1. May I at the outset express to Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla Khan the warm congratulations of the Irish delegation on his election as President of this seventeenth session of the General Assembly. In the course of his long and distinguished career, he has rendered great services not only to his country but to the world community as a whole, both here at the United Nations and as a Judge of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. We consider that the Assembly is fortunate in having a President of his great wisdom and experience to guide its deliberations at the present session. I take this opportunity to assure him that he can always count with confidence on the loyal support and co-operation of the Irish delegation in his discharge of the duties of his office.
2. I should like to take this opportunity also to extend a cordial welcome on behalf of the Irish delegation to the four newly Independent countries which have become Members of the United Nations since the start of this session: Rwanda, Burundi, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Their presence here is a sign of the steady widening of the frontiers of human freedom throughout the world — of the growing realization that it is not only morally right but politically wise that peoples subject to alien rule should be able to determine freely their own national destinies. I have no doubt that the actions of these four new Members here at the United Nations will tend to strengthen even further the confidence felt by delegations such as my own that the universal recognition of the right of national independence is an essential step towards the achievement of peace and justice in world affairs, I warmly congratulate the new Members on the attainment of their freedom and independence, and I take the opportunity at the same time to pay a tribute to the former Administering Power s —Belgium and the United Kingdom — for their willing co-operation in bringing about that result.
3. There are major problems facing the United Nations which in other circumstances I should like to discuss at some length. However, on one occasion or another in the past, the Irish delegation has stated its attitude with regard to many of these issues: Berlin, Tibet, the Middle East, the Congo, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, and the danger of a "troika" veto on the execution of our decisions. I propose, therefore, to confine my remarks in this debate to a new and pressing danger of a fundamental character to which our Acting Secretary-General and many representatives here have already wisely brought attention. Only yesterday [1140th meeting] the Foreign Minister of Cameroon described this as "beyond peradventure the most grave" of all the problems confronting this Organization. I refer to the threatening crisis in the finances of the United Nations — the danger of the disruption of the United Nations through the failure of many Member States to play their due part in meeting the cost of implementing the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Unexciting and even prosaic as this subject may appear, it is one of vital consequence because, far reaching and noble as are the potentialities of the United Nations, it must collapse in chaos if its exchequer is empty. As an army is said to march on its stomach, the onward march of an organization such as ours depends on its purse.
4. Although the small States as well as the large have the duty to contribute their due share of the expenses of the Organization, I am not concerned at the moment with the case of such Members of the Organization, whose failure to pay may temporarily be due to conditions beyond their own control. As we all know, the Charter recognizes that such eases may exist and makes due provision for them. What is more serious, in my view, is the situation created when Members which have no such excuse refuse to contribute their fair share to the cost of specific activities undertaken by the Organization, on the ground that the activities in question should not have been undertaken at all, or that they disagree with the manner in which such activities are being conducted.
5. I do not wish to pause here to discuss the recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice [A/5161], which we accept unreservedly. Neither do I wish to discuss the morality and justice of the sort of attitude I describe, although it is manifestly unfair that those Members which continue to honour their obligations to the Organization should have to shoulder additional burdens in consequence of the default of those which do not. What disturbs me more is the thought of the influence which this kind of attitude would be bound to have on the future effectiveness of the Organization if it were to persist and become more widespread.
6. In an Organization such as this, there will always, of course, be differences of policy and opinion. Decisions are bound to be taken from time to time to which at least some of us will be strongly and even bitterly opposed. It is natural that we should tend to praise and applaud the Organization as long as it is acting- in accordance with our own views and to criticize and attack it when it ceases to do so. But if we were ever to accept the position that Members of the Organization were free to pick and choose between the activities of the Organization they were prepared to pay for, supporting those of which they approved and disclaiming financial liability, on one pretext or another, for those they opposed, the utility of the United Nations as an instrument of collective international action on behalf of the world community as a whole would be at an end. If we were to accept this position, the United Nations, of which mankind has such dire need, would become no more, while it lasted, than a debating society — what our late Secretary-General Hammarskjold called a "static conference machinery". My belief is that it would not last for long and that this bulwark of peace, this best hope for the liberty of small nations, free and yet to be freed, this shield of the rights of man, this reservoir of assistance for under-privileged peoples, would disappear as the League of Nations disappeared, with no less disastrous consequences for humanity.
7. In weighing the effects of the non-payment of contributions, moreover, we should not disregard its impact on public opinion outside these walls. In our various countries, people are watching the United Nations, most of them I believe with hope and confidence, but some, I am afraid, with growing doubt and apprehension. This is a consideration we cannot afford to ignore. It is essential to avoid giving our peoples the impression that the financial burdens of the Organizations are being unequally borne. To be successful in promoting the aims of the Charter, not only must we take the right decisions to deal with the difficulties and dangers which confront us, but we must also convince all men of goodwill, and men of ill will too, that we are united in support of this Organization and are determined that it should succeed. But how can the United Nations hope to make this impression, if Members fail to pay the contributions necessary to implement the decisions which we reach here after prolonged inquiries and lengthy discussions?
8. We smaller nations have, of course, a particular interest in this regard. As Hammarskjold said, the United Nations is, above all, our Organization. It is to our advantage in particular that the Organization should live and, step by step, fulfil the aspirations of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But I doubt whether it can survive the mounting contempt which will be heaped upon it by its enemies and the increasing doubts of its friends if even we, to whom the Organization means so much, are not prepared to make the sacrifice involved in paying the contributions which amount to no more than a few cents per head of our population. Like other smaller countries, Ireland's assessed share of the expenses of the United Nations is small compared to the other contributions we make to the Organization — the sacrifices and hardships suffered by our soldiers serving with the United Nations forces, our purchase of United Nations bonds, our contributions to the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, the World Food Programme, the International Refugee Organization and other voluntary funds. In comparison with these contributions, our assessed share of the expenses of the Organization is relatively small, amounting to no more than four cents per head of our population. The share of some other countries amounts to even less. Even in the case of Members with the highest capacity to pay, it does not exceed twenty-eight cents per head.
9. As we all know, however, the real cause of the difficulties which have arisen in the finances of the Organization is not the failure of smaller Members to meet their obligations, although indeed their defaults have contributed to the loss of confidence in the Organization which our financial difficulties have created. It is found rather in the deliberate refusal of some of the major Powers to pay their share of the costs of specific activities which the United Nations has undertaken even though in all cases these activities were embarked upon on the strength of decisions to which the permanent members of the Security Council positively or tacitly agreed in the Council, or which were taken by the appropriate majority of the General Assembly.
10. In signing the Charter, the smaller nations accepted, of course, the special position of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Legally, therefore, we have no grievance if any of them vetoes a decision approved by the requisite majority of the Council. Each of the permanent members is entitled under the Charter to veto in the Security Council any initiative to which it is opposed and to the cost of which, for that reason, it is not prepared to contribute. But it is quite wrong and altogether inadmissible that we should be asked to recognize a second veto, a financial veto, by means of which permanent members can later nullify decisions of the Security Council upon which they refused to exercise a voting veto, or by means of which they can defeat decisions of the appropriate majority of the Assembly when such decisions are in the course of implementation.
11. To cede such an uncovenanted veto to the major Powers, or any group of Powers, would not only introduce an element of constant uncertainty into the operations of the United Nations; it would risk bringing the Organization into dishonour. For this Organization would indeed be dishonoured if, when a small nation like the Congo accepts our pledged help and we dispatch gallant soldiers and officials in response to its appeal, we were then, owing to lack of a relatively paltry sum of money, to go back on our pledge to the Government concerned and to fail to support those who, in reliance on our good faith, have volunteered to serve the Organization in the face of difficulties and dangers.
12. I can appreciate the exasperation which any Member of this Organization must feel when its national policies are attacked and condemned here in the Assembly, often in what it may regard as unnecessarily provocative and rancorous terms. I can understand, too, the irritation of major Powers when they become dissatisfied with the implementation of decisions which they have failed to veto in the Security Council. I realize also the keen disappointment felt by any Power or group of Powers when they have been outvoted in the Assembly on what they regard as matters of vital interest to them. In all such cases there is a temptation to block the implementation of the decisions concerned, and for that purpose to seek to impose a financial veto on them by withholding contributions. But if Members are swayed by such considerations, the consequences for this Organization must surely be disastrous. Galling as it may be from time to time to abide by the will of the appropriate majority ascertained in the manner laid down in our Charter, abandonment of that orderly democratic principle can only result in the paralysis of the Organization and consequent chaos. Today it is a question of the Congo. If we do not persevere there, patiently and steadily, if we are driven to retreat or to take precipitate action because of lack of funds, what country in what continent will turn to the United Nations in the future with confidence in the value of its assistance?
13. I submit that Member States which, by withholding their contributions, would force the United Nations to betray the confidence of nations which have sought and received its help run the risk of forfeiting moral leadership in this Assembly and of greatly lessening their influence on our affairs. In any case, I submit that the rest of us are morally and legally bound by all means open to us to circumvent any attempt to reduce our Organization to financial impotence contrary to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Members and in clear breach of the letter and spirit of our Charter.
14. The question is, is there anything we can do to prevent a financial veto of the kind I have described being exercised on United Nations decisions in the course of their implementation? I think there is. In any event, I believe that the possibilities in this connexion should be carefully examined. I am firmly convinced that it is in the interest of the great Powers as well as of the small that we should agree upon financial procedures which will ensure that, once undertaken, operations such as the United Nations Emergency Force and the Congo will be adequately financed until such time as this Organization decides that their objects have been achieved.
15. I suggest that in view of the financial crisis looming over us we should undertake an urgent and comprehensive examination of our present budgetary procedures and see how best we can fit them to the needs of the United Nations today. I suggest that there are three possible ways open to us of making certain that the implementation of our decisions will at all times be assured of adequate financial support. The first and most desirable way is, of course, to persuade all Members to pay their annual assessments promptly. The second is to increase from time to time the Working Capital Fund to a sum more in keeping with the present level of the annual budget. There is a third method which seems to be worthy of examination — a method of last resort, a guarantee against any short-fall in the first two. It is to empower our Secretary-General on such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate to borrow in any financial year up to the full amount of the cost of implementing all the decisions of the United Nations in that year.
16. I recognize, of course, that the third suggestion would represent somewhat of a new departure in our budgetary system. In fact, however, it is by no means revolutionary or novel. Indeed it follows the normal budgetary procedures in many States. In my own country, for instance, when expenditure for the year has been decided on and the budget agreed to by my Parliament, the Minister for Finance is authorized to borrow up to the full amount of his commitments on such terms and conditions as he decides to be appropriate. In the event, of course, he never has to borrow anything like the full amount, as revenue from taxes and other receipts are constantly flowing into the exchequer. But this authorization, automatically included in the Appropriation Bill every year, promotes public confidence by affording the assurance that the Minister for Finance can fully meet his commitments during the financial year and carry out in an orderly fashion the social and economic programmes to which our Parliament has agreed. I believe that the Members of the United Nations must put the Organization in a similar position of financial stability and give it the assurance of being able to pursue its task amid the chances and changes of an uncertain world situation without the risk of finding itself obliged for financial reasons to suspend its activities or default in its undertakings and commitments.
17. The consideration and approval of the annual budget is, of course, a matter for the General Assembly. It is within the power of the membership as a whole, therefore, of the smaller countries as well as the larger, to ensure that the funds in the United Nations exchequer will at all times be sufficient to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and the Assembly. In my view it would help to ensure this if we set the amount of the Working Capital Fund at an appropriate level and provided the Secretary-General with emergency borrowing powers to be used in the last resort. There may be other means of achieving the same result; if so, let us examine them. Above all, let us take concrete measures to ensure that our efforts to keep the peace, to help developing countries, to evolve the rule of law and peace-keeping machinery, shall never be defeated through lack of funds. I believe that there are enough men and women of good will throughout the world prepared to make the necessary sacrifices so that that will never happen. With their support, and by our foresight and perseverance, we can at least deserve to succeed.