Mr. KARDELJ stated that he wished to dwell on a few fundamental facts which, in his opinion, were of very great importance to the world in general, and especially to his country.
40. He wished, first, to point out that discrepancies between words and deeds had reached absolutely astonishing proportions; that was true even in the United Nations. It was undeniable that, even in the Assembly, most of the international questions which gave rise to controversy were presented in a guise very different from reality.
41. It was true that, during the preceding ten years, and especially after the cruel ordeal of the Second World War, democratic feeling had so increased among nations that it had become very difficult openly to defend the colonial system, inequitable relations between various nations, imperialistic expansionism, and the attempt of the great Powers to impose their will Upon the weaker Powers. Whatever party they belonged to workers expected an ever increasing consideration to be given to their democratic opinions.
42. That did not mean, however, that everything condemned by the popular democratic conscience had disappeared. The unsound policy was continued, under cover of propaganda tricks. Thus, although the enslavement of nations was considered to be a crime, such enslavement nevertheless continued owing to the use of a whole series of political and economic procedures.
43. The equality of rights of all the sovereign countries were solemnly recognized; some of, those, however, who in words declared themselves in favour of that principle had scant regard for it. in their own relations with other countries.
44. Moreover, a dangerous policy, based on the idea that, in order to defend peace, it was necessary to make the threat of war felt, had found widespread application.
45. Lastly, at the very time when there was so much talk about the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, it was clear that, in fact, such intervention had become the principal instrument of the foreign policy of the great Powers, and that it constituted the main reason for fearing a new war.
46. Such facts, however, which propaganda tried to present under a very different guise, were carefully hidden from public opinion. It even seemed that certain persons were eager to transform the United Nations into a platform for that kind of propaganda.
47. The question was whether the General Assembly would become the scene of appeals for peace, made for propaganda purposes, or would take effective measures for the maintenance of peace. If the United Nations was to be considered an important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, it was necessary, above all, to combat the tendency to conceal the real meaning of international questions behind parades of propaganda and allegedly democratic watchwords.
48. One of the questions which constantly arose was whether States with different social structures could co-exist and collaborate peacefully for the purpose of ensuring a lasting peace among the nations. The answer must necessarily be in the affirmative, for if peace were desired, it must be ensured under the existing conditions of a world as it was, by taking into consideration the fact that different States had different social structures. If the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States were respected, it was obvious that difference of social structure did not constitute a threat of war.
49. The representative of China, at the 223rd meeting, had preached a real crusade against communism; in fact, he had advocated war against the Soviet Union. It was quite obvious that it was not possible to speak of peace when such appeals were made. Yugoslavia felt that, if it were recognized that every nation had the right to decide its own destiny and to organize its own social structure, peaceful collaboration among States of different structure was quite possible. On the other hand, if that principle was not observed, there existed a real threat to peace, not only in relations between States which had a different social structure, but also in relations between States with the same structure.
50. It could be said, therefore, that the threat of war was due, not to differences in social structure, but to the existence of imperialistic and antidemocratic tendencies in international, relations, to the violation of the principle of equality of the rights of States and peoples, to the economic exploitation of other nations, and to intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
51. Hence all efforts to strengthen peace must be indissolubly linked to the struggle for equality in relations between peoples and States, for the preservation of the independence of small States, for the establishment of conditions in which political or economic pressure would have no place in international relations. Those were the questions which really put the sincerity of statements in favour of peace to the test.
52. It was impossible to speak of peace while weak or small countries were threatened and their right to self-determination violated, and while they were exploited or subjugated. The assertion that the principle of the sovereignty of States was out of date, and that it was necessary to set up a world government or State — which, in fact would legalize political and economic domination by one great Power or another — was equally incompatible with any desire for peace. It was impossible to speak of peace and at the same time heap insults upon a Government which called for a greater measure of democracy in international relations. Such contradictory assertions had been — made, and the Yugoslav delegation considered that to be an extremely dangerous factor, which constituted a permanent threat of war.
53. It was obvious that the question of the equality of rights and the independence of small countries was closely linked to the problem of their economic development. It was clear to everyone that the existing discrepancy between the wealth of technical resources and general economic progress of highly-developed countries on the one hand, and the economic position of underdeveloped countries on the other, represented a clear danger to the pursuit of normal economic relations.
54. The United Nations must solve that problem by providing under-developed countries with assistance in the spirit of the Chapter, in other words, the kind of assistance which would help to strengthen the independence of those nations.
55. It would be absurd to speak of economic and political collaboration with respect for the rights of all countries, if the basic premise was that the economies of under-developed countries should only complement the economies of the more developed countries. What should be sought was an increase in the well-being and strength of each country, the maximum development of its productive powers and the strengthening of its autonomy.
56. That was one of the most important questions before the United Nations, although it was among those in which United Nations action had been particularly ineffective.
57. It was true that by its resolution 200 (III) of 4 December 1948 the General Assembly had decided to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, and that measures were being taken to make the assistance available through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. That might be a useful step. The under-developed country which received that assistance, however, had to have the means necessary to profit by it. It should be noted that the current situation was favourable to a rapid economic development of under-developed countries; The best solution of the problem would be one which permitted under-developed countries to rely on the United Nations for economic assistance. Any measure to that end would be a great step towards strengthening the independence of many countries, and thereby towards strengthening peace.
58. Yugoslavia’s attitude on all those questions was well known owing to the position it had taken since the inception of the United Nations. Eighteen months previously, however, it had been faced with the. new problem of defending its independence and sovereignty. A difference had arisen between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
59. As an instance of discrepancies between words and acts, Mr. Kardelj dwelt on the anti-democratic agitation instigated by the Government of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, which had lately aroused world public opinion.
60. That agitation showed that the USSR Government was not always the champion of the world’s current aspirations to democracy and peace. Yugoslavia appreciated certain positive and progressive stands taken by that Government in favour of peace and encouraging pacific co-operation between nations, and supported them. There was, however, a radical difference between the words and the deeds of the Government of the Soviet Union. That was particularly obvious in its relations with Yugoslavia.
61. It was impossible to talk about non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States, while occupying a position such as that taken by the USSR towards Yugoslavia, an independent State. If was not possible to speak of peace and, at the same time, utter the threats which the Soviet Union had uttered against Yugoslavia.
62. That was the more significant since the USSR must be as well aware as any other country that Yugoslavia was not backed by any bloc of Powers and had not entered into any secret treaties or military alliances with any Powers hostile to it. That was probably why it thought it could employ, in regard to Yugoslavia, methods of diplomacy hitherto unknown in history and which moreover could not be considered as creditable to the country practising them.
63.. The peoples of Yugoslavia who, by their own efforts and great sacrifices during the Second World War, had achieved their national and social freedom, wished to organize the socialist life of their country in their own way. They were convinced that by so doing they were serving not only their own interests, but also those of peace and of human progress. They were convinced that, in taking such an attitude, they were showing respect for the historic past and culture of other nations and for their right to live and develop on their own lines, thus bringing their individual contribution to the common cause of human progress.
64. As was always the case in similar historical circumstances, there had been an attempt to cloak the true ideological and material nature of the dispute. In order to establish a hegemony over Yugoslavia, every form; of pressure, backed by a campaign of lies and slander unparalleled in history, had been brought to bear on it. Organized economic pressure had all but brought about a complete economic blockade of Yugoslavia by eastern European countries. An attempt was being made to terrorize people with weak nerves by means of notes which were of inordinate- length and which were not in accordance. with diplomatic practice. That was accompanied by countless frontier incidents and by troop movements amounting to military demonstrations.
65. It would suffice to say that, from 1 July 1948 to ,1 September 1949, 219 frontier incidents involving the use of arms had been provoked by Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. There had also been 69 violations of the Yugoslav air space. Moreover, the Greek democratic army command was being used for political slander of Yugoslavia although not long before Yugoslavia had been blamed for its sympathies with that movement. A considerable section of the Press and broadcasting stations throughout the world had been mobilized to spread base calumnies against Yugoslavia and to insult it.
66. Furthermore! provocative trials, such as the Rajk case in Hungary, had been instituted. Those trials would take a major place in the history of international provocation, if only by reason of the Machiavellian ingenuity of the accusations against Yugoslavia. Brazenly, without the least concern for verisimilitude or any attempt to disguise self-evident contradictions, such calumnies had been hurled at Yugoslavia in the course of the trial that the moral outlook of those who could stage such sinister farces must raise a shudder. Yet those same people must needs try to demonstrate that Yugoslavia was an aggressive country, bent, it appeared, on launching an armed attack against all the eastern European countries. That was necessary in order to justify the brutal pressure on Yugoslavia.
67. Despite the fact that world public opinion had been engaged by those problems for many months, Mr. Vyshinsky had not said a word about them. The Yugoslav delegation, however, felt that those facts could not be passed over in silence, because it was not in fact merely a question of an ideological conflict, but of a desire for hegemony to be exercised over Yugoslavia, an independent country which was threatening no one, which was busied in building its own socialist economy and therefore had no other desire but peace.
68. In their struggle for independence and for the principle of equality of rights in international relations, the peoples of Yugoslavia were defending the right of every nation to the free development of its creative forces, in other words, the establishment of conditions essential to human progress. They were not guided by narrow nationalist considerations, by an absurd claim to a life independent of the remainder of the human race. They were aware of the fact that progress demanded an ever increasing development of the creative energies of nations and that such a development could be achieved only if it were protected from every form of foreign domination and every form of external pressure.
69. Mr. Vyshinsky had strongly denounced in his speech (226th meeting) both the policy of warmongering and recourse to the threat of war. He had emphasized that the USSR Government heartily supported the principle of the equality of rights as between States. He had submitted to the General Assembly proposals emphasizing his Government’s wish that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means. The Yugoslav delegation must state that the Government of the Soviet Union should put its principles into practice, especially where it was easiest, namely, towards the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, a country which belonged to no bloc, which was no threat to anyone and was geographically close to the USSR.
70. That was all the more appropriate since Mr. Vyshinsky had declared that the USSR wished to collaborate peaceably and on equal terms with every country ready to adopt a similar attitude and since that was exactly the kind of collaboration which Yugoslavia desired and was always prepared to provide.
71. In conclusion, Mr, Kardelj returned to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by Mr. Vyshinsky. The Yugoslav delegation was favourable, in principle, to the conclusion of a pact for strengthening peace. It considered, however, that such a pact could be useful only if it were open for accession to all countries, since all nations, whether great or small, had an equal interest in peace.
72. Yugoslavia did not overlook the importance of the part which the great Powers played in the welfare of mankind, particularly with regard to the maintenance of peace. It felt, however, that the collaboration on equal terms of the smaller countries in all efforts for peace was essential in order that such peace should not be confined merely to the great Powers but that it should also exist between the great and smaller Powers, that it should be a democratic peace, a peace of nations with equality of rights, a peace for all, not merely for those with force at their disposal.