France

Mr. Schuman said that general discussion was a form of self-examination in the course of which members of the Assembly reviewed the shortcomings and failures of the past, and affirmed their resolve to persevere in their efforts to achieve better results in future. 41. No one could deny that some progress had been made in the past year. The deliberations of the Assembly during the first part of its third session, held in Paris, had been long and laborious. A second part of that session had had to be held in order to complete the agenda. Certain problems had seemed insoluble and had threatened the United Nations with a deadlock. 42. Although complete and lasting solutions had not yet been reached, at least those solutions seemed possible. At times it had even been possible to draw nearer to the goal. That should console the members of the Assembly for the disappointing regularity with which the same questions reappeared at each of the Assembly’s sessions. There was a distressing resemblance between successive agendas, and the old problems lost none of their urgency. That was true of the Balkan problem, which was before the Assembly for consideration for the third time. 43. In that connexion, the French delegation had always indicated, with the greatest precision, what it considered to be the extent of the competence of the United Nations. The domestic affairs of each country, as the Charter expressly laid down, were solely within its sovereign jurisdiction. If the United Nations had been called upon — and rightly so — to intervene in a domestic dispute which had for years been ravaging a noble and courageous country, it was because intervention by other countries had threatened, and still threatened, to endanger international peace and security. 44. It was clearer than ever that such was the case at that point, since operations in the interior of Greece had ceased and were concentrated in border areas, and since there was little likelihood of their being pursued or resumed unless the authorities in neighbouring countries continued to render, or permit, various kinds of assistance to the partisans. 45. Those were the conclusions contained in the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. For the first time all uncertainty on that subject had been dispelled by the declaration of certain implicated Governments that they would henceforth close their frontiers and disarm the guerrillas who had taken refuge in their territory, thus admitting that their former attitude had been open to criticism. 46. The Assembly should take note of that and hope that the tragedy was about to come to an. end. It was still necessary, however, that those declarations should be solemnly confirmed and that an international body should see that they were put into effect. The Greek people would then be able to devote themselves entirely to their serious domestic problems and carry on the work of political and economic reconstruction in a spirit of reconciliation and respect for democratic principles. 47. The Assembly’s task in that field was not yet finished. It would have to combine authority and conciliation in order to secure the good will and co-operation of all the countries concerned. 48. While the Assembly was still attached to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States, whether Members of the Organization or not, it could not ignore the violation of the essential rights which it had solemnly recognized as belonging to all human beings. The Assembly owed it to itself and to public opinion in every country to raise its voice, particularly against certain police or pseudo-judicial methods which were incompatible with the guarantees which every defendant should be able to claim if justice were not to be a cynical parody. It had been hoped that the victory of the democracies over Hitlerism would preserve the civilized world from such abuses. How could Governments responsible for such a state of affairs rightfully claim a place within the United Nations? In that connexion, Mr. Schuman recalled that other countries which scrupulously observed the principles of the Charter were prevented from joining the United Nations by the improper linking together of various applications for membership, each of which should be examined on its own merits. 49. When the United Nations had admitted the State of Israel it had thereby intended to facilitate the restoration of peace and a normal situation in the Near East. That hope had not been completely disappointed. 50. The situation in Palestine was dominated by two facts. The first was that hostilities had been suspended on all fronts since the signing of the armistice agreements. The truce imposed by the United Nations had given place to a contractual situation. That essential result was largely due to the persevering action and flexible authority of the Mediator and the Acting Mediator, to whom the Assembly should once again express the gratitude felt by all men. 51. The second fact was that, since the conclusion of the armistice agreements, no progress had been made towards a more lasting settlement. It had been hoped that, once completely established, the armistice regime would enable the parties to enter into direct negotiations that would lead to a final stabilization of the situation. By its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the General Assembly had established a Conciliation Commission to bring about those contacts and promote, agreements. It was a cause for profound regret that the countries concerned had not so far achieved the desired rapprochement and that, on that account, the peace which was to replace the armistice was not yet within sight. 52. The representative of France did not doubt that the General Assembly would unanimously appeal both to the Arab countries and to Israel to abandon their passive attitude, in their own interests as well as in the interests of international peace. 53. Two concrete problems affecting the whole of mankind in its sentiments and in its beliefs required the particular attention of the Assembly. 54. One of those problems was that of the Arab refugees, for whom only measures for immediate relief had so far been taken. An Economic Survey Mission had been set up by the Conciliation Commission to investigate the possibilities of repatriation or resettlement. Its terms of reference seemed to have given rise to erroneous interpretations which explained, though they did not justify, the suspicious reserve of certain Governments. It was incumbent on the Assembly to remove those misunderstandings and to prepare the way for constructive humanitarian action. 55. The second problem was that of an international regime for Jerusalem. The principles on which such a regime should be based had been clearly defined in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. In the first place, the Assembly had decided that the Holy Places were to be protected and free access to them ensured in accordance with existing rights and historical practice, both in Jerusalem and in all the other areas of Palestine. In the second place, a permanent international regime was to be established for the whole area of Jerusalem, a regime distinct from that of the other areas of Palestine and placed under effective United Nations control. That regime was to provide in particular for the demilitarization of the area and was to ensure maximum local autonomy for individual groups so far as autonomy was consistent with the special international regime. 56. It was on the basis of those decisions of principle that the Conciliation Commission had studied the problem and established the proposals which had been submitted to the Assembly (A/973). The French Government had considered them with great care and would state its attitude at the time of the detailed discussion. In examining those proposals it would be guided chiefly by its desire to respect and to put into practice the spirit of the aforementioned resolution, which constituted a formal and authoritative decision on the highest international level. But although the aims were clearly defined, the means were less so. In the opinion of the French Government, what was most important was that the solution should be viable and that it should therefore be designed less to satisfy juridical preferences than to guarantee the practical objectives which the United Nations had set before itself. It should also do no more than impose the various indispensable obligations which, moreover, should be reasonably acceptable to all the parties concerned. 57. The question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had been referred to the General Assembly for settlement by the nations signatories to the peace treaty with Italy. 58. After thorough discussion and, in particular, after hearing the points of view expressed by the representatives of certain groups considered to be representative of the peoples concerned, the First Committee, at the third session of the General Assembly, had proposed a resolution (A/873), which was due to the initiative of two Governments which all recognized as being essentially concerned, but which had not finally been adopted, since it had failed by a few votes to secure the required two-thirds majority for certain of its parts. 59. The question must be taken up again, with due regard to the facts already submitted and the trends of opinion revealed in the previous discussion. 60. The first point that seemed clear was the general desire to make independence under a democratic Government the final goal of the territories. That had been shown unmistakably in the draft resolution of the First Committee and had not been contested. 61. Another point that was equally evident was that the immediate and complete achievement of that independence was not compatible with the current political and economic development of the territories concerned. That fact had been emphasized by the Assembly when it had rejected by a very large majority a proposal submitted to it providing for such unconditional independence. It had rightly considered, as the Charter itself stated in Article 73, sub-paragraph (b), that it was first necessary to develop self-government among those peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. 62. It was upon the consequences to be drawn from that second essential principle that agreement had so far failed to materialize. It had been impossible to reach agreement on the best methods to be adopted in order rapidly to prepare the peoples for independence. It had been thought — and France, for its part, considered that there was justification for the view — that the normal method in most cases should be that of trusteeship, in pursuance of the Charter itself. The proposals submitted in that respect had not been adopted. Other ways must be sought. 63. France was willing to participate in the search for them in all good faith and with complete objectivity. It would not, however, be able to associate itself with a solution which, based upon sentiments that were no doubt praiseworthy but somewhat unrealistic and insufficiently concerned with the grave responsibilities of the United Nations, would not take into account the need for a progressive instruction. It would not be in the interests either of the peoples concerned or of international peace to run the risk of disorder, anarchy and affliction. The wisdom of the United Nations required that it should define the stages by which those territories were to advance towards a freedom which was neither a snare nor a hazard. 64. The French Government also believed that due account must be taken of the services rendered by Italy in the past in the development of its colonies and that special account must be taken of these services which it would be likely to render in the future, if it were given the opportunity. Italy, which was unjustly excluded from the United Nations, had regained its position as a great democratic nation. It might still make a great contribution to the joint work of civilization, and the United Nations had no right to disregard it. 65. While some of the problems before the Assembly were thus on their way — or appeared to be on their way — to solution, others remained in an impasse and were liable so to remain for a long time unless there were a radical change in people’s minds and in international relations. 66. That was particularly so in regard to the problem of disarmament and the related problem of the control of atomic energy. Due caution should be exercised against words and appearances, even if those appearances sometimes provided grounds for optimism and some evidence of an easing of the. situation. So long as a real spirit of confidence failed to predominate in international relations, in other words, so long as the most serious questions had not been tackled or settled among all the parties concerned, particularly the question of the form of government for Germany and Japan and the relations between the West and the East, it would be useless to open once again in the Assembly inconclusive discussions which could only become involved in controversy and propaganda, emphasizing and increasing the weakness of the United Nations. 67. The French delegation remained profoundly convinced that the earnest expectations of the peoples would not be ultimately disappointed, that the spirit of peace would prevail in the end, and that international law would eventually be consolidated and respected. 68. Meanwhile, the responsible Governments had the right and the duty to take, within the limits laid down by the Charter, any measures which might help to strengthen the security of their countries until collective security had become a reality, until the Security Council was able to act effectively as a result of understanding among the great Powers, and until an international army had been established. Until that time, Member States were justified in organizing legitimate individual and collective defence and in concluding regional agreements for the protection of their common interests. 69. It was in that spirit that the French Government, after having signed the Treaty of Brussels with four neighbouring friendly countries in 1948, had acceded in 1949 to the North Atlantic Treaty, which grouped together twelve States united by a common Christian civilization and by close political and economic interests. That treaty, like the preceding one, was exclusively defensive. It neither aimed at nor threatened any State. Strictly in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter, its sole purpose was to consolidate security and to achieve that end by means of unequivocal mutual undertakings and the building up of the defences of peace-loving countries in an area of the world which had so often been sorely tried. The French representative expressed the hope that the day would soon come when such agreements would become unnecessary, because the active and trustful co-operation of all its Members would have enabled the United Nations to play the part and to avail itself of the means which the Charter had envisaged for it. 70. It was in altogether different circumstances that another agreement to which the French Government was a party had been concluded during the current year, 1949, namely the agreement which set up the Council of Europe. That, again, was a regional organization. Its purpose, however, was not to reinforce security but to initiate a vast structural reform of the European continent. Its purpose was to create among the States members of the Council of Europe, by progressive development and democratic methods, political and economic ties of such a nature that the totality of those States would end by constituting a unity, which would eliminate exhausting national rivalries and help to facilitate the development of production and trade by adapting them to the conditions and means of the modem world. It would be too bold an anticipation at that stage to speak of a federation, although such a federation corresponded to the aspirations of a considerable part of public opinion. The object in view was the progressive, prudent and ambitious erection of a rational structure which would be a valuable factor of political stability and material progress. That enterprise, likewise, was not directed against anybody. For the time being, it extended to only one half of Europe, but remained open to all those who agreed to contribute to it in a spirit of good will and strict respect for democratic principles and the dignity of the human person. 71. Co-operation among the countries of Europe, the removal of the barriers preventing the free movement of individuals, goods and capital, the development of the feeling of solidarity and a judicious distribution of tasks, would contribute to the solution of the difficulties created by a succession of wars. Such were the hopes fostered by the peoples of liberated Europe. It was to be hoped that they would become living realities for the greatest possible good of all the peoples concerned, and an encouraging example to others. 72. Germany was situated in the heart of Europe and the German problem was at the centre of the European problem. 73. Following the unconditional surrender of Germany, the fate of that country had been placed in the hands of the four principal Allied Powers. It was not necessary to recall the vicissitudes of that Four Power regime. There again, as elsewhere, the impossibility of reaching agreement had led to an impasse, and Germany was cut in two by the insurmountable barrier which separated the western occupation zones from the eastern zone. 74. The blockade of the western sectors of Berlin, with which the Security Council had had to deal, had expressed that antagonism in a dramatic form for almost a whole year. The representative of France was pleased to note that the situation had eased. As a result of the efforts made at the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris after eighteen months of adjournment, a modus vivendi had been arrived at. But it had been impossible to achieve a general solution whereby the policy of the four occupying Powers could be harmonized. 75. In those circumstances, when there was no possibility for the time being of achieving a peace settlement, the western Powers had had to take the responsibility of reorganizing provisionally the part of Germany which was under their jurisdiction. A constitution had been drawn up by the authorized representatives of the peoples of the States of western Germany. Ratified by those States and approved by the occupation authorities, that constitution had come into force at the same time as a new occupation statute transferring to the Germans themselves the major part of the powers previously exercised by the three Allies. 76. That experiment was still in its initial stage. The first President of the new Federal Republic of Germany had just been elected, the first Chancellor had been appointed, and the first Government had been constituted. The destiny of Germany had once again been entrusted to the Germans themselves. Events would show whether they were able to cope with the responsibilities which had been restored to them, and to prepare their future in order and liberty. The rate at which subsequent progress took place would depend on the results of that experiment. France hoped that Germany Would embark upon a course which would enable it to regain its place in the community of free nations, beginning with that European community foreshadowed by the Council of Europe. 77. Although the Council of Foreign Ministers had failed to reach agreement on Germany, it seemed, on the other hand, to have paved the way for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria, a treaty which would make it possible to put an end to the military occupation of that country and to restore to it its real sovereignty. Negotiations for the final drafting of the texts had been carried on throughout the summer and were being resumed that day in New York. The French delegation was very anxious to reach a successful conclusion before the Austrian elections on 9 October 1949. 78. Thus, on one point at least, the hope expressed in resolution 190 (III), which the General Assembly had adopted on 3 November 1948 on the initiative of the delegation of Mexico, and to which the President had appropriately referred in his opening speech (220th meeting), would be fulfilled. Austria would then be able to take its place in the United Nations together with other nations, which had not betrayed either the cause of international morality or that of democracy and freedom. The French delegation sincerely rejoiced in the moral support and spontaneous cooperation of so many nations, whose influence within the Organization was not to be measured by the size of their populations or by the extent of their material resources. France respected human dignity in every individual, and recognized the right of every State to develop freely and to accomplish its mission. That mission was enlarged by the possibility of each State to contribute to the common welfare of all. The egotism of States was not only an offence condemned by morality; it was an error repudiated by the solidarity which bound the destiny of all peoples more and more every day. 79. Every vote cast within the Assembly should be guided by that truth, which was the basis — nay, more, the raison d’être — of the United Nations.