Mr. President, like all the speakers who have preceded me, I am very proud that we are privileged to sit under your Presidency. You have, of course, given the most distinguished service to your own country and have been an ornament for a long time of the Commonwealth association of countries. We count ourselves extremely fortunate that all your qualities of character and intelligence have been put so ungrudgingly at the service of this Organization. I am sure that you will have the full support of the Assembly in the conduct of its affairs all through this session and I might add, Mr. President, that I think that you can do almost anything with us. You have already achieved the impossible of making the Assembly punctual, and that really is something.
41. I should like, too, to great as others have done the new Members who have joined us for the first time, with particular feelings of warmth for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, who are our Commonwealth partners.
42. Mr. President, before he died in the service of this Organization, for which he gave his life, you may recall that Mr. Hammarskjold, in the introduction to his report to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, left us a testament and a guide to the future of the Organization. He said that we were near a point of decision, and the choices, in his view, were these. We could mark time in a phase of static diplomacy, each country advancing its own claims, airing its own opinions, passing resolutions but doing nothing about them. Under this conception, as I see it, more and more Members could default in their financial obligations if they chose; and if we really wanted to bring this Organization to a grinding and impotent halt, we could cap it all with introducing the "troika" at the top. Or, we could choose the way of dynamic diplomacy, and while not stretching the Organization beyond its natural strength, for it is yet young, and while playing within the rules of the Charter, each of us would be willing, slowly and by degrees, but nevertheless deliberately, to subordinate our national interests to the collective will of the United Nations as a whole.
43. I would like to tell my colleagues in the General Assembly that I agree with Mr. Hammarskjold's analysis and with his conclusions. The signs of the times point urgently towards interdependence in positive co-operation, and I find myself in the very closest agreement with what President Muhammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan yesterday said [1133rd meeting] that we are proceeding apace towards the conception of one world. It was the conclusions of Mr. Hammarskjold, endorsed by our own reasoning, which led my country in association with the great majority in his hall to vote against the "troika", and I would like to say that if this proposal is renewed we shall vote against it again. Not only for the reason given by the representative of the Philippines, that this would introduce the cold war into the Organization; that is true, but also because if we introduced the "troika" it would ensure the extraordinary paradox that the world Organization would remain stagnant while the mainstream of international life passed it by. And, of course, it would introduce as well the most reactionary of all ideas when you are thinking in the context of this Organization, that a servant of the United Nations should give his first loyalty to his own country.
44. It is Mr. Hammarskjold's analysis, and conclusions too, which persuade my Government to support the ruling of the International Court of Justice on the payment of dues. We believe that Members should pay their assessed levies both for the operation in the Congo and for the operation on the Palestine border. We do not like some features of the Congo operation, as I shall show, but nevertheless we pay our assessed dues and I hope that this Assembly will make it unmistakably clear that those who fall two years in arrears in their assessments should lose their votes.
45. There are some other things that this Assembly ought to be doing of we were not frustrated by the cold war. We ought to enlarge the Security Council to take account of the changes in the structure of a modern world society. But, Sir, there is an even more pressing reason why we should take a decision about the future role of the United Nations in the world, because all of us are up against a choice which is even more stark than that posed by Mr. Hammarskjold. Nuclear science has now brought weapons to a point of efficiency where a few missiles can destroy millions of people. I do not know if it is common knowledge to this Assembly, but the latest estimate that has been made of the casualties in the first exchange in a nuclear war is over 300 million people dead in the first few days. Three hundred million. That is almost incomprehensible, and I would add to that unpleasant fact that there is the near certainty that local conflicts, which draw in the great Powers, could not possibly be confined to wars with conventional weapons. We might try to do so, but with the best will in the world you cannot, with one kind of equipment, fight another kind of war.
46. I agree with Mr. Gromyko when he says that only a mad man could pursue policies of "positions of strength", so long as this stricture is directed against his own country as well as others. Therefore the overriding fact, of which I believe no political system has yet assimilated the full consequences, is that we have arrived at a point in time when men and women and Governments everywhere have to decide whether we are going to continue in the old way, in which we tried regularly to solve disputes through the test of war, or whether we are going to try the new way of abandoning unilateral action in favour of negotiation, burying our emotions and our passions and making up our minds that, however long the process of negotiation and conciliation lasts, we are determined to carry it through.
47. The year 1962 has seen a case in point, in Laos. There you would have thought there was a country which was very far removed from the rivalry of the great Powers, yet the people were divided among themselves in the country, there was a local dispute and each side began to seek outside help. Eighteen months ago in Laos the great Powers confronted each other on the brink of war, and that war — and I am quite certain that both the East and the West made the same assessment — could not have proceeded very far before it got out of control and tactical nuclear weapons were used. The event, of course, would have brought ruin to South-East Asia and to much of the world as a whole, and the Powers looked over the abyss at the prospect and they did not like what they saw. They decided to talk it out and not to shoot it out. The process was not easy. There was very hard bargaining and, even now, vigilance is necessary to see that the agreement sticks, but nevertheless eighteen nations were able to sit down and reach an honourable settlement. There is peace in Laos, and this has been a demonstration of the practical working of the art of conciliation.
48. There are, Mr. President, certain lessons which I think we can learn, first, from the destructive power of the nuclear bomb and secondly from the negotiated settlement in Laos. The first is this, and it is perhaps the over-riding fact of our present situation. There is, in fact, today a stalemate in nuclear power and, because there is a stalemate in nuclear power, there is in the same way a stalemate in power politics. It is true that it is a stalemate of fear, nevertheless it has brought as a respite from war. It may be that we only hold the peace by the balance of terror; nevertheless the peace is held, and for that at least we should be grateful. However, it must be apparent to everybody who considers these matters and to all my colleagues here that, if man is to be certain of survival, clearly this situation is not good enough and we must do better. The way we can do better is this; so sure is it that fighting anywhere will start a chain reaction that we must draw the conclusion that fighting must not be allowed to start or, if it does start by accident, must be isolated and put in quarantine. Therefore, the first resolution that I should like the Assembly to pass, although I have not yet put it on paper, is this — that we should decide that in every situation, however testing, our minds must control our emotions and our passions. Men who live in a nuclear age and pick quarrels are fools. But men who live in a nuclear age and stir the pot of trouble when it is simmering are worse than fools; they are knaves.
49. There is another lesson that I would add. We must jettison the idea that the object of negotiation is to gain the victory round the table which you were not able to gain by force. Victories round the negotiating table are Pyrrhic victories. Those who suffer defeat at the conference table feel resentment, and resentment breeds revenge. Therefore the task of the diplomat and the negotiator is reconciliation and justice and order. I emphasize justice and order as the basis of interdependence, and indeed of progress, because I believe that I detect a certain suspicion in some minds that law and order is a trick to freeze the status quo. I should like to say that, in our experience, exactly the opposite is the truth: the observance of law and order is a sine qua non of peaceful change.
50. The point was made very well yesterday by the representative of Australia — and I need not elaborate it — that the rule of law is a lesson we have learned from many mistakes and much suffering and it is only by submitting ourselves to the law that we can reconcile conflicting ambitions and serve the interests of progress [1132nd meeting].
51. That is why — because it is our British experience, in particular, in translating our colonial empire into a Commonwealth of free and independent nations — I have always insisted that it is the plain duty of this Assembly to uphold the rule of law and to support and strengthen its institutions. And the two most important institutions which we must support are the Charter and the International Court of Justice. If we do not set an example in observing the law, who will?
52. If what I have said is true, it is clear that peace will only be preserved if each and all of us are prepared to subject our passions and prejudices to strict discipline. And this, I suggest, is something that the United Nations should help us to do.
53. At this point, I do want to name certain dangers to law and justice, and therefore to peaceful change, which I detect as being present among us. I think it is best to put these dangers under the public eye, because it is only when they are recognized that they can be exorcised or controlled.
54. The first and the most dangerous cause of conflict is the communist intention to impose their system on the rest of the world by the type of political warfare backed by force which is curiously called "peaceful coexistence". Neither my country nor any other country has the right to criticize Russia or China if they wish to adopt the communist philosophy and wish communism to be their own political system. But what we cannot tolerate, and what no free people that wishes to practise another philosophy can tolerate, is that we should be press-ganged into the communist service. And attempts are being made, as everybody knows, to do that up and down the world.
55. Mr. Gromyko said, rather rhetorically, last week, in connexion with the United States-and-Cuba situation: Does this mean that a stronger State has the right to gobble up a weaker one? Well, he ought to know and, if he does not know, he might perhaps ask the Chinese. When we come to the debate, I shall look forward with the greatest of attention, I am bound to say, to Mr. Gromyko's promised proposal on the economics of disarmament. I agree with him, it is a terrible thing that we should all be forced to pay millions of our wealth to sustain these huge armaments and these colossally expensive arms. I hope this inquiry, when we come to debate that resolution, will not embarrass Mr. Gromyko, because I am going to ask him how the Chinese invasion of India, which forces India to arm, fits in with his thesis. The Chinese are now 150 miles inside Indian territory. The Indians are forced to rearm. Everybody knows they are a peaceful people; everybody knows they are being subjected to aggression. I shall look forward to this resolution of Mr. Gromyko's with some anticipation and interest, because there are some questions which must be asked.
56. I know that there are a number of people here who want to keep out of the cold war, and I have every sympathy with them. They can ignore it if they choose. But, if India is not immune from it, who is? And self-interest, if nothing else, should encourage those people to look at its origins and causes.
57. It really is too dangerous to all of us in these days to allow politico-ideological crusades backed by arms. We cannot have that in the late twentieth century. This is more than ever true — and, if we are realistic, I think we must take account of it — when the emancipation of a great many small nations from colonial rule has given a strong impetus to nationalism. We have been in the first ranks in bringing our colonial territories to independence, and I am strongly in favour of having that policy proceed with all speed. But I must say that, when one looks round the world, it is extremely disheartening to find that there are so many new countries which have not advanced some claim against the territory of a neighbour. Because that is so, I think it does enjoin upon this Assembly and upon Governments a need for constant vigilance, to see that the legitimate enthusiasm of patriotism does not overflow into aggressive nationalism. Here I would touch on an even greater evil, and this is racialism, I would not excuse a great many things that the old nations did in the past, I have no doubt they were very often wrong in what they did and were sinners, but it would be a tragedy if, in revenge for what the new nations conceive was white arrogance in the past, they allowed the prejudices of colour and race to have full rein.
58. The Charter recognized the importance of change based upon order, and it gave to this Organization the twin task — and let us not forget it — of keeping the peace and assisting peaceful change. The authors of the Charter recognized that neither task could be achieved unless there were rules and disciplines which were observed by the Members of the Organization.
59. Because I believe in facing facts, I am going to say a word about Article 2, paragraph 7. I know some people find this very irksome, particularly those who wish to see the rapid emancipation of countries to be brought to independence. But the authors of the Charter embodied this rule for very good reasons, and they did so deliberately, because they realized that if the United Nations was ever tempted to interfere in the internal political situation of independent States, or in matters under their jurisdiction, that would create trouble and not calm it down. I would ask my fellow colleagues in this Assembly this: if each of us thinks of this rule in relation to his own country, I think he will be bound to admit its wisdom. To play according to the rules of the Charter, is not easy, but I submit that unless we do, the United Nations will not succeed in its role as a peace-maker.
60. I would like to apply some of these considerations which I have advanced to some of the situations which confront us and which have been mentioned by speaker after speaker in this debate. It is this paramount need for conciliation which has greatly influenced the attitude of my country to the problems of the Congo, It Is quite clear that what is required above all in the Congo is a reconciliation of the interests between the provinces and the centre, and one other thing is surely clear, that this conflict of views can only be resolved by the Congolese themselves. If we were tempted to try and impose a solution by force, it would not last a day, unless the United Nations was prepared to assume the role of an occupying and administering Power and assume it for years. With all our many qualities, and we have a great many virtues and a great deal of strength, we are not equipped to do that yet. It may be that we shall be some day. Therefore, I have insisted always that the role of the United Nations in this affair must be to help the Congolese to find and agree on a settlement among themselves. We must use all the patience in the world to achieve that.
61. Therefore, we in the United Kingdom were extremely glad when the Secretary-General decided to concentrate everything on this plan of reconciliation, which has our full support and which has been accepted in principle by Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombé. I have not yet seen — and I do not think anybody in this hall has yet seen — the form of the draft federal constitution. I think, as I said at the beginning, that the main problem in the Congo is the relations between the provinces and the centre, and that the nature of the Federal Constitution is the key to peace in the Congo, the key to everything. I hope that this plan of reconciliation will be adopted and accepted, and we shall work for that as hard as we can, with the hope that before too long the United Nations activities can be transformed from a military operation to one of economic and technical assistance.
62. I would like to say to the Secretary-General how very grateful I am for the patience with which he is dealing with this problem. He and Mr. Gardiner deserve our gratitude for the tact and forbearance which they have used. These are the qualities the world will need if the world is to survive.
63. If the problem of Laos, the problem of Algeria, the problem of West New Guinea and the problem of the Congo could be settled peacefully in 1962, then the principle of order in international affairs, for which I am pleading, and of conciliation, would have won a notable victory.
64. There are other cases where the duty to negotiate is matched by the duty to uphold international law in the defence of freedom. I refer — and Members will not have any difficulty in realizing this — to Berlin. Reference has been made to the wall which has been raised by the East Germans and the Russians through the middle of the city — as Mr. Holyoake reminded us [1133rd meeting], surely the most extraordinary thing that has ever been done — a wall to shut people in and not to shut people out. I was there a very short time ago. I would like everybody in this Assembly to go and look at that wall. The day before I was there a boy tried to bring through his father and mother-in-law-to-be in order that they might attend his wedding. All three of them were shot at the point where I stood the next day. Every day people die on that wall. Only a short time ago a boy of eighteen, as everybody knows, was left to bleed to death in front of a whole lot of mocking East Germans, with 3,000 people watching this happen over one and a half hours, impotent to go to his assistance in anyway. It is an almost intolerable provocation to civilized people that this sort of thing should be allowed to happen in these days; it is an affront to all who recognize and respect man as a child of God.
65. But although we despise, from the bottom of our hearts, a system which can allow such callous cruelty, nevertheless the highest duty, and this is recognized by the people of Berlin themselves, compels us to control our emotions and to seek a settlement consonant with the obligations that we have as trustees of free and independent people. Only a settlement which is negotiated and a settlement which is just can bring lasting security to Europe and, I might add, to Russia.
66. The only permanent solution is one on which I hope this Assembly, if it is true to itself, will insist and that is self-determination for both Germanies. I hope that this will be conceded unanimously by this Assembly: that there should be self-determination for West Germany and for East Germany and they should be allowed to settle their destiny. But, as for the present, Russia, which preaches self-determination for everybody else — I have heard that done time and again from where I am standing now — refuses to allow self-determination to East Germany, and all we can do is to seek a modus vivendi.
67. Now I can think of a number of solutions, Mr. Gromyko is aware of them from many talks with myself and with Mr. Rusk. These solutions would be acceptable to the allies. But I must tell this Assembly quite firmly that what the allies — and I believe the United Nations Organization and this Assembly would feel the same — cannot accept is a settlement of the Berlin problem which would be simply a cloak for a communist take-over of 2.5 million free people. That simply is not negotiable. So we must seek a modus vivendi which is fair and just.
68. I do not know whether the Berlin problem will come to this Assembly, but if it does I hope that everybody will make it unmistakably clear that this artificial crisis must be stopped, that the tensions on the wall and the cruelties on the wall must be ended and that a negotiated settlement must be made which would respect the rights and interests of all the parties in both West and East Berlin, It can certainly be done.
69. If the Assembly will have patience for a moment I should like to say a word concerning a wider question which affects us all, and that is disarmament. It would be foolish to suggest that the Geneva Conference has brought us even to the approaches of general and complete disarmament, although the. meetings of the seventeen nations have given us all a deeper insight into the problems of total and physical disarmament. During our discussions, when this question comes to be debated, we shall find that we shall return time and again to two principles, each of which is basic to the success of disarmament, and each of which presents great problems, let us admit it, in its application. The first is that at all stages of disarmament the balance of strength must not be disturbed. If what I have said at the beginning of my speech today is true, that the peace, although it hangs precariously, depends on the balance of power being held, that is one of the principles which we must observe. And the other is that there should be adequate verification of disarmament to see that paper plans are fully observed.
70. On the first principle, the Western plan provides for a percentage cut across the board divided into three stages until disarmament is complete. At each stage, therefore, you will see that the relative strength, as it is at present, is maintained. 1 have got no particular brief, I must say, for the present balance of strength where one side has an advantage in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and the other side has a larger advantage in conventional forces, weapons, and the advantage, of course, of central communication. The point is that the present balance exists, and starting from there, percentage cuts can be fairly applied across the board. But if we begin trying to change the balance, then, of course, it is clear that the greatest complications will emerge.
71. I think, myself, that the important thing is to start some physical disarmament and turn the rising curve of armaments down. If that is what the Assembly wants, the way to do it, I think, is a percentage cut across the board.
72. At present, I am bound to say to the Russian delegation that the Soviet plan is uneven in its programme for disarmament, mainly because it places, in phase one, the abolition of all nuclear delivery vehicles and all foreign bases. In the Western plan these categories are eliminated altogether, at the end of the day, but not all in one stage. If you put them into the first stage, of course, you immediately offend against the principle of balance, which I named, and the advantage must most definitely accrue to the Soviet Union.
73. Mr. Gromyko made a new proposal the other day when he spoke to the Assembly [1127th meeting]. He suggested that, instead of destroying all nuclear weapons in the first stage, that you might have a limited number and an agreed number of inter-continental ballistic missiles which should be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States, I leave aside for the moment that he left the United Kingdom out of the picture altogether, but we will consider any proposal of this kind, if it is fruitful. At first sight, and I hope I am wrong, it seems to me it is designed to eliminate the West's present superiority in nuclear delivery vehicles without considering the advantages which the Soviet Union has from its superiority in conventional forces now. However, I am only too glad to consider this new proposal. In addition, he raised the question of the possibility of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and also an arrangement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Treaties. Well, we must consider all these. One other question, in connexion with what he proposed, occurs to me. It is this: if the United States and Russia are to retain a certain number of nuclear weapons, and if those quantities are to be limited and agreed, how are the numbers to be verified? I noticed he did not say anything about that. Mr. Gromyko cannot, I think, be proposing that in such a vital matter as this, that the West should take the Soviet Government's word for how many intercontinental ballistic missiles they have retained, or that Russia should take the word of the West. If this means that the Soviet Union is willing to take a realistic attitude on the verification of remainders, then we are a long step forward; if they are not so prepared, then I am bound to say that the proposal means nothing at all.
74. In this context, I hope that Mr. Gromyko will take a long look at verification because in the field of general disarmament there can be no advance unless there is inspection. I cannot understand, I am bound to say, why, when every other country in the world is willing to grant this amount of inspection in order to save the world from this arms race, Russia is not willing to do so. Is all the world out of step except Russia and its friends?
75. Meanwhile, if general and complete disarmament needs more consideration, I must say quite definitely to this Assembly that we could have a nuclear test ban agreement and we could have it now. All the world wants it, therefore I hope we can get it. I should like to say why we could have this test ban now and to inform the members of this Assembly what options are open to our Russian friends. We have made two proposals. This is the first and the best: that there should be a comprehensive ban on all tests, with onsite inspection limited to those cases only where the international control authority says it cannot decide the nature of the noise unless somebody goes and looks. The international authority, in other words, will say, "We do not know whether this is an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. We want somebody to go and look." This could be done on the basis of every suspicious event being investigated, which is the implication of the proposals being forwarded by the eight neutral nations, or it could be done on the basis of a quota only of such events chosen by each side, which is the proposal put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom. I do hope that the Soviet Union will be willing to concede this amount of inspection — a very small amount of inspection — in order to achieve a test ban. But I should like to put forward the second option, which has been given to the Soviet Union. It is this: that there should immediately be a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the sea, with no conditions and no inspection. The object of that proposal, put forward by the United States and ourselves, is to save the world from fall-out. The Assembly will want to know why, with the objection of espionage removed — because there is to be no inspection and no condition — the Russians, along with their friends, are refusing to allow the fall-out to end.
76. Mr. Gromyko referred in his speech recently to a Soviet offer of agreement in these three environments. Well, I studied it. It amounts to a moratorium again which is unpoliced. I am afraid the answer must be that the Soviet Union itself, by breaking its word the last time, destroyed the currency of moratoria. But knowing that Mr. Gromyko was likely to refuse a ban and to say that a ban in the atmosphere was tantamount to legalizing underground tests, an argument which I do not accept, I am bound to say I made another proposal at Geneva. I proposed that we should have the atmospheric ban and end the fall-out, but that at the same time we should set our scientists to work — Soviet scientists, United States scientists and British scientists — and tell them that within six months we wanted an agreed recommendation on how to deal with detection and verification. I believe that if that meeting were to take place we should find the answer. There is everything to be said for that proposal, and I hope that the Assembly will press it upon the Soviet Union. If they refuse again, it can only mean that they are indifferent to the call of mankind to end the fallout and wish the arms race in nuclear weapons to continue. But I do pray that they will think again.
77. My plea then, today, is for more conscious and active use of the processes of conciliation everywhere. How much better it would be for our Development Decade if the cold war could end and the money which we spend upon it could be set to better use, to the provision of more food, better houses and schools and universities: the things the people want.
78. I suppose that the Soviet Government and its communist friends could claim that that is their ambition too, that they are making progress towards it, and indeed that this is what they mean by the victory of the proletariat. But civilization demands something more of people than materialism. It is not an accident that all the great religions of the world charge their members individually and collectively with a duty towards their neighbour. That is the flaw in the communist materialist doctrine. I have no doubt that all the countries which observe the great religions have lapsed from virtue, but the difference between a religious society and a purely materialist communist society is this: that upon the religious society certain restraints are imposed upon action, which assist the process of harmonious living with one's neighbour. There are no such restraints in a purely materialist society.
79. It is useless to ignore that the clash here is deep, only patience and time will resolve it, but meanwhile it is our duty to prevent the confrontation of East and West from degenerating into war. If for the time being peace depends on the balance of fear, that may be unheroic but it is better than war. It is degrading beyond words that in these days peace should depend on the balance of terror, but it is better than destruction. Therefore, we must decide at once not to disturb the balance of power but to work with all our being so that we may base our relationship on the much more solid foundation of interdependence.
80. So, in spite of outward appearances, very slowly, but I think perceptibly, the cold war is beginning to thaw and East-West relations, in spite of appearances, are starting to get a little better. The momentum, once it is started, will not be reversed. If imperialism is being thrown out of the window on the wind of change, so is Karl Marx — and good riddance too. It is time we got rid of these obsolete reactionary doctrines of the nineteenth century. I find the need to think and speak in terms of the cold war inexpressibly tedious. I must encroach on Mr. Gromyko's preserve, but so too, I believe, do the younger generation of Russians. If they have thrown off the physical terror and yoke of Stalin, they are not going to be content very much longer to be bound with the intellectual fetters of Marx. Marx, I am sorry to say, was a citizen of my country — but we have taken all the years since he died to prove that in practice he forecast wrong.
81. This sterile business of charge and countercharge is a waste of energy, talent and wealth, when we all ought to be working for the betterment of man,
82. So long as the free world is attacked, we must respond. We shall never go under. But Britain wants to join others in burying the cold war, in getting ahead with the modern political order in which men want to live.
83. Therefore I say to this Assembly: let us be diligent in conciliation and let the United Nations, self-disciplined and self-reliant, set the pace and the example of peace and peaceful change.