At the outset of what I have to say to the General Assembly I must refer briefly to the speech made yesterday by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Mr. Molotov’s speech indicated distrust and misunderstanding of the motives of the United States and of other Members of the United Nations. I do not believe that recriminations among nations allied in war and in peace promote that unity which Mr. Molotov so rightly points out is essential to the success of the United Nations.
In war we gave to our Allies all the help and co-operation a great nation could. In peace the “United States will support the United Nations with all the resources we possess”.
Our motives in war and peace we leave to the judgment of history. We fought for freedom side by side without recrimination. Can we not fight for peace side by side without recrimination? That closes the sad chapter so far as we are concerned.
I shall not participate in any exchange of recriminations.
We welcome the confidence expressed by Mr. Molotov that unanimous agreement among all the nations, both large and small, can be achieved on such vital matters as the control of atomic energy, and on steps to lighten the burden of armaments and military expenditures which still rests so heavily upon the peoples of the world.
The United States urges disarmament. The United States believes that Mr. Molotov’s proposal should be placed on our agenda and fully considered and discussed.
The initiative of the Soviet Union in this matter is appropriate, because of its mighty armies; just as the initiative of the United States was appropriate in proposing measures to prevent the manufacture and use of atomic weapons.
In November 1945 the United States took the initiative for outlawing the atomic bomb in the conversations at Washington among President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister Mackenzie King. At Moscow in December 1945, that is, in the following month, conversations were held between Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin on this same subject.
In this Assembly last January the resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission and establishing its terms of reference was unanimously adopted. Since then, in the Commission itself, the distinguished United States representative, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, has presented proposals expressing the policy of the President of the United States.
The United States goes further. As President Truman emphasized again last week, it attaches the greatest importance to reaching agreements that will remove the deadly fear of other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the same resolution passed by this Assembly.
So far as Mr. Molotov’s resolution concerns the regulation and reduction of other armaments, the whole world knows where the United States stands and has always stood in this matter. For twenty years before the war and in the fifteen months since the fighting stopped the United States has consistently been in the forefront of those striving to reduce the burden of armaments upon the peoples of the world. Since the end of the war in Europe and the Pacific the United States has progressively and rapidly reduced its military establishment.
After the last war we made the mistake of disarming unilaterally. We shall not repeat that mistake.
I he United States is prepared to co-operate fully with all the other Members of the United Nations in disarmament. It advocates effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violation and evasion.
We cannot reduce armaments merely by talking about the “regulation of armament and possible disarmament”, or the “heavy economic burden caused by excessive expenditures for armaments”. We cannot achieve it without positive acts which will establish the “peaceful post-war conditions” to which Mr. Molotov also referred.
Nor can a system for the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament, as contemplated in Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the Charter be effectively planned except in relation to progress in the negotiation of the armed forces agreements called for by Article 43.
At the beginning of April, four of the five members of the Military Staff Committee made specific proposals concerning the principles which should govern the negotiation of these agreements. In September, the Soviet Union submitted for the first time a statement of its views on the problem.
I am happy to note that Mr. Molotov referred to the work of the Military Staff Committee. I hope it will now be possible for this Committee to make rapid progress. The conclusion of these agreements, providing the Security Council with peace forces adequate to prevent acts of aggression, is essential to carrying out the objectives of Mr. Molotov’s resolution for the reduction of armaments.
Mr. Molotov also referred to Article 43 in connexion with the Soviet proposal concerning the presence of armed forces of the United Nations on foreign territories. He said, “In this connexion it is natural that the Security Council should know the actual situation, namely, where and what armed forces of the United Nations are situated at present outside the confines of their countries ... For its part the Soviet Union is prepared to submit this information to the Security Council.”
The Government of the United States understands Mr. Molotov’s statement to mean that the Soviet Union is fully prepared to report on its armed forces in ex-enemy States as well as in other foreign territories. Therefore the United States urges prompt fulfilment of this policy. The United States has nothing to hide with regard to its armed forces at home or abroad. The United States will promptly fulfil that policy. In no case are the United States forces in friendly countries except with the consent of those countries.
It is our opinion that the proposed enquiry should include all mobilized armed forces, whether at home or abroad.
The President of the United States in his address to the General Assembly at its opening meeting defined the policies of the United States toward the United Nations and the work of the Assembly.
As the general debate has progressed, I have been increasingly moved by the potentialities that I perceive in this Assembly for advancing toward real and lasting peace.
Its members have pointed to the vision of President Truman of a “peace with justice for all; justice for small nations and for large nations and justice for individuals without distinction as to race, creed or colour — a peace that will advance, not retard, the attainment of the four freedoms”.
United in this aspiration, as we appear to be, we are united in service. From disagreement we forge agreement. From free and frank discussion of differing points of view we extract the degree of unity necessary for constructive action. It would help us if we should always make our chief concern what is right, not who is right.
There is an injunction contained in the Constitution of Vermont, my native state. It calls for “a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles”. It seems to me, that before this general debate comes to an end, it would be helpful for us all to recur to the fundamental principles of the United Nations.
The reports that we have before us from the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council refer to some discouraging things and many difficulties in the record of the United Nations during the past year. Some of the speakers have referred at length to these disappointments and difficulties.
To me the real story related by these reports is the immense sum of accomplishment and agreement that the United Nations has achieved in one year under all the handicaps of a world in turmoil and just emerging from the disasters and desolation of the war.
In one year we have advanced towards a rule of world law and have created institutions for international action far beyond the dreams of any one of us as recently as 1 September 1939, 22 June 1941, and 7 December 1941.
Let us review the theory and practice of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, their powers and their work, without evasion, but let us review them in perspective and as a whole and in relation to the powers and work of all the other agencies and institutions of the United Nations.
Australia and Cuba have proposed discussion of Article 27 of the Charter, relating to voting procedures in the Security Council. Let us consider Article 27, but let us consider it in relation to the other one hundred and ten Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. We cannot tear Article 27 from its context.
A recurrence to first principles of the United Nations starts with the necessity for unity of the large nations on matters essential to the maintenance. of peace among the nations, both great and small.
I recall to the. Assembly that the spirit of unity of the nations which became permanent members of the Security Council animated the nativity of the United Nations. The united and co-ordinated action of the great Powers in winning the war and in generating the principle of an international organization for security and peace, based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving nations both great and small, was the travail of the United Nations.
The remedy for the labour pains at Moscow, at Dumbarton Oaks, at Yalta and at San Francisco was the unanimity of the Great Powers. The principle of unanimity in essential matters reflects the realities of the world as it is today. At the same time it provides the basis for a lasting peace during which all nations can, we hope, work together towards transforming the kind of world we have today into a true world society for tomorrow. Certainty of the abolition of war depends upon co-operation by all countries competent to wage war.
The, United Nations was created with the purpose of making it unnecessary for the civilized world to resort again to the ultimate sanction of war against an aggressor, with all its bloody sacrifices and terrible costs to humanity. Towards the fulfilment of this purpose the Security Council has been assigned a limited part of the responsibilities placed upon the United Nations by the Charter.
Let me remind you that Article 1 of Chapter I of the Charter lists four purposes of the United Nations and of these the primary responsibility for only the first, to maintain international peace and security, rests with the Security Council.
The other purposes as stated by the Charter are:
“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
“To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
“To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.”
The primary responsibility for the fulfilment of these other purposes rests with the other organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and the specialized agencies related to the central organization. The International Court of Justice has the responsibility of applying international law established by the United Nations Charter, and in other ways, as it is progressively extended by the nations in the new agreements they will reach through the continuing use of all the other organs of the United Nations.
These are the tasks of building the basis for a peaceful world society; the political basis, the economic basis, the social and cultural basis, the basis of knowledge and understanding, the basis of law.
Of all the institutions of the United Nations the General Assembly is by its constitutional functions and its potentialities the most important. It has responsibility for carrying out all the purposes of the United Nations.
The General Assembly is the supreme deliberative body of the world community. Although it is not a legislative body enacting laws which must be obeyed by the Member States, it exercises great responsibilities and wields great power.
The Assembly is responsible for carrying out the organization of the United Nations as laid down by the Charter. It has already accomplished at the first part of this session many of these organizational tasks.
The Assembly also has the power of the purse. This is a vital power in any governmental entity. Its control of the budget will become more significant as the activities of the United Nations are increased by the addition of new functions and the expansion of existing programmes.
The General Assembly wields power primarily as the voice of the conscience of the world. Its recommendations have behind them the intangible force of the international community. The peace-loving States which are Members of the United Nations will not lightly disregard or flout recommendations of the General Assembly which express the will of an alert and aroused world opinion. Even when it makes no recommendations, its power of discussion, under Articles 10, 11, and 14, of any matter within the scope of the Charter and of any situation, regardless of origin, which may impair the general welfare, is one of the most constructive functions of the whole Organization. By discussion it can clarify the issues and promote mutual understanding among the nations and peoples of the world.
Under the broad and flexible construction of the Charter which the United States wishes to develop, we foresee a great and expanding area of operations for the General Assembly. I need not quote in detail the broad range of the Assembly’s competence as it is established in Chapter IV of the Charter: in questions involving the maintenance of peace and security, international political and legal co-operation, the coordination of international activities in economic, social, educational and health matters, and in the domain of the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. In all these fields, the General Assembly speaks as the voice of all the United Nations, and establishes the general goals or objectives towards which the Organization and all its component parts will move.
The General Assembly must also exercise definitive powers such as the determination of the location of the headquarters, and the approval of agreements relating to the powers of the organs and special agencies of the United Nations.
The General Assembly will, we believe, explore new fields of activity as time goes on, and as functions which may not be specifically provided for in the Charter, but which are not precluded by the Charter, are entrusted to it by the Members of the United Nations. The General Assembly has only just begun its career as the most broadly representative organ of the United Nations. The final extent of its development cannot even be foreseen at this time; but there can be no doubt that it has a vast and increasingly important position to fill in the international community.
These possibilities will be realized to the extent that the Assembly exercises its very broad competence in strict accordance with the fundamental purpose of the United Nations set forth in paragraph 4, Article 1: “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” The Assembly’s recommendations, particularly under Articles 10, 11, 13 and 14, can greatly extend and develop the rule of law among nations, provided its recommendations are such that they are generally accepted and carried out by the Member States.
All the actions of the Assembly in these broad fields are taken in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, which provides that, on important matters, a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting shall be required, while other questions are settled by a simple majority of the Members present and voting.
It is obvious that recommendations of the Assembly will be effective in proportion to the size of the majority by which they are adopted.
As in the case of other organs of the United Nations, it is better for the Assembly to go to great lengths to attain, or at least approach, unanimity than it is to enact resolutions over the opposition of a large dissenting group.
The United Nations Charter recognizes the transcending importance to world peace of close co-operation in the economic and social field. In the Economic and Social Council, its subsidiary bodies and the specialized agencies being brought into relationship with the Council, the United Nations has already created a far more effective and comprehensive institutional structure for these purposes than the world has ever seen before.
In a recent address the Honourable John G. Winant, United States representative on the Economic and Social Council, said: “Peace, if it is to be real and lasting, means more than resolving conflicts between nations. It means positive action to lift the levels of human welfare … now, in our age peace cannot be secured by political action unaccompanied by economic cooperation. If we are not to drift backward to catastrophe, we must go forward together towards a fuller life for all peoples everywhere.”
We Americans represent many races and came from many countries. We could not have built one nation out of many peoples and have learned to live as good neighbours and members of one community without the opportunities for a decent life and rising standards of living that nature and the course of history have given us, or without the spirit of the golden rule to guide our conduct towards each other.
We, the representatives of the United Nations, can never forget that wars find their breeding ground in poverty, ignorance and hunger. That is what gives aggressors their chance. Strong men gain power by contrasting a proposed new order with the old one. We cannot build a peaceful world without higher standards of living and greater opportunities for all peoples.
Decisions in the Economic and Social Council are taken by a simple majority vote, but here, as in the Assembly, the constant effort has been, and should continue to be, to achieve the greatest possible degree of unanimity, rather than to achieve victories based on narrow majority votes. It is not votes that count, but agreements that are or will become universally acceptable because they are necessary and right for the peoples of the world.
Considering that the Council has been at work for less than one year, it has achieved a remarkable record. Like the other organs, its organizational work has been a necessary preliminary towards making it possible for the United Nations to move ahead towards the realization of the purpose set forth in Article 55 of the Charter: “higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development”.
At this session of the Assembly we are called. upon to examine and approve agreements which bring four important specialized agencies into relationship with the United Nations: the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
In the constructive work of the specialized agencies, the decisions of their policy-making bodies are for the most part taken by a simple or two-thirds majority.
The great flexibility of the constitutional structure of the United Nations will facilitate the development of other special agencies for international action as their creation becomes wise and feasible. Each of these agencies can be endowed by its own charter with powers in its own field as great as the community of nations is willing to give and as necessity compels it to give.
The proposal of the United States with respect to the establishment of an international atomic development authority is an example of what could be done in this way. We propose that the charter of this authority shall endow it with power sufficient to ensure that atomic energy will be developed and used for peaceful purposes only, and that complying States will be protected against the hazards of violations and evasions. This is in accordance with the Assembly’s resolution of last January.
I wish also to make clear at this point that the position which I am taking today in regard to the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council is entirely consistent with the position taken by the United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, who has repeatedly made clear that the United States proposals regarding control of atomic energy do not attack the general requirement for unanimity of the permanent members in the Security Council.
The International Court of Justice is now established as one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is potentially one of the greatest of international institutions. It is given a clearly defined role in the process of pacific settlement, namely, that of deciding disputes of a legal character which States submit to it. The Court has a second, and even greater function. It stands as the institutional symbol of the rule of law in international relations.
Progress is being made through increasing acceptances of the Court’s jurisdiction under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. By accepting compulsory jurisdiction over justiciable disputes, the nations give practical recognition to the principle of the supremacy of law. I am proud that the United States has been among the first to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the present court.
Progress is also being made by widening the scope of matters which may be deemed legal, and limiting the questions regarded as political and non-justiciable. This is being accomplished through the willingness of States to accept solutions based on law, and to co-operate in the development of peaceful judicial procedures which can ensure that the law will be based on justice and equity.
The Charter of the United Nations and the ( constitutions of the specialized agencies form a network of legal obligations which guide and regulate the dealings of States with each other, as well as the actions of the international community.
By Article 13 of the Charter the General Assembly is specifically charged with the task of initiating studies and making recommendations for the further development of international law. But the establishment of standards of justice and equity for the international community is the concern of all the organs and related agencies of the United Nations. Every recommendation that is ratified by the Member governments as a convention, agreement or treaty, becomes part of the law of nations.
There is another provision of the Charter to which I wish to call the Assembly’s attention; that is Article 99, which gives to the Secretary-General, in addition to his wide administrative powers, unprecedented political responsibilities. Under Article 99, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace.
While the ultimate significance of this grant of political authority remains in large part to be determined by future events, I believe that the less patient critics of the United Nations might do well to consider the full implications of this authority.
We need not await its full implementation to recognize that the power of the Secretary-General to study conditions which in his opinion threaten the peaceful relations of the Members of the United Nations and to make recommendations based on his findings, represents a significant departure from the usual concepts of international organization and national sovereignty.
The Secretary-General’s right of access to the forces of public opinion, even if we adopt such a restricted interpretation of this authority, is a vital responsibility which distinguishes the United Nations from its predecessor international organizations.
Less obvious, but perhaps equally important, is the function of the Secretary-General and his staff to serve as a cohesive and co-ordinating force in the preparation of studies and proposals for the several organs, by suggesting compromises or techniques for dealing with matters under discussion and by acting as an intermediary or conciliator. Many of these activities will never be a part of the official record, but the ability of the Secretary-General and of his staff to function effectively in this manner will have an important bearing on the development of the United Nations.
Members of the United Nations are pledged under the Charter to accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote the interests and well-being of the inhabitants of all Non-Self-Governing Territories. In addition, the Charter provides for a trusteeship system for such territories as may be placed under it by agreement. The human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Charter apply equally to all peoples; to peoples who do not yet govern themselves as well as to those who do.
Draft trusteeship agreements have been submitted to this Assembly by nations administering League of Nations mandates. The United States hopes that a sufficient number of these agreements will be approved by the Assembly to make possible the immediate establishment of the Trusteeship Council and the trusteeship system. The structure of the United Nations cannot be completed until this is done.
The fullest possible implementation of the Charter provisions that deal with all Non-Self-Governing peoples is just as important as implementation of the trusteeship system itself. In its first years at least, the trusteeship system will probably apply to only a small percentage of the Non-Self-Governing Territories.
The provisions of the Charter recognize that the economic, social and political development of dependent peoples towards their full participation in the family of nations must be advanced if peace is to be made secure. The Charter and the institutions of the United Nations provide greater opportunities to that end than dependent peoples have ever had before.
In considering both the Australian proposal and the Cuban proposal in this Assembly we bear in mind the whole constitutional and institutional structure of the United Nations and their relationship to the political realities of today and the political necessities of tomorrow.
These proposals are directed against paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter. This provides that on all except procedural matters, decisions of the Security Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with one important exception; that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting in decisions relating to the pacific settlement of the dispute. In decisions under Chapter VII relating to enforcement action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is absolute. There is no exception in matters of enforcement.
The principle of unanimity of the great Powers has from the first, and by general agreement, been limited in its application as a voting procedure to matters essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter requires unanimity of the major powers only in substantive decisions by the Security Council. There is no requirement for unanimity in the Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council and in the Trusteeship Council. Similarly, the Statute of the International Court of Justice specifically provides for decisions by majority vote. The United Nations specialized agencies do not require unanimity of the major Powers.
This does not mean that unanimity, or the closest possible approximation to it, is not to be desired and striven for in all these agencies. It means only that it was not deemed essential to apply the principle to the voting procedures. Tire greatest possible degree of agreement in all these organs and agencies is most important, for through them laws and customs of the international community are made.
These organs and agencies do not have the power to enforce the law. That power rests with the Security Council and that is the reason why the Members of the United Nations applied the principle of unanimity to the voting procedures of the Security Council and not to the voting procedures in any of the other institutions of the United Nations.
The large nations that are permanent members of the Security Council possess the power to keep peace in the world, to enforce observance of the law. The Charter does not give them that power. It recognizes that power and places obligations upon these nations to use it in accordance with the law.
The unanimity requirement in the Security Council does not relieve the permanent members from any of the responsibilities and obligations they have assumed under the Charter.
I have heard it said by critics of the unanimity formula that it legalizes aggression by a permanent member because that member can prevent enforcement action against itself. Of course, this formula does no such thing.
The permanent members are bound legally and morally in the same degree as all other Members of the United Nations, “to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”. In the same degree as all the other Members they are bound to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. These sweeping and binding commitments are not limited by the power of veto in the Security Council. The veto does not legalize any violations of these commitments. They are the law.
No Member of the United Nations can be permitted to ignore the fact that, as Secretary Byrnes said on 28 February 1946, “the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not in fact relieve any State, large or small, of its moral obligations to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter”. Nor does the failure of any organ of the United Nations to take a decision relieve any Member of that obligation.
Besides being bound by the law of the United Nations Charter, twenty-three nations, including the United States, Soviet Russia, the United Kingdom and France, are also bound by the law of the charter of the Nürnberg tribunal. It makes planning or waging a war of aggression a crime against humanity for which individuals as well as nations can be brought before the bar of international justice, tried and punished.
It is true that if one of the great Powers violates the law of the Charter and the law of Nürnberg tribunal against aggression there is, ultimately, only one way to enforce the law, and that is by a major war. That, however, would be just as true if the Charter did not require unanimity in the Security Council. A decision involving military measures against one or more of the permanent members by other permanent members would not be a decision for police action as the Charter contemplates it, but for war.
I believe I have made clear the reasons why the United States considers that unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in action by the Council concerned with the enforcement of peace is wise and necessary at this stage in the development of the international community.
Criticism of Article 27 is directed particularly at the fact that the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members extends to decisions concerning peaceful settlement as well as to enforcement action.
It is true that the requirement of unanimity tends to reduce the speed of action of the Security Council and increases the difficulties in the way of adopting a clear-cut decision. It may even prevent action which might peacefully settle a dispute.
On the other hand, the unanimity requirement tends to discourage the taking of intransigent positions and to encourage the achievement of agreement through compromise. Certainty is better than speed. In the long run important decisions unanimously accepted by the permanent members are likely to produce better results than decisions which find the permanent members divided. The unanimity requirement, properly applied, prevents the Security Council from being progressively committed to a course of action inconsistent with the vital interests of any permanent member.
It was these latter considerations, among others, that prevailed at San Francisco. In the Four Power Statement of 7 June, 1945, to which France later agreed, the permanent members took the position that substantive decisions on peaceful settlement require the concurrence of the permanent members of the Council because of the possible consequences of those decisions. It was believed they might have major political repercussions and might initiate a chain of events which in the end would require the Security Council to invoke measures of enforcement under Chapter VII.
It was held that since the Council cannot take enforcement action without the concurrence of all the permanent members, it might endanger the effectiveness of the Council’s work, if decisions under Chapter VI that might lead to the necessity for enforcement action under Chapter VII were taken by a vote which found the permanent members divided.
Despite the attitude of the five Powers and the decisions made at San Francisco, which I have described, the United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable, at some time in the future in full agreement among themselves and with other members, to support modification of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under Chanter VI.
However, a case for amendment of the Charter ought not be made on the basis of so brief an. experience. The United States is opposed to amendment of Article 27 of the Charter at this time.
We must recognize that during the first nine months the Security Council has laboured in unusually difficult circumstances. In its infancy, before it had established its rules and its precedents, the Council was forced to consider substantial differences among the permanent members about problems arising directly from the war.
We must remember that the Security Council, and the United Nations as a whole, was not intended to deal with the peace settlements that must be made as a result of the war. These settlements, both with the ex-enemy States and among the major Allies themselves, were left to separate negotiation. Until they have been made, differences among the major Allies about the terms of settlement will inevitably handicap the work of the Security Council. As these settlements are made, we can expect that the areas of present disagreement among the permanent members will be greatly reduced.
The United States does recognize that there is room for improvement in the operations of the Security Council. There is room for improvement in the application of Article 27 and of the Four Power Statement in the Security Council. There can be little doubt that a number of the difficulties which have arisen could have been avoided if the voting formula adopted at San Francisco had been more fully and clearly defined. There has been confusion and misunderstanding both within and without the Security Council.
Necessary action by the Council for the peaceful settlement of a dispute should never be prevented by the votes of any one or any number of its members, permanent or non-permanent. In this connexion, we should not forget that the non-permanent members possess six votes in the Council, and that at least two of these votes are always necessary to action by the Council.
Restraint and self-discipline to avoid doing anything contrary to the letter or spirit of the Charter arc essential in the application of the voting formula. This is one of the greatest challenges to conduct if we are to give to the United Nations strength for peace.
A programme of interpretation and application of the voting principles which will facilitate and not hinder peaceful settlements should be pursued. Here is where clarification through discussion, definition, and regulation and practice are necessary to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of the Charter. This is a United States policy.
We would not have today the laws and the institutions of the United Nations without the unanimous agreement of the great Powers and the general agreement of all nations. We must continue that unity.
As they stand, these laws and institutions offer in their entirety far greater possibilities for the establishment of a just and lasting peace than humanity has ever known before.
We have hardly begun to explore and to exploit these possibilities. That they are virtually limitless can be perceived the moment we stand back far enough to get perspective.
The Charter and the institutions of the United Nations reflect the greatest common denominator of agreement now realizable in a world of sovereign States, with differences in ideology, political and economic systems, and cultural and social traditions.
Science and technology are uniting the world as it has never been united before. Fears and suspicions must not continue to divide the peoples of the world. i We must use the institutions and laws of the United Nations to banish these fears and suspicions. So far as we succeed in doing this we shall succeed in creating a world society and a world rule of law in which the veto will wither away.
This may take a long time. But there is no short cut, no magic formula, by which we can escape the price of peace. Only by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles will we give to the Charter a living spirit in the moral sense of nations and of the human race.