Mr. ACHESON said that the fourth session of the General Assembly was opening at a time when the initial shocks and adjustments of the post-hostilities period had been generally absorbed into the lives of nations. The real shape of the major problems of the post-war era could at last be seen with greater distinctness. The nations were coming to grips in many practical and prosaic ways with their tasks in a world which was far from ideal.
22. The United States delegation had given much thought to the major problems which had agitated and dominated international life since the end of the recent war, and had done its best to analyze their nature and their significance. It recognized that some of them were of a terrible seriousness, but also that they were-deeply rooted in the experience and traditions of great peoples, in the philosophies of major politick movements, and in inertia — the inertia of institutions and conditions which intimately affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people across the globe. They were too deeply rooted, in many instances, to be rapidly overcome by persuasion or compromise or by isolated diplomatic gestures.
23. Many people, becoming aware of the depth of those problems, despaired of their solution by peaceful means. The United States had never shared and did not share that feeling. General Marshall had warned against what he called “fighting the problem” instead of applying oneself to its solution. That warning applied to problems in the international field in the past months and years. It was true that the problems were serious, that they were bitter; and that they were not susceptible of any sudden and dramatic solutions. But it had not been proved that they would not eventually yield to the effects of time and patience and hard work. To the extent that they could not be solved for the time being, they must be endured; but there must be unceasing efforts to overcome them step by step. There were grounds for hoping that persistent effort, geared to the ever-present process of change in human affairs, would eventually produce a more hopeful and a more solid structure of world relationships than the existing one.
24. The major problems of the time could not be solved by national action alone, but required common action in the light of the common public interest. The increasing recognition of the concept of public interest in the field of international relations was a significant — though little heralded — fact of the twentieth century.
25. The sure vision of the leaders of the nations united in the previous war had given birth to the United Nations, a forum in which the international public interest could be fully expressed and applied in the solution of problems.
26. The questions which lay before the fourth session of the General Assembly affected vitally the general complex of world problems. Those questions should be faced soberly and practically. Even if the right answers to them were found, that would not by itself bring about the desired transformation in world affairs. Only out of a long series of such patient and often undramatic efforts could that transformation eventually be achieved.
27. With respect to the Greek question, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had concluded that Yugoslavia had decreased, and perhaps even ceased, its aid to the Greek guerrillas, and that guerrilla activities in general were declining, but the danger still existed because of continuing aid, principally from Albania. It was timely for the Assembly to make a renewed effort to restore peace along the northern Greek border and to re-establish normal relations between Greece and all its northern neighbours. Outside aid to the guerrillas must stop and Greece must be permitted to bind up its wounds. The session could provide further opportunity for continued and sincere efforts among interested parties to bring about that result.
28. Mr. Acheson believed that he expressed a desire widely shared in the Assembly when he voiced the hope that the USSR, which in the past had not participated in the Special Committee, would join in renewed consultations aimed at settling that persistent and serious problem. If the northern neighbours of Greece had come to realize that their own self-interest required respect for the recommendations of the United Nations and an adjustment of their relations with Greece, a rapid solution should be attainable.
29. A further matter in which the public interest had been deeply engaged for a long time was Korea. Despite serious obstacles, United Nations agencies had made a successful contribution to the creation of the Republic of Korea and had assisted it in its development. Unfortunately, the authorities of the northern portion of Korea had so far refused to permit the United Nations Commission to visit that region or to arrange for the unification of the country.
30. It was the view of the United States that a United Nations commission should continue to be stationed in Korea. Among the principal responsibilities of such a body should be to observe and report on any developments which might lead to military conflict in Korea, to use the influence of the United Nations to avert the potential threat of internal strife in, that troubled land, and to explore further the possibility of unification. The authority of the commission to observe and report on the actual facts might be sufficient to prevent open hostilities. That was the fervent hope of all patriotic Koreans.
31. In accordance with its established policy, the United States would continue to give full support to the work of the Commission on Korea.
32. Turning to the question of Palestine, Mr. Acheson said that it was a source of considerable satisfaction that the period of active hostilities in that country had been brought to a close by, the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and the several Arab States. The efforts of the Acting Mediator and his staff in that connexion were worthy of high praise.
33. Since the beginning of 1949 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been carrying on its work. While no agreed settlement between the parties had so far been reached, there was nevertheless hope that progress would be made in moving beyond the armistice stage to a real and permanent peace.
34. Eventual agreement between the parties was essential for the political and economic stability of the area. Later during the session the Conciliation Commission would present a report, including the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission which was in the Near East. On the basis of that report, the General Assembly should be able to provide such machinery as might be necessary further to facilitate and encourage agreement among the parties. The United States stood ready to give its full support and assistance to that effort.
35. The plight of the Palestinian refugees presented to the world a pressing humanitarian problem. It was of the highest importance that the States immediately concerned should recognize and accept their governmental responsibilities with respect to the problem. As an interim measure, the General Assembly should make the necessary provision for the maintenance of those refugees until the time when they could again become self-sustaining members of the Near Eastern communities.
36. It was the hope of the peoples of all faiths that the General Assembly would be able to act successfully upon the report of the Conciliation Commission in respect to Jerusalem. In the view of the United States Government, it should adopt a practical plan for a permanent international regime in the Jerusalem area and for the protection of, and free access to, the Holy Places.
37. Another problem of great complexity which the General Assembly had not solved at its previous session, but which appeared ready for solution, was the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. The exhaustive discussion at the third session had helped to clarify the issues, to bring out new information and to enable many Members to develop their views on the matter. At the fourth session, the General Assembly should work "out plans for a united and independent Libya, to be carried to completion in not more than three or four years.
38. It was the view of the United States Government that the Assembly should agree on provisions enabling the peoples of Eritrea to join in political association with neighbouring Governments, and the peoples of Somaliland to enjoy the benefits of the Trusteeship System.
39. The Assembly should make every effort to reach agreement on the major lines of a workable plan for the solution of that important problem.
40. The General Assembly’s responsibility for the disposal of the former Italian colonies arose from the agreement of the four major signatories to the peace treaty with Italy to accept the Assembly’s recommendation. Such a grant of a new power of decision to an organ of the United Nations, by express prior agreement to the responsible parties, opened a promising avenue towards enhanced usefulness of the United Nations.
41. The development of that precedent might well assist the settlement of various other political problems by special agreement, in advance, to accept recommendations of the General Assembly or the Security Council, or, in legal questions, the determination of the International Court of Justice. Through such advance agreement additional services would and should be rendered from time to time by the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations.
42. The United States Government felt a deep interest in the varied activities of the United Nations affecting, the peoples of the world who had not yet become fully self-governing. In Indonesia, the United Nations was witnessing an example of the development of a colonial people to freedom and independence and, through cooperative efforts of both parties at the Round Table Conference at The Hague of a voluntary association for mutual advantage.
43. Progress was being made in the realization of the Charter’s objectives regarding non-self-governing peoples both in colonial areas and in those under trusteeship. The United States Government would continue to support the aspirations of those people who were working out their destinies in the spirit of the Charter, to the end that they might achieve self-government or independence at the earliest practicable date.
44. There was another field in which the concept of international public interest was becoming increasingly evident. The Charter expressed the determination of the peoples of the United Nations “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.
45. The Economic and Social Council had laid before the General Assembly, a programme for co-operative action by the United Nations and the specialized agencies for rendering technical assistance in the economic development of underdeveloped areas (A/983).
46. The United States Government would give full support to such a programme to be launched by the United Nations, in which international action would supplement and support the steps taken by the national Governments to improve economic and social conditions. In every field — health, education, agriculture, industry, and others — particular projects had demonstrated that, with the support of local authorities, a small number of experts could bring great benefits to large numbers of people. Those efforts were not for the selfish advantage of any one country. They were for the common good,
47. Poverty, malnutrition and disease went hand-in-hand, and their existence was a threat to the prosperity and stability of the rest of the world. National economic development must come primarily from the efforts of the people concerned, working with their own national resources. But their efforts could be leavened and the process speeded-up by international co-operation to assist the less developed areas to acquire the knowledge, skills and techniques by which their efforts could be made more productive.
48. The recommendations of the Economic and Social Council on that subject were on a bolder scale than anything undertaken in the past through international organizations. They offered effective tools in the struggle for increased production and ever-widening opportunities for employment. They deserved careful consideration and approval in the common interest,
49. The Charter recognized that social progress and higher standards of life grew from larger freedom. Man did not live by bread alone. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of the greatest achievements of the third session of the Assembly, constituted a long stride towards freeing men from tyranny or arbitrary constraint. The United States attached great importance to that aspect of the work of file United Nations.
50. The Assembly was confronted with a concrete issue in that field namely, the question of observance of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The treaties of peace with those countries set forth the procedures for the settlement of disputes arising under those treaties. Within the preceding few weeks Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania had refused to follow those procedures. Since, however, the three Governments sought to support their position on legal grounds, the United States favoured submission to the International Court of Justice of the question whether they were under an obligation to carry out the treaty procedures. It was to be hoped that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania would not in advance refuse to accept the opinion of the Court and to act in accordance with it. The United States as an interested party would accept as binding the view of the International Court of Justice.
51. That issue involved more than the violation of terms in a treaty. It affected the rights and freedoms of all the people who lived in those three States.
52. The United States Government deeply regretted that no agreement had been reached in the United Nations on the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
53. The United States was continuing and would continue to strive for an effective system of international control of atomic energy which would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons. That was why it supported the Atomic Energy Commission’s plan of control and prohibition as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948. It was clear from the resolutions passed by the General Assembly on the subject that the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations also supported effective control and effective prohibition.
54. Because the Soviet Union refused either to accept the United Nations plan or to put forth any other effective plan of control and prohibition, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had again reported (A/993) that it was in an impasse. The Commission had found that its discussions were not enlarging areas of agreement. On the contrary, they were hardening existing differences. It had concluded, therefore, that it could do nothing practicable or useful until the sponsoring Powers reported that a basis for agreement existed.
55. As one of the six Powers which had sponsored the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States, in response to the request formulated by the General Assembly in its resolution 191 (III), was endeavouring, through consultation among the sponsoring Powers, to find a basis for agreement. It held that that offered the best prospect of determining whether any hope remained for finding such a basis. It was ready to discuss any proposal advanced in good faith for effective international control of atomic energy and for effective prohibition, but unless and until the Soviet Union demonstrated a willingness to cooperate in the world community and, in the field of atomic energy, gave evidence of such a willingness by agreeing to a truly effective, enforceable system of international control and prohibition, there was no hope that a basis for agreement could be found.
56. On the subject of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments, all were aware that there was no immediate prospect of universal agreement. The work done by the Commission for Conventional Armaments had helped to provide a useful start towards the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces when that became practicable. The Commission should continue to formulate such plans in order that they might be available whenever the opportunity to utilize them arose.
57. The United States Government could be depended upon to contribute fully to the creation of the necessary conditions of confidence and, with their attainment, to play its full role in the regulation and reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. The policy of the United States in that important matter was in full conformity with General Assembly resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948, which looked towards the composition of differences among the major Powers and the establishment of lasting peace.
58. In the perspective of history, the first four years of the United Nations had been marked by great advances in international co-operation among nations. Yet the assured and durable peace which mankind had sought in victory in 1945 and still sought in the world had not been attained.
59. In the Charter the nations had pledged themselves to settle their problems by peaceful means, and to build up the conditions essential for peace. Disregarding those obligations, a small group had persisted in policies threatening other members of the international community. As a result a profound sense of insecurity had enveloped large areas of the world.
60. To meet that threat of insecurity in Europe, the United States had joined with members of the North Atlantic community in a treaty which made dear, in advance, the determination of the parties to resist armed attack on any of them. The American Republics had undertaken similar commitments under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. But those treaties were made pursuant to the principles of collective action to resist aggression embodied in the Charter.
61. Methods and procedures to give effect to that principle varied with circumstances. The Members of the United Nations, and the General Assembly itself, should constantly study the means which would lead to the stabilization of peace.
62. In the final analysis, the security problem was a universal problem. It could not be solved except on a universal basis, through the United Nations.
63. The business of the General Assembly was to make its contribution to the solution, in the common interest, of the great problems urgently confronting the nations of the world. On behalf of the United States, Mr. Acheson pledged unreserved support for and devotion to a concerted effort to that end, and appealed to all Members to proceed with appreciation of the limits of what they could be expected to accomplish, with confidence in the long-term values of patience, and with reliance upon the power of common sense in international affairs.