Poland

The international situation has now entered a special phase. The great international problems have matured and demand a solution more urgently with each day that passes. Some of them have been waiting for a solution too long already. I shall here mention only the problem of disarmament, the German problem and the problem of the liquidation of the last vestiges of colonialism. 42. We must be able to take decisions so that events should not spontaneously turn against us all. It is true that the world is divided — in some respects, indeed, more deeply than ever before. But at the same time it is more than ever before united by the common interest in surviving, in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. 43. The cause of peace is today indissolubly bound up with recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of peoples and with the abolition of dependence and of colonial exploitation in all its forms. 44. If we all accept this as our starting point we can solve all international problems. An ever increasing majority of the human race is in favour of accepting this principle. This is the starting point for the international policy of the socialist States and many non-aligned States take a similar position. 45. It is otherwise in various Western countries and more particularly in the most powerful of them. For many long years the policy based on positions of strength has been the official doctrine of the United States in this matter. This policy has underlain the activities of NATO and other associated military groups. The object has been by operating from a position of strength or by actually using force, to contain and push back socialism and to stifle the aspirations of the peoples for liberation from colonial dependence. 46. Today the policy based on positions of strength has no material basis. Unrealistic though it is, it is still extremely dangerous. It is dangerous to peace and hence dangerous for all, including the ruling classes in the West. 47. It would appear that an ever increasing number of serious statesmen in the West understand the situation. But a different policy, a new policy which would take into account the realities and necessities of our times, has not yet emerged. That is why use of old criteria is still prevalent in the West. It is the interests bound up with armaments and the exploitation of the economically weak countries that are supporting this old policy, which is further advocated by the fanatical champions of anti-communism and colonialism. 48. Narrow-mindedness, shortsightedness and blindness are arrayed against common sense, realism and a clearer insight into the future. 49. In these circumstances the following questions arise: are there any limits to the subservience shown by the various governmental circles in the West to the most militant groups and the most dangerous trends? How far does their loyalty or their subservience to the positions-of-strength policy go? There are facts that give a disturbing answer to these questions. 50. What do we see at the present time? We see the efforts to solve the majority of the most important international problems meeting with resistance; the unceasing West-German provocations in Berlin; a serious situation further deteriorating in South Viet-Nam because of the open and continuous intervention of United States troops; the situation in the Congo; the situation in South Korea; the resumption of activity by the notorious spy aircraft over the territories of various States; and, lastly, the extremely dangerous policy of intervention conducted by the United States against Cuba. 51. It can thus be said that events are taking a dangerous course, At the same time, however, it is common knowledge that the forces of peace and independence are growing steadily. The masses are becoming increasingly aware of the situation and of the solutions that must be adopted and their desire for peace is becoming stronger every day. At the same time, realism and common sense are also gaining ground. If it were not so, there would have been no agreement on Laos nor a peaceful settlement of the problem of West Irian. Nor would there have been any progress towards decolonialization. 52. But the basic factors in the international situation and the course of events cannot long continue to evolve in opposite directions. We have entered a period when a decisive choice has to be made between the policy based on positions of strength and peaceful coexistence, 53. The problem of Cuba provides a dramatic example of the clash between the criteria of the policy based on positions of strength and the criteria of peaceful coexistence. The outcome of this clash may have very serious repercussions for the cause of peace. 54. Why is the United States unwilling to admit the existence of the new Cuba? Why does it refuse to maintain normal relations with it? The Cuban people, it is true, wish to build a socialist society in their country. But are they not entitled to do so, just as the American people are entitled to live under a capitalist system? Not even ninety miles separate certain capitalist States and the socialist States that are their neighbours. West Berlin is situated in the very heart of the German Democratic Republic. But no socialist State is asking the people who are its neighbours or the population of West Berlin to change their social system, Poland and other socialist States maintain friendly relations with the neutral countries and correct and often even good relations with a number of NATO countries. We wish to maintain and develop these relations. 55. But there are some in the United States who appear to think that the principles of the normal coexistence of peoples ought not to be applied, at least to the American continent. That, perhaps, is what they have in mind when they speak, in the year 1962, of the Monroe Doctrine. However, no one is compelled to endorse their attitude, 56. Cuba is said to threaten the United States; but it is well known that there are no foreign bases on Cuba, other than the United States base at Guantánamo. Cuba has no armed forces capable of or trained for aggression, and does not intend to establish any. 57. Cuba, it is true, does possess defensive forces; but it was the United States itself which showed Cuba the need for such forces. 58. Cuba does not and cannot threaten the United States or any other country. On the other hand, entire United States armies are stationed in the immediate vicinity of the socialist countries and there are hundreds of United States and other nuclear and air bases nearby directed against those countries. 59. Of course, we do not want to be threatened. We are opposed to the existence of foreign bases in the territories of the various countries, but at the same time we patiently seek solutions based on common agreement. 60. The United States Government, on the other hand, is unwilling to recognize the existence of the new Cuba, Which is not threatening it. It was unwilling to recognize it even long before Cuba chose the path of socialist development. Some North American circles, disregarding the voices of reason that are also to be heard in their country, simply refuse to accept the fact that Cuba is independent and has ceased to be an area for exploitation by them. 61. The problem is thus neither a local problem nor a dispute between East and West. What is involved here, in fact, is a problem of principle, that principle relating to the sovereignty of peoples and their mutual relations. It is a question of choice between the colonialist policy of strength or positions of strength and peaceful coexistence. 62. If this aggressive colonialist policy towards Cuba were to achieve its purpose, that would mean a great strengthening of the forces that are ready to push the United States onto the path that is most dangerous for all Latin America, for the entire world, for the United States itself and for everyone. This cannot therefore be permitted. 63. We hope that the attitude of the peoples and the good sense of the responsible statesmen will make it possible to direct the course of events towards peaceful coexistence. 64. We have presented — from this rostrum, in particular — Poland's views on the German problem; we have ceaselessly warned against the dangerous manner in which it is developing; we have submitted and supported proposals which could have changed the course of that development. It is not our fault, therefore, that the German problem has now entered a critical phase and that its solution can no longer be deferred. Here, too, the essence of the problem is the choice that must be made between the policy of strength and peaceful coexistence. 65. For many years the Western Powers — and the Federal Republic of Germany itself — tended to use the German problem as the highest trump card in their policy of strength towards the socialist countries and to transform the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin in all respects into a springboard against the socialist countries. They have succeeded in this aim, but the international situation has by no means developed as anticipated by the authors of the Western plan with regard to Germany. 66. It is already clear that the policy based on positions of strength towards the socialist countries and the entire Western conception of a "solution" of the German problem on the basis of that policy were and still are unrealistic. Such an unrealistic policy could offer only one real prospect — that of a dreadful catastrophe. 67. At the same time it is now plain that the Federal Republic of Germany has not confined itself to serving as the vanguard of the West; on the contrary, it has broken free and has become the most powerful State in the Western part of the European continent. How faded now are the illusions, sincere or pretended, of those who used to claim that, within the framework of the various Western groupings, they could contain and direct the expansionism of the revived West German imperialism. 68. Today the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, skillfully exploiting his French partner's dreams of power, is challenging the principal NATO allies and is heading directly towards hegemony over the whole of Western Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany has become the most stubborn and aggressive force of the cold war; it is preventing the West from taking more realistic decisions; it is carrying its allies along in its own speculative policy. 69. There are doubtless many Western statesmen who now realize the enormous danger inherent in the policy which the West has pursued up to now with regard to Germany and are aware of the ever-increasing cost their countries will have to bear to the advantage of their German ally and competitor. In spite of that, they do not always succeed in disentangling themselves from that policy and they fail to do so because certain circles, and especially militarist circles in various countries, have not given up their old plans and because in many cases they are themselves unable to discard the old cold-war concepts. They consider, for example, that they cannot lose their prestige in the eyes of the Germans and cannot disappoint the latter's hopes. 70. We, however, know that there are different Germans; we know that it is possible to base oneself on the peaceful forces of the German people, that it is possible to build a peaceful German State — as the German Democratic Republic is doing. But one can also base oneself on the most aggressive and militant forces, arouse and fan their hopes and build an imperialist and aggressive State — as the Federal Republic of Germany has been doing up to now. 71. One can also follow Lord Home's example and play on the passions of the chauvinist wing of German public opinion and on the sentiments of other circles. But the Chairman of the United Kingdom delegation would have done better to make some changes in his statement of yesterday: he should either have corrected several passages in that statement, particularly the one dealing with Berlin, or have deleted, to the satisfaction of all housewives, the harsh adage that "men who ... stir the pot of trouble when it is simmering . . . are knaves". It would be best of all, we think, if everything were changed to accord with the just arguments his statement contained about the need for negotiation, conciliation and justice, and with certain other ideas — if we have understood them correctly. 72. I come back now to the principal question: which are the Germans and what are the German hopes that various Western statesmen are afraid to disappoint? What hopes would be disappointed by the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German States, by the recognition of the existence of two German States, by the transformation of West Berlin from a "front-line" city and a military base into a free and demilitarized city? What hopes are these that would be disappointed? The hopes cherished by certain Germans of seeing the German Democratic Republic annexed by the Federal Republic of Germany? Such hopes must be dispelled and dispelled as quickly as possible, for they are unrealistic and at the same time extremely dangerous. 73. What hopes would be disappointed if the Eastern frontiers of Germany were recognized as definitive and if atomic arms were prevented — in one way or another — from appearing in Germany and in this part of Europe? The hopes of crossing these frontiers and marching further to the East? These hopes must be dispelled and as soon as possible, for they are unrealistic and at the same time extremely dangerous. Without putting an end to hopes and aspirations of that kind it is impossible to halt what is a threatening development In Europe. 74. It is necessary to conclude with Germany a peace treaty that will have clear and unambiguous significance. If the Governments and responsible statesmen of the West will hot or cannot decide, the socialist countries, for their part, cannot wait passively until this development brings the whole world to the edge of the abyss. Failing what would be better, a joint political and juridical instrument, they will conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, and this will not be a mere formality. 75. It would, of course, be better to reach agreement beforehand on the practical consequences of such a treaty; it could become a turning point in East-West relations, opening the way to the joint solution of other international disputes and problems. 76. In the principal problem, too, the problem of disarmament, time is working against us. The tempo of the nuclear arms race is quickening. The development of nuclear technology, especially in recent months, is not diminishing the threat of a surprise attack or of a war unleashed by mistake or by chance; rather it is increasing that threat. 77. The ending of the race for weapons of mass destruction can be finally achieved only within the framework of general and complete disarmament and, while directing our efforts towards that goal, we can and should at the same time slow down the race and limit its extent, It is even possible in certain regions to reverse the trend. 78. Poland has always advocated the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance once and for all nuclear weapons tests. 79. At the fifteenth session of the General Assembly two years ago [874th meeting], Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Chairman of the Polish delegation, proposed the establishment of an early and compulsory date for the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. That proposal was expressed in a draft resolution which, to our regret, was not discussed. 80. We regret also that the compromise proposals of the eight neutral Powers presented at the Geneva Conference on 16 April 1962 have not been accepted as a basis of agreement by the Western Powers. 81. The conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests is continuing as in the past to encounter opposition from the United States which has up to now refused to renounce underground testing and, as always, adduces arguments relating to control. We do not share the doubts of the United States about the effectiveness of national means of detecting underground tests. 82. Quite apart from these differences, however, it is precisely the United States which, being the most advanced in underground testing, would be running the least risk if it agreed, if not to a treaty, at least to a moratorium in this field. 83. The whole question is whether we do or do not want to arrest the nuclear arms race. It is thus not a technical but a political problem. 84. In these circumstances, it is a matter for congratulation that the idea of fixing an early date for the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests is emerging in this Assembly. 85. Poland has expressed itself in favour of prohibiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Such a step would be of fundamental importance as part of the whole complex of measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons. Linked with this idea are the many proposals that have now been made for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world. 86. The establishment of denuclearized zones in areas where a particularly serious danger of conflict exists would be of decisive importance. Central Europe is undoubtedly such an area. 87. We consider as urgent, as increasingly urgent, the proposal to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe — a proposal which was reiterated by the Polish delegation to the Geneva Conference in its memorandum of 28 March 1962. We consider the establishment of this zone as a major step forward towards disarmament and as an essential element in the peaceful settlement of the German problem. 88. While considering these measures with all the seriousness they deserve, we do not forget that they are only partial measures. They are intended to facilitate the only radical and final solution, namely, general and complete disarmament. That is their essential purpose. 89. The measures to which I have just referred are essential because they reduce the threat of a surprise nuclear attack and the fear of such an attack — this fear that aggravates the armaments race and burdens the entire international situation today. 90. The condemnation of preventive war, in accordance with the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly at the present session by the Soviet Union [A/5232], would constitute one of the measures directed against that threat. 91. We consider the removal of the threat of surprise nuclear attack in the earliest phase of disarmament as a crucial element of general and complete disarmament. The most effective approach to this objective would be by way of the liquidation of bases and of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In that way nuclear weapons would be immobilized and their continued perfecting and stockpiling and, in general, their possession would have no practical meaning. This should be carried out as soon as possible. In our view, the new compromise proposals which Mr. Gromyko introduced in this Assembly[1016th meeting] established the latest date by which this fundamental requirement must be fulfilled. 92. With such an approach, all the problems of disarmament which are so difficult at present, such as, for example, the problem of preserving the security balance or the problem of control, would become much easier to solve. General and complete disarmament would become an irreversible process. 93. Therein lies the decisive advantage of the position taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on disarmament. By contrast, the chief danger of the Western proposals lies in the tendency to retain nuclear weapons and their vehicles at all stages of disarmament. That would mean that the fear of a surprise nuclear attack and mutual distrust would weigh upon the whole process of disarmament and might at any time result in the halting of all progress and even in the resumption of the arms race. 94. In this matter, too, we have to choose: either the policy based on positions of strength and nuclear strategy or disarmament and lasting peaceful coexistence. 95. There are still 50 million people in the world who wear the chains of colonialism. Men continue to die in the struggle for freedom. 96. We must not relax our efforts so long as a single people remains under colonial slavery. It is certain, however, that we are making progress in tills matter. 97. We have welcomed among us the delegations of Rwanda, Burundi and Jamaica as well as the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago. We shall soon be welcoming the representatives of the heroic Algerian people who, after long years of war, sacrifice and dreadful suffering, have broken down the door to freedom. 98. The old colonial system is coming to an end. The whole of mankind now has the new historic task of destroying its baneful heritage. 99. The problem now to be faced is that of the development and economic emancipation of the countries that are under-developed and devastated as a result of foreign exploitation. 100. It is for the peoples concerned themselves to organize their lives in such a way as to make the best use of their own strength and their natural resources and to ensure the speediest possible development of their production potential. 101. It is the peoples concerned themselves who have decisive influence in determining what forms and directions foreign aid should take in order to promote the true development of their economies, for in this area it is not the technical and economic but the political problems that are decisive and the most difficult to solve. Those who exploited and wish to continue exploiting the weakness and backwardness of the poorest nations are still strongly entrenched. 102. Poland, like the other socialist States, without, of course, interfering in the internal affairs of the new countries or imposing its views upon them, considers it its duty to support these developing countries in their struggle to assert their legitimate rights. 103. I should like to mention two problems that can only be solved on a world-wide scale. The first concerns the volume of resources allocated to the developing countries. Their needs, which have been piling up in many cases for centuries, are so vast that they cannot adequately be met unless a substantial portion of the means now spent on armaments is allocated to them. 104. The proposals submitted at this session by the Soviet Union delegation follow these lines. Once again, however, general and complete disarmament must be achieved for these resources to be released. A choice has to be made — between the armaments race and real large-scale assistance to the under-developed countries. 105. The second problem is, first of all, the removal of the obstacles to the development of these countries. 106. Up to the present time, as has been stated many times in this forum, the gap between these countries and the developed countries has not been narrowing: on the contrary, it has been widening year by year. What Is still worse, statistics show that the wealth is continuing to flow from the economically weak countries to the developed countries, and not the other way round. The aid which is being given with one hand is being taken back, with interest, with the other. 107. If we add to this the fact that so-called aid is accompanied by military or political conditions or by requests for certain privileges, the picture becomes clear. Exploitation is continuing and the economic dependence of the under-developed countries is even increasing. There are many methods of neo-colonialist exploitation; in practice, however, it is by means of world trade, increasingly influenced by the monopolies, that the wealth of these under-developed countries is transferred to the coffers of the monopolies. What is worse, it is precisely in this field that we are faced with new dangers, dangers that do not threaten the under-developed countries alone. I have in mind the direction that certain processes of integration are taking. 108. No one can quarrel with the development of international co-operation and the specialization of production if these are designed to expand production and lower its cost, to increase exports and reduce export prices, and to expand international trade. 109. It is on these principles that are based the activities of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, of which Poland is an active member. 110. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance is not a monopoly. On the contrary, it may be said to constitute an International anti-monopoly. We erect no tariff walls. We simply want to produce more and more at lower cost; we want to export and import more and more and, in the last analysis, to consume more and more. 111. This is leading in practice to the rapid expansion of our exports of industrial goods, machinery, equipment and entire plants to the developing countries. It is leading to the rapid growth of our markets for these countries' products. 112. In this respect, we want to pass, to an ever increasing extent, from the exportation of machinery and equipment in exchange for raw materials and agricultural products to the exchange of industrial goods for industrial goods, in accordance with the principles of a fair and rational division of labour with these countries. The activity of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, far from limiting, actually increases the possibilities of trade between East and West, and we have proof of this. 113. The situation is quite different when so-called integration is achieved by first erecting barriers to trade between a particular group of States and the rest of the world. It is quite different when this is done in order to pursue a sui generis monopolistic trade policy to the detriment of other countries, particularly the economically weak countries. It is quite different when, in addition, certain political objectives are sought against the interests of a particular group of States. 114. That, in our view, is the direction in which the so-called common market is developing The increasing role of the Federal Republic of Germany in that group and the German integration programme which bears the hallmark of the cold-war policy can only increase our concern. 115. The Polish delegation considers that the only common market that the world needs today is a worldwide common market, free of all discrimination and inequality in world trade. 116. That is why we attach great importance to the convening of an international conference devoted to the problems of trade. It should, among other things, deal with the problem of establishing a world trade organization founded on the principles of universality and the equality of States. The fact that the majority of the participants in the Conference of non-aligned countries, held at Cairo, proceeding from the standpoint of their countries' interests, arrived at similar conclusions can only strengthen our conviction. 117. In the case of this issue also, the struggle for peaceful coexistence links up with the struggle for the full independence of the peoples. 118. In Poland we are convinced that at the present time, when fundamental decisions have to be taken, our Organization is even more necessary than in the past, It will fulfil its tasks if it rids itself of the vestiges of the period when it was so often wrongly used as an instrument of policy by a certain group of Powers, very often as an instrument of cold war policy. 119. The tendencies to use the United Nations in this way have not disappeared. That is why certain vestiges of the past still remain. That is why the seats of the Chinese delegation are occupied by a few private individuals. 120. The United Nations will play its proper part if in its structure and methods of work it reflects the principal forces In the world today, if it becomes, in consequence, their meeting place, their place for discussion, agreement and co-operation in the interest of all, in the interest of peace. 121. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and to congratulate you on your election to your high office. I also hope that this session over which you are presiding may become enshrined in the memories of all who hope to see the United Nations become a major instrument of peaceful development and international co-operation.