Argentina

Mr. ARCE said that the difficulties which clouded the international horizon could be traced to causes both within and without the United Nations but that some, if not all, of those difficulties had been successfully resolved. 116. Those which divided the great Powers, or which were the outcome of their conflicting interests, were beyond the sphere of action of the United Nations. The most the other States were able to do was to offer their good offices and to emphasize the responsibility of the great Powers in maintaining peace. 117. On the other hand, the differences which arose within the Organization were more within the scope of Member States, which were in duty bound to study them, to publicize them and, whenever possible, to suggest a method or methods which appeared best calculated to resolve them. It was partly for the purpose of fulfilling that duty that Mr. Arce had risen to speak. 118. For the fourth time since the entry into force of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had assembled in order to deliberate. When the Organization had been established in San Francisco, it had been decided that its Members should meet together annually. According to the terms of the Charter, the current session was the fourth regular session of the General Assembly. But if that purely formal consideration could be disregarded for a moment, and if the political significance of that gathering of the nations and the peace of the world were borne in mind, then it would be seen that that gathering was also — and must be — the annual gathering of Member States determined at all costs to survive, whether by retaining the existing Organization or by establishing another which would be better able to ensure collective security, order, justice and social progress. 119. That consideration should be borne in mind for two important reasons. First, because the purpose of maintaining peace, which was the primary objective of the Organization, required a wider rather than a more narrow field of action; it called for the admission of all the nations of the earth; it required that the war which for six years had devastated large areas of the earth should be forgotten and that thoughts should be concentrated solely on peace, which could be more easily preserved with a greater number of nations associated in the achievement of that noble aim. 120. The second reason was that if the peace were unfortunately broken, it would be much easier to restore it if there were a greater number of associated nations. Moreover, it was imperative that possible aggressors should be fully aware that in such an eventuality they would have to face a union of nations already in being. A policy of plain speaking, of calling a spade a spade, was the best service to the United Nations. 121. Mr. Arce then proceeded to take stock of the period which had already elapsed, of the defects which had been noted and of the results achieved. The United Nations was a living organism which thought, spoke, acted, succeeded and made mistakes. It was an organism which must develop and be perfected if it were not to disappear. Although its disappearance would not necessarily result in the disappearance of its component parts, it would destroy the aims which had inspired its formation and structure. If the nations wished to profit by experience, they must at all costs prevent the eclipse of the Organization. The United Nations must not be destroyed. 122. Mr. Arce preferred to associate himself with those speakers who dealt with the success achieved rather than the mistakes made by the Organization although, in the last analysis, both groups were solely concerned with serving the cause of the United Nations. 123. The Argentine Government was particularly interested in the improvement of the Organization and, as in the past, it was always prepared to co-operate in the task of ensuring peace among nations, of promoting liberty among peoples and of improving the social conditions of individuals. 124. Even in the very darkest moments, the Argentine delegation had never lost sight of the noble purpose of seeking good for the sake of good alone without considering less worthy interests. Argentina was prepared to fulfil the obligations arising out of its international commitments, but that did not prevent it from working for the settlement of differences, no matter how deep-rooted such differences might be. Argentina would never give up the hope that agreement might be reached, and even if all paths appeared to be blocked, Argentina would still be ready to work for peace. Recent events furnished authentic proof of the purposes of the Argentine Government and of the aims which inspired the policy of the delegations which had represented it previously and of the delegation which represented it at the current session. 125. Representatives of all the groups and voicing all the tendencies existing in the General Assembly had made frequent references to violations of the Charter. The representative of Argentina felt that such references proved that no one deliberately set out to violate the Charter. The diversity of points of view provided a sufficient explanation of those charges, and showed the advisability, if not the necessity, of undertaking a study of the provisions which gave rise to such controversies. 126. The undertaking of such a study did not imply that those provisions must be modified in accordance with a given point of view. It was necessary, in the first place, because provisions which had been approved without great difficulty four years previously had in practice been subjected to the most contradictory interpretations. They must therefore be revised, clarified, modified or deleted or, if in the course of debate agreement were reached on a single interpretation of a controversial provision, that provision must be retained. 127. It was necessary, in the second place, because a provision which had been approved in spite of serious differences of opinion or under the pressure of special circumstances, had turned out to be bad or inoperative in practice; it was therefore advisable to reconsider it. 128. Those differences had arisen both in regard to the sphere of action of the Security Council and in regard to the interpretation of the powers of the General Assembly. 129. The energy with which the Argentine delegation had fought the privileges granted to certain members of the Security Council was a matter of common knowledge. Mr. Arce did not dispute the privilege of membership conferred upon particular States under Article 23 of the Charter. But whereas the Charter did not require that those States should be given similar treatment in the Economic and Social Council, they were re-elected whenever there was an election. And although the Charter did not require that they should be given five of the seven vice-presidencies of the Assembly, that always happened. 130. Such conduct in organs in which the various States had no special privileges whatever clearly showed the consideration given to the great Powers notwithstanding the silence of the Charter in that regard. In those circumstances, the fact that the members which enjoyed the privilege to which Mr. Arce had referred were reelected, showed a fortiori that they would be re-elected to the Security Council. For while the permanent members of the Security Council might doubt the sentiments of some of the fifty-four other Member States, they could not doubt the political experience of those States; consequently the one Council where they would remain indefinitely, even if no such privilege were granted in the Charter, would be the Security Council. 131. The fifty-four other Member States were at least as much concerned with world peace as the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the indefinite re-election of those members would be in the nature of an insurance policy which the other States would willingly sign and maintain without any external compulsion. It was clear that such a course of action would be in greater harmony with Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter, concerning the sovereign equality of all the Members, than with Article 23, which conferred the privilege of permanent membership on certain States designated by name. 132. But what could not be accepted was the privilege commonly known as the veto. The use of such an extraordinary power might be justified in a case involving the political interests of the State concerned, if any decision of the Security Council were likely to harm those interests. It was absolutely unjustified, however, in cases involving the interests of other States or in connexion with the most varied and most insignificant questions. 133. That privilege was bound to create, and did in effect create, sectors or spheres of influence, as in the era of the balance of power. The expansion or contraction of those spheres of influence might affect privileged States which were proposing to exercise, in their own interest, the privilege granted to them, but the other nations were kept in constant fear, waiting for the spark which would once again ignite a horrible war. 134. Mr. Arce would not discuss the disadvantages which had been demonstrated in practice by the use of the veto; they were well known to all the representatives as well as to those who followed the proceedings of the Security Council in the Press. But certain drawbacks could not be passed over in silence; he was referring to what had been called the hidden veto and the double veto. 135. The first of those had been regarded with favour by those who considered that the end justified the means. Mr. Arce held a completely different view. The so-called hidden veto was actually a veto, despite the fact that the permanent member which resorted to it, not wishing to cast an affirmative vote, took refuge in abstention. In fact, it was not a hidden veto, because nothing attracted greater notice than a permanent member which abstained from voting. It could be said that it was morally inadmissible for the permanent members to abstain from voting. They had accepted a responsibility under the Charter, and hence should always cast a vote, whether yea or nay. 136. It was easy to show that an abstention was, in effect, a veto. The Charter made no mention of a veto; nor did it speak of negative votes intended ipso facto to void a decision which had been approved by seven or more affirmative votes. The Charter spoke of decisions adopted by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Under the Charter, any decision which had not obtained the affirmative votes of the five permanent members had no legal force. 137. Nevertheless, the Security Council, using an arbitrary interpretation, had accepted as valid resolutions which had obtained the affirmative vote of only four permanent members, provided the fifth permanent member had taken refuge in abstention. Such an interpretation led the representative of Argentina to call the so-called hidden veto by a name which was more accurate in the light of the Charter and the facts, to wit, a furtive or shame-faced affirmative vote. 138. That arbitrary interpretation constituted a new privilege for the permanent members, which appeared to seek their own convenience and to escape their responsibilities, rather than to promote the general interest of the United Nations. 139. Mr. Arce recalled the Declaration subscribed to by the five permanent members in San Francisco, for that Declaration was apparently the Gospel of the veto. That document, which bore the signatures of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, stated: “The first group of decisions” — the document was referring to questions of substance — "will be governed by a qualified vote — that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members.” 140. Accordingly, in pursuance of an explicit provision of the Charter and of the equally express opinion of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, all decisions of the Security Council which had been held valid although they had obtained the affirmative vote of only four of the permanent members, were null and void. 141. The permanent members of the Security Council answered those arguments by saying that the Council was implicitly empowered to interpret the scope of the powers granted to it and that, consequently, no other authority of the United Nations had the right to discuss the validity of its decisions concerning the application of Article 27. 142. It should be pointed out that the issue was not an interpretation but a modification of the Charter. As yet, however, so few representatives claimed that the permanent members of the Security Council had exceeded their powers that it was useless to make attempts which were doomed beforehand. They would have to wait for a better time, but, in the meantime, it should be recognized that the Security Council was claiming the right to interpret the Charter in regard to its own powers; it was to be hoped that it would not deny the same right to the General Assembly, in other words, to the United Nations. 143. No such prerogative as the double veto appeared in the Charter; it was based on the San Francisco Declaration. That Declaration had not been incorporated in the Charter as a key to interpretation, nor had it been approved by the San Francisco Conference. Hence, the double veto was a new privilege which the permanent members of the Council conferred upon themselves, though without any legal justification. An examination of the text of the Charter led to a diametrically opposite conclusion. 144. In accordance with the procedure of the double veto, whenever a doubt arose as to whether a question was one of substance or of procedure, and therefore whether it was or was not subject to the veto, it must be resolved by a prior decision which required the affirmative vote of the five permanent members. That method of resolving doubt was provided for neither in the Charter nor in the Council’s rules of procedure. Consequently, it had no legal value. The correct procedure in such cases should be to seek guidance from Article 18 of the Charter which dealt with voting in the General Assembly. 145. The Security Council had preferred to depart from the Charter and to adopt its own interpretation, basing itself solely on the fact that that was the solution appearing in the Declaration of the permanent members. Thus the least important question might become a question of substance simply at the wish of any one of the permanent members. 146. The use of the double veto as well as of the hidden veto showed that the permanent members of the Security Council believed themselves entitled to interpret the Charter in their own way in so far as it referred to the powers which had been granted them. So long as there was no revision of the Charter, that view must be noted. 147. The delegation of Argentina felt that in both cases there was an abuse of power and hence had asked at earlier sessions of the Assembly that a general conference should be convened under Article 109 of the Charter to discuss various questions and to proceed to the revision of the Charter if the conference considered it advisable or necessary. 148. When a text was open to doubt or when, through abuse of power, it was given an entirely false interpretation, it was more advisable to amend it so that it would clearly express what had been decided and thus establish the procedure to be followed thereafter. 149. The Argentine delegation had renewed its request (A/970) before the opening of the fourth session of the General Assembly. It had been argued in the General Committee that the subject might give rise to heated debates and that the current session of the General Assembly, already named the “Peace Assembly”, was aiming at solutions based on effective international co-operation which might be prejudiced by the Argentine proposal. The delegation of Argentina had not wished to shoulder so heavy a responsibility; it had withdrawn its proposal and was prepared to accept less extensive and even provisional solutions. It hoped, however, that its confidence would not be deceived. 150. Should the attitude of Argentina contribute to the removal of even one of the difficulties dividing the great Powers, the delegation of that country would feel satisfied with the procedure adopted in accordance with the principles of peace and harmony put forward by its Government. Should the contrary prove to be the case, the Argentine delegation would feel compelled to renew its proposal the following year and would attempt to convince the representatives that the sole purpose was to seek a clarification of those provisions which in practice had given rise to contradictory interpretations. 151. The much discussed assessment of the powers of the General Assembly was one of the questions most vital to the life of the United Nations; Mr. Arce deplored the fact that its importance had failed sufficiently to impress itself upon those States, Members of the United Nations which enjoyed no privileges. 152. Next to the question of the maintenance of peace, the admission of new Members was the most important subject to be considered by the General Assembly, since the acceptance of all, or at least most of the States still outside the Organization, was a decisive factor in the strengthening of peace. 153. When every country in the world had the right to be heard before the Assembly of the United Nations, no Power, however great, would dare to defy the world, as represented in the United Nations. Any attempt to do so would merely condemn that Power to the execration of all free men of the world including those living within its own borders. Hence the General Assembly should take up the defence of the principles of the United Nations and finally reach a decision with respect to all pending applications for admission to membership in the Organization. 154. The Argentine delegation would be very pleased to see all peace-loving countries admitted to the United Nations. Even though some of them were not admitted in consequence of a negative decision of the General Assembly — the only organ with the right to postpone their admission — the Argentine delegation would prefer a final decision to the shameful spectacle of more than a dozen States knocking at the doors of the United Nations without the latter condescending to reply. 155. The General Assembly could, but was not bound, to bar any State from admission to the United Nations. When the facts leading to a negative attitude on the part of the General Assembly were not serious, as in the case of States which had not as yet obtained the support required under the Charter, a mere postponement might be sufficient. The reasons for a negative decision might disappear. Mr. Arce was convinced that in the end the United Nations would admit all countries showing a desire to co-operate in the task of maintaining peace. The General Assembly must emerge from the impasse which it had reached. With that purpose in mind, the Argentine delegation intended to submit to the First Committee certain solutions which it was considering. 156. The Argentine delegation felt that the provisions of the Charter on that question were clear. In view, however, of the fact that doubts had repeatedly been expressed, it was desirous of securing some decision which would safeguard the unquestionable right of the United Nations to settle matters pertaining to its own constitution; those were matters concerning which no privilege could be invoked, since they were within the competence of the United Nations itself, which had laid down the procedure governing its decisions. 157. The “Peace Assembly” quietly proceeded with its discussions in spite of rumours and reports of all kinds. Mr. Arce felt, personally, that the General Assembly was right in not allowing itself to be swayed by the political difficulties that had emerged in one of the areas into which the international field was divided. Political difficulties appeared and disappeared; technical progress was a consequence of unending study and work and could not be held back. A step in any given direction was followed the next day by a step in the opposite direction. There should be no cause for alarm, however, since the forces of nature could be used in various ways and human genius would always contrive some means to eradicate or reduce the bad effects and to make use of the good. 158. Mr. Arce proposed a truce during which the United Nations might pursue its efforts for the realization of its primary aim, peace, pending the working out of an agreement on all types of weapons, both atomic and non-atomic. If such an agreement were to be arrived at, it was necessary to reduce the effects of other even more dangerous weapons, such as rumour, intrigue, political jealousies, arbitrary measures and unbridled ambition. 159. Mr. Arce stated, on behalf of the delegation of Argentina, that it would do everything in its power to bring about such a truce.