May I add my congratulations to the many that Muhammad Zafrulla Khan has already received on his election as president of the Assembly at this session. The overwhelming majority by which he was elected is a fitting tribute not only to the personal esteem in which he is held, but also to his record of service in his country, in this Organization and also as a Judge of the International Court.
2. The President and I first met in 1948 — fourteen years ago — when we led our respective delegations at the Paris session of the General Assembly. In the years that have passed since then, I have continued to hold him in high esteem. I am certain that his occupancy of the Presidency at this Assembly will be characterized by that sense of fairness, of impartiality and of justice for which he has acquired a well-deserved reputation.
3. A year has passed since the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, It is appropriate that we very briefly glance at what has happened during the past year.
4. The record, as chronicled in the world's Press, is not an encouraging or a cheerful one. In no less than forty-five countries there have been revolutions; coups d'état; revolts; border clashes; internal unrest, accompanied by, riots and, violence; serious racial clashes between Whites and non-Whites, and states of emergency. These are continuing today, as testified in the newspapers, particularly in The New York Times of yesterday.
5. While these conditions were prevalent in forty- five other countries, the Republic of South Africa was free from disturbances and unrest, except for a few sporadic anti-Government demonstrations which received very little support from the mass df the Bantu population. Furthermore, in the Republic of South Africa, political calm has been accompanied by conditions of financial stability and by exceptional economic progress, to which a number of visiting businessmen and economists from the United States of America and from Britain have borne testimony also during the past few months. So much for conditions of violence, revolt and unrest in forty-five countries, except South Africa.
6. What about the general international situation? Has there been any improvement since the last session of the Assembly? On the contrary, the position has deteriorated and international tensions have increased, The Cuban situation has become more threatening. The Geneva discussions on disarmament and nuclear tests have proved abortive. The Berlin situation has worsened, and the position in South-East Asia gives cause for concern. I do not think it necessary to deal further with the deterioration in the international situation. It is common knowledge.
7. I come now to the United States. Has its position been strengthened? Has its prestige been increased since the last Genera Assembly? I think that even the most fervent supporter of the Organization cannot give an affirmative reply to that question. True, during the past year the membership of the Organization has still further increased; but will anybody be so bold as to say that the increased membership has brought fresh life and saner counsels to the Organization?
8. The prestige of this Organization, already at a low level, has been dealt a further blow by the recent actions of the Chairman of a United Nations Committee, and of the majority of the Committee itself. Before, dealing with other matters I shall now, first of all, proceed to deal with this extraordinary affair. It is necessary in the interests of the Organization itself that full information, a factual account, be given of what actually happened.
9. It will be recalled that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly a resolution [1702 (XVI)] Was adopted establishing a Special Committee Of seven members who were instructed, in consultation with the Government of South. Africa, to visit South West Africa, and there to inquire into a number of matters which were specified in the resolution. A letter was subsequently sent by the Secretariat to the South African Government requesting its co-operation in carrying out the terms of that resolution.
10. In reply, the South African Government invited the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee for South West Africa to come to South Africa for discussions It was made clear that this invitation was without prejudice to the stand which South Africa had consistently taken on the juridical aspect of the South West Africa issue. This invitation was accepted by the Committee, and in due course the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman came to Pretoria.
11. I now come to the discussion which took place, Alter the initial discussions between the South African Prime Minister and myself on the one hand, and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee on the other hand, the Prime Minister formally invited the United Nations representatives to visit South West Africa, They were given the assurance that they could go wherever they pleased, to see and to meet whomever they wished.
12. This was. announced in a press release, G.A.2471, of. 7 May 1962 issued by the United Nations Office of Public Information. This press release read as follows: "The Chapman and Vice-Chairman stated that, in the light of the terms of the invitation, and of its acceptance by the Special Committee on South West Africa, they accepted the present invitation. They expressed their appreciation to the Prime Minister and to the South African Government for the opportunity to become directly acquainted with the Territory and its peoples.
13. The itinerary was then discussed and arranged the two representatives of the United Nations Committee were assured by the Prime Minister — as to that I can personally testify — that they were free to alter the itinerary in any way they wished, and to extend their visit if they so desired. Two aircraft were placed at their disposal for this purpose. In due course they visited South West, Africa.
14. On their return to Pretoria, the talks were resumed. In the course of these talks the Prime Minister asked the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of this Committee whether in the course of their visit and in their private talks with the Bantus — the natives — they had found any evidence in support of the charges against the South African Government, charges which had figured, so prominently in the discussions of the Fourth Committee at the 1960 and 1961 sessions of the Assembly, namely — these were the charges — that there was a threat to international peace; that the inhabitants, particularly the non-white inhabitants, were being exterminated — genocide — and that militarization of the Territory was taking place.
15. The Vice-Chairman of the Committee, in reply to the Prime Minister's question, said quite frankly that he had found no evidence of these allegations, and the Chairman stated that he did not notice any degree of evidence as to the truth of these charges.
16. Here I should point out that at the commencement of the talks, that is before they went to South West Africa when matters of procedure were discussed, it was decided by both parties that agreed communiques would be issued if and when, necessary. The Chairman agreed with this suggestion and in fact he welcomed it.
17. This procedure, which was then decided upon, followed the precedents established when the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa visited South Africa in 1958, and also when the late Secretary- General, Mr. Hammarskjold, came to.; South Africa for talks with the Prime Minister. On both those occasions it was felt that this procedure would facilitate free and frank, discussion, and would obviate press speculation which would oblige participants in the discussions either to confirm or to deny such reports. I may add, because this procedure has been criticized, that the procedure of regularly issuing communique is also followed at Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences, four of which I have personally attended. I would add that such press communiques are never signed.
18. In accordance with the procedural arrangement, a Joint statement was issued at the conclusion of the talks. This statement reflected what the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Committee had already stated in the preceding discussions, namely, that during their visit to South West Africa they had 'seen or heard nothing to justify the allegations, first, that the situation there was a threat to world peace; second, that genocide was being practiced by the South West African Administration; and third, that militarization was taking place.
19. This joint statement was thereafter issued to the Press, But it was also released by the United Nations Office of Information on 26 May 1962 in press release G.A.2501.
20. About ten days later, the Chairman of the Special Committee for South West Africa denied participation in, and responsibility for, the conclusions as set out in the joint statement. He further denied that he was jointly responsible for the issuance of this document. The Vice-Chairman, on the other hand, firmly contended that the Chairman had been consulted, and that he had, after suggesting certain changes in the wording, approved of the communique being issued. The Vice-Chairman also told the Special Committee for South West Africa that the two members of the Secretariat who had accompanied them; namely, Mr. Berendsen and Miss Jacqueline Yarrow, had been present at the discussions with the Chairman.
21. The Special Committee for South West Africa was now clearly in a difficulty. After all, the records of the Fourth Committee show that at the fifteenth session in 1960 and again at the sixteenth session in 1961 of the General Assembly, no less than thirty-one Member States had declared that the situation in Southwest Africa was a threat to world peace; sixteen States had made allegations regarding genocide — the words used were that the population was being exterminated — and nine States had complained about the militarization of the Territory. Indeed, these charges, figured prominently in the discussion that led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1702 (XVI), appointing this Committee.
22. And now the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of this specially appointed United Nations Committee, after having visited the Territory, after having been given the facilities to see whatever they wished to see, and after having listened in private — everything took place in private — to a number of deputations, reported on their return to the Republic that they had found no evidence to support these serious charges.
23. Thus, deprived of what I may call the eagerly sought pretext for taking steps against South Africa, and finding themselves in this very awkward, and indeed painful dilemma — in view of the admission by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee — the majority of the Special Committee on South West Africa decided that the only way out of the difficulty would be to ignore the presence of the joint communique, in fact to pretend that it had never happened.
24. For purposes of the record, I now give the actual wording of the relevant paragraphs of the communique, which the Chairman of the Committee afterwards denied having seen — and still less approved.
25. First, I quote the introductory paragraph, which was agreed to by both and which reads as follows: "Discussions between Ambassadors Carpio and Martinez de Alva and the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were resumed in the same friendly and frank atmosphere that characterized the former meetings. Ambassador Carpio expressed the appreciation of the visitors for all the arrangements made and for the free and uninhibited opportunities given to the Vice-Chairman and himself to meet with all sections of the population of South West Africa desiring to contact them and hoped that further visits could in' the future be arranged."
26. That introductory paragraph is of particular importance because of the Chairman’s expressed "appreciation ... for all the arrangements made for the free and uninhibited opportunities given... to meet with all sections of the population of South West Africa desiring to contact them".
27. Then comes the important third paragraph of the joint communique, which reads as follows: "At the request of the Prime ’Minister, both the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman gave their impressions gained during their ten-day visit to the Territory. They stated that in the places visited they had found no evidence and heard no allegations that there was a threat to international peace and security within South West Africa; that there were no signs of militarization in the Territory; or that the indigenous population was being exterminated." The admission that the two United Nations representatives found no threat to international peace is of particular importance.
28. I shall deal first with the authenticity of the communique issued after the termination of the Pretoria discussions, and With the Chairman role in its preparation, approval and issue.
29. I have already stated that at the outset of the talks it was agreed by both sides that communiques regarding the discussions would be issued as and when necessary. The first such communique was issued at the conclusion of the first round of talks. In that communique the Chairman denied - having ma de certain statements to the Press before his departure from New York. That was. his first denial. I shall return to this later.
30. As for' the final communique, from which the Chairman of the Committee later dissociated himself, I wish to state most emphatically that both its issue and its proposed contents were discussed at a meeting on the morning of Friday, 25 May, when the Chairman Was present. It will be recalled that the Chairman made a great point later of the fact that he had been ill when that meeting took place. I would therefore repeat most emphatically that both the issue and the proposed contents of the final communique were discussed at a meeting on the morning of Friday 25 May, when the Chairman was present. It Was then agreed that a draft should be prepared by the Officials — that is, the official of the delegations of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman and the officials of the • Government delegation — on the basis of the discussions to date.
31. When the meeting later reconvened to consider the draft agreed upon by the officials, the Chairman of the Committee was not present. We were informed that he was not feeling well and was at his hotel. But the Vice-Chairman agreed that discussion on the draft should be continued, on the strict understanding that the final text would have to receive the Chairman's approval before it could be issued. He undertook to discuss the draft communique with the Chairman before any final decision was taken. I may add that I was present at all the discussions and can personally testify to what happened. So can Mr. Brand Fourie, known, to most permanent representatives here as South Africa's previous Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Both of us can testify to the truth of what I have stated here.
32. The following day, the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee for Southwest Africa and the two United Nations officials reported that the amended text of the communique had been fully discussed with the Chairman, who had given his approval, subject to certain changes, particularly in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the communique — changes which he regarded as essential. The paragraphs in question were accordingly redrafted to reflect the changes requested by the Chairman, Several minor editorial improvements in other paragraphs were also discussed with the Vice-Chairman and with the members of the United Nations Secretariat, and they were adopted. The South African Prime Minister then inquired whether the text could be regarded as agreed by all. The Vice-Chairman replied in the affirmative, and the communique Was accordingly issued.
33. The Committee had been told that the Chairman could not participate because he was very ill; suffering with pain. According to the doctor who attended him at the hotel, the Chairman's indisposition was not such that he could not have participated in the consultations in his hotel room with the Vice-Chairman and the two officials regarding the final terms of the communique. Indeed, the officials informed the Press in reply to inquiries that the Chairman was being consulted as if he had been present at the official talks.
34. I come now to a very important fact. It is significant that it was only ten days after the communique had been issued that the Chairman of the Special Committee for the first time denied having been associated with the communique — and then only when he was questioned by reporters on his departure from South Africa. Meanwhile, of course, he had seen the local newspapers, which were full of the news and were fully reporting the terms of the communique; and he also knew that it had been issued as a press release by the United Nations Office of Public Information at New York. He also knew that the Vice-Chairman had reported on the communique at an informal meeting of the Special Committee for South West Africa in Now York.
35. While he was in the hospital the Chairman was Visited regularly by members of my Department — these were courtesy visits — including an Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, who had participated in all the talks. To no one did the Chairman make the slightest suggestion that he dissociated himself from the terms of the communique. He was also regularly visited by Miss Jacqueline Yarrow, a member of the United Nations Secretariat. I mention that because of his statement that he was all alone and could not see anybody.
36. Mr. Brand Fourie, former Permanent Representative of the Republic to the United Nations, called on the Chairman of the Special Committee in his hotel bedroom on Saturday afternoon, that is, the same day that, according to his statement, the Vice-Chairman had "worked on him" to persuade him to agree to the communique. Mr. Fourie actually mentioned the communique in the course of' his discussion with the Chairman, but the Chairman gave no indication whatsoever that he dissented from the communique.
37. In spite of his repeated denials of having had anything to do with the communique, it is interesting to note that the Chairman, in his joint report with the Vice-Chairman to the Special Committee for South West Africa, when dealing with the question of assistance to South West Africa by specialized agencies, then use the identical language incorporated in the relevant paragraphs of the communique which he had repudiated. The passages in question, to which I have just referred, were in fact lifted bodily from the communiqué, which be now alleges he had never seen, much less approved.
38. come now to the contents of the communique, The Chairman of the Committee later dissociated himself in particular from the statements in paragraph 3 regarding an alleged threat to international peace, militarization of the Territory, and the alleged extermination of the population.
39. As regards the alleged threat to international peace and the militarization of the Territory, the .informal record of the discussions at Pretoria, after the United Nations" representatives had returned from South West Africa, that is, before the communique was even discussed, shows that the Vice-Chairman found no, evidence of the allegations in question, while the Chairman of the Special Committee stated, and I quote his words, that he did not notice any serious degree of evidence as to the truth of that important charge.
40. The Prime Minister then reminded the Chairman that he and the Vice-Chairman had been told that they could go wherever they wished and that they were at liberty to change the itinerary, if they so wished, and it was also pointed out to them that they had in fact inspected all the centres in regard to which allegations of militarization had been made, including the Caprivi Zipfel, which had been added to the itinerary at the express request of the Chairman.
41. In reply to. the Chairman's veiled suggestion that there were probably military bases which they had not visited, the South African Prime Minister immediately offered, if time did not permit the Chairman of the Committee himself to return to South West Africa, to ask the military attaches of any two embassies selected.by the Chairman to carry out immediately a detailed investigation of the Territory and to report direct to him, that is, to the Chairman. This offer was not accepted, and the Chairman later said he was satisfied that, in the light of the information given, no further investigation appeared to be necessary.
42. As to the alleged extermination of the population - genocide — the informal record of the discussions at Pretoria shows that the Chairman of the Committee, while commenting on factors such as medical facilities, agreed without reservation that the visitors had seen no trace of genocide.
43. I give this information to the General Assembly in order to show that, quite apart from the joint communiqué from which the Chairman subsequently dissociated himself, the Chairman had previously in the course of the discussions admitted that there were no grounds for these three serious allegations which had been made in the Fourth Committee. As I have said, Mr. Fourie and I were both present at these discussions.
44. The Special Committee on South West Africa was then faced with the position that these three charges, particularly the one relating to international peace, which had figured so prominently in the discussions of the Fourth Committee, were not supported by their Chairman and Vice-Chairman after a visit to South West Africa. Finding itself in this dilemma, the Committed, by a majority vote — I want to emphasize that — decided not to include the communique in Its report, in other words, to pretend that it had never happened. For good measure, the Committee also decided not to include in its report the formal protest which, in my capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, I had instructed our Permanent Representative here to hand to the Acting Secretary-General, which he duly did by means of an aide-memoire.
45. I have finished with that communique for a moment, and I now come to another and important chapter in the history, of the visit of these two United Nations representatives to South Africa.
46. In view of the fact that South Africa's policy of separate development, also known as apartheid, had figured prominently in the debates of the Fourth Committee and also in the General Assembly, the South African Prime Minister, in the course of the Pretoria talks, gave full information regarding this policy and its application in practice.
47. After their visit to South West Africa, the two United Nations representatives on the invitation of the Prime Minister, then visited the Transkel, which is one of the large Bantu areas where this policy is being put into practice. After their return from the Transkei, they visited a gold mine at Johannesburg, and afterwards the Chairman of the Special Committee for South West Africa was interviewed by the representatives of three different newspapers. The reports published in the three different newspapers agreed that he had made statements favourable to the Governments about apartheid policy.
48. According to the Rand Daily Mail, he said: "I would like to see apartheid succeed. It is a policy that has never been tried. I must say it is contrary to what I thought." Die Transvaler reported that he had said: "I would like to see apartheid succeed in this country, because you have both the experience and the time at your disposal. "Die Vaderland reported him as saying;: "This is a policy that has never yet been tried out. I would like to see apartheid succeed, it may provide a solution. I must say that apartheid is different from what I thought it was."
49. It will be realized that these statements created a sensation not only in South Africa, but also in Manila, and perhaps even in Cairo. It Was reported that the Philippine Government had cabled to ask their newly-appointed Ambassador to the United Arab Republic for an explanation. As a result of pressure from his own Government, he promptly denied the correctness of the three newspaper reports. Later, at New York, he tried to get out of his difficulty by pretending that he had confused the words "Transkei" and "apartheid". He even went so far as to give to the representative of a United States news agency a verbatim report of what he had said at the Johannesburg Carletonville lunch.
50. I have to tell this General Assembly that he did not have a written speech, but had spoken extempore, "off the cuff", as they say in the United States. The fact is that, in the course of his remarks at this lunch, which were very appreciative of what the Government had done, he never mentioned the word "apartheid".
51. Finally, there-is this evidence. During the course of his visit to Transkei, and at what is known as "the Great Place of Paramount Chief" — Botha Sigau — the Chairman of the Special Committee addressed a gathering of about sixty persons. Notes were made by the two officials who were present, and I have compared them. Both agree that the Chairman spoke along the following lines. He was now addressing a group of the chiefs of the Bantu and a number of their counsellors, officials and others. He said: "Your own approach to independence is based on the policy of apartheid — a word which has made South Africa famous in the. United Nations and all over the world. This policy has often been misrepresented in the United Nations. I am glad that Ambassador Martínez de Alva and I have been granted the opportunity, through the gracious Invitation of your Prime Minister, to witness the application of this policy in the Transkei. Ambassador de Alva and I are going back to the United Nations and we are going to ask the world to have more patience, and to give more time to this great experiment."
52. The information that I have given to the General Assembly today shows, and I regret to have to say so, that the Chairman of the Special Committee on South West Africa is a person who, in order to save himself, is prepared to deny any statement that he actually made. The history of his visit to South Africa is that of a succession of denials, and even denials of denials. In fact, some people have wondered whether he would not even deny that he had ever been to South Africa. Indeed, his. succession of denials started at the beginning of his visit, when, after being questioned by the Prime Minister, he issued a communique, after th6 Prime Minister had drawn his attention to a statement which he was reported to have made to The New York Times, in which he repudiated that statement, viz., that if he and his Vice-Chairman were actually permitted to visit South West Africa, it would be a history-making admission by South Africa of United Nations authority over the Territory. My Prime Minister took this up very strongly, and the Chairman said that he was misreported and agreed to issue a communique, which he duly did, denying this statement.
53. The Chairman of the United Nations Committee even went so far as to complain? after his departure from South Africa, that he had been poisoned by coffee which was served during a break in the Pretoria discussions. Although this allegation is both childish and ridiculous, full medical evidence as to the nature of his indisposition has been circulated privately to the members of the Special Committee for South West Africa.
54. The Chairman of the Special Committee also alleged that he was held under guard while in the hospital. There is not one grain of truth in that charge. The "fact is that he and his Vice-Chairman, also while they were at their hotel, were attended by a security officer, a courtesy generally afforded by all Governments in all countries to important official visitors, generally known as "VIP's".
55. The Chairman of the Special Committee for South West Africa also complained that his visit to the Territory was in the nature of a planned tour, of a personally conducted tour, where he was shown only what the Government wanted him to see. This allegation is completely false. I have already said, and I confirm it again — I was present and Mr. Fourie was present — that he and his Vice-Chairman were given every opportunity to go where they wanted and to see and to talk to whomever they wished it was also arranged that they could see deputations-privately, which is what happened.
56. Since his return from South Africa, the Chairman has complained that sufficient time-was not allowed for the Vice-Chairman and himself to study conditions in South West Africa. In view of this complaint, I have to inform the Assembly that he himself before leaving New York had indicated that the visit would have to be a brief one in view of his appointment as Ambassador to the United Arab Republic. Furthermore, while in South West Africa, the Chairman of the Committee decided at the last moment no to participate in several visits which had been arranged and which were on the itinerary, including one to the alleged military base in the Caprivi Zipfel. That visit had been arranged at his express requests He also eliminated from the itinerary a Visit to Waterberg East Reserve, where a few hundred Hereros had assembled to meet him. And yet, after his return to New York, he had the effrontery, to complain that he had not been permitted to visit this particular Bantu area.
57. I could give further information about the doings of the Chairman of this United Nations Committee, but I think I have said sufficient to show that from the United Nations point of view, the most important lesson to be learned from this unpleasant history is that irresponsible persons should not in future be included as members of important United Nations committees. But I would like to add that persons should not be appointed to a United Nations committee who, like the majority of this Special Committee, close their eyes to facts and, to use an American phrase, "kid themselves", that the joint communiqué never happened.
58. The majority of the members of this Committee have not only ignored the confessions of its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, namely that there is no foundation for three of the most serious charges levelled against South Africa by the Fourth Committee, but they have refused to recognize the fact that the South African Government has in past years, gone out of its way to create a better atmosphere and to improve relations with the United Nations without prejudicing its stand on the juridical aspect of the South West Africa issue.
59. There was an offer made more than ten years ago to come to an arrangement regarding South-West Africa with the three remaining associated and allied Powers, as a way to revive the old-League of Nations arrangement. That otter was turned down.
60. There was the readiness to meet and to discuss the position with the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, and the further fact that the South African Government, namely the offer made two or three years - sideration to the partition suggestion, a suggestion that came from the Good offices Committee and not from the South African Government.
61. There was the invitation to the late Secretary- General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld to visit South Africa in order to discuss the differences that had arisen between South Africa and the United Nations. That visit took place, and I can now inform the Assembly — it is a year since Mr. Hammarskjöld unfortunately passed away — that the discussions were very satisfactory and that Mr. Hammarskjöld had been invited to pay a second visit and that he had favourably considered the invitation.
62. There were three other moves by the South African Government, namely the offer made two or three years ago that an outstanding international figure, to be selected in consultation with the President of the Assembly, be invited to visit South West Africa. This offer was not even replied to; it was ignored. It was followed last year by the invitation, which I personally made, to three formed Presidents of the General Assembly, to visit South West Africa. I can now mention, for the information of the Assembly, that the three former Presidents invited by me personally were Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, Mr. Belaunde of Peru, and Mr. Boland of Ireland. Nothing came of this offer.
63. Then came this last effort to try and secure a better relationship and understanding with the United Nations, namely the invitation to the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee on South West Africa, to visit the country, to go where they liked, to see whom they wished and to have private talks with the people there. We have seen what the result of this gesture was. The two gentlemen frankly admitted that they found no evidence of three of the more serious charges levelled against South Africa. One? of them, the Chairman, later turned round and mendaciously denied his own admissions.
64. The majority of the Committee then proceeded to pretend that the joint communiqué did not exist. What a farcical situation. They preferred to accept the accusations of subversive organizations in the territory and of so-called witnesses, most of them expatriates, representing those subversive organizations
65. I have shown that the South African Government has gone out of its way to create a better atmosphere and to improve its relations with the United Nations. Our well-meant efforts have been in vain.
66. The joint communique issued after the Pretoria talks referred to a statement made by the South African Prime Minister in the course of the discussions with these two gentlemen, namely that he had told them then that a detailed five-year plan for the further economic and social development of the non-European population of South West Africa was being worked out.
67. The initial preparations have since been completed, the Prime Minister recently announced the appointment of a commission of five experts, all highly qualified in their respective fields, to inquire into and to report on steps to be taken for further promoting the. material and moral welfare and social progress of the non-white inhabitants of the Territory. The persona appointed to serve on this commission are not only experts in their particular fields but also men of eminence and high standing in South Africa.
68. So much for the South West African situation and, more particularly, the visit of these two representatives of the United Nations. I wish now to deal, as I indicated earlier, with existing conditions within the United Nations and with what I can only term its loss of prestige during recent years. First I want to refer briefly — and I think it is necessary that I give the information — to South Africa's attitude towards the Organization at the time of its establishment and its attitude today.
69. When in 1946 General Smuts, then Prime Minister, one of the founders of the United Nations, asked our Parliament to ratify South Africa's membership of the United Nations, the need for a world organization was clearly felt. I was a member of the Opposition at the time and I participated in the debate. Dr. D.F. Malan, then Leader of the Opposition, who two years later became Prime Minister, put his party's attitude as follows: "In principle we are in favour of a world organization, this being necessary, we believe, for the maintenance of world peace so far as it is possible." He and other speakers then drew attention to certain unsatisfactory features of the United Nations Charter. On the other hand, it was noted that in Article 2, paragraph 7, a guarantee was given that the United Nations would not be permitted to interfere in the domestic affairs of Member States. Without that guarantee it is very doubtful whether South Africa and many other countries would have become Members of the Organization.
70. There was speedy disillusionment regarding this safeguard which had been regarded as a cornerstone of the Charter. At the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, the Indian delegation, supported by a majority of the Member States, disregarded the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7. General Smuts — who was a founder of the United Nations — the man who wrote the Preamble to the Charter — General Smuts, who led our delegation, returned to South Africa a disappointed and disillusioned man. He publicly stated that he had "found himself up against a stone wall of prejudice" at San Francisco. That was at the first session in 1946. He said that the United Nations was "swayed by emotion".
71. During the years that have followed, the United Nations has, in increasing measure, interfered in South Africa's domestic affairs, and recently also in the domestic affairs of one of our neighbours, namely, Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations will no doubt continue to do so during the present session of the Assembly.
72. The attacks on South Africa, from the time that General Smuts led Our delegation at the first session in 1946, have yearly increased in intensity and also in vindictiveness. Our country has been singled out for calumny and vilification, in many cases by delegations, whose own Governments are guilty of discriminatory practices and the oppression of large sections of their own populations. In spite of this campaign of vindictiveness and calumny. South Africa has faithfully carried out its obligations to the United Nations. When the United Nations Assembly called upon its Members to join in resisting communist aggression in Korea, South Africa was one of only sixteen Member States that responded to the call, and sent an air squadron to Korea. Some of the countries whose delegations were, and still are, in the forefront of the attacks on South Africa, accuse us of not carrying out the principles of the Charter, but, they were prepared to send only medical supplies and, in one particular case, only an ambulance. Many of them preferred to disregard the call of the Security Council. This is a very important matter in these days.
73. South Africa has, ever since becoming a Member of the United Nations, regularly paid its annual assessments for the general budget — we do not owe penny, up to the last assessment — and we have regularly paid our assessments for the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez area; meanwhile many of those countries that accuse South Africa of not carrying out its obligations under the Charter are considerably in arrears with their contributions and payments.
74. South Africa also contributes to four United Nations funds financed by voluntary contributions. When is few years ago the Assembly called upon Member States to take a number of Hungarian refugees, South Africa was prepared to do so, and carried out its undertaking. Some of the States now attacking South Africa gave similar undertakings which they have wholly or partially failed to honour.
75. in view of the support which South Africa has consistently given to the United Nations, in spite of often malicious attacks, f am entitled, I think, to deal with the shortcomings and deficiencies of the Organization. Before proceeding to do so, however, I wish to reiterate and to make perfectly clear that the South African delegation realizes the need of an international organization for achieving the ends set out in the Charter, particularly in Article 1, but is satisfied that the United,) Nations as it operates today, with the spirit prevailing in the Organization, cannot hope to accomplish those purposes unless it undergoes a radical change.
76. It is not only in South Africa that this view is held. I notice that some government leaders, when in their own countries, have expressed similar views. I trust they will repeat those views in this Assembly. But also persons of national and international reputation, not all of whom are connected with the Government of their countries, have openly criticized the United Nations. Only about five or six weeks ago, ex-President Herbert Hoover of the United States, speaking at West Branch, Iowa, said: “The time has come in our national life when we must take, a new appraisal of this Organization ... now, we must realize that the United Nations has failed to give us even a remote hope of lasting peace. Instead, it has added to the dangers of wars which now surround us.
77. Realizing that a destructive criticism was not of much avail, ex-President Hoover then proceeded to say: "The time is here. If the free nations are to survive, they must have a new and stronger world-wide organization ... For purposes of this discussion, I may call it the Council of Free Nations."
78. Ex-President Hoover then proceeded to set Out his ideas, and he concluded by stating: "...some, such organized Council of Free Nations is the remaining hope of peace in this world."
79. I suggest that the leaders of the free world would do well to ponder the ideas and the views of this wise and experienced former President of the United States, who in the past has been a national leader and an able administrator.
80. The present unsatisfactory state in which the United Nations finds itself has been developing for some years. In 1855 — this is, seven years ago — at the commemorative session of the United Nations held at San Francisco, I stated my delegation’s misgivings about the Organization. I said: "Has the United Nations lived up to the ideal of universality? Is it not a fact that separate geographical, racial and ideological blocs or groups soon materialized, and that in regard to many issues the tendency has been for these groups or blocs to stands together and to vote together? I concluded by saying: "Impassioned speeches from the rostrum, renewed assurances of our belief in the aims and ideals of the United Nations — these are hot enough ... We must ask ourselves, now and during the coming months when the General Assembly meets in annual session, how and why we have strayed from the path so clearly defined at San Francisco. We must get back to San Francisco, and to the spirit of San Francisco.
81. In 1955 it might still have been possible to get back to the spirit of San Francisco. Today, the United Nations seems to have reached the point of no return. During past years it has become a different Organization. The ideals of its founders have been, ruthlessly pushed aside. The actions of too many of the Member States are actuated by self-interest. Important provisions of the United Nations Charter are callously disregarded, or otherwise used to serve the ends of groups of States. Decisions of the Assembly are generally taken, not on the merits of a particular case, but as the result either of caucus decisions or of what is known as "horse-trading". Principle is ignored, instead, there has developed the application of what last year described as "the double standard" — one standard for the strong, and another for the weak; or " more often, one standard" for a particular group of States, and a different standard for another group.
82. Perhaps the most unhealthy feature of what I might call the new United Nations is the manner in which certain Member States, while professing their dedication to the principles and ideals of the Charter, shamelessly proceed to act contrary to those principles.
83. In this connexion, I return to the point which I made at the beginning of my statement, namely, that we should look at world happenings only during this past year, since the sixteenth session.
84. From the point of view of observance or non-observance of the principles of the Charter, the outstanding event during the past year has undoubtedly been India's brutal aggression against Goa. This event must be seen in the light also of India's aggressive plans in Connexion with Kashmir.
85. I have here a number, of quotations from speeches made in past years from this rostrum by Mr. Krishna Menon and others, in which they repeatedly affirmed India's devotion to the principles of the Charter and its renunciation of actions which are likely to aggravate. international tensions. Permits me to mention Only a few of them.
86. At the twelfth session of the United Nations in 1957, the Indian delegation was one of the sponsors of a resolution [1286. (XU)] which, inter alia, called for: “... mutual respect... non-aggression, respect for each other's sovereignty ... and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs". The following year, India was again one of the sponsors of the resolution [1301 (XIII)] which, inter alia, called upon and urged all Member States: "... to live together within the letter and the spirit of the Charter...""... to resort to the Organization for the peaceful solution of problems". "... to take effective steps towards the implementation of the principles of peaceful and neighbourly relations".
87. In the debate which followed, Mr. Lall, the Indian representative, urged the acceptance of the principles of: "... non-aggression and respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 1960, Mr. Nehru urged that; "... military and other violent, methods should be avoided for the solution of problems".
88. In 1960, the Indian delegation actually introduced a resolution [1495 (XV)], entitled "co-operation of Member States", in which it was urged "that all countries, in° accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions likely to aggravate international tensions". It is obvious that we should not aggravate them either by psychological warfare or by intrusion and threats to safety.
89. In November of 1961, Mr. Krishna Menon said that: b "war is no longer hi be the instrument for settling international problems". But when the Government of India decided on aggression against Goa, all her lofty protestations of devotion to the-principles of the Charter went by the board.
90. The matter was brought to the attention of the Security Council. Did the Security Council take action — or even condemn India's aggression? It did not. The double standard was applied: one standard for the strong, and another for the weak. Is-this Assembly likely to take action? I am fairly sure that nothing will be done. Again, the application of the double standard.
91. In view of the course which the United Nations has been following during recent years, and also during the past year, is it a wonder that statesmen and other prominent persons in Western countries are losing faith in the United Nations, and are saying so quite frankly?
92. There was the recent statement of Lord Home, the British Foreign Minister. Referring to the Goa case, he said: "The United Nations has not only failed to condemn an act of aggression but went some way to condone it". Lord Home referred to what he called "nationalism on the rampage", and said: "This is being imported into the United Nations, and if it is not halted, the United Nations will first be weakened and finally broken".
93. This was said by the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain.
94. On another occasion during this year, the British Foreign Secretary referred to what he called "the crisis of confidence in the United Nations". Linking it with India's notion in Goa, he said: "For the first time since its foundation, a number of countries voted without shame in favour of the use of force to achieve national ends. Four countries which are members of the Security Council supported resolution condoning the use of force by India against Goa. And then Lord Home made this significant statement: "When, therefore, we have reached a stage where a large part of the Organization which is dedicated to peace openly, condones aggression, it is an understatement to say that there is cause for anxiety."
95. In this country also, in the United States, fears are being publicly expressed regarding present tendencies in the United Nations. Former Vice-President Nixon, commenting on the Acting Secretary-General's appeal to participate in the United Nations bond issue to stave off bankruptcy, is reported to have said: "The key question is whether the United Nations is worth saving at all."
96. Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs, described the United Nations as "a cold war battleground”. In the October 1961 issue of Foreign Affairs. Senator Fulbright suggested the establishment of "a concert, of free nations" — the same idea as that of former President Hoover.
97. Another prominent Senator, Senator Henry Jackson, in an address to the National Press Club in Washington, quite recently suggested that the United States attached too much importance to the United Nations. He expressed the opinion that the best hope for peace "does not lie with the United Nations, but on the power and unity of the Atlantic: Community".
98. But very interesting first-hand testimony on present conditions and tendencies in the United Nations is contained in a report recently issued by the United States Government Printing Office at Washington. It gives, the views of two members of Congress, who last year were Selected to serve on the United States delegation to the General Assembly, i.e., on their own delegation. After reviewing the proceedings1" of the Assembly, the two members of Congress stated their "conclusions". That section of their report opens with the following paragraph: "The statesmen who drafted the United Nations Charter had a noble dream. Those who would noW rely on the United Nations as a cornerstone of our foreign policy are not awake to reality. It can no longer be • considered a union of peace-loving nations."
99. The two members of Congress, whose report I have just quoted, were, I must remind the Assembly, members of the United States delegation last year. According to the report, they then put what they called two "pertinent questions". These questions in the report are the followings "(1) Can the United Nations, without change in its present composition and present character, ever reach its original goal? (2) Do the policies and activities of the United Nations at this time further the best interests of the United States?" These two members of Congress, members of the United States delegation, then proceeded to give the reply; "Reluctantly and regretfully our answer" to these questions "is ’No'."
100. We in South Africa have noted with satisfaction that these two members of the United States delegation strongly criticized the motion adopted by the General Assembly last year, which censured the statement which I made from this rostrum. They expressed themselves very strongly on that motion. These two members of the United States delegation, members of the United States Congress, summed up the position as follows: "All these facts lead us to reemphasize that those who would still have us rely on the United Nations as a major instrument of our foreign policy or, as an agency dedicated to keeping the peace, are not awake to the facts of life as they are today and probably will be for some time to come."
101. The opinions I have just quoted are not those of two obscure members of the United States Congress. They were specially selected to serve on the United States delegation. Their opinions and conclusions are based on the experience of discussions in the Assembly and in its Committees, and on their observation of the inner Workings of the Organization and of the various delegations.
102. Before concluding my statement I wish to refer very briefly to South Africa's policy of separate development, also known, as apartheid. This, I repeat, is essentially a domestic matter governed by Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. However, to remove misconceptions, I gave full information at two previous sessions of the Assembly regarding the application in practice of this policy, but with little or no effect. To use the words of General Smuts, when he returned from the first session of the United Nations Assembly in 1946: "I found myself up against a stone wall of prejudice." The attacks continued unabated.
103. May I pay in passing that some of the sharpest attacks come from the Press, and from political leaders of countries where racial discrimination, is openly practiced and where serious clashes between whites and non-whites frequently take place, in some cases quite recently. Representatives know to which countries I am referring,
104. In view of misrepresentations regarding the so- called "Bantustan" policy, that is, the policy of eventual full self-government for our different Bantu nations, I explained last year that self-governing powers would be progressively introduced. Subsequently, in the Special political Committee, I was told that the Bantustan policy was merely a bluff.
105. In passing, I wish to mention another instance where a United Nations body misrepresented the aims of the South African Government, thus creating suspicion instead of harmony, which they are supposed to achieve, or to strive for under the principles of the Chapter. In the draft resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the three British High Commission Territories or Protectorates bordering on South Africa, which was sent to the General Assembly by the Special Committee of seventeen members, we find the following passage: "Expressing its profound concern at the declared intention of the Government the Republic of South Africa to annex these Territories, and condemning any attempt to jeopardize the right of the people of these Territories to establish their own independent States" {A/5238, para. 214]. A charge is made by a Committee that we intend to annex those Territories.
106. Our colleagues in the British delegation will recall that the South Africa Act of 1909, passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, envisaged the transfer of these Territories, under certain conditions, to the then Union of South Africa. However, the negotiations for such a transfer, carried out over many years, came to nothing. Speaking in our Parliament on 9 February 1961, our Prime Minister stated that "the Protectorates would never be incorporated.
107. On subsequent occasions, Dr. Verwoerd, our Prime Minister, again in clear terms, outlined his Government’s policy in this matter. Less than three weeks ago, addressing the Transvaal. Congress of the Rationalist Party, he emphasized that "Incorporation of the Protectorates was not possible and not wise. The Republic, for its part, was prepared to accept the Protectorates as good neighbours. This co-operation could be achieved if the Protectorates sought friendship."
108. Despite these statements by the South African Prime Minister, we get this charge by a United Nations Committee against South Africa, totally unsubstantiated, totally false.
109. To return to the so-called Bantustan policy — this policy has since been implemented in the Transkei, the largest of the Bantu territories. South Africa's critics and enemies in this Assembly Will, I know, “be disappointed to hear that it has been well received by the Bantu of that territory and that it is operating smoothly and successfully, in spite of attempts by agents of subversive Bantu organizations cut side the territory, and by certain newspapers, to discredit and to sabotage the scheme. This policy will be progressively introduced also in the other Bantu territories.
110. South Africa's policy of separate development for Whites and non-Whites will once more be attacked at this year's session of the Assembly, and no doubt threats will be made, and even incorporated in resolutions of the Assembly.
111. Let me assure the Assembly that South Africa will not be deterred by criticism and vilification, or by threats and intimidation, from moving forward on the road — let us say, to our "New Frontier" — which it firmly believes is in the interests of all sections of our peoples.