Czechoslovakia

Mr. CLEMENTIS said that, in surveying the achievements, and failures and in analysing the problems which had concerned the United Nations during the past year, one important and positive fact had come to light, particularly when those achievements were compared with those of the preceding session of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his report for the year 1949, had rightly stressed that the fear of war had decreased, and he was partly right to consider the breaking of the Berlin deadlock as the main factor contributing towards that improved situation. 2. Thus it had once more been clearly proved that the peaceful development of the world depended on the co-operation of the leading great Powers, and on the widest and most frequent application of the principle of unanimity, especially to the solution of post-war problems. There was no doubt that, if another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers were held at the same time as the General Assembly, as had happened in 1946, in order to solve further problems, there would be a relaxation of tension throughout the world and it would have far-reaching effects upon the, results of the Assembly’s deliberations. That would further prove to those who sincerely strove for the success of the United Nations in the spirit of the Charter, but who so far had not been realistic enough to recognize and respect the real prerequisites for that success, that the co-operation of the leading Powers was a sine qua non. 3. The daily practice of the United Nations supported that thesis. In cases where one of the great Powers or a group of great Powers had tried to achieve their own selfish and unjust aims within the United Nations with the aid of a mere mathematical and mechanical voting majority, the result had too frequently been failure to solve the problem in question. It was sufficient to cite the examples of Greece and of Korea or the series of questions concerning the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the reduction of armed forces and armaments in general. 4. The principle that it was absolutely necessary for all the great Powers to agree among themselves on the solution of important political questions was as old as the Organization itself which had been born under the sign of that principle; it was so simple and obvious that even a political novice must understand it. Therefore the fact that it had not been and was not being applied, that attempts were being made to by-pass it, or even to abolish it from the Charter, as advocated by the crusaders against the veto, indicated that an effort was being made to attain aims other than those declared publicly. Thus, for instance, an attempt was being made to prevent much tried Korea from becoming free and united, and to maintain a controlled and divided Korea; efforts were being exerted to avoid prohibition of atomic weapons and rather to achieve monopolistic control over them. 5. There was no escape from the dilemma thus created. However, even if it were admitted that the fear of war had really diminished and that that achievement — however modest in scope bu. of fundamental significance — had been attained largely as a result of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris in the Summer of 1949, one characteristic fact must be emphasized. It was that the official representatives of one of the great Powers participating in the Council, which had even been one of the initiators of the Paris meeting, had done their best to minimize the significance of that meeting in order to stem the relaxation which had followed it. 6. The great Power in question was the United States, which claimed a leading position within the United Nations as well as outside it. The United States stood at the head of the capitalistic States and determined not only their attitude towards the fundamental questions of world politics but often their internal policies as well. Yet, in the case of the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the United States could rightfully — as could all the other participants — have claimed that it had contributed towards an act of merit, which had been acknowledged with satisfaction by the whole of peace-loving mankind. Instead, it had behaved in a contrary manner without achieving any significant result. 7. Mr. Clementis did not intend to analyse the causes of that seemingly contradictory phenomenon. Obviously, a relaxation of the international tension was not convenient for a further application of the strong hand policy nor for a continued waging of the cold war, nor for the creation of an atmosphere of fear, all of which were so necessary to justify the tremendous expenditures for the increase in armaments and the political and economic subjugation of other countries. 8. Despite the attitude of the leading country of the capitalistic world, despite the North Atlantic Treaty and continuous provocative warmongering, there had been a lessening of international tension and of the fear of war, owing to the consistent attitude and activity of the Soviet Union and to the powerful and clear will of hundreds of millions of people all over the world to maintain peace and to struggle for peace. That spirit of hundreds of millions of peoples of all nations and races should not fail to influence the discussions of the General Assembly and their outcome. 9. Mr. Clementis pointed out that although there were many serious problems on the agenda of the General Assembly, there was also the usual number of items introduced purely for purposes of provocation. Those latter items were apparently intended to divert the attention of world public opinion from other more essential questions. The usual majority had insisted on reverting to problems which had already been discussed at previous sessions instead of approaching new questions constructively. 10. Even in connexion with the Palestine question, where the work of the United Nations had yielded many positive achievements, it should be emphasized that if the United Kingdom had not pursued its own particular policy in and around Palestine, and if the United States had not played a double role, the question would not have had to be referred to the Assembly for a final solution and, what was more, it could have been solved without bloodshed, .and the hardships which had befallen hundreds of thousands on both sides could have been avoided. 11. The substance of the majority of the other problems which were again before the Assembly was political. They could be solved only politically, and not by far-fetched juridical constructions or by a mathematical counting of votes. The question of the admission of new Members was a case in point. At the previous session, when the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice had been adopted by an insignificant majority, it had been pointed out that a formalistic juridical approach to the question was politically untenable and absurd. It had led to everlasting and futile discussions in the Committee on the Admission of New Members and later in the Security Council. Certain Powers intended to reopen those discussions while they continued to make speeches exhorting respect for the principle of universality of the United Nations and the need, which was truly very pressing, to shorten the period of the sessions. 12. Other questions which had been before the Assembly for several sessions were being dealt with by commissions and agencies which had been established by the usual majority and which were in fact undisguised instruments of Anglo-American power policy. The majority of those bodies had been created in violation of the spirit and the letter of the Charter or of other existing international agreements. 13. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, of sad renown, fell within that category. Its reports remained an unfortunate and warning chapter in the history of the United Nations. The faculties of observation of the members of the Committee were peculiar inasmuch as they failed to see any of the horrors which the monarcho-fascist units had perpetrated in all the regions of unfortunate Greece. Their auditory faculties were also impaired, for they did not seem to hear any of the provocative speeches about the preparation of military raids into neighbouring countries. 14. Moreover, it should be noted that the Committee had not been overly concerned with observing its terms of reference. Although, from an objective standpoint, all the conditions required for ending the civil war in Greece had already existed for some time, it had neither acknowledged nor given support to such a possibility, despite the fact that a concretely formulated proposal opening the way to the only possible and lasting solution had been presented to Mr. Evatt, President of the third session of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the so-called peace and order maintained by means of intervention and at a sacrifice of countless lives was not even a permanent solution. 15. Mr. Clements added that his remarks concerning the Committee on the Balkans could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the United Nations Commission on Korea, which had been constituted in violation of the Moscow agreement. Moreover, from the formal point of view, the illegal activity of the Commission, constituted on the principle of pacta sunt non servanda, had been confirmed by the Interim Committee, a body which had no competence and which had been created illegally in violation of the Charter. 16. What ventures was the United Nations embarking upon? The United Nations was an Organization which had taken upon itself the responsibility for the observance, reinforcement and respect of international law. The United Nations should be the institution to prevent rather than to permit a gamble with the destiny of a nation such as Korea; which had suffered so much in the past and should be allowed to shape its own future. 17. The case of Korea served to demonstrate the harm that could be done by an illegal body such as the Interim Committee. Normally a body which had carried on such activity would have been dissolved, even had it been created legally. Instead, a proposal was being, made that the existence, of the interim body should again be prolonged, although the courage was lacking to designate it as a permanent committee. What was to be the activity of that body in the future? Was it once more to interfere with the competence of the General Assembly while the latter was not in session? The proposal for prolonging its existence became a question of principle which would reflect the attitude of every Member nation towards the Charter. 18. The most vital questions facing mankind were again before the Assembly in a not too encouraging form. Those questions, so constantly and justly placed on the agenda by the USSR delegation, were international control of atomic energy, prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction in armaments and armed forces. To declare that those questions were beyond solution and to stop the work of the relevant commissions was to abandon the most important mission of the United Nations. Perhaps such action was designed only to justify the tremendous armaments taking place within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty? 19. Mr. Clementis recalled that the preceding year, in his reply to Mr. Bevin’s announcement of that treaty under the innocent cloak of a regional pact, he had stated that that road led to the abandonment of the principles of the United Nations and to the creation of opposing blocs of States. Recent developments clearly confirmed that thesis. No explanatory speeches or insincere references to the Charter in connexion with the North Atlantic Treaty could in any way alter that reality. The delegation of Czechoslovakia could not agree with those who defended the North Atlantic Treaty by maintaining that the spirit rather than the letter was the decisive factor in judging whether or not the treaty violated the Charter. What, indeed, was the spirit of an instrument which hid behind atomic bombs? 20. Although the submission of the question of the former Italian colonies to the United Nations, and even the activity of the Organization in the Indonesian war, had been cited as proof of the growing authority of the United Nations, the reality was quite different. On the eve of the opening of the Assembly it had been learned, that the United Kingdom had generously granted a somewhat peculiar independence to Cyrenaica, keeping for itself all the prerogatives of sovereignty. Similarly, as had been the case before the opening of the second part of the third session, the Assembly had learned that another roundtable conference was meeting at The Hague. It was clear that the tactics of postponement, of making it impossible to reach an agreement, as in the case of the former Italian colonies, and of failure to respect the resolutions of the United Nations, as in the case of Indonesia, were intended to present the world with a fait accompli, to arrive at the so-called internal legal solution which the Union of South Africa had undertaken in direct contradiction with resolutions 65 (I), 141 (II) and 227 (III) of the General Assembly in the case of South West Africa. 21. Those were just a few concrete examples to prove the oft-repeated statement of the Czechoslovak delegation that the United Nations was being by-passed, that its authority was being weakened and that efforts were being made to misuse it. 22. In the category of what Mr. Clementis had called the usual, number of items introduced purely for purposes of provocation, were those concerning the violation of human rights, included in the agenda apparently for the sole purpose of providing the representatives with an opportunity to voice their prejudices against the Soviet Union and ,the peoples’ democracies, and thereby offering the Press suitably prefabricated material for anti-Soviet propaganda and warmongering. It was clear that those responsible for that campaign wished it to be continued not only because of deep-rooted industrial, economic and financial interests, but also because of the internal political need for fighting communism, which in some instances provided a convenient device for curbing strikes and weakening the trade union movement of the working class, and thereby for masking semi-fascist regimes and internal difficulties. It was, of course, also possible that the inclusion of those topics in the agenda of the Assembly was merely a smoke-screen, designed to hide cases of serious and systematic violation of human rights on the part of those countries which verbally, and in the Press, most warmly supported the proponents of the discussion of those items. Was it perhaps a manoeuvre to prevent prior accusations of flagrant crimes against freedom, equality and humanity from being lodged against those countries which most frequently invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 23. The campaign against the Hungarian People’s Republic and in favour of the treacherous Cardinal Mindszenty had failed sadly. And the anti-Bulgarian attacks in favour of Bulgarian citizens who had committed high treason and were priests by profession, sounded hollow. Recently, in order to keep the issue alive, Australia had entered a complaint against the Romanian People’s Republic (A/948). 24. Mr. Clementis recalled that during the second part of the third session, the Czechoslovak delegation had clearly stated that the question did not belong on the agenda of the General Assembly, and had given the reasons for its position. It felt that the boringly identical accusations represented an endeavour to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. Legal punishment of high treason and other actions which were crimes according .to penal law could not be considered as a violation of human rights. 25. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak delegation was willing at any time to discuss the positive contribution of the peoples’ democracies in strengthening and broadening human rights. Mr. Clementis pointed out that, while Governments which frowned upon the peoples’ democracies had been unable to guarantee freedom from fear of the atomic bomb to their citizens or freedom from want to their unemployed, the people of the peoples’ democracies had launched a world-wide proclamation of man’s inalienable right to peace. The peace congresses of Wroclaw, New York, Paris, Prague, Budapest, Moscow and Mexico City had been peace plebiscites at which the representatives of hundreds of millions of people had proclaimed their desire for peace, their will for peace and their firm resolve to destroy the evil work of warmongers and the grave-diggers of peace, both at home and abroad. 26. The working and thinking people of the world found support and expressed confidence in the Soviet Union, which rallied to its side all the truly peace-loving peoples of the world. Malicious attacks on countries which had punished those who were preparing for war in alliance with the enemies of peace from abroad, were ridiculous at a time when hundreds of millions of people were calling for the right to peace. That most basic right was still in danger and it was up to the United Nations to free mankind from the fear that its right to peace could be violated, or, more accurately, that that right was being violated by the preparation for war. 27. That did not mean that fruitful, outstanding and worthy achievements in the field of protecting and strengthening human rights were not possible within the scope of the United Nations. It was sufficient to recall war as such, the way it was being waged in Viet-Nam, in Indonesia, in Malaya, the treatment of the Natives and the Indians in South Africa, or, less far afield, in the land of “Jim Crow”. 28. The third session of the General Assembly had been told about a so-called self-imposed minority. Similarly, the fourth session was hearing about a small group which was allegedly insisting on a policy of threatening other members of the international community. That was peculiar logic and peculiar fact-finding. That small group, which devoted the major part of its material and spiritual resources to peaceful reconstruction of its economy, which, without outside help, relying solely upon itself and the spirit of unselfish mutual co-operation, had developed its economy to a level which showed constantly improving trends and which had no reason to fear economic crises — that small group was allegedly menacing all the others and causing a profound sense of insecurity. But the other group, which not long after the war had exhibited tendencies to revise solemn agreements and obligations concluded during the war in the spirit of friendship and understanding, had begun to proclaim doctrines and to strengthen old military bases and construct new bases around the socialist countries, that other group which even on the eve of the fourth session had announced the creation of organs for the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, was supposed to be the one which implemented the obligations of the Charter. The conclusions to be drawn were obvious. 29. The Czechoslovak delegation had already stated the causes which, in spite of those unpleasant realities, had eased rather than strained international relations. That situation certainly encouraged work within the United Nations where, in spite of obvious differences of opinion, in spite of real difficulties which could not be surmounted at once, activities that would be beneficial to all peace-loving men could be promoted. 30. Before the opening of the fourth session, and in the plenary meetings, it had been said that the United Nations could successfully further such activity, especially in the economic and social fields. The Czechoslovak delegation would welcome such a development. It had been gratified that, after discussion in the Economic and Social Council, the question of the implementation and the observance of Articles 55 and 56, and in particular 55 a of the Charter, had been included in the Assembly’s agenda. Those provisions called for action to achieve or maintain full employment and higher standards of living and economic stability. Although those problems had definitely been solved in Czechoslovakia, as well as in the other countries that were building socialism, the Czechoslovak delegation would welcome discussion on them. 31. Perhaps those problems had been placed on the agenda of the Assembly as a result of the lessons learned from the failure of the Marshall Plan. Czechoslovakia had opposed that plan, among other reasons, because it had been established outside the framework of the United Nations and was contrary to the principles of the Organization. 32. The activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should serve as a warning to those who hoped that the United Nations would achieve success in the economic field. The Bank, which had originally been planned as an institution working in the spirit of the United Nations, had become an instrument of the power policy of the United States. 33. The foregoing survey of the problems included on the agenda of the General Assembly gave no cause for satisfaction; rather it should be taken as a very serious warning and a challenge to increase efforts so that the United Nations might finally fulfil its highest and most important mission, which was to secure peace and to further relationships among all peace-loving peoples of the world. 34. The contemporary movement for peace was not an expression of defeatism, but a manifestation of self-confidence and strength, qualities which characterized its representatives. The United Nations would be .able to fulfil its great mission for peace only when it became strong, when it refused to permit its authority and competence under the Charter to be by-passed, misused and undermined through the creation of illegal bodies and the discussion of matters which had no place on its agenda. When those negative activities had been eliminated from the life of the United Nations, the Organization would really become what the whole of peace-loving mankind would like it to be. The attainment of that goal required ceaseless and patient struggle against such condemnable practices and, above all, a creative initiative which would enable the United Nations to develop its most essential activity, namely, the strengthening of peace in the world! 35. The USSR delegation, faithful to its great tradition, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vyshinsky, had once again come forward with proposals (226th meeting) which were a simple and workable instrument for solving the most vital problems of contemporary mankind. Under the terms of these proposals, the General Assembly called upon all nations to cease all preparations for a new war, to free the people from the ever-present burden of an armaments race, to draw the necessary conclusions from the solemn obligations they had assumed on entering the United Nations, to prohibit atomic weapons and secure an effective control of those instruments of genocide, and to settle differences between countries by peaceful means; it further exhorted the great Powers, which bore the principal responsibility for security under the Charter, to act in accordance with that responsibility. 36. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported the proposals of the USSR delegation, for they had already been approved by the whole of the Czechoslovak people, by all the countries which desired peace and by millions of people from all over the world. It was unquestionable that the absolute majority of mankind sought peace and that the universal desire for peace could not be divided by any kind of iron curtain. 37. No one could possibly deny that the proposals of the delegation of the Soviet Union had been made in the spirit of tire Charter, or that their adoption would tremendously increase the authority of the United Nations. Mr. Clementis felt sure that the attention of world public opinion would be focused upon the fate of those proposals, for everyone knew that their adoption would mark a revolutionary turning point, a historic turning point in the post-war development of the world. Mankind had paid a heavy toll in fighting, privations and often blood in order to achieve such gains. The proposals for peace did not entail sacrifices and suffering; on the contrary, they were intended to save mankind from them, and from something very much worse. The USSR proposals put a fateful question to the United Nations. Could any honest member of the world community hesitate even for a moment to give a positive reply? 38. Mr. Clementis concluded by recalling that General Romulo had coined a new name for the fourth session of the General Assembly, namely, the “Peace Assembly”. That name should enter the annals of the United Nations. The adoption of the USSR proposal would determine whether that would come about.