28. As I take the floor in this general debate, I have pleasure in presenting my compliments to our President, that eminent Chilean statesman, Mr. Jose Maza. As the author of his country’s Constitution and an outstanding commentator on our Charter, Mr. Maza was particularly fitted, by reason both of his legal knowledge and of his political experience, to assume the responsibilities now laid upon him.
29. For ten years, at every session, our debate has revolved round one central theme: peace among the peoples in an atmosphere of mutual trust between States. For ten years, we have sustained our efforts; we have sought untiringly the ways which would lead most securely to genuine peace. There have been many deep disappointments, yet we have never yielded to discouragement or given way to despair.
30. When the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Charter was celebrated a few months ago, the nations assembled at San Francisco had put all their hopes in the Geneva Conference. In July, the Geneva Conference confirmed those hopes. The personal contact established there between the Heads of Government was the foretaste of a new spirit in international relations.
31. The leaders responsible for the fate of so many millions of human beings clearly and unanimously affirmed their will to work for the establishment of lasting peace between nations, a peace obtained through security and disarmament — precisely the policy consistently followed by my country. They solemnly condemned recourse to threats or to the use of force in international relations, a condemnation in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the Charter.
32. In this way, the Geneva Conference gave a tremendous uplift to the hopes of all the peoples in the world. That sentiment has been spontaneously expressed by all the speakers who have preceded me on this rostrum.
33. But hope, however strong, is never more than an expectation. We should now go forward from hope to certainty, without disappointing that expectation. If disappointment there should be, it will be none of our doing, for we are resolved to consolidate at Geneva in October that which was confirmed at Geneva in July. This is a duty which we owe to ourselves no less than to our peoples.
34. Public opinion is already taking for granted something yet to be won. It is for us, in steadfastness of will coupled with clarity of thought, to win the wager that public opinion has made, a wager which is as great as the impatience of the peoples.
35. In order to succeed, we must create the conditions for success. We have said, and we shall repeat, that what is needed is the establishment of peace among the nations in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. This is a long-range undertaking, because confidence cannot be commanded, it has to be earned. It is earned by honesty of thought and tested by consistency of action.
36. The same language of peace and peaceful coexistence should be spoken in all circumstances and in all places. If the conflicts in the world are to be reconciled, all action which is divisive or disruptive in character must he avoided.
37. We have shed some light on the world stage; there are still some shadowed areas, and it is for us to dispel the shadows. It is our duty to say this, with realistic courage, without indulging in illusion, but also without yielding to scepticism.
38. This moral duty I intend to carry out here, with frankness and with clarity, without resorting to diplomatic hedging, for I am addressing a gathering which, as Mr. Dulles so rightly pointed out [518th meeting], should be the highest moral authority in the world.
39. At Geneva, the four Heads of Government defined certain objectives. They affirmed their common will to establish conditions for a lasting relaxation of tension, and they undertook to lay the foundations for peaceful coexistence between States, however diverse their political, economic and social systems.
40. What are the conditions for true relaxation of tension and genuine coexistence? In order to define them clearly, let us recall the chief distinguishing characteristic of the world in the twentieth century, as it stands on the threshold of the atomic era.
41. Henceforth, the peoples share a common destiny, for better or for worse, whether the future brings prosperity or annihilation. But at the same time, the world is divided by opposing political philosophies, which at first sight appear totally irreconcilable.
42. It is our great duty to overcome this incompatibility, and perhaps some day we may be able to eliminate it. In this endeavour, there must be .no recourse to force. That is the historic principle proclaimed by the four Heads of Government at Geneva. But here, as always and everywhere, illusion must be carefully distinguished from the truth.
43. I would like now to say a few words about the hazards of a deceptive easing of tension, and to identify the conditions for a genuine detente.
44. The easing of tension would be an illusion if the policy of force were to continue, if it were to be carried out by other methods, under different guises and in fresh settings. A detente is not genuine if it is but an agreement to stay the strife over one point, entered into with the object of attacking more forcefully on another front; nor is there any detente if force operates under the protective; colour of internal subversion or of incitement to crude nationalism. These are but attempts to cause disruption, having as their objects disequilibrium and, ultimately, hegemony — in short, the negation of coexistence.
45. A true relaxation of tension, on the other hand, rules out all disguise, all shifts, all manoeuvres. It is not the instrument of any one particular policy, but the climate of the action of all parties. It implies a reciprocal respect for the values and essential interests of each, as a preliminary to gradual progress towards a general rapprochement. It lays a foundation of tolerance on which coexistence can be built up.
46. That is the true spirit of Geneva. That is also the fundamental principle of our Charter, as set forth in its preamble.
47. While it is true that the peoples, all the peoples, have one common objective, which is to live in peace and prosperity, they must be perfectly free to choose, from among the diversity of means, whichever is most consonant with the traditions of their history, their temperament and the values of their civilization.
48. We should like to be sure that everybody, everywhere, shares this view. We should like to be sure that there is no more thought of breaking down one system of values for the sake of implanting its opposite in its stead, through subversive means which would be but the continuation of a policy of force and hence repugnant to the spirit of the Charter.
49. It is, I must say, difficult for us to forget that agitation among the non-self-governing peoples has always been considered the essential weapon of communism against the free world.
50. If anyone is now thinking of opening a new front in Africa, let me tell them that the stakes are too high. I want to say, in terms which should leave no room for ambiguity, that such a course of action would more than anything else hamper the solution of the great problem of our age: the ordered realization of the wish of all peoples for independence and freedom.
51. France is watching this march of time and this movement of societies. Nowhere is France seeking an excuse for inaction. But, in the world today, there is no true independence without freely accepted interdependence. This observation, which experience has proved correct, applies most particularly to countries whose national structure is too narrow or too fragile. The duty to associate is for them no less compelling than the right to freedom, and, in practice, the right and the duty become one and the same thing, because what is a nominal independence in isolation and weakness? It would but invite the servitude of poverty and the disorder of anarchy. It is our intention to give to the peoples whose destiny is linked with ours a true independence within a voluntary association.
52. Nor does France propose to be content with preaching. Last year, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country referred in this very hall to the negotiations then in progress between the Governments of France and Tunisia: he expressed the hope that they would speedily produce results [498th meeting, para. 22].
53. The promise has been kept. The negotiations were concluded under our present Government. The agreements between France and Tunisia were signed on 3 June 1955. The French Parliament ratified them by a very large majority. The sovereign of Tunisia in his turn ratified them at the proposal of his Government, which had itself negotiated them. They are now in force.
54. France intends to make of Morocco a modem, democratic and sovereign State, united with France by the ties of freely accepted interdependence. My Government, in open discussions, has prepared the way for the constitution of a representative Moroccan government capable of introducing reforms. Decisions have been taken. These decisions will be translated into reality. A Moroccan government will be set up. I can say definitely and with assurance, from this rostrum, that the reforms will be carried out.
55. But it is quite obvious that a course of action thus conceived cannot be pursued in the heat of passion; it calls, on the contrary, for a meeting of minds, and France will never allow anything to jeopardize the future of a country which it has succeeded in pacifying, unifying, and lifting irreversibly above its original condition.
56. Such an orderly and constructive evolution would inevitably be retarded by foreign intervention and perverted by appeals to violence. Whoever would attack this evolution, either in its beginning or in its unfolding, would be an enemy of true coexistence and would, by an extreme paradox, be inviting the United Nations to underwrite violence and to legalize the use of force.
57. Besides, it would be inconceivable that the United Nations could be so unmindful of its functions and so untrue to its mission ae to intervene in the domestic affairs of Member States. On the contrary, in the very apt words of Mr. Molotov himself, the United Nations has a “special duty to strive to lessen still further the tension in international relations” [520th meeting, para. 169]. Its moral authority, like its future, depends on respect for these obvious principles.
58. Each of the countries represented here is entitled to have an opinion on the development of other countries. The French Government, in particular, has an opinion on the conditions prevailing in certain nations. It might, with justification, complain of certain acts which are hardly compatible with normal relations between civilized States. It has never occurred to it to advocate the use of violence for the purpose of settling such problems, and, in reply to those who want to put France on trial, I shall not rely solely on the legal argument — though that in itself would constitute a full rebuttal — that such questions are outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Nor shall I tell them that the past and the present of my country, its past and continuing contribution to civilization and freedom, would entitle it to reply to its detractors by a dignified silence.
59. I shall remain completely realistic and say to them only: look where you are going; look where you are likely to lead us; you are trying to bring to naught the effort which France has made to build up a free association between itself and the peoples of its overseas territories, peoples closely bound to France by ties of geography, history and obvious mutual interests; but you know that in Africa France has a mission which she alone can discharge, therefore, whether or not you realize it, your objective is to create chaos. And who would profit by that chaos, what would follow in its train? Would not any tampering with France’s policy in Africa hurt the Western community and its security organizations? I would ask you to ponder these remarks.
60. Just as States cannot achieve coexistence without mutual tolerance, so peoples can only know peace if they have the certainty of„ their own security.
61. So far as the West, and France in particular, are concerned, there is no true security outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By putting all the forces of member States which are stationed on the European continent under a unified command in time of peace, NATO safeguards the peace of Europe, for it rules out simultaneously any miscalculations concerning the consequences of an attack on one of its members, and any individual act of aggression by those members.
62. By its very nature, it is perforce purely defensive, and it thus offers to the Soviet Union itself the perfectly legitimate safeguards which that country is entitled to demand.
63. These authentic guarantees, backed by NATO, cannot be replaced by abstract guarantees of the Locarno type which a recent past has proved to be illusory. The French Government, for its part, does not desire a return to the situation which existed in Europe in 1939, for that was precisely the situation which led to the Second World War.
64. I therefore sincerely believe that the Soviet Union is misguided in attacking NATO and in concentrating its propaganda on the removal of what it inaccurately describes as “foreign bases”.
65. I should like to emphasize again today what I said at San Francisco. I know of no “foreign bases” within the framework of NATO, nor do I know of any “foreign” military establishments imposed on any State within that same framework. I know only of joint defences, pooled freely and voluntarily, solely in the service of the same peaceful ideal.
66. I feel bound to declare quite candidly that if relaxation of tension is to mean the dissolution of NATO and the departure of the Americans from Europe, then France is firmly opposed to such a policy, for it would mean the destruction of the bases of a true security in exchange for the promises of a hypothetical security, it would inevitably result in a disturbance of equilibrium which, by increasing tension, would ultimately spell the doom of peaceful coexistence.
67. Conversely, I should like to stress once more the contribution made by the Paris Agreements to this same peaceful coexistence. For the time being, they offer the only means, the only example of a system of limitation, publication and control of armaments. They are the seal on the reconciliation between France and Germany and the decisive element in the pacification of Europe. They provide the foundation for the steady and progressive building up of Europe. So they are really in a way a practical application of the principles of the United Nations Charter.
68. At the same time, they have also made it possible to advance along the path marked out for us by the Charter. It was upon their entry into force that the change in the atmosphere of international relations, so welcome to all of us, began.
69. We have heard speakers recount the international events which are described as the symptoms of the recent relaxation of tension. There is one fact which must not be forgotten: according to the calendar, which does not lie, they all succeeded the ratification of the Paris Agreements. It was as though the strengthening of Western solidarity and the desire for union affirmed by the European peoples had progressively created the conditions for genuine negotiation, subject to reasonable regard to the legitimate interests of the parties. In such negotiations, attempts at disruption and acts of pure propaganda designed directly or indirectly to destroy the foundations of security are inadmissible,
70. What are the positive tasks which lie before us? They are those which the four Heads of Government defined at Geneva: the restoration of German unity with guarantees of security, disarmament, and closer contacts between East and West,
71. The French Government considers that the reestablishment of German unity is the essential condition for a return to a normal situation in Europe. The division of Germany, in the very heart of Europe, represents a constant factor of insecurity. It hardly seems necessary to labour this point, for so long as the division remains a satisfactory solution cannot mature; the continued division is bound to complicate the facts of the case as time goes on; it is therefore more than an injustice; it is a mistake.
72. Reference has been made to the possibility of a gradual re-establishment of unity through the development of contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Germany. I am afraid that this theory of two Germanys is likely to lead us into a deadlock. The French Government, for its part, knows of only one elected government in Germany, that is, the Government of the Federal Republic. It is impossible to place a lawful government and de facto authorities on the same footing. Moreover, the Soviet formula comes up against certain practical obstacles. German unity cannot materialize, as some speakers have said again and again, from mechanical and automatic measures; yet it is precisely the bald juxtaposition of two diametrically opposed systems that constitutes the most mechanical, the most automatic and the least feasible or measures. In this case, as in others, the law of democracy must be observed; in other words, genuinely free elections must be held throughout the territory.
73. While we consider that there can be no security in Europe without the reunification of Germany, we also believe that Germany cannot be reunified unless a system of security is established. The essential connexion of these two premises was affirmed in the strongest terms by the four Heads of Governments at Geneva.
74. As I said just now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Paris Agreements provide the most comprehensive and reliable guarantees of security that we can imagine. These' guarantees might be extended, on a contractual basis, in connexion with the re-establishment of German unity. Of course, we cannot entertain the idea of setting up a contractual system of security which would have the effect of legalizing, and thus perpetuating, the present division of Germany.
75. With regard to the system of security itself, I repeat that it is inconceivable that purely legal guarantees should be substituted for the genuine guarantees provided by the defensive organizations already in existence. Nevertheless, France is prepared to go as far as possible in. the direction of these real and specific guarantees.
76. A united Germany should, in our opinion, be subject to controlled military restrictions, although these restrictions and controls should not be in any way discriminatory. We are also in favour of reciprocal controls, which would guarantee to every one the observance of rules established by common agreement.
77. On these bases, it should be possible to arrive at an equitable agreement between East and West, and if the Soviet Union is really concerned only with ensuring its own security — a very legitimate concern — I can say on behalf of my country that agreement is indeed possible.
78. But apart from the organization of security in Europe, there is the question of initiating general and Controlled disarmament, which is an ever-present objective of French foreign policy.
79. The United Nations has had this problem before it for a long time, and, in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, it has made steady and appreciable progress in the treatment thereof. Among the many constructive suggestions that have been made, I should like to mention those put forward by the French delegation [DC/71, annex 16]. The Head of the French Government, like the other three Heads of Government who met at Geneva, paid a well-deserved tribute to the Sub-Committee, with which I should like to associate myself.
80. The question will also be discussed at Geneva by the Foreign Ministers. They will have to consider the plans submitted by the Heads of Government, as well as the results of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.
81. It is both a long-term task, the difficulties of which we must not under-estimate, and an urgent mission, to which the peoples rightly attach fundamental importance.
82. All the Governments are profoundly convinced that the terrifying threat of nuclear war which hangs over civilization itself must be warded off. They are anxious to lighten the burden of armaments, with the object of bettering the standards of living of their peoples and contributing to the development of the less fortunate regions.
83. How can we bridge the gap between the difficulties of the problem and the urgency of its solution? Both the Soviet Union and the United States have cogently stressed certain very real obstacles which must be taken into consideration if any progress is to be made.
84. The Soviet Union recognized in its note of 10 May s 1955 [A/2979] that the implementation of a disarmament programme would presuppose a preliminary reestablishment of mutual confidence between States. This view is shared by the Western Powers.
85. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the United States have drawn attention to the specific problems raised by the organization of control in respect of atomic energy. The French delegation, incidentally, has given repeated warnings on this subject for three years.
86. In its note of 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union expresses the fear that international control may prove powerless to prevent the manufacture, and hence the use, of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The conclusion it draws is the following: “Until an atmosphere of confidence has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples.” We thus run the risk of being caught in a vicious circle, since the institution of control depends on the re-establishment of confidence, and confidence is obviously dependent on control.
87. We cannot reconcile this contradiction otherwise than by entering upon the first stage as soon as possible, while at the same time setting the goals to be reached. The measures to be taken at this first stage will create the atmosphere of confidence which is indispensable for the implementation of a general programme of controlled disarmament.
88. It is necessary, however, to confine the discussion to the question of disarmament proper; the problem is so complex already that it should not be complicated further by the introduction of political conditions.
89. By subordinating the restoration of confidence among States to the evacuation of Germany and to the prohibition of foreign bases — in other words, to the death of the North Atlantic Treaty — the Soviet note of 10 May introduced an element of confusion. It would be most desirable that the problem of disarmament should be rid of this confusion as soon as possible. It would indeed be a curious method of restoring confidence to begin by depriving the peoples of Western Europe of their defences even before security had been really ensured by the implementation of general and controlled disarmament.
90. At this first stage, we might, by means of the aerial inspection proposed by President Eisenhower, by means of control on land at certain strategic points, as suggested by Mr. Bulganin, and by means of a system of inspection such as that proposed by Sir Anthony Eden, satisfy ourselves that no Power is preparing a surprise attack.
91. And since I have the opportunity of recalling the bold initiative taken by Mr. Eisenhower, the President of the great American Republic, I should like once again to express France’s wishes for his speedy recovery.
92. This machinery would find a fitting complement in the system of financial controls suggested by Mr. Faure. The French proposals have the essential merit of initiating a reduction of military expenditures and approaching the problem of disarmament from a particularly constructive point of view; they would constitute a dynamic element of a general disarmament and at the same time would make it possible gradually to raise the standard of living of vast under-developed and under-equipped areas.
93. It is by carrying out simultaneously a series of measures based on these various plans, and by synthesizing their main features, that we shall advance towards the restoration of confidence in international relations and that we shall be able to proceed to the execution of a general disarmament plan, which would, of course, relate both to conventional armaments and to nuclear weapons.
94. The third problem which we shall have to consider at Geneva is that of contacts between East and West. The French Government is deeply convinced of the need to repair the cleavage of the world by drawing the two halves of Europe closer together, on the economic as on the cultural level. What we are concerned with is how to facilitate the movement of people, ideas and goods to the fullest possible extent.
95. We are glad to note the efforts recently made in this direction by the Soviet Union. We sincerely believe that it is to our mutual advantage to get to know each other better and we fervently hope that further progress along these lines will be made at Geneva. This subject is so full of possibilities that I cannot undertake to explore it thoroughly now. I should merely like to stress that, here again, the question is how to extend and expand the action taken by the United Nations in a spirit of international co-operation.
96. I also wish to emphasize the great value of the example set by the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held at Geneva in August 1955.
97. I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating our distinguished and energetic Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on his part in the Conference. I shall not say that we expected any less of him, for we have had plenty of experience of his successes.
98. In a great upsurge of solidarity, the scientists of the whole world, showing a sincerity equal to their zeal, undertook to exchange publicly their knowledge of a subject which is of vital concern to mankind. They gave us a magnificent lesson in disinterested co-operation, and the Conference will go down in history as an astonishing effort of the will to peace. It is thus undoubtedly the first and the most moving earnest of the new spirit which can develop in international relations, since the Governments also played their part by not hesitating to authorize the publication of what until then had been most jealously guarded State secrets. When further progress has been made, after a period of time to be determined later, France would welcome another general exchange of information on the discoveries made.
99. The communications exchanged at Geneva and the reports on practical achievements have already shown how the weapon of fear can become the instrument of prosperity. Immense prospects have been opened for the economy of the future. The economic map of the world may have to be revised. Countries which are under-developed owing to jack of power resources may henceforth reasonably entertain the hope of passing from want to prosperity, as modern science makes headway.
100. In the context of the economic development of these countries, the United Nations will have to encourage access to new sources of power. It is to be hoped that the current negotiations on the establishment of an Atomic Energy Agency, which is specifically intended to ensure such access, will soon be successfully completed.
101. In this way, in the years to come, a new field of action, incalculable in its scope, will be open to the United Nations. In order that the Organization may be able to fulfil all its present and future obligations, with that universality which should be its natural attribute, it is desirable that the greatest possible number of States should be associated in its work.
102. The admission of new Members is one of the most crucial questions for the future of our Organization. The Charter opens the doors of the United Nations to all peaceful States which are willing and able to carry out the obligations it imposes.
103. It is regrettable, for the advancement of peace and for international understanding, that the object of the rules governing admission should continue to be frustrated by the denial of an examination, on its merits, of each separate application. Applications with unequal claims are linked together in such a way that States are being kept out which fulfil the prescribed conditions and which could make a constructive contribution and at the same time ensure a better representation of certain continents.
104. The French Government hopes that, in consequence of a sounder understanding of international co-operation, some progress will be possible this year, and that the United Nations will admit countries which have been kept out unfairly; and first and foremost among these I would mention Italy.
105. We consider that the admission of new Members should not be subordinated to the revision of the Charter. The Charter is an adequate instrument if the nations which have subscribed to it are determined to seek understanding and if they refrain from interfering, in furtherance of their own purposes, in problems which do not concern them.
106. If this determination exists, problems will be solved without any amendment of the Charter; if this determination is lacking, problems will remain unsolved, even if the instrument is perfected. It therefore seems to me to be wiser to await a more propitious atmosphere before undertaking whatever reforms may be desirable.
107. I have not dealt with all the problems which are now before the United Nations. I should like to say, however, that my country is not indifferent to a single one of them. In the course of the session, my delegation will have many opportunities of stating the views of the French Government.
108. Before I conclude, however, I should like to mention one point. My country, with its unfailing respect for treaties, intends to carry out all its obligations to the letter; this naturally applies to the obligations which it undertook last year at Geneva, at the time of the Conference on Indo-China.
109. I have spoken to you absolutely frankly about the matters which concern the French Government. I have done so, as I told you I would, in perfectly simple terms. I hope that in this straightforwardness of thought and expression you will see only respect for the importance of our deliberations, only the expression of our determination to go to the root of problems, in order to ensure that our actions will be right and effective.
110. By reason of its geographical position and of its place in history, France is at the very heart of the great dispute which divides the world. In view of the particularly onerous responsibilities which it has to undertake, it is perhaps more determined than any other country to reach constructive and lasting solutions with the least delay.
111. That is why I was anxious to state precisely what we ought to do, and not to minimize the obstacles which may delay our progress. I am confident that these obstacles can be overcome and that our tasks can be accomplished.
112. You may rest assured that France will do everything within its power to enable mankind to regain its awareness of the great good that can be done by collective effort in a world at peace.