. However that may be, we naturally favour a rapid solution of the Berlin problem, through negotiations and on the basis of existing reality. We are assuredly not alone in wondering how it is that effective negotiations have not been embarked upon sooner. As long as it remains unsolved, and as long as States continue to make it the subject of displays of force, declare themselves ready to use force, and engage in various preparations confirming such declarations, this problem will continue to weigh heavily on international relations as a whole. 33. As for the question of the German people's right to self-determination, which some quarters like to raise in an apparent desire to reduce the whole problem to that issue, I can state without hesitation that we favour self-determination for all peoples, and consequently for the German people; but we would desire that those raising the question should also favour a consistent application of this principle on all continents. In the case of Germany, however, and if the problem at issue is primarily that of the country's reunification, certain facts cannot and must not be ignored. The fact of two German States stemmed from the Second World War, and this situation has been maintained as a result of a policy determined by the great Powers and by the state of their mutual relations. Moreover, the question of self-determination for the German people cannot be raised separately from that of European security. Germany has been the aggressor in two world wars.. At the end of the second, the members of the anti-Hitler coalition reached an express understanding to prevent any possibility of a rebirth of militarism, revenge-seeking and a policy of aggression on the part of Germany. For reasons which are well known, this goal has not been achieved. On the contrary, we are witnessing the remilitarisation of Germany, whereas the right to self-determination can be conceived and conceded only within the framework of Germany's guaranteed demilitarisation. Only subject to the same condition can a lasting solution for the Berlin problem be expected. 34. The death of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has resulted in the post he occupied becoming vacant. It is in the interest of the normal functioning of the Organization that this post should be filled as soon as possible. If opinions differ as to the procedure to be followed, and if it proves impossible to reach a rapid solution, my delegation considers that a provisional solution must be sought. Here again, we are in the presence of different arguments, polarized in advance by what one or other of the great Powers regards as in line with its present or future interests. Naturally, we cannot ignore these arguments. The common interest requires us to reach a solution agreed upon by us all. 35. Our principal concern should none the less be to find the solution which will best serve the general interests of the United Nations. That is why we favour a provisional solution whereby a qualified person chosen from amongst the non-aligned countries would exercise these functions which have fallen vacant. This must in no way prejudice the definitive solution, which will have to be reached by common consent. 36. As regards the definitive solution, we hold to our original opinion that the person nominated should come from one of the countries outside the blocs but be less powerful, politically, than the former Secretary-General. In addition, my Government still considers that it would be desirable to flank the Secretary-General .with an advisory body of at the most five members, chosen from the different regions of the world. These proposals are based on our conviction that the authority and role of the United Nations must be transformed. The Declaration of the Belgrade Conference recommends a whole series of measures designed to strengthen this Organization, and especially to adapt its structure and aspect to the positive changes which have come about on the international scene and hence to the Organization's numerical composition, so that the bonds which unite the world may, through the United Nations, be strengthened. 37. It is precisely because we are pursuing such an aim that we should all oppose any attempt to limit or reduce the role of the United Nations in the settlement of major international problems. For the same reasons we cannot approve any reinforcement of the privileged position already enjoyed by the great Powers in this Organization. We are convinced that the authority and role of the United Nations, as the supreme body of the international community, can be strengthened only through a guarantee of its universality and the promotion of ever greater equality between all its Members.