As Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of my country, I am indeed very pleased to have the opportunity of attending this, my first session of the General Assembly. I am pleased to be here for another reason; that is, that I come here fresh from the Conference at New Delhi held from 12 to 14 November 1956 of the Prime Ministers of the Colombo countries, whose joint statement, issued after the New Delhi Conference, I find has been referred to on various occasions by several speakers. I welcome the opportunity of being able, where necessary, to explain to you more fully what we feel with regard to some of the important problems that you have been called upon to deal with at this time.
2. At the outset, I wish to offer to the President, Prince Wan Waithayakon, on behalf of the Ceylonese delegation, our congratulations on his election to this high office. I have no doubt that his long devotion to the ideals and the causes which this great Organization represents and the recognition by representatives of his high qualities of devotion, ability and tact, have been responsible for his election. Personally I have an especial pleasure in his election because his country is in the same region as mine, and between my country and his there have been close and friendly cultural and other bonds for many centuries.
3. My country, together with many others, languished in the anterooms of this Organization for many years until, by a signal stroke of statesmanship last year, sixteen countries were admitted to membership of the United Nations.
4. I regret that there are still countries which are awaiting admission, countries whose claims to such admission appear to many of us to be unquestioned, and whose admission will undoubtedly make more fully representative the membership of this great world Organization for peace. I hope that before long their claims will receive the consideration which is their due. Amongst them, I wish to mention in particular such countries as the People's Republic of China and Japan.
5. I read with great interest the annual report [A/3137] of the Secretary-General. There are some matters of importance in which appreciable success has been achieved in the year under review. In certain others, valuable progress has been made — and in all I suppose it might be said that a certain degree of continuous activity appears to have been maintained.
6. I should like to take this opportunity, if it is not out of place, to congratulate the Secretary-General on the able, efficient and devoted manner in which he has been, and is, performing his functions, particularly during recent events. The Secretary-General, as the chief executive officer of the United Nations, in carrying out, in the letter as well as in the spirit, the decisions of the United Nations, has greatly enhanced their reputation and prestige. I congratulate him, and I congratulate ourselves, on possessing an officer of such pre-eminent and distinguished qualities.
7. I suppose it is true that the normal activities of the United Nations have been overshadowed by certain recent happenings subsequent to the period covered by the annual report of the Secretary-General. I refer to happenings in Egypt and in Hungary. These events have provided, on the one hand, a crucial test for the United Nations and, on the other hand, a great opportunity. I should like to say that it is my opinion that the United Nations has emerged out of these crises with its reputation and prestige enhanced. I have heard, no doubt, many people here criticize the United Nations on the grounds that it is slow to act, that when it does act it cannot act effectively, that it sometimes tends to lose itself in diffused thinking — and still more diffused decisions. Those who criticize the United Nations should bear in mind that, given all the circumstances in each case, the United Nations has proved as successful, sometimes even more successful, than what one might realistically have expected. The United Nations is not a super-state possessed of forces, armed forces, capable of asserting its authority even over powerful Members or non-members who may act contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. It can and does bring to bear a certain collective moral force of the world which, although it may not be expeditiously effective in all cases, commands in certain cases, as it has done in the past, success and in certain others at least a very salutary restraining influence.
8. I naturally wish to say a few words on the two questions that are exercising our minds today: Suez and Hungary. I do not propose to delay you with a reiteration of the whole history that has led up to these tragic happenings.
9. In the case of Suez, I wish briefly to recount certain facts that are important to the background of our thinking in this matter. The President of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. I do not find in any quarter a disposition seriously to question his right to do so. Although the manner in which it was done, the time in which it was done, may be considered expedient by some and incorrect by others, the basic fact of his right to do so has not been questioned. If that is correct, I consider that it follows as a corollary to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company that the power of operation of the Canal should also be vested in Egypt.
10. But that is not the whole story. There are important international interests in the Suez Canal that also need to be safeguarded. We are all agreed on that. These interests I feel could adequately have been safeguarded, while recognizing the right of nationalization and the right of control following thereon, by entering into a convention on somewhat similar lines to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, but with further provisions, if need be, to provide for some consultative or advisory committee whose advice Egypt would have been compelled to seek in dealing with important matters of an operational nature. If there was a disagreement between the two, surely some machinery for arbitration in such instances could have been devised.
11. That would have been the most hopeful method of procedure in order to obtain agreement, while satisfying what both sides claim to be certain fundamental needs. But the moment that a majority of the countries assembled at the London Conference decided on international control of the operation of the Canal, fundamental difficulties immediately arose. The mission to Egypt, led by the Prime Minister of Australia, for discussions with Colonel Nasser, was bound, in the circumstances, to prove a failure. I cannot believe that anyone seriously contemplated that it could be otherwise. Thereafter, quite rightly, the Powers more immediately concerned referred this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations and an agreement on certain principles — the six principles, no less — by the United Kingdom, France and Egypt was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in a resolution. [S/3675]
12. What we fail to understand is this: why were not negotiations proceeded with on the basis of those agreed six principles to see how far agreement could he reached? I have yet to understand why either one side concerned, or the other, or both, failed to requisition the good offices of the United Nations in order to carry on those negotiations. The matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations in order to pursue the method of negotiation as against that of force, which had been threatened earlier. It had reached the point when those negotiations could take place on an agreed basis for discussion.
13. Why did they not take place? Why was it necessary to have the intrusion, before further discussion, of this unfortunate resort to force? Israel made an attack on Egyptian territory. Why, pray? Because it had grievances in the past? Because it feared Egypt's aggression or attacks in the future? Why was this particular moment chosen? I never choose to condemn anyone until condemnation is based on proof. But is it not somewhat difficult to escape the belief that the Israel action, followed by that of the Anglo-French forces, were not altogether unconnected with each other, and that Israel, at the very least, may have thought, in a moment of inspiration, that it was a good moment for it to move, and that an attack by it then would produce action on the part of the United Kingdom and France which would in fact amount to support ?
14. However, as I said, I prefer not to attach motives to anybody. Until something is definitely proved, I prefer not to condemn anyone. It is a mistake to do so. But it does seem to me at least rather a strange coincidence that those events, in that order, should have so taken place; it is a very unfortunate coincidence. I am glad that the United Nations immediately dealt with the matter and arrived at certain decisions and that those decisions are now in the process of implementation.
15. May I say here that I appreciate very much the fact that even in principle the United Kingdom, France and Israel have accepted the decisions of the United Nations for a cease-fire and for a withdrawal. I only hope that those steps will materialize very quickly.
16. I must tell the Assembly that it is my view, and the view of my colleagues, the other Asian Prime Ministers, that the position is still extremely delicate and dangerous. We do not feel that there is any occasion for undue complacence. I am glad that, substantially, a ceasefire has taken place. But the withdrawal has not yet taken place. A United Nations Emergency Force is already in the process of being established in Egypt in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations in supervising a withdrawal of those forces. I say this, and I say it with all seriousness, that as long as foreign troops — be they Israel, United Kingdom or French — continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the position is one that is fraught with the greatest danger and one that may bring about results leading to a third world war. I wish to say that those forces must be withdrawn now, without any delay. I wish to say that I think it would be very unwise to follow some principle of a phased withdrawal, a withdrawing of those forces in numbers according to the numbers of the United Nations Emergency Force who enter: for example a hundred United Nations troops going into Egypt and a hundred being withdrawn; two hundred United Nations troops going in and two hundred being withdrawn. There can be no greater mistake than that.
17. The moment that even a token United Nations force is established on Egyptian territory, it will be sufficient occasion, in the interests of us all, for Israel forces to be withdrawn behind the armistice line, and United Kingdom and French forces to be withdrawn from Egyptian territory. I cannot conceive that either Egypt or Israel would make an assault upon forces of the United Nations. I just do not believe it. So that it is really not required for a large force of the United Nations to be present before those forces are withdrawn. The first and the most vital thing is a withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory now, as early as possible. If that does not happen, even if under the guise of “volunteers” — and we know what “volunteers” mean — other countries, in order to secure the observance of the decisions of the United Nations, take steps, I fear that the results may be very far-reaching and all our efforts so far be swept away in a moment.
18. There is another important thing, of course: the early clearing of the Suez Canal. That is very important to all of us, particularly to my country. Most of the trade of Ceylon — 75 per cent of it — passes through the Suez Canal. I take it that, not only for us, but for other countries, Western as well as Asian, it is important that the Suez Canal be cleared as early as possible. I feel that it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations.
19. There is one point regarding that matter, namely, whether the clearing of the Canal should start at once in full force, prior to any substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory, or whether it should begin subsequent to that. I hope that such quibbles will not stand in the way of the practice of doing the thing that is necessary. I, personally, feel that a substantial withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory at once would greatly facilitate the further task of clearing up the Suez Canal. I am quite sure that Egypt — at least, this is my hope — will not object to the United Nations, under its flag, using whatever material and tackle — and it is rather specialized tackle which is required for this purpose — are available, from whatever source they happen to come, in order to clear the Canal.
20. The withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt immediately and the very quick clearing of the Suez Canal must then be followed by negotiations regarding the Canal on the basis of those six principles to which we have already referred and which presumably still stand. Those are the steps that are necessary to be taken at once. Those are the steps which I hope the United Nations will try to achieve in the course of its deliberations in the days to come.
21. With regard to the general settlement of the rather complicated and complex affairs of Western Asia, that is another matter. I sincerely hope that sometime those troubles also can be settled, particularly those between Israel and its Arab neighbours. I trust that when the bitterness of these incidents has died down to some degree, it will be possible for those primarily concerned at least to have a talk about an honourable settlement of those differences. But I hope that that long-term process will not be mixed with the immediate needs that have arisen today out of this situation. I am not so optimistic as to believe that those differences can be settled at an early date; I do not believe so for a moment. First things come first, so let us deal with these first problems which I mentioned and which are essential to prevent the possibility — believe me, the probability — of a serious worsening of a situation, which some may feel, superficially, is now assuaged. It is not so.
22. I wish to say a few words about Hungary. There seemed to be a feeling in the minds of some people that some of our countries were indifferent, or even lukewarm, about certain happenings in Hungary. I wish strongly to repudiate this charge. What happened? It will interest the Assembly to know that when the very first draft resolution [A/3286] regarding this Hungarian episode was introduced here, it was done in such a desperate hurry, it was sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly so quickly for a vote to be taken within a few hours, that some of us had no opportunity to bring our minds to bear on the problem or even to send instructions to our representatives here as to how they were to vote. I was fast asleep in Colombo when an urgent cablegram from our permanent representative here was received by the Permanent Secretary, asking for instructions as a vote was going to be taken. I had not all the facts or data before me. I could not even get my office open in order to get such papers as were available there at that hour of the night. We arc rather respectable in Colombo. We go to bed fairly early and we remain there till morning. What could I do? I instructed my permanent secretary to send off immediately a cablegram to our representative here, making certain general suggestions and asking him to consult with other groups with which we associate in taking action. We abstained from voting. That is how that abstention came about.
23. Is it really not possible, when this world Organization discusses subjects of paramount importance, to allow a certain reasonable measure of time for consideration and consultation before important decisions are arrived at? It seems to me a great pity if the urgency of the situation — if I may so call it — demands the taking of action in that horrid manner. That is what happened. I believe that in the case of some other Asian countries also they had not time to issue instructions to their representatives or even to consider the matter. There seemed such a desperate haste to get something through — a desperate haste which I fail to understand. I do not think that the lapse of a few hours, twelve hours, would have made such an overwhelming difference to the case.
24. With regard to the second draft resolution on Hungary [A/3316] that was moved here, it was like the proverbial curate’s egg, good in parts and bad in parts. We agreed with the request that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Budapest and from Hungarian territory without any delay. We could not quite agree with that portion of the draft resolution that requested that free elections be held in Hungary under the vigilant eyes of United Nations observers. You will have noted what we said at Delhi. What we said there was that the USSR troops should be withdrawn and that Hungary should be left free to work out its own destiny. Why should we dictate to any country that it should have elections as we want it to have them? Surely, whether it is a Soviet dictatorship in Hungary, an Anglo-French dictatorship in Egypt or even the dictatorship of the United Nations which militates against the sovereignty of a country, they are all, I think, equally unwise and undesirable.
25. What were we to do with a draft resolution, part of which we agreed with and part of which we disagreed? I asked my representative here to secure a separate vote on the separate parts. When the draft resolution as a whole was put to the vote [571st meeting] we followed the only logical course; we abstained from voting, having expressed our views quite clearly and openly from this rostrum.
26. The latest draft resolution [A/3357/Rev. 2] that proposed by Cuba, the debate on which I had the privilege of listening to here yesterday, was passed by a majority vote. Another draft resolution introduced by India, Ceylon and Indonesia [A/3368/Rev. 3] was also passed, I leave it to the ingenuity of the Secretary-General to reconcile the two decisions. However, I feel that the draft resolution introduced by us was more reasonable and logical than certain aspects of the wording of the other draft resolution.
27. The Assembly has also passed a resolution [1007 (ES—II)] calling for relief in Hungary. We decided to recommend that to other countries and to do it ourselves, at the Delhi conference, and our Governments are doing it. My Government has voted for this a few days ago. We are a poor country but we have decided to give what we could give towards relief, in Hungary as well as in Egypt. Budapest needs relief; does not Port Said? They all need relief. If I may be forgiven for using the phrase — and I do not say it disparagingly of anyone — there is no fundamental difference, to my mind, between the thug or rowdy who deals a man one blow and the thug or rowdy who deals a man two blows. Fundamentally, both are worthy of condemnation. That was our attitude regarding Egypt and Hungary.
28. However, let us remember this, Mere dialectics are not sufficient in dealing with these situations. Let us learn the lessons which Egypt and Hungary teach us. Let us deal with the immediate, pressing problems and let us gear up the world Organization, if we can, to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. That seems to be the wise course to follow.
29. We gain nothing by undue mutual recriminations and revilings. As a Buddhist, I remember the story of Buddha and the answer he gave to an opponent who came before him and abused him for hours. Pie listened to him patiently and said: “My dear friend, if you invite guests to a banquet and the guests do not come, what do you do with the food that is prepared?” “Oh,” was the reply, “I and my family will consume the food if the guests do not arrive.” So he said to the man who had abused him: “You have offered me your abuse. I am not accepting it. You can take it yourself.”
30. Mutual recriminations and the wounding of one another’s feelings by sharp retorts and angry words will not help us very much. But there are certain things to which we cannot be blind. What have we to do now? I have suggested the immediate steps to be taken in Egypt and the immediate steps, on which the Assembly has decided, that should and must be taken in Hungary.
31. I would appeal to the Government of Hungary not to oppose the recommendation of this Assembly that some impartial observers go there in order to observe the situation and to discover the truth or otherwise of the charges that have been made on the one side and equally vehemently repudiated on the other. I appeal that that step be taken, and I appeal to the United Kingdom, France and Israel to withdraw their troops — as indeed they have agreed to do — now without any delay. In that way the good name of those countries, as well as, perhaps, world peace, will best be safeguarded.
32. There is a further significance, of course, in these happenings, and I would draw your attention particularly to this. We of Asia who have suffered under imperialistic colonial rule for many centuries are, naturally, extremely sensitive toward anything approaching a resurgence of the spirit of imperialism and colonialism. I hope we are wrong, but we feel strongly that the happenings in Egypt, and perhaps the echo of those happenings in Hungary, are a manifestation once again of a certain resurgence of the spirit of colonialism, the desire of a strong Power to achieve its purposes and to impose its will, even by force, on a weaker Power.
33. Are you surprised that we lay greater emphasis on Egypt than on Hungary? Far more dangers are inherent for the world in the Egyptian situation than in the Hungarian. We deplore both, of course. But this Assembly very rightly came to the conclusion that the problem of Egypt was a more urgent and serious one than that of Hungary, although both are to be condemned and deplored alike.
34. You will see, therefore, the importance of these happenings and how strongly many of us — the vast majority of this Assembly — feel on these matters. It is not too late even now to put things right. It is not yet too late to remedy this situation, although I greatly fear that the bitterness created by these incidents will not be easily forgotten and will not be easily forgiven. But let us hope that the preservation of peace now and the lapse of time will again restore that confidence that has been so seriously and tragically shattered. We had got into the habit recently of believing that the great Powers of the world were united in upholding peace and decency in dealings between mail and man, between nation and nation. We believed that this great Assembly provided the opportunity for all, great and small, to unite in achieving that objective. But when great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, themselves act in a way that has brought on their heads the condemnation of this Assembly, can it not be realized how gravely that confidence is shattered, particularly in the minds of those of us who are small and weak and who had hoped that in this new world we would be able, without national or international brigandage and piracy, to work out our own destiny and to advance toward peace and happiness ?
35. Those are the results of these happenings. I have dealt with the two important problems of today, the problems of Egypt and Hungary — with the position as I see it and the steps that should be taken immediately and also perhaps in the not too distant future. I wish now to say a few words about Asia. There is some misunderstanding of the position of some of our Asian countries, and I wish to explain the position to you fairly.
36. Many of our countries in Asia have re-emerged into freedom after three or four hundred years of colonial imperialist rule. In this epoch of newly gained freedom, we find ourselves faced with a dual problem — a problem within a problem. First, there is the problem of converting a colonial society — politically, socially and economically — into a free society, and then there is the problem of effecting that conversion against a background of changing world conditions. The world is in a state of change and flux today. The world is going through one of those rare occasions — they happen at certain intervals — of a change-over from one society to another, from one civilization to another. We are living today, in fact, in a period of transition between two civilizations, the old and the new. During a period like this, all kinds of conflicts arise — ideological, national, economic, political. That has happened in the past, and in the past those conflicts were settled by some nice little war here or there. Today we cannot afford the luxury of war, for we all know what it means.
37. Therefore, the task for us today is a far more difficult one than ever faced mankind before: to effect this transition to some form of stable human society, and to do it amid a welter of conflicts, with reasonable peace and with the avoidance of conflicts that burst out into war, for war is unthinkable today. This is an age when we have to live and let live, when we cannot afford to hate each other so much that we are prepared to sacrifice all mankind in the name of peace or for some other reason. We cannot afford to do that today. Within the limits of honour, of course, and those principles which we hold dear, we have to live and let live.
38. That is the philosophy behind the doctrine of coexistence. We in Asia do not hate anybody. We want to be friends with all. We have to build up a new society for ourselves; one, as I have said, which best suits the genius of our country. We should like to get some ideas and some principles from this side, and some from the other, until a coherent form of society is made up that suits our own people in the context of the changing world of today. That is why we do not range ourselves on the side of this power-bloc or that power-bloc. That is the philosophy of neutralism. It is not something dishonest; it is not a matter of sitting on the fence to see whether we can get the best of both worlds. It is a position that is inexorably thrust upon us by the circumstances of the case. It is a position that will be of great help in the world situation today, for we do provide a bridge over the gulf between the two opposing factions.
39. We are supposed to be the “uncommitted” nations. I strongly object to that word. We are committed up to the hilt. We are committed to preserve decency in dealings between nations, we are committed to the cause of justice and freedom, as much as anyone is. That, briefly, is our position in Asia. I trust it will not be misunderstood.
40. Sometimes the feeling comes over me, as I am sure it does over many of us, that the fight is not worth while — that there is, in fact, no hope for mankind to escape the perplexities, problems, conflicts, hatreds and enmities that seem to be arising all about us. But sometimes when I feel like that I am fortified by the thought that through the dark fabric of human history there passes one golden thread of unfailing strength and firmness — the unconquered, unconquerable spirit of man. It has manifested itself through the ages in various, diverse, different ways: first of all, the unconquerable spirit of man fighting for bare survival and existence; later, fighting for various causes — national causes maybe, or the cause of justice, the cause of freedom or the pursuit of truth on the part of the great religious leaders down through history. Today it is needed in the cause of human friendship and of peace.
41. What is peace? Peace is not merely a negative thing — the absence of one set of people trying to kill another set of people. No doubt the prevention of war is a necessary factor for peace, but peace, believe me, is something much more positive than that, for peace in its true sense means human understanding, human friendship and cooperation out of which, indeed, peace in its true form alone can rise. I look upon the United Nations as the one machine available to mankind today through which it can express this unconquerable spirit of man in its efforts to achieve that peace, friendship and collaboration which is, I hope, the object of us all.
42. My country is a small one, a weak one and a poor one, but I venture to think that today, particularly in an Organization such as this, the service that a country can render — that a Member can render — is not to be measured alone by the size of that country, its population, its power or its strength. This is an Organization which expresses itself most effectively by bringing to bear a certain moral force — the collective moral force and decency of human beings. That is a task in which the weak as well as the strong can render a useful service, and I give the Assembly the assurance, on behalf of my country, that as far as we are concerned, every endeavour that we can make in all sincerity to assist in the achievements of those noble ideals for which this Organization stands, will always be forthcoming in the fullest measure.