Unfortunately, I was not able to be present when the election for the office of President of the General Assembly took place. I should like, therefore, to take this opportunity to pay my tribute to the charm and devotion to duty of the President’s predecessor, Mrs. Pandit, during her tenure of office. We are delighted that she is to represent her country in London. At the same time I should like to offer my congratulations to the President and to his country, upon his election. We know that he will discharge the duties of his high office with skill and wisdom.
22. This general debate gives us a unique opportunity for the exchange of views and the development of ideas about foreign affairs. Many interesting and eloquent speeches, worthy of thought and study have been made. May I, in the early part of my speech, say that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, deeply regrets that he cannot be here. Last year in the general debate, as his convalescence was ending, I said that the whole world would have have cause to rejoice when his wisdom and experience were again at the service of the cause of peace. I think that the last twelve months have certainly proved the truth of that statement. Unfortunately, man has not yet learned how, in his attempts to master time and space, to be in two places at the same time, and Mr. Eden’s presence in London during the last few days, as I think everyone will understand, has been essential. Therefore, he has not been able to take part in the general debate, but he does hope that an opportunity may present itself for him to come here later in the session.
23. I shall begin with a review of events since last year’s general debate. It has always been our belief that there is no single formula for peace. It is too much to expect that all the complicated problems of this troubled world should be settled in one comprehensive agreement. We have to tackle our problems one by one, and I should like to adopt that principle in reviewing the past twelve months.
24. First of all, Korea, which was very much in our thoughts this time last year, affords us negative cause for satisfaction. There has been no fighting during the last twelve months. We have not still to talk about the future of large numbers of prisoners of war. The armistice is in force. It has proved possible to reduce foreign troops. A political conference took place in Geneva. It did not reach agreement, but no discussions about Korean affairs have ever reached agreement on the first attempt, and failure to agree now does not mean that there never will be agreement. Time may prove the necessary solvent.
25. I think everyone feels that there must be no more fighting, that unification must be achieved by peaceful means. The Western Powers, the countries which sent troops to fight under the United Nations flag in Korea, believe in unification on the basis of elections in which there will be genuine freedom of choice by the individual elector, who will be free in fact as well as in name. That will require, at least, impartial international supervision of the elections, and the United Kingdom Government will continue to work for that objective. We are not prepared to compromise upon that. We cannot see why that international supervision should not be under the auspices of this Organization. We hope for the resumption of negotiations between the appropriate parties at the appropriate time; that is to say, at a time when there is hope of some real progress. We feel that there is no point in hurrying further discussions which may be used solely for propaganda purposes. So much for Korea.
26. Then there are the problems of Germany and Austria. Last January and February a four-Power Conference was held in Berlin. It did not reach agreement. The position of the Western Powers was clear. They stood for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections throughout the whole of Germany under some kind of international supervision. A unified Germany would thereby be brought into being which would have the necessary authority to negotiate and sign a peace treaty. This would lay the foundation for a settlement in Central Europe. The Soviet Union Government took a precisely opposite view. It maintained that the first step was to bring into being an all-German Government which would be a coalition between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Communist authorities in Eastern Germany. A peace treaty would be negotiated and signed with this coalition government and elections would follow at some later, unspecified date, under no form of international supervision. We were convinced that, if this plan were accepted, not only would it be extremely difficult to negotiate the peace treaty, but elections would have been delayed on one pretext or another until the Communist Party was in a position of “fix” them, as other elections have been “fixed” before, with consequences of which we are all aware. Therefore, agreement on that basis was impossible for us.
27. With regard to Austria, as Mr. Dulles has pointed out [475th meeting], we were prepared to sign a State treaty accepting the Soviet Union version of the five articles whose text had not yet been agreed upon between the four Powers. Unhappily, this was not accepted. The Soviet Union Government was unwilling to agree to any arrangements which would provide for the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Austria. It accordingly put forward new and, what were to us, unacceptable conditions for the signature of the treaty. First, the Soviet Union Government wished to amend the draft treaty in such a way as to restrict Austria’s right to choose its friends, and, secondly, to add a proviso which would allow foreign troops to remain in Austria until the German treaty was signed. In putting forward this last proposal, the Soviet Union Government added, as part of it, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Vienna. As Vienna is within the Soviet zone of occupation, the implication is obvious. There has accordingly been no treaty, and Austria remains occupied.
28. Mr. Vyshinsky made the strange allegation on 30 September [484th meeting] that the Western Powers had wasted two years by putting forward an abridged treaty and, therefore, were to blame in the matter. I do not want to enter into the whole history of the Austrian question, but inaccurate statements have to be rebutted. Briefly, the facts are that in 1952, unable to reach agreement on a longer draft of a State treaty, on which agreement had proved impossible owing to the attitude of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers put forward the draft of a shortened treaty confined to eight articles relevant to the single issue of the restoration of Austrian independence and the withdrawal of occupation troops. The Soviet Union Government rejected this draft, alleging that it failed to make provision for the protection of human rights in Austria, democratic government, and the suppression of Nazi activities. The Western Powers then offered to cover these matters in the shortened treaty, if that would secure Soviet Union agreement; but this effort was in vain. The Soviet Union Government refused and, therefore, as I have stated, in a final effort to reach agreement, the Western Powers at Berlin eventually announced their willingness to accept the Soviet version of every one of the unagreed parts of the longer treaty; but again,, that was in vain. Austria remains occupied. We deplore that fact and have nothing but admiration for the courage and patience of the Austrian people.
29. The Berlin Conference did not produce a settlement of either the German or the Austrian problem for reasons which I have just outlined. It was, however conducted with courtesy and good temper. The attitudes of the parties were clearly defined. The Conference, in spite of the failure to agree, lessened, rather than increased, world tension. It paved the way for the Geneva Conference.
30. During the past year the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was constituted in accordance with the General Assembly’s resolution of 28 November 1953 [715 (VIII)] and met in private in London during May and June. It held some nineteen meetings, and was certainly the fullest international discussion on disarmament at which I have been present. A frank and useful exchange of views took place, a number of constructive and, I think, valuable proposals on various aspects of disarmament were made by the representatives of the Western. Powers. I shall say more about them later.
31. Then there is Indo-China. The Geneva Conference brought to an end fighting which had gone on for many years. The terms of that settlement were not perfect, but they were terms which both sides could and did accept. Her Majesty’s Government hopes that as a result of this settlement the Associated States will be able to take their place among the nations of the free world as fully sovereign States. We hope that they will be able to build their national independence and prosperity in peace, and that their efforts towards this end will not be marred by interference from their powerful neighbor. The Geneva Conference, without doubt, also contributed to the lessening of international tension.
32. Progress has been made during the past twelve months in another South-East Asian matter, the evacuation of Chinese nationalist troops from Burma. Her Majesty’s present Government in the United Kingdom has thought from the time it took office three years ago that the presence of these troops in Burma was a real danger to peace. Thanks to the proceedings in the United Nations, and thanks to the Joint Military Committee in Bangkok, constituted as the result of action here, large numbers of Kuomintang troops have been evacuated. The task has yet to be completed, but without doubt progress has been made and tension eased.
33. I come now to the Middle East, where, during the events of the past twelve months, the United Kingdom Government has made great efforts to play its part in trying to produce a better atmosphere. Disputes which were damaging some of Britain’s traditional friendships have been solved, or are on the way to being solved.
34. In Iran, agreement has been reached over oil by means of a settlement which takes into account both the national aspirations and rights of the Iranian people and other legitimate interests. On personal grounds, too, it gives me great pleasure that friendly relations between the United Kingdom and Iran have been restored. One of the most respected figures at these meetings is our former President, Mr. Entezam, the representative of Iran, I am very happy that our personal friendship, maintained throughout the two last difficult years, has once again become public and formal.
35. Secondly, we have initialled the heads of an agreement with the Egyptian Government which we hope will shortly be embodied in a formal treaty. We have had many ties of friendship with Egypt in the past. In the last six or seven years, however, our relations had steadily grown worse because of the dispute over the base in the Canal Zone. Here, also, we believe that the terms of the new treaty will have regard to the national aspirations and rights of the Egyptian people and, at the same time, be of solid worth in the defence of the whole area; and, not less important, it will provide a basis upon which Anglo-Egyptian relations can once more develop in friendship.
36. Thirdly, an agreement has been reached between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of neighbouring rulers, about methods of settling troublesome boundary disputes which had been causing much bad feeling.
37. We are all aware of the many difficult and pressing problems which still remain to be solved in the Middle East, but I think that the four countries concerned, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, are entitled to take credit for having made great efforts, helped by friendly nations, to arrive at settlements of the disputes to which I have referred.
38. An outstanding event of the past twelve months has been President Eisenhower’s atomic energy proposals. This generous conception was a constructive attempt to break down the barriers which have so far prevented the international use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Of course the plan is not, and could not be, a solution of the disarmament problem. But by creating an international relationship on the question of atomic energy — a degree of co-operation in one field — this proposal, if acted upon in good faith, is bound, in our view, to contribute to a general lessening of tension and to progress on disarmament itself.
39. I can only regret the reaction of the Soviet Government to the plan up to very recently. It has seemed unwilling to consider it on its merits, apart from the general question of atomic disarmament and the unconditional ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, on 25 May, at the eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London, Mr. Yakov Malik said; “Thus this proposal would not only fail to halt the atomic armaments race but would lead to its intensification.” No amount of explanation by the United States representative caused Mr. Malik to modify this rather curious proposition, which he reiterated on more than one occasion, and this, I think, could only be interpreted as a rejection of President Eisenhower’s proposals. I can only hope that as a result of our debates in the Assembly the Soviet Government will now be convinced of the desirability of co-operating and participating in this great work.
40. So much for the developments of the past twelve months.
41. There are still plenty of dangers to peace. Apart from divided Austria, divided Germany and divided Korea there are difficulties in carrying out the Indo-China settlement. There is the present situation off the coast of China. There are the tragic differences between Israel and the Arab States. The past year has been one of almost unparalleled natural disasters; floods, earthquakes and typhoons have caused so much loss to so many. And the grim spectres of hunger, poverty and disease still range over much of the world’s surface and trouble the conscience of mankind. From time to time there comes to our ears the distant rumble of one nuclear explosion after another, from one side of the iron curtain or the other.
42. Therefore, complacency would be absurd. On the other hand, pessimism can be overdone. Let us not overlook the items, some of which I have sought to recount, where solid progress has been made. I submit that the record of achievement that I have outlined is not a bad one, and on balance, in my belief, the chances of a third world war have receded during the past twelve months — I repeat, have receded.
43. Even with regard to nuclear weapons, it is as well that the public should have the sombre facts brought to mind. My own view is that, whatever the weapons used, another world war will be the end of civilization. If, as a result of all the talk about nuclear weapons, the world realizes that fact, so much the better. One of the reasons for which, quite apart from the political and military arguments, I have always opposed the banning of one particular weapon in isolation is the implication that, thereby, in some way we are making another world war Safe for humanity. I do not believe that at all; I think it is complete nonsense. When it is everywhere understood that recourse to war is going to mean the complete destruction of both sides, may that not be the supreme deterrent to war which has hitherto been lacking?
44. Our task, therefore, is to consider how we can consolidate such gains as have been made, and how we can maintain the momentum towards a more peaceful world. In this assessment, in the assessment of the possibilities of doing this, the role of the United Nations is a very important factor. The Secretary-General has referred in his valuable and thoughtful annual report [A/2663] to the dangers of neglecting United Nations machinery for the discussion aw settlement of problems affecting the peace of the world. I agree with other representatives who have referred to this aspect that the position of the United Nations must not be weakened.
45. I ventured to suggest a year ago [443rd meeting] that the role of United Nations is threefold. First, there is the role which the United Nations should play to maintain international peace and security by taking effective collective measures, in the words of the Charter, “for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”. Second, there is the role which the United Nations should play as a conciliator in the settlement of disputes and disagreements which, if left to themselves, may lead to a breach of the peace. Third, there is the role which the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, should play as a world forum for the debate of current issues falling within its competence.
46. With regard to the first role: in the Security Council, the Soviet Union has applied its veto on many occasions — Korea, of course, was an exceptional case — to prevent action in disputes which affect sometimes only in the most indirect way the interests of the Soviet Union itself, action which would have had on frequent occasions the unanimous support of all other members of the Security Council. I am not seeking to praise or to blame; I am merely stating facts. I think this has to be remembered when Mr. Vyshinsky sheds, as he did on Thursday, what I think we can only describe as crocodile tears about the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. But the effect of all those vetoes, the effect of the Soviet Government’s policy in the Security Council, has been to force the rest of the world to rely more than was originally intended upon such collective self-defence arrangements, based upon Article 51 of the Charter, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As I have said, I am not seeking to praise or to blame. I am just giving the course of events: one action has led to the other. When I talk of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization based on Article 51, I am not dealing with matters falling within the scope of Article 52. But it is a fact that in present circumstances it is upon the existence of effective arrangements under Article 51 that our hopes for the maintenance of world peace must in the main be founded.
47. In the second role, that of promoting conciliation, our Organization, and particularly the General Assembly, has been more effective. It is true that many of the more important negotiations of the post-war period have been held outside the United Nations. A number of them have been successful. Well, there is nothing wrong in that, because Members are indeed enjoined, in Article 33 of the Charter, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Thus it is quite right that Member States should make use of one or another of these various methods of settling differences. When they succeed, using those methods, United Nations aims are achieved also. But the Assembly has itself contributed in a number of cases, and contributed decisively.
48. Thirdly, there is the role of the United Nations as a world forum. It is possible through our Assembly, to mobilize, world opinion on an issue. We all remember how, at the seventh session, after long and arduous debate, the Assembly adopted resolution 610 (VII) about Korean prisoners of war originally proposed by India. This undoubtedly paved the way for a settlement, at a later date, of a hitherto intractable problem. Our debates therefore may not have an immediate result, but they can certainly prepare the way for ultimate settlements.
49. Of course, in the view of the United Kingdom, it is not wise even for a world assembly to indulge in unlimited debate on every topic. I have had words to say upon that matter already during the course of this session. The Assembly, in our view, should debate only matters which are within its competence and which it is wise to debate. I will not reiterate the dangers of any alternative course, but they are real.
50. There is a further, most important aspect of United Nations work. Many speakers have mentioned it and none, so far as I know, has failed to praise it. I refer to the work of the specialized agencies and other similar bodies. We warmly support this work, we are conscious of its value, and we are sympathetically considering the extent of our support. I have spoken at greater length upon these matters in previous years, but let no one think that the compactness of my reference this year shows any diminution of United Kingdom regard for this work or of our realization that there can be no real stability in the world until standards of living are progressively improved throughout the whole world. I am certain that all of us listened with great interest to the most thoughtful remarks of the representative of Venezuela just now upon that matter.
51. But, before seeking to determine the progress which we are likely to make in the next twelve months, we have to put to ourselves the question which I raised in my speech in the general debate last year and which, judging by the speeches this year, still perplexes most delegations: what is really in the minds of the rulers of the Soviet Union when they express a desire for peaceful coexistence?
52. Mr. Vyshinsky said quite a lot about it in his speech. He reaffirmed the Soviet wish for coexistence. He rejected the idea that it was just tactics, or the desire for a breathing-space. I am afraid that many people, as has been shown by the course of this debate, still have grave anxiety upon the matter and do fear that the basic aim of the Soviet is still world revolution. One thing is clear: that we have as yet no proof that the aim is peace in the real sense of the word. There have been indications of a desire for lessening of tension. The Soviet co-operation at Geneva was an example of that. The tone at international discussions like those at Berlin and Geneva has improved. Some minor agreements have been possible. Courtesies have been extended. Travel restrictions have been modified.
53. On the other hand, the propaganda and the name calling continue. We have again had in Mr. Vyshinsky’s speeches all the old stuff about “fascist beasts”, “United States bullies”, “Wall Street monopolists”, “aggressive blocs”, and again we have had misrepresentation of our objectives and our actions. These statements were sadly out of tune with any idea of progress in the field of disarmament. But no doubt they will be repeated a thousandfold in the various organs of Communist propaganda. I beg the rulers of the Soviet Union to believe that that sort of language is not in accordance with our mood here at this Assembly — the mood of dedication to the cause of peace. There continues to be the wildest misrepresentation about living conditions in the free world. Communist Parties everywhere, whether in Europe, Africa or Asia, seek to infiltrate, to subvert, to overthrow. Methods vary, but the aim is constant: it is called “the creation of a revolutionary situation” — in other words, the bringing into disrepute and disarray of all existing forms of government, all forms of social and economic organization, other than the Communist system. Every government this side of the iron curtain has experienced this. An attitude of neutrality between East and West is no protection.
54. It cannot be denied that the inspiration — and a good deal more — comes from Moscow and Peking. There are disturbing reports of activities all along the southern borders of China, to which reference has already been made. The situation in Laos, for example, is disquieting. A Communist-front youth organization met in Peking last month to discuss the struggle for what was called “national liberation”, not only in non-self-governing territories but also, so they said, in India, Burma and Indonesia. We know that such a meeting could only take place if it was in accord with government policy — for, if we know anything, I think we know that spontaneous expression of opinion about political matters is not exactly encouraged on the other side of the iron curtain. All that is inconsistent with real peaceful coexistence. A change of attitude in Moscow and Peking would quickly be reflected, I believe; a real change of policy would speedily be carried out. We in Britain remember the speed with which the Communist Party changed overnight its attitute to the war against Nazi Germany. We know that it lies within the power of the Governments in Moscow and Peking to stop this sort of activity.
55. Some people may criticize me for having taken this opportunity to speak out plainly. I have done so not to threaten or to provoke or to recriminate, but to explain the causes for our anxieties and our actions. I believe that if we deal in realities, if we put our points of view to one another for the purpose of reconciliation, then we serve the cause of peace by speaking out.
56. We, the countries on this side of the iron curtain, want peace; we seek peace; we are ready to negotiate for peace; we are prepared, as we have shown in the case of Austria, to make great concessions to achieve success in such negotiations. Democracies — countries where there are free elections, real freedom of choice — hate armaments, hate preparations for war. We long for peace and friendship. We may be foolish sentimentalists, but we remember the comradeship of the war. We want to demolish the iron curtain. We want normal processes of trade, travel and social intercourse. However, there is much evidence at the present time that peaceful coexistence in the eyes of the Communist rulers represents coexistence to the extent of the avoidance of an atomic world war, but, apart from that, continued support of disruptive and subversive elements everywhere working for the Communist world revolution. It really lies with the Moscow and Peking Governments to refute by deeds that evidence and that belief in the minds of many people. That would be a decisive contribution to world peace. That would transform the whole world scene.
57. Mr. Vyshinsky spent much time on 30 September in attacking the European Defence Community, the proposals for a German defence contribution, and the General Federal Government. He attacked them in unmeasured terms. He alleged that what was in mind was the restoration of Germany as a militaristic State. The Western purpose is, of course, not to recreate German militarism, but to enable Germany, in partnership with allies, to make a contribution to its own defence, with safeguards and limitations mutually agreed upon and mutually accepted. That seems to us to be essential if Germany is to take its rightful place in the comity of nations. The United Kingdom therefore wholeheartedly welcomed the successful conclusion of the London meetings. The agreement reached is no threat to anyone. We believe it will make for peace and stability. I would ask representatives carefully to examine the provisions for the restriction and control of armaments which are embodied in that agreement.
58. After all, the alternatives to this policy with regard to Germany are completely unsatisfactory. Germany cannot be kept disarmed by force forever. The kind of Germany which the Soviet Union Government appears to desire is one in close alliance with the Soviet Union — a so-called "people’s democracy”. Would that mean a disarmed Germany? I must say that the Soviet Union attitude on this matter appears to me to be quite cynical. For what has the Soviet Union been doing all this time in East Germany? Under the guise of police forces, there is an East German army. It consists of about 90,000 men. They are organized into two Soviet-type rifle corps, each of two infantry divisions, and one mechanized division. There is, in addition, one independent, mechanized division. It is estimated that, altogether, there are about 1,300 tanks and self-propelled guns held by these forces, and about the same number of field, anti-tank and antiaircraft guns. This is a police force, mark you. Since October 1952, these men have ceased to wear police uniforms. They now wear olive green uniforms with a mixture of old Soviet and Wehrmacht features. Police ranks have been dropped, and military ranks and insignia adopted. In addition, there is a navy 6,000 strong and an air force, called the “People’s Air Force”, training in Soviet aircraft. Quite apart from all that, there are the security, frontier and ordinary police. In view of those facts, the Soviet Union campaign to deny Western Germany the opportunity to have any military forces at all on principle is, I repeat, cynical. There is no other suitable epithet.
59. However that may be, a united Germany — united on the basis of free elections and accepted into the community of nations — must be the aim of all of us if there is to be permanent stability in Europe.
60. I must also comment here on the alternative Soviet Union policy for Europe, which is illustrated by its proposal for a European security pact. Some people may say that I am entering into unnecessary controversy with the Soviet Union representative, but, after all, these matters were raised in his statement and, if we are to have what can be described as a general debate, we must surely try to answer the points that are made.
61. This proposal for a European security pact was first put forward at the Berlin Conference in February and has been repeated on several subsequent occasions. The proposal is designed to put an end to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and leave unsolved the vital problem of the reunification of Germany. In fact, the proposal is based on an inferior status for Germany, its neutralization and continued division; while leaving unchanged the Soviet Union Government’s political, economic and military control of the countries of Eastern Europe.
62. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being as a direct consequence of the policy of the Soviet Union in Europe. It was an effort to prepare joint defence in response to overwhelming Soviet Union strength. NATO is for us the foundation of our policy. It is the basis of security in Europe. It threatens no one; and as time goes on and, as we hope, the need for military defence becomes less, the economic, cultural and other features of the Atlantic Alliance will become relatively more important. The Soviet Union now proposes the end of NATO. It wishes to substitute a security arrangements to which all the European nations, together with the United States, shall subscribe — in other words, an organization constructed upon the basis of universality.
63. I do not understand how that would improve upon the United Nations itself. The United Nations should be the comprehensive organization. Mr. Vyshinsky was very critical of the way in which the United Nations was working. Well, why does the Soviet Union Government assume that a comprehensive pact in Europe would be any more effective? If the Soviet Union is thinking of the value that an organization constructed on the basis of universality would have, then let it permit the United Nations to function as the Charter intended, and so diminish the need for collective security arrangements based on Article 51 of the Charter.
64. Mr. Vyshinsky talked about the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. He alleged that it was, as he put it [484th meeting, para. 90] “a perfidious scheme to set one group of Asian peoples against another”. That, of course, is a complete misrepresentation of the facts. The Treaty is purely defensive. It is in no sense a breach of the Geneva agreements, either in letter or in spirit. At the Geneva negotiations, Mr. Eden made it absolutely clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister and others that the United Kingdom Government for its part proposed to join in such a defence organization. It is an agreement between States having a common interest to defend themselves against aggression. It is made clear in article IV that no action will be taken on the territory of any State other than the signatories except with the consent of the government concerned. It is a purely voluntary arrangement. We believe that it will contribute to the stability of South-East Asia — a stability which is essential if all the under-developed countries of South-East Asia are successfully to go ahead with economic and political development on democratic lines.
65. Finally, I come to the question of disarmament. My country took a lead in pressing for a meeting of the Disarmament Commission in April and for the appointment of the Sub-Committee. We felt that the time had come to make another attempt to reach agreement. We were gratified that our invitation to hold the Sub-Committee meetings in London was accepted by the other four member countries. At those meetings I ventured to suggest that we should discuss the problems of disarmament in three groups. First, we should decide upon the scope of any disarmament plans, that is to say, what it was we wanted to prohibit and what it was we wanted to limit, and the extent of the desired limitations. That was the first group of problems. Secondly, we should seek agreement upon the nature and powers of the international control organization which is essential for any internationally-supervised disarmament plan. Thirdly, we should seek agreement on a phased programme for bringing into existence the control organization and for putting into effect the prohibitions and limitations agreed upon.
66. Certain memoranda were put before the Sub-Committee on behalf of various countries, including a most valuable one by the United States delegation [DC/53, annex 4] on the rights, powers and functions of the international control organ. This is not the time to survey these memoranda in detail, but on 11 June Mr. Moch and I put forward on behalf of the French and United Kingdom Governments a memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] as a basis for compromise which seemed to us to constitute a great effort to meet the Soviet point of view. The United States and Canadian representatives warmly supported our memorandum. At the risk of wearying the Assembly, I wish to quote the final passage of the speech I made at the 17th meeting of the Sub-Committee when introducing that memorandum. This is what I said then: “I have expanded our proposals paragraph by paragraph. Let me now put them another way. So far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we are suggesting: first, a conditional ban on use, followed by a ban on manufacture, followed by a total prohibition and elimination. So far as conventional armaments are concerned we” — I was speaking of the views of the Western Powers — “are suggesting two stages for the agreed reductions. Our position is as follows: we are ready to list the weapons to be prohibited and those to be reduced; we are ready to negotiate at once on the reductions to be agreed in armed forces and armaments; we are ready to draw up detailed rules for the international control organ along the lines of the proposals submitted; we agree forthwith to a declaration banning atomic weapons except in defence; we agree that as soon as the control organ is set up there should be a freeze on all military manpower and expenditure levels. We propose that after that, in two phases, we should attain total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of other armaments and armed forces to the agreed levels. We propose that the timing of these processes should be controlled by the international control organ; this organ, endowed with the necessary powers, shall decide in accordance with its estimate of its own capabilities and authority the timing of each phase. “These are our proposals. They are an outline, in my submission, clear, comprehensive and realistic. They are a blueprint for world disarmament. At the risk of appearing to labour my points, I will repeat the respects in which we have sought to meet the Soviet Union point of view: first, our plan includes specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons; second, our plan provides that conventional armaments and nuclear weapons shall be dealt with together; third, when the treaty comes into effect those who have ratified it are committed from that moment to a process which ends and is bound to end in comprehensive disarmament. There is no question of first having complete disclosure and verification of conventional armaments and then deciding whether or not to prohibit nuclear weapons; fourth, we have made it abundantly clear that disarmament and not disclosure and verification is our essential objective. “These proposals are put forward in good faith as a realistic and sincere attempt to break the deadlock between us, and I sincerely hope that they will be carefully examined in that spirit.”
67. That was the spirit in which we put forward our proposals of 11 June. The Soviet Union representative at these discussions declared that the French and United Kingdom proposals did not represent any change and, in effect, he refused to accept them as a basis for discussion then. I was not unduly depressed by that and said so, because I hoped that after time for reflection the Soviet Government would come to see the value of our initiative. That appears now to have happened, and the Soviet draft resolution on disarmament [A/2742], introduced by Mr. Vyshinsky at the end of his speech on 30 September, specifically accepts the Anglo-French plan as a basis for a draft international convention.
68. The Soviet draft resolution contains what it describes as certain fundamental provisions. The language of these is not altogether clear and will require careful examination. Such examination is not appropriate in a general debate. I will, therefore, confine myself to some general comments and say that, on the assumption that the clear and precise principles of the Anglo-French plan have been accepted by the Soviet Union, I see a distinct possibility of progress.
69. On the first group of problems, the scope of a disarmament plan, we should be able quickly to list what we want to prohibit and what we want to reduce. It will be a more complicated matter to decide on the levels to which the reductions will have to be made in types of weapons, manpower, resources and so on. However, I sincerely hope that there will not be years of protracted negotiations on these matters. Let us aim, all of us, at speed and simplicity.
70. On the third group of problems, the phased programme for bringing into existence the control organization and the putting into effect of the prohibitions and limitations, I hope that we are nearer common ground. If the Soviet Government has really abandoned its demand for an unsupervised ban on nuclear weapons in advance of a scheme of disarmament, that is a step forward. I have always felt that, from a practical point of view, the Western concept of stages — a phased programme — was the only possible way to achieve practical results. If the Soviet Government has accepted that, it certainly is to the good.
71. The timing and bringing into existence of the control organization is an important matter within this group of problems. Our view has been that, before anyone can be expected to carry out substantial prohibitions or reductions, the control organ must be in existence and its officials stationed in all the countries concerned, ready and able to supervise the prohibitions and reductions agreed upon. That, throughout, has been a vital point in our argument. The Soviet draft resolution is not clear on that very important matter, and it is a point upon which we shall focus attention in the Committee discussions. It is a point of timing, but a basic point.
72. Perhaps the most important area for examination between us in the Committee is that covered by the second group of problems to which I have referred, the nature, functions and powers of the control organ. The nature, functions and powers of the control organ, together with what I have just said about timing, are the crux of this disarmament problem. The Soviet Government proposes first the establishment of a temporary control commission under the Security Council to supervise the first stage in the disarmament programme. We have to be very sure that that would provide the necessary certainty that the agreed reductions were in fact taking place. When I say “we”, I mean from the point of view of both sides, which seems to me to be a commonplace. Would this temporary commission have real power to do more than request information from participating countries? What exactly is meant by the phrase: “The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them”? Are we to read that as meaning that the commission would be given overriding authority? What would be the rights and powers of its servants? Are its decisions to be subject to veto in the Security Council? These are questions which will have to be answered.
73. The proposal for the permanent control organ suggested for the second stage will also require clarification. The moment when its control measures will begin to operate is not specified. As I have indicated, it is unrealistic to expect nations to carry out prohibitions and reductions before agreement is reached on the nature and functions of the control organ which is to enforce those prohibitions and reductions.
74. I am not quite clear why it is necessary to have two systems of control. Why do we need a temporary commission for the first stage of disarmament? The Anglo-French proposals for a control organ, which would be in existence at the beginning of disarmament, which would gradually assume greater powers and functions, would seem to us to provide a far better guarantee for the observance of a disarmament treaty than the proposals for the two types of control organ now suggested by the Soviet Union. All these matters, however, we can explore in committee.
75. The Soviet Union Government appears to have moved towards the Anglo-French proposals. That is a fact to be welcomed. Some people say that this resolution may have been put forward solely to confuse the domestic political situation in countries considering a German defence contribution. However that may be — I make no comment on that point — the United Kingdom is prepared to deal with these proposals on their merits and to press on with the work in the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the technical bodies which will have to examine certain aspects of these matters. The sincerity of our desire for effective disarmament was shown by the proposals of 11 June 1954 which, I still maintain, are a blueprint for world disarmament. The fact that our proposals have at length been accepted as a basis — I hope there is no mistake or misunderstanding about that — is a step forward. It is a cause for satisfaction that after years of apparently profitless debate, the Western proposals of 11 June, and the Soviet acceptance of them as a basis, hold out the possibility of progress in this all-important field. I promise you, we will never give up our efforts to seek agreement.
76. I have tried to indicate lines upon which we should fashion our conduct and steer our discussions, ways by which the momentum towards real peace can be maintained and increased. I have endeavoured to speak objectively. I may have said some unpalatable things, but I have been trying to deal with real problems, about which I feel deeply, in real terms. I have tried to deal with some of the matters which have already been raised in the course of the general debate.
77. Whatever may be said about the practice and performance of the United Nations, I still believe that the only chance for permanent peace lies in a world organization such as this, endowed with the requisite authority and enabled to use that authority. We are, many of us, conscious of the force of public opinion in our own countries. One of our primary tasks here is to create a climate of world opinion. In this materialistic age let us not underestimate the moral force of the world opinion that can be generated here.
78. The road towards peace is hard and certainly uphill. There are many curves and gradients; travellers along it are weighed down by national responsibilities and interests. On the other hand, those travellers along the road to peace carry with them the hopes of mankind, of those who have lost loved ones in the wars that are past; of those who fear the consequences of another world war; of ordinary men and women in every land, the patient simple folk who want only to be left in peace to achieve a fuller, freer, better life. Let us decide together to persevere together on that journey, seeking not only the approval of our fellows but also the inward satisfaction of knowing in our own souls that we have, each one of us, according to our individual capacities, tried to play a worthy part in leading mankind towards the haven of lasting peace, the heart’s desire of a troubled world.