Mr. EBAN observed that the General Assembly was approaching its labours in the fourth session under the critical and expectant gaze of the world. The instinct among peace-loving peoples everywhere to identify the prospects of peace with the success of the United Nations was accurate and sound. It was true that the international scene was rich with many other groupings and coalitions of States united in the pursuit of common objectives and ideals. Yet they did not claim to answer the crucial question which faced the contemporary world. To say that Governments and States founded on similar political doctrines and kindred cultures could achieve close co-operation was to affirm something that stood in no need of proof. That was not the question which multitudes of anxious peoples all over the world were asking; they were asking whether Governments with different and opposing interests could achieve a point of mutual tolerance, above their differences and above their opposition. They were asking whether divergent and contrasting political doctrines could live together in peace, side by side. The main issue was the co-existence of different ways of life within a common allegiance to a single international code.
187. That was an issue which could be decided only in the General Assembly — that unique forum where alone all the factors of world power and opinion were represented as equals. Seen in that light, the principles of the universality of the United Nations and an equitable geographical distribution of its organs assumed a primary and urgent importance. Those two principles would guide the Israel delegation in its approach to the discussion of the problems of applications for membership, the future of the Interim Committee and other constitutional questions.
188. The lack of agreement among the great Powers had rendered the enforcement provisions of the Charter inoperative so far; yet if would be wrong to conclude that the lack of a capacity of enforcement doomed the United Nations to ineffectiveness. For that deficiency did not prevent the United Nations from promoting the advance of subject peoples towards independence. It did not impede the work of the Organization in developing international co-operation in the economic field, with the objective of full employment and technical assistance; it in no way affected the capacity of the General Assembly to reach binding decisions on questions such as that of the former Italian colonies, in which its jurisdiction had been accepted in advance by the parties. It did not hamper the work of the specialized agencies. Above all, it did not diminish, but powerfully increased, the need for United Nations efforts in the field of mediation and conciliation.
189. The Government of Israel had had opportunities of intimate contact with the work of the United Nations in that field. During the previous month the Security Council had been able to endorse the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and its four neighbours with the aid of the United Nations Acting Mediator. A pattern of normal and orderly life had grown out of those agreements. The armistice lines did not merely separate armed forces; they marked clearly defined areas of full civil jurisdiction. The Government, the courts, the legislatures, the security authorities of each respective State operated smoothly and unchallenged up to the appropriate armistice line. The agreements themselves committed all their signatories to abide firmly by that provisional settlement until new and final agreements were reached by further negotiation. The United Nations might well find satisfaction in the end of hostilities and the assumption, by the Governments concerned themselves, of full responsibility for a final settlement to be attained by peaceful means.
190. Mr. Eban pledged his Government to continue with zeal and perseverance its efforts to reach such a settlement in direct negotiation with the Arab Governments concerned. The lesson of the past year had been concisely expressed by Mr. Bunche to the Security Council when he had stated that "once the parties could be brought together, they could, with United Nations assistance, be led to reasonable and honourable agreement. Recent experience had convinced the Israel Government that it was only by coming together that the parties were likely to evolve the provisions of a new agreement. It was Israel’s hope that the United Nations would make it its main resolve to promote that objective. It had become generally recognized that the Arab States and Israel needed a maximum of contact and a minimum of intervention in order to settle the political problems still outstanding between them.
191. The fact that such a savage and inveterate conflict could have been brought to an end and healed by methods of pacific settlement could not be without significance for the treatment of other conflicts which had so far baffled the Organization. The mediation which had brought about the armistice had been patient, impartial, detached from the predilections of individual Governments and assiduously addressed to the maintenance of contact between the parties. It might be of some value for the General Assembly to explore whether such principles of conciliation under neutral and mutually accepted auspices might not be applied anew during the current session towards tire solution of such acute problems as the relations between the States of the Balkans and the overriding issue of atomic control.
192. Among the residual problems of the Palestine conflict, two were still in the forefront of international interest.
193. During the second part of the third session, the Israel delegation had put forward the view that the refugee problem created by the attack upon Israel could find its solution only in a co-operative regional effort on the part of all the Governments concerned. It had not changed its view on the initial responsibility for that great human catastrophe; surely those who decided to initiate military operations could not wash their hands of all responsibility for helping to dispel the suffering thus created. For that reason the Israel delegation felt it to be both unrealistic and inequitable to require a solution of the problem by exclusive concentration on Israel alone. The Israel Government was gratified to observe a growing consciousness that all the States of the Near Fast must bend their efforts, each to the limits of its genuine capacity, to contribute towards a rapid solution. Had resolution 194 (III) adopted on 11 December 1948 laid greater emphasis on the principle; of wide regional responsibility, it might have been possible for Israel and the Aral States to find a common approach at Lausanne.
194. The humanitarian issues involved in the refugee problem were undoubtedly tragic and grave. Moved by those considerations, and eagerly desirous of creating conditions of co-operation and stability throughout the Near Fast, the Israel Government, though beset by grave financial problems of its own, had decided to contribute to the United Nations Relief For Palestine Refugees, to reunite Arab families separated by war, and also to undertake a specific commitment for facilitating a solution by a measure of repatriation to be carried out in the context of peaceful relations and as part of a regional programme of resettlement.
195. Israel had made those offers before a single one of the Arab States had undertaken any commensurate responsibility. It had done so in the hope, thus far unfulfilled, of eliciting a similar response among other Governments in the Near East. Having already taken from the shoulders of the international community the major burden of the refugee problem bequeathed by the racial persecutions perpetrated by nazism, Israel had become the first Government to make a tangible offer towards the solution of another humanitarian problem produced by the military action of other States. In a continuation of that effort, the Israel Government was preparing to co-operate closely with the United Nations Economic Survey Mission which was exploring the possibilities of development and resettlement in the Near East. A fuller discussion of that problem might well await the report of that group.
196. The agenda included another item of vital importance to the relations between the United Nations and its newest Member, namely the question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Earlier in the year, when the Jerusalem problem had been a subject of profound international interest, the President of Israel had made a public pronouncement, to the terms of which the Israel Government still faithfully adhered. He had said: "The Government and people of Israel are conscious of the international interest in the safety of the Holy Places and the right of free access to them. We pledge ourselves to ensure full security for religious institutions in the exercise of their functions; to grant the supervision of the Holy Places by those who hold them sacred: and to encourage and accept the fullest international safeguards and controls for their immunity and protection. Just as we are resolved to give complete and practical expression to the universal interest arising from the Holy Places, so we expect that the international community will understand the direct and inescapable responsibility which Israel bears and exercises in the daily life and administration of Jewish Jerusalem."
197. On 5 May I949 when the Ad Hoc Political Committee had proceeded to discuss the Jerusalem question in relation to Israel’s obligations under Article 4 of the Charter, Mr. Eban, in accordance with his Government’s instructions, had developed those principles by advocating the establishment by the United Nations of international agencies extending over the whole city but "concerned exclusively with the control and protection of Holy Places.”
198. It would thus be seen that Israel regarded the Jerusalem problem as composed of two elements, First, there was the responsibility of the United Nations for ensuring that Holy Places and sites were reverently preserved and that religious institutions were assured full liberty in the exercise of their functions. Secondly, there was the responsibility, no less valid, and for the Government of Israel not one whit less compelling, for ensuring to the Jewish population of the city the full enjoyment of its democratic political rights in association with the only Government to which it was prepared to offer its allegiance.
199. There was no incompatibility between those two purposes. Conflict could arise only if there was an unjustified encroachment by one upon the other. Thus, if the political aspirations of Israel and of Jerusalem's population were carried to the point of repudiating the concern of the United Nations for the safeguarding of Holy Places and sites, there might he an encroachment upon a universal religious interest. No such eventuality would ever take place. On the other hand, if the United Nations were to impose upon the population of Jerusalem any burden of deprivation not strictly related to the satisfaction of universal religious interests, an encroachment would take place upon cherished political freedom.
200. It must be remembered that the safeguarding of the Holy Places and religious rights had always been the exclusive justification of any measure of international supervision. General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 19-18 did not make an unconditional demand for separate treatment or effective United Nations control in Jerusalem. It recommended separate treatment and effective international control explicitly “in view of [Jerusalem's] association with three world religions". Once full provision was made for the effective recognition of that religious association under United Nations supervision, the international and religious aspects of the problem would be settled, and there would remain only a problem of political relations in Jerusalem, to be solved in accordance with the principle of self-determination by the method of conciliation.
201. It would be a disservice to realistic investigation to ignore the exact relationship existing between the Jews of Jerusalem and the State of Israel, for that relationship would profoundly affect the task of the General Assembly in the Jerusalem question.
202. The situation might be briefly described. When a law was promulgated in Israel, the Jews of Jerusalem obeyed it. When a tax was levied in Israel, the Jews of Jerusalem paid it. When the parliamentary institutions of Israel were elected, the Jews of Jerusalem helped to elect them and participated in their operation. When civil or criminal litigation arose in Jerusalem, it was to the courts of Israel alone that the Jews of Jerusalem took their case. The coinage and stamps of Jewish Jerusalem were the coinage and stamps of Israel. The slowly reviving economy of Jerusalem was sustained and nourished by the State of Israel, which provided from its own resources all the social services of the new city — in regard to health, education, water supply and social welfare. The language and religion, the cultural sentiment and national allegiance of the Jews of Jerusalem were those which they held in common with the State of Israel and its people.
203. There was thus no link uniting a citizen of Paris to the Republic of France, there was no bond between a citizen of London and the United Kingdom, which did not exist between a Jew in Jerusalem and the State of Israel. For in modern society no man, however conscious of civic pride, felt complete in the limits of a purely municipal allegiance; he must reach out to identify himself with a wider political and social culture. In that respect, too, the Jewish citizens of Jerusalem were as those of all other cities.
204. Yet there was one aspect of the ties uniting Jewish Jerusalem and the State of Israel which had an altogether exceptional force. In 1947, after the United Nations had undertaken full responsibility both for the religious and the secular life of Jerusalem, it had failed to carry out that responsibility. Jerusalem had been subjected to siege and famine, while the international community, for several months, had remained supine. Men, women and children had fallen by the hundred in the city's defence and in its relief. At critical moments both water and food supplies had been cut off with no hope of replenishment. The consequences of that situation, had it been permitted to endure, would have been annihilation for every Jew in Jerusalem as complete as that which could be inflicted by the most devastating bombardment.
205. Salvation had come from one quarter alone. The State of Israel, struggling against dire odds for very survival, had girded all its strength to throw a lifeline to the beleaguered city, reopening its communications and saving it from strangulation. Every man, woman and child in Jewish Jerusalem could thus ascribe the fact of his or her physical survival directly to the State of Israel and its Government. It was not surprising, therefore, that they were disposed to give their loyalty and co-operation to that Government alone.
206. The existing situation in Jerusalem was thus both a cause and consequence of the city’s rescue and pacification. It rested firmly upon valid armistice agreements entered into by the parties concerned and endorsed by the Security Council. It was therefore a legal situation and not merely an accomplished fact. Moreover, the relation between Israel and Jerusalem constituted no obstacle whatsoever to the fulfilment by the United Nations of its desire and duty to undertake responsibilities for safeguarding the Holy Places and sites.
207. The fact that such firm patterns of authority and government already existed in Jerusalem made it imperative for the United Nations to seek a solution in harmony with established and legitimate interests. Indeed, in its second progress report (A/838), presented to the General Assembly on 19 April 1949, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine wrote that it was endeavouring “to formulate in conformity with the terms of paragraph 8 of the resolution of 11 December, proposals, which will at the same time be acceptable to both parties”. Yet the Commission had since apparently reached the conclusion that the consent of the parties was not an important or even a relevant consideration. The General Assembly was perhaps not aware of the fact that the plan presented by the Commission in document A/973 had never been discussed with the Government of Israel, which was administering almost the entire new city of Jerusalem. Nor had it been at any time the subject of negotiation with representatives of the population of Jerusalem.
208. That procedural disregard of the opinion of the authorities and population directly concerned was unfortunately reflected in the substantive proposals themselves. The plan set up organs of government as though Jerusalem had no Government; it established courts as though Jerusalem had no courts; it made detailed arrangements for the control of public services as though Jerusalem were living in anarchy; it replaced independent institutions, resting upon consent, by new institutions having no roots in the city and no duty of response to democratic processes. Not one of those administrative councils was really necessary for the protection of the Holy Places; not one of those courts had duties essentially related to the religious associations of the city. The whole administrative superstructure, which would revolutionize the budget of the United Nations, was irrelevant to the primary objectives of the. Organization in Jerusalem.
209. Moreover, by dispensing with any effort to reach consent, the Conciliation Commission sometimes collided sharply with the devout political and religious conscience of the population. Thus, for example, there was a proposal in article 5 whereby Jews might be forbidden to take up residence in Jerusalem on the ground that they were Jews. The Israel Government knew the General Assembly too well to believe that there was a chance of such a proposal being adopted, and had no real feeling, of alarm. It knew that the Organization would not put up a notice to tire effect that no more Jews were wanted at the gates of the Holy City, which had been made illustrious in history through the spiritual experience of the Jewish people, wherefrom had branched off tire great streams of Christianity and Islam. Yet the fact that such a proposal could be made showed how urgent it was to begin formulating the policy of the United Nations in regard to Jerusalem anew, in close association with the peoples and interests involved.
210. Finally, a similar criticism could be made of the proposal for demilitarization, which failed to take account of two facts. In the first place, the simultaneous dismissal of Jewish and Arab forces from Jerusalem would not create equal security for both parts of the city. It would put the entire city once more in the situation which had nearly produced its downfall a year previously, at the mercy of Arab forces which, by the facts of geography, would then be free to surround it from three sides. The demilitarization programme also conflicted with the armistice agreement which exclusively governed the security situation in the whole Jerusalem area, including the disposition and reduced size of armed forces.
211. Regardless of its strong feelings on the Commission’s report, the Israel delegation would contribute earnestly and constructively in the Assembly to the work of determining, in a practical and final form, the responsibilities of the United Nations on the one hand and of the Government of Israel on the other. It would seek a solution which satisfied the interests and concern of the world religions and of the United Nations, and at the same time the aspirations of the people of Jerusalem to government and security in conformity with their national allegiance.
212. Israel was already encouraged by some principles put forward in the general debate. The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (225th meeting) had rightly ascribed primary importance to the protection of the Holy Places and the need for an agreed solution. The Foreign Minister of France (225th meeting) had carried the discussion into new and constructive channels by concisely emphasizing three factors: the importance of carrying out the practical objectives of the United Nations without undue insistence on juridical preferences; the need to avoid imposing obligations not strictly indispensable; and the desirability of seeking the consent of the population concerned.
213. The Israel delegation would propose that the General Assembly should limit the commitment of the United Nations to the safeguarding of the Holy Places and should initiate such formal agreements as might be necessary between the United Nations and the State of Israel for the implementation of those safeguards. The Israel Government aspired to full international recognition of the political status of the Government of Israel in Jerusalem.
214. A solution along those lines would have the following advantages over that proposed by the Commission: it would rest on consent and would therefore present no problem of implementation or enforcement; it would terminate the period of doubt and potential conflict that had already lasted too long; it would be financially and administratively feasible; and it would simultaneously give complete satisfaction to the interests of the great world religions and of the people of Jerusalem. Under those conditions, an era of peace and development would descend upon the Holy City, while the United Nations would stand forth as the ultimate and accepted guarantor of its religious immunity.
215. The solution of most international problems required an exact balance between the interests of the international community and those of an individual State. Yet when two legitimate interests faced each other, it was often possible to satisfy the main substance of both.
216. Small nations represented in the General Assembly must often ask themselves what they could contribute to the general welfare in a world so dominated by large units of power. Perhaps in their very disinterestedness and in their passionate need for security, they were the best qualified to search out the common ground between conflicting interests and to assert the persistent need for mediation. The Israel Government, which had itself learnt the consequences of war and the benefits of conciliation and which represented a new political unit whose traditions and future depended on the maintenance of international peace, would join its humble effort to any movement for extending the use of the methods of pacific settlement prescribed by the Charter. It was in that spirit that the delegation of Israel came forward to undertake its duties at its first full session of the General Assembly as a Member of the United Nations.