110. Mr. President, it is both my privilege and my pleasure to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your election to the presidency of this Assembly. I would say that this is a signal honour which you richly deserve If for no other reason than your long and useful association with this body. We have every reason to hope for, and to look forward to, a most successful session of the Assembly under your leadership.
111. Two profoundly encouraging signs have, of late, been widely noted in this Assembly, namely, the remarkable self-possession which has been exhibited in the midst of tempestuous discord and the Increasing tendency to approximate unanimity in the decisions taken. The first affords a sure indication of growth and emerging maturity of the Assembly; the Second augurs well for the weight and force of its influence wherever its "presence" has been invoked. It is heartening that this inclination to comprehensive accord could manifest itself even in those central issues of our time on which one would expect a bitter divergence of views. May the General Assembly at this thirteenth session, stimulated by past example, voice its universal sentiments in the same universal fashion.
112. This development, however gratifying, should not mask from our view the realities which today so harshly divide our world and fragment man's allegiances. In a sense there are no ultimate solutions; there are only ultimate problems. But this is merely to say that we acknowledge the frailties of man; that we are not gods. We cannot, however, be released from the inescapable obligation to persist in seeking solutions to the problems with which the life of mankind is sorely beset.
113. Of these problems, none confronts us so starkly as the Issue of whether man in his lack of wisdom shall cause his own extinction, or whether man in the fullness of his wisdom can achieve his own redemption. The resolving of this issue permits, I dare say, no compromise with time tor, until we resolve it, the race of man on earth must remain a haunted and tormented one.
114. Disarmament has been a perennial problem with us. Undismayed by lack of results, we have tried to carry on as patiently as we could. But the past year, I must confess, was a disappointment. The inability of the Disarmament Commission to meet was a severe setback to the disarmament negotiations. The refusal of a principal Power to participate in the discussions constituted a distinct disservice to the cause of peace.
115. It may be true that the procedures and techniques of the Disarmament Commission have not been altogether perfect, but such imperfection is hardly ground for a course of action which, if obstinately pursued, would have reduced the Commission to ultimate impotence,
116. Disarmament, in the view of my delegation, is not one of those questions which can be negotiated on the principle of "the more, the merrier". Four recent developments, however, add considerably to our hopes that & "breakthrough" might be developing in the interminably protracted discussions: first, the apparent understanding among the principal Powers to suspend, on a provisional basis, further experimental explosions of nuclear weapons; second, the Geneva accord on the feasibility of policing a ban on nuclear test explosions; third, the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of Atomic Radiation concerning the hazards of radioactivity resulting from such explosions; and, fourth, the projected meeting in Geneva of technical experts from the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Pact on the problem of preventing a surprise attack.
117. It may be stated that none of these developments has a direct bearing on actual disarmament measures. But if It is accepted that the safest way to test the workability of any disarmament measure is to place it on an empirical basis, and that only such schemes as could be properly controlled at a given time should be adopted, then we submit that any agreement on enforcing the temporary cessation of nuclear tests, which may be reached by the Powers principally concerned cannot fail to yield the widest implications for the disarmament problem as a whole.
118. There is one aspect of this matter about which there can be no argument, namely, that the provisional agreement to suspend tests is a positive response to the deeply human emotion of fear aroused by the dangers of radioactive contamination. While the conclusion of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation is not final, and may be considered debatable in some quarters, it does tend to support the growing view that, the less radiation, the better for the human race. It Is a view which must certainly be taken into urgent account in the coming negotiations on the halting of nuclear tests,
119. From all this, certain instructive conclusions emerge. First, the wisdom of the Assembly in enforcing over the past four years the "stage-by-stage" measures approach to disarmament and related questions has been amply vindicated. Secondly, it would appear that technical agreements may hereafter become an essential pre-condition of disarmament negotiations, providing as they do a basis which may well influence favourably the course of such negotiations.
120. We must therefore hope that the projected conferences will confirm our high expectations and that their results will enhance, in turn, the prospect for an early accord on the control of outer space and its exclusive use for peaceful scientific purposes.
121. The success of space satellites, if dedicated to the arts of peace, holds out for mankind a promise of rich and unimaginable rewards. It would be manifestly unfortunate if that hope were again frustrated by our failure to agree on such controls as would insure the use of outer space solely for peaceful scientific purposes. As early as two or three years ago proposals to that effect were initiated, but it is now apparent that they have become entangled with considerations of a different sort. It must, however, be abundantly clear that if we procrastinate any longer, hoping merely to stumble on a solution instead of actively working to achieve it, the pace of events will inevitably overtake us and result in irretrievable loss of the opportunity to utilize outer space to man's advantage rather than for his own destruction. It is hoped therefore that any scheme, even of an interim nature, for the peaceful utilization of outer space will not become inextricably involved in the general context of disarmament negotiations and that it will be made a subject of separate agreement.
122. Twice in the last two years special emergency sessions have had to be convoked to deal with problems arising out of the troubled situation in the Middle East. We all know the happy results that attended the efforts of the Assembly in the crisis of 1956 — results which have exceeded even our most sanguine expectations at the time. As for the more recent crisis, we have every reason to hail the decision of the Arab States themselves to shoulder the primary responsibility for the stability and peace of their region. Apart from its special relevance to the immediate problem of the Middle East, the reaffirmation of the principle of non-interference has served as a healing touch to| those who have suffered from its violation and as an emphatic warning to those inclined to flout it for selfish ends that they can do so only at their own peril.
123. It will hardly escape notice, however, that the Middle East problem has three aspects which are so intimately interlocked that a solution on one level, while fully desirable, may not necessarily produce the kind of lasting peace that we all ardently wish for the peoples of the area. In other words, the problem has to be viewed in its widest context.
124. There are no. magicians in the Assembly, but only a group of burdened men trying as best they can, in a spirit of common humanity, to help solve each other's difficulties. It may well be that a completely viable solution to the Middle East problem is at this time beyond our grasp. But it may also be that by keeping the broad issues in view, as a whole and in their naked reality, we will be kept from being led too far astray in our quest. We feel that we can sum up the Middle East problems as follows: first, the power rivalries in the region; second, the existing difficulties between the Arab States and Israel, principally as they centre on the question of refugees; and, finally, the growing strength and direction of Arab nationalism. All of these Issues have been before the Assembly in one form or another ever since the United Nations began. But to say so merely emphasizes the scope and the intractable nature of the problem which, before this session is too old, will confront us once again.
125. Of the specific situation before us it is appropriate only to repeat, pending the receipt of the Secretary-General's report, the truism uttered by the preceding President of the Assembly to the effect that deeds, not words would supply the ultimate test of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the Assembly's decision. In the meantime, we remain vastly encouraged by the mounting evidence of good faith among the Arab nations in their relations with one another.
126. In the Western Pacific, some two hundred miles from my country, the world attention has been riveted on the two tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Since 23 August, Communist China has subjected these Islands to sustained artillery action of varying intensity with the avowed Intent of seizing them and the Nationalist stronghold of Formosa. The United States has in turn repeatedly warned that it will not relinquish its responsibility to defend Formosa, including the related areas of Matsu and Quemoy, if in the judgement of its President the attacks on those areas could be a prelude to an attack on Formosa.
127. As we watch day by day the varying pressures that are made to bear upon the crisis, we can only express the fear that beyond a certain point it may no longer be possible for the countries concerned to keep control of all the factors of the situation. This dire possibility and the ever-present danger that wide areas may be engulfed if the crisis reaches unmanageable proportions, make the question of the off-shore islands a critical case of profound concern to us all.
128. In consonance with the Charter of the United Nations, my country cannot accept or condone the use of armed force in the settlement of international questions. We recognize no valid substitutes for the peaceful procedures of the Charter.
129. The talks now being conducted between the United States and communist Chinese ambassadors in Warsaw have given us some ground for relief. While we may indulge in guarded expectations as to the outcome of such talks, my delegation supports the suggestion already put forward that, as evidence of good faith, Communist China should observe in the interim a facto cease-fire in the off-shore islands area. This will serve to insulate the Warsaw negotiations from the varying fortunes of opposing military action in the Asian "rimland". We hope that Communist China will not insist on conditions so obviously unacceptable as to wreck every fair prospect of reasonable agreement.
130. If the. talks break down — and let us hope that they, do not — and the current situation persists, the Assembly or the Security Council, I assume, will not fall to bring the influence of its collective wisdom to bear upon the issue in such form and manner as are suitable to the circumstances of the situation and in conformity with the principles of the Charter.
131. Elsewhere, on the periphery of the Middle East, lie the two problem spots of Cyprus and Algeria, in either case, the issue has shifted from the essence of self-determination to the form and process by which it should be applied. In the case of Cyprus, we cannot but deplore the violence which has raged periodically therein. We note, too, with mixed feelings of misgiving and hope the persistent efforts to discover some feasible common ground among the complex rival claims of the three countries involved. In the present circumstances, precipitate efforts to press too far or too fast any conceivable adjustment could wreck the chances of a permanent solution. The danger, as we see it, is not so much that there seems to be no solution in prospect as that, if the breach is so widened between the countries involved, a future solution may be rendered even more difficult.
132. In the case of Algeria, the situation has, for well-known reasons, clearly deteriorated, or at any rate has not advanced materially towards a solution. It will be recalled that at its last session the Assembly suggested that pourparlers be entered into by France, Morocco and Tunisia. Since the unfortunate incident at the Tunisian border, France and Tunisia have entered into certain agreements concerning French troops on Tunisian soil, suggesting the possibility of restoring harmony between the two countries. It may then be possible, the French having achieved their constitutional reform, to look forward to informal discussions with a view to exploring possible solutions to the Algerian problem.
133. It is clear, however, that both problems have reached the point where they cannot be permitted to deteriorate further. The overriding necessity of reaching an accommodation of the interests of the parties in each case must compel them before long to discover an appropriate solution to their difficulties and create a favourable climate for a just, peaceful and democratic settlement. As we see it, the role of the General Assembly is to encourage the parties in their search for a mutually acceptable formula of conciliation and compromise.
134. It remains for me to speak of a principal concern of a majority of the Members of our Organization: the economic development of less developed countries. It might be more true to say that this is a principal concern of all the Members, since in the last analysis world stability is directly dependent on the economic health of the whole earth, not just of a few favoured segments of it. The greater the imbalance in economic progress, the more certain the possibility that social tensions and upheavals will occur and pose lasting threats to international peace. Fortunately, the principle of common responsibility and joint action in this respect is now an accepted one.
135. It is in this light that we must view the approval last year of the establishment of the Special Fund. The aim of the Fund is to increase technical assistance by a substantial margin and ultimately to provide capital for the development of less-developed areas, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The new programme thus touches on two of the principal problems facing most of the States Members of the United Nations.
136. There are no quick or certain nostrums for the problems of economic stability, which are patently incapable of being solved in isolation. But those of us who are concerned most of all with the strengthening of the United Nations will do well to keep in mind that in the end the strength of the Organization can have its source only in the strength of its individual Members.
137. For thirteen years we have carried on patiently and painfully, through crisis after crisis, to bring peace to our troubled world. We know not where our efforts will find surcease; whether in the survival of man with a promise of a richer life or in his total destruction. Wisdom may lose to folly, but let it not be said that, in the lifetime of this Organization, we who gather under its canopy year after year have faltered in our resolve to work out man's salvation.