58. At the outset of my statement today I wish, on behalf of the delegation of Jordan, to express to you, Mr. President, our heartfelt congratulations on your election to the presidency of this Assembly. The official and personal intimate friendship which exists between Your Excellency, as a prominent Arab diplomat, and the members and representatives of the Jordanian Government gives my delegation a feeling of satisfaction and pride that you enjoy the confidence of this Assembly. The Jordanian delegation has much pleasure in taking this opportunity to pay tribute to the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Sudan whose friendship to Jordan is highly regarded and whose valuable contribution to the cause of Arab solidarity will never be forgotten.
59. My delegation takes the floor today after the general debate has gone far enough in exposing the views of various delegations on major international issues and matters of concern to all States, big and small alike.
60. Jordan, as a Member of this world Organization, has its own view on each of these issues, and will present it when they are tabled for discussion. Needless to say that, as an Arab country with a long record of true Arabism, Jordan feels that every problem in any Arab land is its own. Jordan, therefore, always seeks joint efforts with its sister States for dealing with Arab problems in its endeavour to fulfil Arab aspirations and defend Arab interests. In pursuing this policy of true nationalism, my country follows a course of political conduct in line with our best Arab traditions of self-respect and silent effort, discounting the need for propaganda in this field.
61. The problems of Palestine and Algeria will always constitute basic issues of our national policy in any international development, until the legitimate rights of the Arabs in these two countries are restored. The plight of the Palestine Arab refugees will remain the tragic expression of the failure of the United Nations in redressing the wrong suffered by them.
62. While the question of Palestine has not, unfortunately, advanced the slightest in the direction of peace and justice, the Algerian question moved forward towards expressing the true will of the people of Algeria when an Algerian National Government was established on Arab soil. We hope that this natural courageous step will help to end the present tragic war in Algeria and bring about peace to that part of the Arab homeland.
63. There are other disputes in the Arabian peninsula which cause tension in Arab foreign relations. It is the view of the Jordanian Government that, in order to maintain peace and security in the region, these disputes should be settled peacefully in a manner that would satisfy legitimate Arab rights. In its efforts to serve the cause of peace and regional solidarity, the Kingdom of Jordan will endeavour to work in close co-operation with the Asian and African countries, with whom we form a greater entity.
64. The attention of the world is directed at present to the serious situation in the Far East. We hope that the joint efforts of the free world will continue to be a stabilizing factor in that important and strategic area and defend the cause of freedom and peace.
65. The problem of West Irian is one of the foremost problems in Asia. Although it is not on the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, it continues to be a threat to international peace. The Government of Jordan hopes that a peaceful settlement can be reached between the two disputing parties in such a way that it will fulfil Indonesian national rights in that area.
66. Just before events in the Far East began to occupy the headlines, the attention of the world had been focused on the Near East. Troubles and bloodshed broke out in Cyprus. It is the hope of my country to see that a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question is reached by agreement of the parties concerned, with due regard to the principle of self-determination.
67. In Lebanon, disturbances destroyed the pleasant and progressive life which our brethren there had been enjoying for decades. Peace in Lebanon is a major concern to my countrymen, as our relations with Lebanon are not only those of kinship but are also based on daily business life and on the fact that Jordan's main air and sea outlets lie in Lebanon.
68. As troubles broke out in other parts of our region, Jordan was close to them, but fortunately stayed out of them, thanks to the courage of our gallant young King, to the solidarity of the Jordanians and to their duly-established Government,
69. The Jordan delegation is mainly concerned at this particular time with its own case, which was considered by the General Assembly at its third emergency special session. Since the report of the Secretary-General requested in the resolution adopted on 21 August 1958 [resolution 1237 (ES-III)] has just been circulated [A/3934/Rev.1]. my delegation takes this opportunity to present the views of the Jordanian Government on this report, and we are in a position to do so.
70. On 14 August 1958, the Jordanian delegation to the third emergency special session of the General Assembly presented its case [735th meeting]. Following the presentation of the Jordanian case, consultations and discussions among the representatives of the Arab Governments were conducted with a view to achieving a settlement of this internal Arab dispute. The discussions resulted in a resolution which was drafted by all the Arab delegations to the United Nations and accepted by their respective Governments. It subsequently was adopted by the unanimous vote of the General Assembly. This resolution was an impressive expression of the will of the Arab States to settle their domestic affairs among themselves. Jordan, as a complainant, was happy to have achieved that satisfactory result.
71. The resolution in its preamble reiterated the Charter's aim of. a good neighbour policy, an aim to which my country has adhered throughout its record at the United Nations. The resolution, moreover, specified in particular that the Arab States had agreed in the Pact of their League to strengthen the close ties and relations that exist among them, and to stabilize these ties on a basis of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty.
72. In section I of the operative part, which contains the foundations of the whole resolution, the Arab States renewed their assurances that each member State of the Arab League shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each of them shall abstain from any action calculated to change the established systems of government.
73. The resolution went even much further along that line and called upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conformed to these principles. Inasmuch as these principles, which were embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the Pact of the Arab League, are renewed assurances given by the Arab States, co-sponsors of the resolution, they carry the weight of new pledges for pursuing a new policy of mutual benefit, co-operation and good neighbourliness amongst all Arab States.
74. Thus the intent of the resolution could not have been merely to reaffirm the already established principles and assurances, but to translate these into realities and deeds. The General Assembly demonstrated this aim when, in its resolution, it requested the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned, such practical arrangements as would help in upholding the Purposes and Principles of the Charter in relation to Jordan in the present circumstances.
75. When the representatives of the Arab Governments placed their resolution before the General Assembly, they were fully aware how great the responsibility was which they agreed to undertake in respect of their inter-Arab relations and their international obligations. Their intentions, when drafting the resolution, were assumed to be real and genuine. They envisaged the serious setback in their national and international prestige if they were to violate their pledge or break their word; for if they were to do so, they would be sinning against Arab nationalism for all generations to come. They would indeed be destroying their own national growth and impairing Arab unity. My country has thus viewed the resolution not only as an Arab national document but also as a favourable response to its complaint,
76. Jordan and its Government and people suffered considerably from the pressure and unfair treatment directed against them by one of their closest Arab neighbours. While Jordan was trying to overcome its internal problems of economic hardship, financial difficulties, drought, lack of a convenient outlet to the sea, the misery and misfortune of the bulk of the Palestine Arab refugees, and domestic disorder resulting from the subversive events of 1957, it was confronted with additional difficulties initiated from a bordering Arab territory.
77. It is not my intention to review this unpleasant recent history, but I should say that the resolution of the Arab States which we and all our Arab brethren hailed and celebrated has up to now failed, I am afraid, to enjoy implementation by all the parties cosponsoring it.
78. On the part of Jordan, we have never failed to take up the challenge when we had to do so. In this particular instance, however, we did not hesitate to respond fervently and immediately to the call of our Arab brethren to reopen a new page in our relations and work together as members of one family. The moment the resolution of the Arab States was adopted, we immediately complied with its terms. My Government's instructions were issued to Jordanian broadcasting stations to stop all counter-propaganda or commentaries that could have been considered against the spirit and letter of the resolution, or that might even annoy any Arab Government. We appealed to the Jordanian Press to follow the same policy. We exchanged messages expressing congratulations and good hopes with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and we declared that we were ready to forgive and forget.
79. My Government, under the directives of His Majesty King Hussein, followed that policy not only because we had to fulfil our international obligations and honour our pledge, but because we whole-heartedly wanted to pursue a national policy in which all the Arab peoples and Governments could join, hand in hand, in order to lead the way towards progress, happiness and peace.
80. But as we willingly followed this honest policy and expressed our sincere intentions, our attention was drawn, by our own people, to the fact that we alone were following the declared policy of the resolution. People in Jordan and outside Jordan were astonished to see the implementation of the resolution being carried out by Jordan, the party which made the complaint, but not by the United Arab Republic, against whom the complaint was made.
81. We complied with the terms of the resolution in every respect and from the very moment it was adopted. The United Arab Republic, unfortunately, did not follow the same line. My delegation feels that we have to present some proof of this statement. In doing so, we submit a brief sketch of these infringements.
82. The first infringement is through the blockade. Jordan's commercial and transport lines of communication are cut off by the United Arab Republic through its northern and southern territories. Jordanian aeroplanes are prevented from flying over Syria and Egypt. Shipment of petroleum fuels to Jordan is not yet permitted through Syria, and overland transportation for commercial and civil purposes is interrupted by Syrian frontier authorities. The fact that the Government of the United Arab Republic takes an unfavourable attitude towards my Government should not be allowed to result in this unfair treatment of the people of Jordan and to make them suffer this kind of blockade. This is a measure which neither international law and agreements, humanitarian and national sentiments, nor the terms of the resolution in question would permit.
83. The second infringement is through radio incitement. The three official broadcasting stations in the United Arab Republic, namely, the Cairo Radio, the Voice of the Arabs in Cairo, and the Damascus Broadcasting Station, with a fourth covert station operating from a roving jeep, somewhere near the Jordanian borders in Syrian territory, have not stopped their agitation and incitement, attempting day and night :to inflame the Jordanian public. However, during the last few days, there was a noticeable improvement in the tone and expressions of the Cairo radio, but not that of Damascus nor of the secret station operating from Syria.
84. The third infringement is through the Press. It is most regrettable that of all the daily and weekly newspapers of the United Arab Republic, both Egyptian and Syrian, not a single newspaper has stopped attacking Jordan since the resolution was adopted. The Jordanian delegation is in possession of a long record of the inflammatory propaganda of the Press.
85. The fourth infringement is through infiltration and the smuggling of arms. These activities have continued from across the Jordanian frontiers. Jordan's security patrols checked several incidents on the northern and southern borders during the month of September. A list of these incidents is in the possession of the Jordanian delegation.
86. In addition to these instances there are other forms of violations which my delegation prefers not to make public unless the course of the discussion requires us to do so.
87. In view of the failure of the Government of the United Arab Republic to translate the terms of the resolution into deeds, the question arises as to why the United Arab Republic was not able to carry out its obligations. We do not like to assume that the higher wishes expressed in Cairo do not echo far enough in all departments and provinces of the Republic. Nor do we wish to learn that certain destructive elements in the United Arab Republic are enabled to ruin whatever could be mended in the structure of Arab unity. Those who claim that they serve Arab nationalism through trouble and destruction are serving only their own selfish interests at the expense of the welfare of their countrymen. Those outsiders who claim that they defend the Arab cause by inciting one Arab State against another and by kindling inter-Arab hostilities are those who do not harbour sincere intentions towards the Arabs.
88. However — and no matter what the reason was for the non-compliance by the United Arab Republic with the resolution — Jordan has decided to continue to demonstrate its good intentions and live up to its national and international responsibilities. This conduct on the part of Jordan is a further expression of its strength and internal solidarity, as self-restraint on such occasions is not a sign of weakness but an expression of courage and self-confidence. Yet, we in Jordan could swiftly adjust ourselves to any situation which we may be called upon to meet.
89. My Government was therefore very happy indeed and honoured to receive the Secretary-General, on 27 August and again on 8 September 1958. Mr. Hammarskjold held several audiences with His Majesty the King and his Prime Minister, attended also by other members of the Jordanian Government. Jordan’s views at these meetings were expressed to him very frankly and very clearly. The Secretary-General has always been known as a man of outstanding ability and sincerity. Representatives of the Jordan Government, therefore, followed a constructive method of discussion with him. The main objectives of our discussion with the Secretary-General were to reach with him a correct understanding of the purposes of the resolution, and to try and find with him adequate arrangements for fulfilling these purposes.
90. The Government of Jordan did not find that the Secretary-General’s interpretation of the purposes of the resolution was different from its own understanding. 'The Secretary-General says in paragraph 27 of his report: "The spirit and direction of the consultations in Jordan thus corresponded fully to the interpretation of the resolution which I have given in this report."
91. We met with the Secretary-General on all essential points. The Members of the Assembly do recall that during the debate of the third emergency special session Jordan held the view [735th meeting] that neither a United Nations force nor a United Nations observers' team would be an answer to its case. My Government was, therefore, glad to find that the Secretary-General shared these views.
92. In the joint communique that was issued in Amman at the end of the Secretary-General's first visit on 26 August 1958 it was stated: "The policy of the Government of Jordan as represented in the debate at the emergency special session of the General Assembly by the representative of Jordan is that neither a United Nations force, nor a border observation group, would adequately serve the purpose which the General Assembly had in mind. This view is shared by the Secretary-General." Again in paragraph 27 of his report, the Secretary-General repeats the same views by saying: "As from the beginning it had been also my view that neither a United Nations force nor a border observation group would adequately serve the purposes of the resolution in relation to Jordan, I accepted this stand of the Government of Jordan,"
93. But when Jordan declared its opposition to the employment of United Nations forces or observers on its territory, certain Members of this Assembly tried to make a point of that and to accuse Jordan of having taken this stand as an excuse for keeping the British forces on its soil. No sooner had their accusations faded when the Secretary-General himself declared that he shared Jordan's views on this matter.
94. Jordan, therefore, in consultation with the Secretary-General, considered some other form of a presence of the United Nations in Jordan. My Government and the Secretary-General have agreed that the organization in Jordan of a "representative office" of the United Nations, properly staffed, and the designation thereto of a special representative of the Secretary-General would serve to assist in the implementation of the resolution with a view to upholding the principles of the Charter in relation to Jordan in the present circumstances.
95. The principles of the Charter which are laid down in the resolution in relation to Jordan are those of good neighbourliness, non-aggression, non-interference in its internal affairs, respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignly, and equal and mutual benefit. Added to this are the renewed assurances made in section I of the resolution, to which the practical arrangements refer. These assurances are that each Arab State shall respect the systems of government established in the other Arab States, and so on, as set forth in the remainder of paragraph 1 of section I.
96. These are the principles embodied in the resolution for setting up practical arrangements in relation to Jordan in its present circumstances. The present circumstances involving Jordan were illustrated in its complaint. They include: first, indirect and subversive aggression from without, aiming at forcing the overthrow of the lawful and constitutional régime; secondly, armed infiltration of persons and smuggling of arms across the borders; thirdly, radio and press incitement and use of covert radio stations operating from without; fourthly, commercial and transport blockade; and lastly, acts of violence and unjust treatment against Jordanian citizens and damage to their personal property.
97. On the basis of this understanding we envisaged that the practical arrangements which the Secretary-General was requested to establish would undertake to face the afore-mentioned aspects of our complaint.
98. Our discussions with the Secretary-General led to an agreement on several conclusions: (1) It is agreed that the adherence of all to those principles in relation to Jordan should be under the purview of a United Nations special representative stationed in Amman because it is recognized that the resolution is addressed primarily to Jordan. (2) It is recognized that the special representative in Amman would need to be supported by a certain number of assistants, to be determined in the light of the needs as experienced by his activities in consultation with the Jordanian Government. (3) The Government of Jordan understands that the stationing of the United Nations representative in Amman should enable him to watch the deflection of any party involved in the dispute from the principles set out in section I of the resolution in relation to Jordan. (4) In order to carry out his duties in Jordan, for the purposes mentioned, certain conditional arrangements were found to be required in regard to the United Arab Republic and Lebanon. The Government of Jordan believes that the United Nations representative in Amman should be assisted by other United Nations organs in the United Arab Republic for the accomplishment of his tasks since the sources of Jordan's complaint lie in the territory of the United Arab Republic. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 30 of his report, says: "The stationing in Jordan of a United Nations organ, for the purposes mentioned, gave rise to a practical problem because the new organ with this location would require an established and guaranteed line of communication. For practical reasons this would involve also the Governments of Lebanon and the United Arab Republic. However, as both these Governments have undertaken to grant all the facilities, including liaison offices in Beirut and in Damascus, needed in support of the establishment of a United Nations organ in Jordan, I have concluded that the practical problems can be resolved and that the new organ can be stationed in Amman." (5) The Jordanian Government took the stand that similar arrangements like those to be established in Amman should be set up in Cairo. However, in view of the fact that a liaison officer is going to be stationed in Damascus and another one in Beirut, and that both will be directly subordinated to the representative stationed in Amman, and in view of a further arrangement of establishing another diplomatic representation of the Secretary-General to the area, my Government recognized the reasons for the conclusions of the Secretary-General.
99. I must read what the Secretary-General writes about this subject in paragraph 35 of his report: "Were a local diplomatic representation to be established, it should obviously cover the whole area. It would, therefore, be impossible to reduce the weight of the objections mentioned by a compromise, limiting the representation to only some of the capitals concerned. In these circumstances the most satisfactory arrangement has seemed to me to be the assignment for the purpose of a special representative at Headquarters, who would proceed to the area and visit the various Governments on behalf of the Secretary-General, as need be. The Government of Jordan, recognizing the reasons for my conclusion, has accepted it while maintaining its stand that local diplomatic representation in all the capitals from its viewpoint would have been preferable. The other Governments concerned have assured me of their willingness to receive a diplomatic representative of the Secretary-General from Headquarters, as I might find it necessary. The report continues as follows in paragraphs 36 and 37: "Under the planned practical arrangements there will thus be two officials assigned to assist the Secretary-General, for purposes of the resolution: one keeping within his purview the implementation of the principles of the resolution by all nations in relation to Jordan; one serving as a special representative of the Secretary-General in such direct contacts of a diplomatic nature with the Governments concerned as the Secretary-General may find called for in the light of the findings of the representative charged with the purview. The last mentioned representative would for practical reasons be stationed in Jordan, while the diplomatic spokesman would be at Headquarters. "It follows from the principles reflected in the planned arrangements that the representative in Amman would be in contact with the Government of Jordan as host Government and with the Secretary-General, but not directly with any other Government in the area, while on the other hand the diplomatic representative would be entitled to take up discussions with those other Governments on behalf of the Secretary-General, but would not be in direct contact with the Government of Jordan. The liaison offices in Beirut and Damascus would be directly subordinated to the representative stationed in Amman, with the task of assisting him in questions relating to the line of communication to be established."
100. It is understood — as is clear and explicit in the resolution and in the report of the Secretary-General — that the afore-mentioned arrangements would be in support of a positive good neighbour policy among the Arab States. This policy would provide safeguards for the independence and integrity of each one of these States and respect for their systems of government. Talking about these arrangements, the Secretary-General says in paragraph 6 of his report: "... they are not to be regarded as a substitute for a policy aiming at good neighbourly relations in accordance with part I, but as being made in order to support the general implementation of such a policy in relation to Lebanon and Jordan...”
101. In judging the adequacy of the practical arrangements for the implementation of a good neighbour policy among the Arab States, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 16 of his report, takes into account "especially the degree to which the pledges to a good neighbour policy seem to have already been translated into live reality". Then he goes on to say in the same paragraph: "In the period of transition, when it is justified to hope that the Arab nations will succeed in their efforts to establish a good neighbour policy but while frictions and departures from the main line may still be feared, the practical arrangements must in the first instance aim at keeping under review the degree of implementation of the general policy line and provide for means to set straight what may seem to be going wrong."
102. The Goyernment of Jordan would like to have seen the brotherly relations and good neighbourliness among the Arab States brought about without the help of any outside arrangement and prompted only by a sincere sentiment of nationalism and a true feeling of brotherhood. Let us hope, therefore, that the crisis through which the Arab countries recently passed will be an effective reminder to them to avoid further tests.
103. At any rate, there are encouraging signs in the direction of an improvement in the relation of neighbouring Arab Governments with Jordan, The Secretary-General tells us in paragraph 21 of his report: "From all the Governments contacted, I have heard firm expressions of an intention to translate the terms of the resolution into a living reality." In paragraph 22 the Secretary-General says: "However, it seems reasonable to work on the assumption that the impact of the intention of all Governments to translate the words of the resolution into deeds will increasingly be felt and that, therefore, the implementation of the good neighbour policy will meet with growing success."
104. The Jordanian Government, moreover, earlier understood that the United Arab Republic Government had reaffirmed in clear terms its adherence to the principles of non-aggression and non-interference set out in the resolution; and that it undertook to provide all such facilities as the United Nations may need from it in order to maintain the intended "presence" of the United Nations in Jordan. We were pleased to learn Also that it looked forward to such steps in the direction of a normalization of the relations with Jordan as the elimination of present restrictions on air traffic; and to know of its desire to work in the direction of mutual restraint in propaganda.
105. On the other hand, it is my Government's earnest hope that such relations will become normal. However, as stated by the Secretary-General in paragraph 23 of his report. "For the present, practical arrangements made by the Secretary-General may be developed on the afore-mentioned assumption and with a view to strengthening the forces working in the desirable direction. Were the assumption later to prove unwarranted, a reconsideration of the practical arrangements would become necessary. In the ultimate case of a failure of the good neighbour policy they would have to be so developed as to present a more solid guarantee for the line of action which they are intended to support."
106. In any case, the representative stationed in Amman will report to the Secretary-General on the development of these relations. Paragraph 38 of the report reads as follows: "The reports to the Secretary-General from the representative stationed in Amman would not be public documents unless the situation were found to call for their circulation as official documents of the United Nations. Such circulation, which might serve as a basis for action by the General Assembly or the Security Council, represents obviously an alternative line of action open to the Secretary-General in such cases as would seem to him to call for stronger measures than diplomatic demarches. Were the findings to be of a serious nature, they may, under present circumstances, be regarded as indicating a threat to peace and security in the sense of Article 99 of the Charter. This fact, and the possibilities for action which it opens for the Secretary-General, lends added weight to the planned arrangements as a means to help in upholding the purposes of the Charter in relation to Jordan."
107. We now turn to the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Jordan. In our discussions with the Secretary-General in Amman, we came to the conclusion that the question of withdrawal of foreign troops should be seen in the context, not solely of the practical arrangements which may be agreed upon, but essentially in the context of the development of a good neighbour policy in the region, supported by such arrangements.
108. It was also the feeling of the Jordanian Government and of the Secretary-General, if I may say so, that the question of withdrawal is to be considered side by side with the question of the development of such a good neighbour policy. We in Jordan believe that a substitute for any foreign aid would be Arab cooperation. Very recently, Jordan proved this conviction on its part, and proved it in an actual and vital manner. Now, as relations of the Arab Governments are again heading towards normalization, we in our turn, will act swiftly and in consultation with the United Kingdom Government to expedite the early withdrawal of British troops from Jordan.
109. My delegation, in its statement on 25 September 1958 [758th meeting], declared that consultations were already taking place between the Governments of Jordan and the United Kingdom with the purpose of arranging for an early withdrawal and with the hope that satisfactory progress in the Arab neighbour policy with Jordan would be made.
110. Today the representatives will note from the Secretary-General's report that the Jordanian and British Governments have agreed, on the lines set out, that withdrawal will begin during the month of October. My Government is consulting with the Government of the United Kingdom on the announcement of the date withdrawal will commence. It is hoped that this announcement will be made tomorrow, 1 October.
111. It might be useful at this juncture to recall that the request of the Jordan Government for British military aid was made by the decision of the Jordanian Council of Ministers, supported by the unanimous vote of the two Chambers of the Jordanian Parliament, with the approval of the King of Jordan and the general consent of the population. In view of this fact, the terms "aggression" and "occupation" which were used by certain representatives cannot apply to this legitimate action, exercised by a sovereign State as a temporary and defensive measure.
112. The Jordanian delegation is happy to mark the stages of success through which the case of Jordan has passed until it achieved these results. When the Jordanian complaint was submitted to the General Assembly at its third emergency special session, it was well | received. It became the central issue of discussion. The j great majority of the members of the Assembly ] recognized the validity of Jordan's argument. In addition, the complaint of Jordan won the sympathy and the support of Jordan's sister States. The renewed assurances given in resolution 1237 (ES-III) are formal expressions of that sympathy and that support. The measures 'which Jordan had to take during the crisis proved to be sound and correct, as indicated by that resolution of eighty Members of this Organization to the effect that United Nations machinery should be provided for Jordan in the present circumstances to help in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter, and to make possible the early withdrawal of British troops from Jordan,
113. The progress of Jordan’s case advanced even further when discussions with the Secretary-General proved that our interpretation of the resolution corresponded to his interpretation, and when our views were substantiated in his report. The manner in which Mr. Hammarskjold is moving ahead in the setting up of "practical arrangements" is greatly appreciated. He has already asked Mr. P. P. Spinelli to go to Amman to organize the new machinery. My Government was pleased to welcome Mr. Spinelli and his staff. The Jordanian delegation wishes, therefore, to express a sincere sentiment of gratification for the remarkable success which the Secretary-General achieved in his last visit to our region. I would remind him, if I may, of the words of the respectable old Bedouin tribal Sheikh who shook his hand warmly and said to him: "Come back to our country. Visit us again, not in an official capacity, but as a very deer friend".
114. Lastly, and before I leave this rostrum, I feel I should say one more thing. In the course of the debate certain representatives, none of them Arab, although professing that they advocated Arab views, took the floor to criticize my country and my Government. They charged that our national policy was pro- imperialistic and they tried to teach us our own nationalism. They described us and our regime as servile. They attempted to misrepresent the prestige and the popularity of our King. I should like to ask them what they have to do with our domestic affairs? What is more noteworthy, the Jordanian delegation has never discussed the internal conditions of the countries which these delegates, represent, in spite of the gravity and seriousness of the events which have taken place in some of their countries. But as they sharply and unjustifiably criticized my people, I must tell them that those who subject nationalism to the rule of doctrine should not try to hurt the national sentiments of others. What is more noteworthy is that some of the attacks should emanate from the representative of such a Government as the present Hungarian regime which — as is a matter of common knowledge — has gone to the length of persecuting its own people to appease its master.
115. The popularity of the King in Jordan, the love which he enjoys among his people, and the prestige of his Government are striking features to everyone who lives in Jordan or who visits Jordan.
116. We, in Jordan, have passed through a period of continued difficulties and several crises, one after the other. But we were able to come out of them with a great deal of courage to spare and a great deal of self-confidence in reserve. Not a single drop of blood was shed, and not one bullet was fired. Not a single shop was closed nor any protest made. On the contrary, expressions of support and enthusiasm for the King and the cause of his people were expressed in a very impressive manner.
117. My delegation, therefore, wishes to advise those representatives, in all frankness and in all honesty, not to build their judgements on false assumptions. This will be better for them and for the course of the debate. May I, in conclusion, reserve the right to speak again on the subject should the occasion arise.