58. The spontaneous unanimity with which you have been elected, Mr; President, and the praise bestowed upon you by those who have spoken before me are evidence of the respect and confidence you have inspired in all members of this distinguished Assembly. Allow me to associate myself unreservedly with this general confidence, which, I am sure, will enable you to carry out your task successfully in the unusual circumstances in which this Assembly has met,
59. The Assembly meets under the shadow of the Berlin crisis, the greatest international crisis which has convulsed the world since the end of the war. Whatever the importance of the other problems with which we shall have to deal, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is chiefly because of the Berlin problem that the present tension has arisen and that our greatest anxieties are justified.
60. What is at issue—as we have already heard many times—is the peace of the world. The crisis also involves the fate of more than two million men and their indisputable right to an independent and secure life. In the face of this twofold danger that mankind will be submerged in a nuclear cataclysm or that terror and weariness will lead to the abandonment of the ideals which bring meaning and joy into human life, every sensitive and sensible man must feel great anxiety.
61. More generally, we can say that the Berlin problem, which is also the problem of Germany, is the keystone of relations between East and West in Europe. Mr. Gromyko referred to this fact a few days ago [1016th meeting, paragraph 46] when, in a very important part of his speech, he expressed with some passion his country's deep concern about what he called the adventurous plans of the West German revenge-seekers". Long and painful past experience might explain but not justify his attitude. Yet we cannot ignore the intense anxiety caused in most European countries by a series of diplomatic and political events which has taken place since the war in this part of the world and which is now expressed and symbolized by the name of Berlin.
62. It is undeniable that the difficulties which we encounter in our Organization arise essentially from this spirit of suspicion and anxiety. As Lord Home said rightly a few days ago [1017th meeting]: " .. .the United Nations reflects the political divisions in the world... so long as the world is divided the United Nations can be no more than a shadow of what it ought to be".
63. This could not have been better said. This fundamental statement illustrates the full importance of the
efforts now being undertaken, to solve the Berlin crisis.
64. Either failure or success would inevitably lead to diplomatic and psychological chain reactions. In particular, the success of the present negotiations would remove one of the chief sources of tension between peoples, at leas'; for sometime; it would restore confidence in the future and might enable the work of the Organization to return gradually to normal. It may be clear to the world that nothing irreparable separates us and that peace is better served by the gradual solution of existing difficulties than by resounding formulas and spectacular plans designed only to strike the imagination. Once more, we might say that the most direct road to victory is success.
65. In the circumstances each of us has a particular duty, depending on his own position. For a country like Greece, which has no direct responsibility for the negotiations but is still concerned about their issue, I believe that our duty can only be to avoid by our attitude anything which might unnecessarily poison the situation and make the negotiators' task more difficult.
66. We shall adhere strictly to this course of action, which Greece has followed constantly since it has belonged to this Organization. Yet it is important that this course of action should be generally accepted and followed in good, faith.
67. No one can claim to have a true desire for peace if he takes every opportunity of breaking contractual undertakings, repudiating the clauses of peace treaties and bringing about situations which prejudge the equitable settlement of problems.
68. Nor can one help to establish a spirit of tranquillity and understanding by putting forward sensational proposals with no purpose but propaganda or by mechanically repeating slogans and personal insults which offend all restraint and dignity.
69. Still less can one encourage the spirit of moderation and restraint which is so necessary at this time by exhibitions of overwhelming power or threats of annihilation. In the tempestuous events of our generation, our peoples—all our peoples—have often proved that, although to live in peace is something precious, such a life can never be bought at the cost of the moral values on which its existence depends* Let those who have the means resist vain hopes of intimidation and try rather to gain the confidence of all. Let them remember the immortal words of the Athenian ambassadors who addressed the people of Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, throwing down this noble challenge:
"None deserve praise except those who, when called upon to dominate other peoples by reason of their natural superiority, prove to be more just than the force at their disposal would allow them to be."
70. The Hellenic delegation's attitude to the various problems on the agenda will be based on these considerations. I shall not therefore make a detailed statement at this stage of the views we shall put forward in the course of the debates.
71. However , there are three matters on which I think it necessary to give our views here and now.
72. First, as a matter Of principle, I think I should say that my delegation will adhere strictly to the full provisions of the Chafer, honestly interpreted. Our attitude on each question under discussion will be decided not by considerations of expediency but by the rules of law established by the Charter. In a political assembly such as ours it is inevitable that the legal and real aspects of things should often conflict. But we should condemn our institution to inaction and failure if we were to pay too much attention to special interests or, by misinterpretation, to make law the servant of self-interest. Let us have the courage to admit that this attitude has prevailed for too long and that there is no doubt that it has done more than anything else to undermine the foundations on which our Organization rests.
73. To evade decisions taken by this distinguished Assembly, in one way 6r another, is no way to apply the principles of the Charter.
74. Nor is it consistent with the obligations imposed by the Charter to hinder the working of our Organization by avoiding the payment of financial contributions required by decisions of the Assembly.
75. No one can apply the principles of the Charter by speaking of the self-determination of peoples whenever this might embarrass an adversary, while avoiding the very word whenever fear or self-interest stand in the way of any demand for self-determination.
76. No one can apply the principles of the Charter by making the election of new Members a matter for bargaining and ignoring the strict rules laid down in the Charter in this connexion.
77. No can anyone apply the Charter by condemning the executive of our Organization to impotence, by refusing to co-operate in the election of a single Secretary-General under the conditions clearly and unequivocally set forth in Article 97.
78. At this grave moment it is particularly important to be clear and frank. In the divided and stormy world in which we live today, the fragment of law which the storm has spared are our only guard. We should preserve them with all our strength.
79. With regard to the problem of, disarmament, I wish first to say that my delegation is happy that an agreement of principle has been reached in this field between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union [A/4879]. Of course, as several Members have pointed out, the application of the agreed principles will probably be a laborious and uncertain task. But we find it hard to imagine that it will be impossible to find some solution of the crucial question of control over the successive stages of disarmament, taking into account all legitimate interests. I can understand, to a certain extent, the concern expressed from this rostrum by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union [1016th meeting], who is anxious not to hand over all his country's military and technical secrets to international observation prematurely, or before the process of disarmament has reached its decisive stage.
80. But is there not an equally great and probable danger in controlling only those armaments which have been destroyed at the end of each stage of the plan, remaining in ignorance of the existing level of armaments in each country and, perhaps, having no disarmament at all? I think this danger is particularly serious because, whatever progress is made in disarmament; the countries at the highest level of industrial development will still have a reserve of technical and scientific knowledge and facilities with which they could always reopen the whole question. It has been rightly said that it is possible to destroy the atomic bomb but not the knowledge of it. Human nature being what it is, we cannot yet rule out the possibility that certain States, acting in good faith but concerned only about their national security and the schemes they attribute to their adversaries, may be reluctant to carry out the full provisions of a plan for gradual disarmament.
81. The danger of prematurely establishing international observation of the level of existing armaments in each country—assuming that is possible to control all armaments—seems negligible beside these disturbing possibilities.
82. In any case, simply because of these difficulties and of the inevitable disparity between any agreement which may be reached and a rapidly developing situation, we think more attention should be paid to that part of the plans under consideration which concerns the establishment of an international force. My delegation has already drawn attention to this matter on several occasions and proposes once again to make its own contribution to the discussion of the problem. In this connexion it is hardly necessary to add that the problem of disarmament is necessarily related to that of possible threats to peace, particularly the problem of subversion in Member States. It is meaningless to speak of respect for the independence of peoples while trying to destroy its foundations by infiltration or subversion.
83. These matters bring me naturally to the question of the Secretary-General. It would be useless to speak of an international force, which in extreme cases would have to deal with an aggressor and whose command would obviously be under the supervision of the Security Council, if its unity were impaired at the level of the Secretary-General and of the military command itself. I know of few countries which would be ready to entrust their national security to a command of this kind. Yet both recent and remote history provide well-known cases of the disappointments to which such a form of military organization leads inevitably.
84. Hence we must not endanger the element of unity and continuity clearly and solemnly established in the provisions of Articles 97 and 100 of the Charter concerning the office of Secretary-General.
85. This is necessary both because of the needs of the normal working of a vast organization such as ours and because of the prospects opened before us by the possible development of the disarmament plan. To destroy the unity of the post of Secretary-General would endanger the whole future of disarmament.
86. The force of events has led the Assembly and the Council, in each of the resolutions they have adopted, to request the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of tb/^i'3solution concerned and to assume further responsibilities. We think it absurd to consider reducing the efficacy of his office by setting up a sort of triumvirate, which would be condemned beforehand to impotence. We shall oppose this suggestion in the conviction that we are defending not only the letter and spirit of the Charter—which have been so eloquently analysed by the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino [1018th meeting] and by others— but the future of our Organization and the rights of all peoples, particularly the peoples of the small countries.
87. We cannot speak of the post of the Secretary- General without mentioning the noble and moving figure of its last holder. The homage which is his| due, and which I now wish to pay him on behalf of my country, has been earned not only by the outstanding service he has rendered to our Organization and the nobility of the idea which inspired him in his work, which was to make the United Nations an "instrument of Governments through which tiny... should.,. try to develop forms of executive action.. .
88. This homage is due to him; also, and above all, because of his personality, his sense of duty and his abnegation in the service of the ideals to which he devoted himself. It is because of these qualities that his achievements will have lasting effects on the history
of the United Nations. I myself can find no more fitting tribute to him than the words of a great thinker of the last century:
"Eminent men have never been happy; for it is only by their unrelenting struggle that they are able to save what is ideal in their age. But this is why their work can only be an accumulated youth rescued from the erosion of time".
89. Destiny has put an end to the achievements of a great worker for international co-operation. Yet no human achievement is really finished when it leaves such a heritage.
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