How can anyone stand on the smoking ashes of “ground zero” and not be overwhelmed by disbelief, anger, and frustration? How can anyone escape the enormity of what happened in September or not feel compassion for all those who have lost someone dear to them? At “ground zero” we not only witness death and destruction, but we also see how American values have come under siege. These are shared values. That is why the people I represent now stand squarely behind the United States. 14 No matter how deeply moved we may be, we must look beyond our anger and frustration. Through our tears, we should discover opportunity. Through our bitterness, necessity. We must turn compassion into solidarity, turn solidarity into common action. We need a plan — in sum, we must turn to the United Nations. The reaction on the part of the United Nations from the beginning of this crisis has been prompt and responsible. As we meet this week, we must try and keep the momentum going. And that is precisely what we are doing. There is something I have sensed in the first few days of this general debate — namely, determination — determination to use the United Nations to the fullest, on many different fronts, as a centre of gravity for our common actions — common action for confronting a global threat — common action to maintain the international order. With regard to that common action, what have we learned so far? Three lessons. Lesson number one: the law must be firmly in place. There is a wealth of legal rules to guide us in these difficult times, and more of them are on the way. A striking example of innovative rule-making was presented by the Security Council. Binding under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, resolution 1373 (2001) takes action not in regard to a specific threat or breach of the peace, not against a particular Member State, but takes action to confront a phenomenon, a threat to our human values and economic interests — action against unidentified enemies. By writing new law, the Council has broken new ground. Even more so, as it has set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of its decision. Jointly with our partners in the European Union, we are taking the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) very seriously. One aspect of it is especially important to us: promoting ratification of all of the various anti-terrorism conventions and monitoring compliance. My country has some expertise to offer and will gladly share it. Meanwhile, an overarching convention against terrorism is in the works. That is good. But we are getting bogged down over a definition of terrorism. That is bad. Let us not forget that it took us 20 years to produce a fairly useless definition of aggression. The world cannot wait that long. Besides, when terrorism stares you in the face, you’ll know it. In addition to rule-making, the real challenge lies in implementation. There, we should try harder. Let me give you one example. Just before the summer we lost our momentum in the fight against biological warfare, and therefore the fight against bio-terrorism as well. The world is a scary place. Anthrax is only one motive for retrieving that momentum. Let us resume our efforts to turn the Biological Weapons Convention into an instrument that can really make a difference. The need for stepping up security is immediate, comprehensive and self-evident. In the aftermath of 11 September, nobody would deny it. But we need to be concerned with the downside of security as well. Parts of our value system may come under pressure when Governments seek to bolster public safety, and by this I mean human rights and fundamental freedoms. As private citizens we must be ready to make concessions and, yes, we will be forced to relinquish some freedom from intrusion in our private lives. But we cannot be expected to live in a never-ending state of siege. Wherever we have to strike a balance, we have to do so wisely. Long ago, we drew a line beyond which we cannot step — we cannot detract from the basic principles of human rights. Those principles are the true measure of our evolution and our civilization. If we look the other way, we lose the moral high ground. If we compromise, we lose out to those who besiege us. What is being put to the test here is our own value system. The core notion of that system is tolerance. Tolerance must, however, come from all sides. Tolerance is not the equivalent of giving in to intolerance. It does not imply that you bend at the slightest pressure. Tolerance means that you stand up to be counted, that you draw a line in the sand when your basic values are challenged. That is lesson number one. Lesson number two: there are “black holes” in the international order: failing States. We knew they were there all along, but we have never been quite sure how to deal with them. Why should we care about failing States? For several reasons. Look at the avalanche of drugs, drug-money, weapons, and warlords spilling out of Afghanistan. Look at the blood diamonds streaming out of Africa. Think of how failing States attract parasites and how they turn into breeding grounds for terrorism, a haven for international crime. Think of peace and security, too; of how faltering countries become a liability to their own people; of how they flaunt the rules of the game and become a liability to the whole neighbourhood. 15 How do we deal with failing States? That question has never been answered in a systematic manner. Any answer begins by recognition on the part of the Member States of this Organization that failing States are a problem. Indeed, it may turn out to be the most pernicious problem of the new century. From that point on, we need to build a strategy, and do so together, within the framework of this Organization. What are we aiming at? How ambitious are we? Can we get in early to prevent failing States from failing? Are there any early warning signals to look out for? If we see those signals, do we have the means to act? And the political will? Once States are failing, do we try and fix them? Do we settle for ending the fighting, wherever fighting is going on? Or do we limit ourselves to humanitarian aid? These are all difficult questions. My belief is that outside intervention only goes so far. I do not believe that massive injections of aid are the right answer to failing States. For one thing, donors are reluctant to poor money down a black hole. But more importantly: the solution should not come from the outside, but rather from the inside. Even in the poorest country we will find well-educated citizens just as committed to building better lives for their children as in the rest of the world. They need a helping hand in building good governance and a viable civil society. Yet, ownership is paramount. Failing States, too, have the capacity to fix themselves. Indeed, only if they fix themselves will they no longer fail. Our role should be to help galvanize and to enable those capacities. Lesson number three: the United Nations should be doing the right things. As of today the Northern Alliance has entered the city of Kabul. That fact makes it even more imperative that we speak about Afghanistan in the United Nations. Consensus is growing that in post-Taliban Afghanistan, the United Nations should play a central role. I certainly support that view. But a central role in what? For make no mistake: once the bombing stops, the difficulties are still overwhelming. The country is not only rugged and ruined, but also the size of Central Europe and packed with landmines. Factional fighting is bound to continue. The United Nations can do a lot, but we need to beware of sending the United Nations on an impossible mission. Instead of calling on the United Nations for functions where it is weak, let us call on the United Nations for functions where it is strong. For example, take governance, a major worry to us all. Much as we seek to avoid it, a political vacuum is a realistic prospect, given that tribal conflict in Afghanistan is as old as the country’s history. Afghans are a proud people. Hostility towards outside intervention is strong. The country needs to be governed from within. We may be looking both for a broad-based interim Government and for a stable permanent structure. Without rushing to elections, we need to be satisfied that such a political settlement is supported by the population. In the process, the United Nations might play a central role as a catalyst and as an adviser, but not as a governor. Afghanistan is not East Timor. It is important, too, that any settlement be supported by the neighbouring States and by a Security Council resolution. As regards security: in the absence of a functional national army, transitional military arrangements are essential. They are essential to create a secure environment enabling reconstruction to begin and refugees to return home. Choosing the right format is critical. A conventional United Nations peacekeeping operation may not be a good idea — certainly not for the country as a whole. Supplying peacekeepers is still voluntary. Realistically, the troop levels needed for a country this size would almost certainly not be attained. Bosnia has taught us the hard lesson of the price we pay when we send in a United Nations force that is below par. We should be careful to avoid another Somalia. Different formats for security arrangements are possible, and we should reflect on them as a whole. In a previous context, Ambassador Brahimi has offered us a wide spectrum of lessons learned about United Nations peacekeeping. We should take them to heart. Now, as the Special Representative, he deserves all the support he needs from us. Concerning mine clearance: Afghanistan has more landmines than any other country in the world. The country cannot possibly get back on its feet as long as those mines are there. We have to get rid of them, and the United Nations can help us to do that. We must pay the bills. As to reconstruction: we should capitalize on where the United Nations is uniquely positioned either to deploy operations in the field or to coordinate those of others. Let us not limit our view to the part of the 16 United Nations here in New York, but rather broaden it to the entire United Nations system, including the Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods institutions. We need to bring the full weight of that system to bear on the future of Afghanistan. I am speaking of the World Health Organization and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Drug Control Programme, of the International Labour Organization and the World Food Programme, of the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. There is no need to set up a whole new mechanism. The Afghanistan Support Group is fully entrenched, and we should use it. Especially now, caught in the crossfire, the Afghan people are not to be envied. Their plight will not be over once the guns are silent. Food stocks, health care, housing, utilities, schooling, agriculture — the list of concerns is a long one. But all of us need to push that agenda. We may not be part of the problem of Afghanistan, but we must be part of the solution. Yet again, reconstruction cannot be imposed upon a nation. Here, too, a sustainable recovery needs to come from within. All the men, and especially the women of Afghanistan, must once again become the makers of their own fate and future. The answer lies with them. The United Nations is not merely “an ineffective acronym”, as a misguided message on the Internet would have you believe. For global issues, multilateral cooperation is the only answer. Multilateralism is solidarity worked into a plan. As I said, the reaction by the United Nations system in the aftermath of 11 September has been prompt and responsible. In order to maintain that level of performance, we, the Member States, will have to show the stamina, support and commitment to make it happen. Our track record is not impeccable. The United Nations can go no faster than we will let it, which means we have to make it work. This also means we have to provide it with all the resources, and the political will, to give it the push and punch we need.