United Kingdom

Mr. Bevin recalled that in his speech to the General Assembly at the third session, he had made it clear that the United Kingdom was disappointed with the progress of the United Nations. He felt that it might yet recover its original spirit, but he was bound to point out that the apparent incompatibility existing between the great Powers had made it impossible to find a satisfactory basis for a world peace structure. It Was useless to nourish delusions; the facts must be faced. 2. The United Nations had been created to achieve universality. That had been the conception behind the League of Nations, but it had never been achieved. It had been confidently assumed that if the great Powers could, in spite of their widely differing economic systems, find a basis upon which they could co-operate, there would be a reasonable chance of succeeding in giving effect to that principle of universality. He had come to the current session with a slight hope that in the course of it the General Assembly might take a step forward in that direction. The speech the USSR representative had made at the 226th meeting, however, could scarcely be called encouraging or likely to help in the achievement of that objective. It must be remembered that unless there was a firm universal foundation based on understanding between the five great Powers, there was little chance of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the subordinate agencies proving effective. 3. Scarcely any problem which had been referred to the organs or to the subordinate agencies of the United Nations had-been approached or dealt with in an objective way. The hopes of the United Nations had been given a grave set-back by Mr. Molotov’s speech during the Assembly in 1946, in which he had described what he called the two tendencies. It had been clear, from that speech, that one section of the United Nations was firmly convinced that the non-communist area of the world was bound to fall victims to its own contradictions, that no genuine co-operation would be received from the USSR Government. That had been borne out by events. Every step that had been proposed for the rehabilitation of the world, such as the Marshall Plan, any scheme devised to raise the standard of life throughout the world, such as that of assistance to underdeveloped countries, had met with virulent and abusive propaganda of the kind to which the world had become accustomed. 4. Sooner or later, however, people would learn that things were not inevitable in the world. The great slump of 1929 would not inevitably recur. Mr. Bevin was convinced that the prophets of disaster and doom would be disappointed. A large area of the world had learned to co-operate; it had profited by past experience and was consciously resorting to measures to counteract the operation of blind forces. As Mr. Acheson had said (222nd meeting), the conscience of the world was developing, and it was realized that universal co-operation could and did produce better results than could be attained by merely waiting for world collapse. The United Kingdom was consciously planning, thinking and trying to work out schemes to avoid the devastating and blind operation of economic forces visiting doom upon the people. 5. One of the handicaps of the United Nations had been the refusal by certain Powers to abide loyally by its decisions, but in spite of that some achievements had been realized during the previous year. The United Kingdom was happy to be able to note some improvement in the situation in Greece. It was to the credit of the Assembly that it had made tremendous efforts, session after session, to try to reach a solution of the problem of Greece, and Mr. Bevin was convinced that the whole world realized that the promotion of civil war anywhere, or interference from outside, was contrary to all the principles of the United Nations. At the meetings of the Security Council in London in 1946 it had been made quite clear that Greece must be allowed to settle its own affairs and develop its own institutions in its own way. The United Kingdom delegation was grateful to President Truman and his Government and to the Congress of the United States for the generous assistance which they had extended to Greece when its independence and integrity had been seriously threatened, as also for the timely help they had extended to Turkey when that country had been subjected to a war of nerves. 6. The efforts of the Greek people to maintain their free institutions, the sacrifices made by the Greek Army, the patience shown despite a flow of abusive language and propaganda, all evoked the same kind of admiration the United Kingdom had felt for Greece when, in the early days of the war, that country had faced the fascist hordes and when those who currently abused it had concluded a treaty of friendship with Hitler. Greece had paid a heavy price for liberty. It was to be hoped that it would henceforth be left alone in peace and would be free to hold elections without interference. Mr. Bevin trusted that Greece would find it possible to be generous to those of its people who had been misled. 7. Greece had been a signatory to the five peace treaties signed in 1947. Unfortunately it still had no agreement with its neighbour, Albania. That little country had been used as a base for attacks on Greece. Mr. Bevin would urge Greece to settle, its differences with all its neighbours in a spirit of conciliation. In that connexion, the United Kingdom Government was indebted to the Members of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, whose report it had received and read. He would ask representatives to study chapter V of that report, which gave the conclusions of the Committee. The report was impressive in its impartiality, as also for its solemn condemnation of the conduct of certain Governments. 8. The General Assembly would be called upon to deal with the question of the former Italian colonies. The colonies had been under military occupation since 1943 and failure to arrive at a settlement had been a great obstacle to their political and economic development. The United Kingdom had had to operate a military occupation under the terms of the Hague Convention, and it was unfair to the people living in those territories to handicap them further by failure to decide the issue. 9. During the war, at the time of the great fight of the desert-, when the United Kingdom had been almost alone, a solemn pledge had been made to the Senussi. That pledge must be honoured. In order that internal affairs might be carried on, a local administration had been established. That did not in any way prejudice the Assembly in dealing with the problem. 10. With regard to Eritrea, Mr. Bevin said that it was the British Commonwealth which had liberated that country and Abyssinia. At the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, after full consideration and study, the United Kingdom had made clear its attitude towards that problem and, although it had given further study to the whole problem, its position in principle remained the same. The United Kingdom Government supported Ethiopia’s claim to Eritrea, except in regard to the Western Province. It was firmly convinced that, provided proper protection was assured to the Italian minority, a great step could be made towards peace in that area. There had already been co-operation between the Italians and the Ethiopians in trade and development, and there was evidence that if such co-operation were allowed to grow naturally, the whole community would benefit. 11. With regard to Italian Somaliland, the United Kingdom maintained the proposal it had submitted in the First Committee during the second part of the third session. 12. Turning to the question of Tripolitania, Mr. Bevin wished once more to make it quite clear to the Assembly that the United Kingdom had no desire to remain in that territory. His Government as the occupying Power was prepared to do anything it could in helping to reach a solution. The interests of the local inhabitants must be given full consideration, and it was greatly to be hoped that there would be no delay in producing a solution to the problem. 13. Mr. Bevin would take the opportunity to deal with some of the reflections which Mr. Vyshinsky had made (226th meeting) upon the United Kingdom Government and other Governments in relation to the parts they had played in their foreign policies and in the promotion and conclusion of the Treaty of Brussels and the signature and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty. 14. The North Atlantic Treaty was one of the great events of history. The threatening language which had been used by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech had been heard by the General Assembly year after year. It was a constant repetition of untruths, made in the hope that if they were reiterated often enough, someone would believe them. 15. Mr. Bevin said he had made it clear, during the debate at the third session of the Assembly, that if it were found impossible to proceed on a universal basis, as had been hoped, an attempt must be made to proceed with those who would co-operate. That conclusion had been reached because so much remained to be done as a result of the war, and it had been proved to be true. 16. The North Atlantic Powers were a community. They had a similar civilization. They all adhered to the basic principles of liberty and democracy. They did not rely on secret police. They believed in government by the people and for the people, uncontrolled by any dictatorship. It was therefore a natural development that those Powers should come together, but they had taken care to come together within the framework of the United Nations. 17. Mr. Bevin turned next to the question of Germany. It was a subject which had caused great concern during the third session of the Assembly and was still causing concern; it had a great bearing on the discussions which would take place during the current session. 18. The four great Powers had undertaken to bring about a peaceful Europe, and the United Kingdom Government had always striven to give effect to the undertaking. Before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1947, it had given months of consideration to every facet of the situation in Germany. As a result, the United Kingdom delegation had placed before its colleagues on the Council of Foreign Ministers its proposals for a basis on which a peace treaty with Germany might be drawn up. It had been prepared, of course, to give full consideration to any other proposals that might be made on the subject. 19. Seven weeks had gone by, but the only response had been speeches similar to the one made by the USSR representative at the 226th meeting. That was not negotiation; that was not trying to find a solution; that was not doing business in international affairs. Ministers could not be expected to sit, week after week, month after month, simply to be abused and told that they were warmongers. 20. Prior to that meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Byrnes, then Secretary of State for the United States, had put forward a draft treaty, the provisions of which were designed to contain Germany for forty years, and so to eliminate any possible danger of war or of conflict between the Allies within that period. Mr. Bevin asked all delegations to study the reply given to that proposed treaty by the Government of the Soviet Union and, by that reply, to test the sincerity of the proposals it had submitted to the Assembly at the 226th meeting. 21. Later, Mr. Marshall had brought forward his plan for the relief of Europe, and in London, in November 1947, had renewed his Government’s offer of a treaty of disarmament. Once again, Mr. Bevin asked students of international affairs to study impartially the proceedings of those negotiations and then decide where the danger to the world peace really lay. 22. Credit had. been claimed for the United Nations in the report of the Secretary-General for the settlement of the Berlin incident. That was perhaps an over-simplification. The Assembly should consider where the initial responsibility for precipitating the crisis in Berlin lay. It had not lain with the United States, France or the United Kingdom. The entire world had been thrown into a state of apprehension by the action of the Government of the USSR, which had sought to use its power of blockade to starve two and a half million people and to bring pressure on the other three Allies. It could hardly be claimed that that action was in keeping with the proposals submitted to the Assembly at its 226th meeting. No one had known the intentions of the Government of the Soviet Union, or what incident it had been trying to provoke. The other three Powers had displayed much patience. For a whole year they had proceeded together to feed two and a half million people by air communications rather than submit to USSR pressure. They had done everything possible to settle the problem, including bringing it before the Security Council. The then President of the Council, Mr. Bramuglia, together with his colleagues, had made great efforts to find a way out. The solution they had proposed had been accepted by the Western Powers but it had been vetoed in the Security Council by the USSR representative. In Mr. Bevin’s opinion, the actions of the Government of the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin had been designed to persuade the world that that Government was prepared to risk war rather than be denied its objective, which was the complete and illegal control of Berlin. Only the determination of the Western Powers to combine to give effect to the principles of the United Nations in the face of that possible aggression had brought about a partial solution, of the problem, which unfortunately had not yet been satisfactorily settled. 23. Looking back over the previous years, and re-examining the policy pursued in Europe, the question arose whether any other course could have been followed by the Western Powers, Greece had been threatened. Mr. Vyshinsky had visited Romania, abolished the Government and installed another under the domination of his Government. Bulgarian independence had been destroyed and the opposition leaders liquidated. In Hungary the freely elected Government had been undermined; in Poland no free elections had ever been allowed to take place, in spite, of the undertaking given at Potsdam. Finally, in the Assembly where the great democrat, Jan Masaryk, had been a familiar figure, a reference must be made to the disappearance of everything that he and his father and President Benes had stood for in Czechoslovakia. 24. If all that was the price of peace, then in Mr. Bevin’s view it was a very high one. Indeed, he would go further and ask whether it was really peace. 25. The Western Powers were fully aware of the USSR’s intention to use its agents and the Cominform to upset the economy and political structure of every Western Power. It could not be denied that that was the deliberate policy of the Government of the Soviet Union. Could the Western Powers really be expected supinely to permit the development of that policy to lead to such results as had been seen in Czechoslovakia and in the other countries mentioned? If the USSR Government expected by such methods to convince the Western Powers of its sincerity, it was deluding itself. The Western Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union; one step towards promoting confidence would be for the Government of that country not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. 26. No country had more successfully carried out its imperialistic policy under a new disguise than the USSR. It had sought to create in each of the democracies a group charged to attempt disintegration and destruction, while at the same time it kept its own doors tightly closed because it could not permit the truth from the outside world to reach its people. Not only was no one in that country permitted to entertain an opinion which was unacceptable to the Government, but, behind those closed doors, the Government was pursuing a policy designed to ensure that words, in the minds of the people of the Soviet Union, should have a meaning directly contrary to their meaning for the rest of the world. Thus peace was apparently peace only when it produced results approved by the Politburo. The possessors of independent opinions were labelled warmongers. That produced some curious results. Markos, in Greece, as long as he had been approved, had been a peace-lover. The fact that he was fighting with foreign assistance against the duly elected Government of his country had been quite irrelevant. Suddenly, however, he had ceased to be peace-loving. Yugoslavia had also been peace-loving as long as it had found favour, but had become a warmonger overnight. The Chinese Communists were so far peace-loving; so were the North Koreans. But at any moment they might cease to be peace-loving and become warmongers. Czechoslovakia had become peace-loving overnight, in February 1948. The world knew that Czechoslovakia, in all its history, had never been anything but peace-loving. “Peace-loving”, then, could be made a word of ill-omen, just as “warmongering” signified independence of Moscow. 27. There were many other verbal perversions. Religious freedom was interpreted to mean persecution, and civil liberty meant, the rule of the secret police. All those whose duty it was to listen in the-United Nations to the representatives of the Soviet Union were under no misapprehension. The USSR representative’s recent speech abounded in examples of such differences in the use of words. 28. It had been suggested that differences should be settled by mutual discussion. If that meant that in the future views were to be exchanged in a spirit of reasonableness and compromise, then on behalf of the Government and the people of the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin would welcome it. For three years the United Kingdom had been trying to conclude a treaty with Austria. In the light of the new declaration, it seemed that a solution might be reached. 29. It was, however, difficult to reconcile that declaration with the language used in the note addressed by the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia. At the end of the note the following appeared: “If this is so, then the USSR Government deems it needful to declare that it will not put up with such a position and will be forced to use other more effectual methods to defend the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia and to call to order the fascist violators who have gone too far.” 30. Yugoslavia was an independent country and a Member of the United Nations. There was, however, nothing in the note to the effect that if a satisfactory solution was not reached, the matter would be referred to the United Nations. What it did say was that the Government of the Soviet Union alone would determine the instrument, and would use it. It said that that Government would use “more effectual methods”. It was not known what those methods were. Would they endanger the security and integrity of Yugoslavia? More, would they endanger the peace of the world? Some unhappy events in history had begun in that part of the world. Was it the intention of the USSR to resort to some dastardly means? The meaning of the words was obscure. The United Kingdom Government had information, however, that troops had begun to move towards Yugoslavia. 31. A very dangerous situation existed which all regarded with apprehension. The matter did not solely affect the two countries. It was to be hoped that Mr. Vyshinsky’s advice to other countries had been accepted by his own Government, and that the threat of force contained in the Soviet Union’s note to Yugoslavia would be withdrawn. The situation strongly resembled that which had existed in Berlin when the United States, France and the United Kingdom had been in effect warned that they would be forced out of Berlin unless they submitted to USSR pressure. If the note were withdrawn, and, in the event that no settlement were reached between the parties concerned, if the question were submitted to the United Nations, that would represent an important practical contribution to the restoration of world confidence. 32. Turning to the question of China, Mr. Bevin said that the plea of the Chinese Government representative (223rd meeting) merited full consideration. He did not propose for the time being to discuss the details of the problems which it raised. 33. There had been many conquests of China but no conquerors. Each in turn had been absorbed by the Chinese people. Modern China, however, had been sorely tried. In 1931, it had suffered from Japanese aggression. When the Japanese had been defeated, civil war had divided the country. The United Kingdom. Government would watch events in China very closely, but judging by the speeches being made by the victorious leaders, slogans of the same kind as had been heard elsewhere were echoing through China. China might, after all, find itself in need of all the Members of the United Nations, and not only of one single country. Any attempt to create prejudice and hatred would not be in China’s interests. The United Kingdom would make no attempt to interfere in the choice of government, but China had entered into certain international obligations which must be honoured, and a wise approach to the handling of those problems would be in the interests of the whole world. 34. Mr. Bevin made a short reference to Malaya, where circumstances were closely connected with those in China. There had been terrorism in that territory on similar lines. The local inhabitants had been struggling hard to restore their economy, and the United Kingdom had been collaborating and assisting, step by step, in the development of measures leading ultimately to self-government. Great strides had already been made, and it was a matter of great regret that the people were being kept in a state of apprehension, not by the revolt of any of the local population but by the instruments of an outside Power. 35. Mr. Bevin had taken careful note of the speech delivered by the Indian representative (222nd meeting). It had been, in his opinion, a very thoughtful speech, particularly in its references to self-government. The United Kingdom Government was, of course, very gratified to have been able to co-operate with the peoples of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma to bring about a transfer of power to over 400 million people in Asia, a major political operation carried out in a most remarkable manner and in good faith. Notwithstanding all the differences that had hitherto existed, the United Kingdom had been glad to be able to hand over a great civil service trained by the United Kingdom in the art of administration and an army well trained to keep order; the transfer of power had been carried out effectively. 36. The United Kingdom earnestly hoped that the difference between India and Pakistan would soon be finally resolved. Nothing would give greater joy to their friends. If that one difficulty were removed, it would help to expedite their economic development, so essential in that part of the world. 37. It was a matter of great regret to the United Kingdom Government that Ceylon, which was innocent of wrong of any kind, which had achieved its independence like India and Pakistan, had been denied the right to sit in the Assembly. It was in the interests of the United Nations that a way should be found whereby nations which fulfilled the conditions required for admission to the General Assembly should not be kept out by a veto. 38. Mr. Bevin wished to take the opportunity of congratulating the Economic and Social Council and its President, Mr. Thomson a very good year’s work. Reading through the Council’s report, he had felt that its recent session had probably been the best it had held. In his opinion, the future success of the Council would depend to a great extent on the cutting out of less essential activities and concentration on really practical ones which could be applied effectively and quickly. Confusion and loss of efficiency would result if the efforts of the Council were too diffused. 39. Turning to the question of atomic energy, he characterized as threadbare the accusation that the Atomic Energy Commission had failed to fulfil the task given to it by the General Assembly because of continuous attempts on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to impose on the Commission a plan which was unacceptable to self-respecting nations. The facts were that, so far from having been imposed, the plan had resulted from several years’ work in the Commission, in which, it should be remembered, nineteen Members of the United Nations had taken part at various times. All but two of the members of the Commission had accepted it in preference to the USSR plan. Both plans had been thoroughly examined and exhaustively discussed, and the Commission’s acceptance of the plan in November 1948 had been endorsed in resolution 191 (III), adopted by no less than forty members of the General Assembly. Those forty members must feel flattered by the suggestion that they had been coerced into adopting a plan which no self-respecting nation could adopt. 40. The USSR was continually putting forward a plea for prohibition of the atomic weapon and perpetually seeking to blame the United Kingdom and others for failure to make, prohibition a reality. That was an absurd charge; those nations were as anxious as any others for prohibition. The original declaration by President Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King, issued in Washington in 1945, had, in fact, called for the elimination of the atomic weapon, and General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 had repeated that call. 41. Since that time, a series of resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities in the Atomic Energy Commission itself had emphasized that essential aim of the elimination of the atomic weapon. The United Kingdom and others had, however, recognized that effective prohibition depended on effective control of atomic energy. In common with others, it supported the plan approved by the General Assembly, because that plan would provide for effective control. Nevertheless, the. Soviet Union had clung obstinately to the proposals for control which it had put forward in 1947 and which had been rejected over and over again as inadequate. It had continued to decry the plan approved by the Assembly. Mr. Bevin had listened to the USSR representative’s speech at the 226th meeting with very great attention, and would like to know whether he was to understand that the Government of the Soviet Union was finally prepared to accept the decision of the United Nations. If that were so, then the decision must be put into effect. 42. It was not obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom or of those who thought as it did that had prevented agreement. Mr. Bevin would remind the Assembly that at the 226th meeting, on 23 September, the USSR representative had called for the “unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of appropriate strict international control”. President Truman’s statement on the same day had reemphasized the need for “truly effective and enforceable international control”. The two statements appeared to advocate the same thing. If, then there was to be effective control, the means of inspection and of operating effective control must be open to the United Nations to carry out. 43. A further argument had been used, however, to the effect that the reason the Atomic Energy Commission’s plan had not been accepted was that it interfered with independence and sovereignty. If, however, all nations were in danger from atomic weapons and wished to establish control, and if they placed control in the hands of a collective body, representing the world, then, up to that point, they would surrender their sovereignty in order to achieve effective. control and in order to see to it that each one was treated fairly and that its position was secure. That was provided for in the plan adopted by the Assembly. It meant, therefore, that the USSR must raise its curtain and open the way to the system of control approved by the General Assembly, the system which the United Kingdom and the majority of the other nations believed in their hearts to be the only means that would ensure adequate security. 44. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, adhered to the original declaration which President Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King had issued in Washington in November 1945, and it was ready forthwith to take all constructive steps to give effect to it. 45. It was being asserted, however, that a convention prohibiting the use of atomic weapons would in itself be enough, and the argument had been advanced that the use of gas during the Second World War had been prevented by the existence of the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed in Geneva in 1925. In that connexion, Mr. Bevin drew attention to the fact that no provision had been made in that Protocol for enforceable inspection. Such inspection had certainly never been applied, and in the course of the war it had become known to the United Kingdom Government, as it had to the USSR Government, that the Germans were producing gas. It had been feared that they would use it and, indeed, they had come near to using it. In the very critical days of the war, Generalissimo Stalin had received the same information and had requested the United Kingdom Government to issue an announcement that, should the Germans resort to the use of gas, the United Kingdom would retaliate to the fullest possible extent. The United Kingdom had agreed to do that and the announcement had been made. The United Kingdom had proceeded to speed up the production of gas in order to be able to retaliate in the event that Germany resorted to gas warfare. That situation had arisen largely because there had been no provision in the Protocol for inspection. It was an ineffective Protocol, because its implementation had been left to the discretion of the respective Governments. The atomic weapon was such a terrible weapon of destruction that any nation which really wanted to put an end to it could readily agree to inspection in order to satisfy every citizen of the world that a convention on atomic warfare was really effective. 46. The United Kingdom had approached all those problems on the basis, first, of collective security; secondly, of disarmament with inspection; thirdly, of enforceable control. 47. In conclusion, Mr. Bevin asserted that, notwithstanding disappointments in those great problems, the United Nations had performed a great task. The world Organization could not be built in a day or a year, but it would grow. One of its great advantages was the opportunity it offered for debate and open discussion of different approaches to world problems. All those annual events, all those agencies which were confidently created, were gradually helping to develop in the minds and hearts of the peoples of the world a greater understanding of the importance of international law, of the rule of law, of the moral acceptance of law, of the necessity for the adoption of a high standard of moral values in the enforcement of that law, and of the necessity for the universal adoption of optional clauses and for the willing acceptance of decisions, even if they were not quite to the liking of all. 48. In view of the magnitude of the problems involved, the United Nations might have to limit its scope in order to have greater success in the questions it sought to deal with. It had perhaps, in its enthusiasm, thrown its net a little too wide. It had perhaps attempted too much and achieved too little. Concentration on fundamental problems might be the way to make it more effective and more successful; that was a course which should be carefully studied. 49. Mr. Bevin was convinced that, in spite of frustrations, it was the people’s will that the United Nations should go forward and not lose sight of the great objectives that man had always had before him: universal peace, universal brotherhood and the means to settle all disputes without resort to force.