Norway

Once again we meet here at the United Nations to discuss the troubled state of the world and the role which our Organization has to play in improving this state of affairs. A few weeks ago, we were preparing for this general debate in a mood largely determined by what, at least on the surface, appeared to be a relaxation of the tensions which the so-called “cold war” had created in international relations during the first post-war decade. Today we can but register the fact that this atmosphere of relaxation was abruptly shattered by the tragic events in Hungary land the crisis in the Middle East. During this, its eleventh session, the United Nations finds itself in the midst of the turmoil resulting from these events. This situation inevitably must give the statements which we hear during the present debate a tenor radically different from what might have been expected some weeks ago. 39. It is not my intention to indulge in a lengthy effort to explain how and why this sudden change in the international picture occurred, or why it has caught both us here in the United Nations and the general public somewhat unprepared. There is, however, in my opinion one important fact which tended to become obscured during the period when declarations of peace and friendship took the place of serious efforts at making peace. This fact, so brutally revealed in Hungary and in the Middle East, is of course that the mere absence of war does not mean that we have peace. 40. This may be a truism. But is it not true that peace is a state of affairs so ardently desired by the war-weary peoples of the world — and statesmen are no exception — that even the simplest facts tend to be overlooked when an apparent state of peace becomes the main feature in the picture of the world which our information media draw for us? 41. This brings me directly to an attempt at evaluating the role of the United Nations in present circumstances. 42. One basic fact must be emphasized from the very beginning: this Organization of ours has no means of its own to enforce its decisions. If, therefore, Member States are not willing to act in accordance with the decisions of the Organization, then there is not much that can be done through the Organization. The moral obligation upon each and every Member in this respect is unequivocal and uncompromising. There can be in practice no exceptions to this rule unless one wishes to strike at the very foundations of the Organization. 43. The discretion to act cannot be exercised unilaterally. It is, furthermore, clearly not consistent with the obligations of membership to take the law into one’s own hands to redress wrongs, even if these wrongs are strongly felt. In every such instance, the action taken is determined by unilateral and subjective judgement of what constitutes right and wrong in a particular situation. Such discretion has no place in an international order built on law, just as it has no place in the internal order of individual countries. 44. Having said this, I hasten to add that I am fully aware of the fact that order, be it of an international or national character, is incomplete and not acceptable if based exclusively on formal legal obligations. It is of equal importance that it be based on justice. And this is the crux of the matter. This is the real test to which the United Nations must be put before we can determine its role as a peace-making organ. Peace may be attainable if we are willing to pay the price for it. We do not know whether justice is attainable if this price is paid. We do not know whether the United Nations has the power to secure justice. These are fundamental questions, and upon the answers to them rests the future of this Organization. 45. Let me now turn to the Middle East situation and discuss these questions in the light of the events which have occurred there. 46. The outbreak of hostilities through the invasion of Egypt by Israel forces, followed by the intervention of British and French forces in the Suez Canal area, came as a shock to us and, I am sure, to many other friends of these three countries. I would not be quite sincere, however, if I also professed surprise at the outbreak of warfare in this region. 47. Over a number of years we have watched developments in the Middle East with growing concern and apprehension, and with a feeling of frustration at the lack of will and determination to change the fragile armistice into a stable peace. We understand that this frustration must have been felt many times as strongly by those most directly concerned, above all by the Government and people of Israel. We reject their action, but we understand their motives. We also understand that they are disappointed with the United Nations because of its failure to exert decisive influence towards the establishment of peace in the Middle East, although I must, in all frankness, express some doubts as to the support which Israel itself has given to the United Nations efforts over the last two years to create an atmosphere more conductive to a settlement. Be this as it may, the invasion of Egypt and the resort to full-scale war came as a shock to us. 48. To the United Nations it came not only as a shock, but also as a spur to action. Our Organization did not stop at issuing directives to the belligerents to halt operations. It actually took measures to facilitate the halting of operations and the withdrawal of troops from the invaded territory. These measures, which of course centre on the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force, may prove to be a signal event, not only in this particular situation but in world history. 49. I shall return to this a little later on, but let me here express the gratitude of the Norwegian Government in the first place to our distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, for the courage and sense of leadership he displayed in a situation whose implications one hesitates fully to recognize. We are also grateful to those Governments which spontaneously gave their full and unreserved support to the efforts of the United Nations to attain its first and most urgently needed goal, the cessation of hostilities. Last, I but not least, we are appreciative of the respect for the United Nations shown by the parties in heeding the cease-fire call of the General Assembly. 50. Now the guns are silent in Egypt and we ardently hope that they will remain silent. If not, there is not much use in discussing now where we should go from here. Because, while it is true that peace is not the mere absence of war, it is equally true that a just peace cannot very well be initiated, as long as war is raging, inflaming passions and obscuring reason. 51. Another prerequisite for initiating peace is the withdrawal of troops from Egypt. This is the expressed policy of the General Assembly, and we feel confident that the three Governments will abide by this decision of the General Assembly as readily as they responded to the call for a cease-fire. 52. We note their declarations in response to the Secretary-General’s questions on this point and feel confident that, as and when United Nations forces enter the area in sufficient strength to discharge fully the mission entrusted to them by the General Assembly, there will be full compliance with the decisions of this Assembly. 53. I now return to the question: where do we go from here? During the discussions in this Assembly at its first emergency special session, when it was about to establish a United Nations Force, my delegation said: “We may today lay the foundations for peace in that troubled area ... “But let us not forget the restoration of peace would mean that but half the mission had been accomplished. The second half of the mission is for this Assembly to see that justice is done.” [566th meeting paras. 51 and 52.] 54. Has the United Nations the power and the influence to help establish a just peace in the Middle East? This seems to me to be a question that we, each and every Member of this Organization, must put to ourselves and answer for ourselves. We are the ones who must decide what the United Nations can do. 55. There is no such thing as a United Nations acting freely above or beside the membership. If the United Nations has failed so far in the Middle East, it has done so because Member States have failed. There is no justification for now diverting the unavoidable soul-searching away from ourselves and our own policies over the past years to the policies of an anonymous organization, and thereafter disclaiming responsibility for this organization’s mistakes. The mistakes are our mistakes, and we should try not to repeat them. 56. First of all, it seems obvious to my Government that a mere return to the fragile armistice arrangements in 1949 in the Middle East is not a realistic policy. These arrangements were meant to last for a few months, as a transition to peace. They could not last as a basis for permanent relations between neighbouring countries — and, as we have seen, they did not last. 57. Secondly, the two principal parties involved, Israel and the Arab States, will have to make certain fundamental concessions on a, mutual basis. Israel must recognize that its emergence in Palestine unavoidably must lead to serious psychological and other difficulties on the part of the Arabs, and must also be a disturbing element in the established cultural, social and economic order in this predominantly Arab region. These very serious difficulties must not only be understood; they must also be recognized by the leaders of the Israel nation as a determining factor in their policy-making. 58. The difficulties have furthermore been compounded by the presence around the borders of the new State, on a semi-permanent basis, of hundreds of thousands of the former inhabitants of this land, who for eight years now have been living in misery and despair and who in their desperation may have constituted the main reason why the armistice machinery of the United Nations has not been able to achieve its ends. I may also add that the armistice lines, because they split the Arab world in two, did much to keep alive the bitterness which the events of 1948 had unavoidably created among the Arabs. 59. There are in this situation, I submit, elements which should impress upon Israel the need for concessions of a substantial nature in any final peace settlement, and it is our hope that Israel’s leaders will give the most earnest consideration to these elements, because Israel’s security, in the final analysis, lies in the establishment of peace with its neighbours, and not in the uncertainties of a military balance of power. 60. I turn now to the Arabs and the fundamental concessions they will have to consider in order to give peace a chance to take root and grow in the Middle East. The State of Israel is there to stay. This is a fact which must be recognized, and such a recognition must be the starting point for the formulation of a policy on the part of the Arab States which will be their indispensable contribution to the maintenance and safeguarding of international peace. Real world peace is inconceivable without peace in the Middle East. Peace in the Middle East is equally inconceivable without peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. 61. The Arabs represent an old and proud culture, and their religion has imbued them with a sense of moral and spiritual values of the highest order. Surely they have their substantial part to play in the attainment of the goals of this world Organization, and the Norwegian Government, for one, is confident that a cooperative spirit will guide the actions of the Arab Governments, in concert with the actions of the United Nations, in this hour of crisis. Such a spirit of cooperation will be needed no less during the coming weeks and months when, as we hope, a determined effort will be launched to seek a new basis for a lasting peace in that area. 62. Addressing myself to the role of the United Nations in these efforts, I want to stress that the obligations of every Member State are no less than those resting upon the parties directly involved. There is, I believe, a wide measure of agreement among Members that the role of the United Nations in the efforts to restore peace, while being substantial, cannot and should not replace what must be the main, in fact the indispensable, instrument for bringing peace to the Middle East — namely, direct contact between the parties. This peace must be the making of the peoples of the area and not of any outside State, States or agency. Whatever assistance can be given from outside in order to facilitate the peace-making efforts of the parties should be given for this purpose alone and not in a way which might tend either to delay or to thwart whatever efforts are made by the parties. 63. While I think, therefore, that the role of the United Nations, so far as negotiations are concerned, should be one of discreet, friendly prodding, I firmly hold that extensive assistance from the United Nations will be needed in order to enable the parties to carry out the adjustments and reforms of an economic and social nature within and between the respective countries in the area which a peace settlement certainly will require. The General Assembly could very well start considering, even at this stage, this particular aspect of its peace-making role in the Middle East. 64. I cannot leave the subject of the Middle East without expressing my disappointment at the negative attitude which the Soviet Union has so far taken towards United Nations policies in the Middle East during the crisis. This attitude is all the more disappointing since these policies have been supported by the vast majority of the United Nations, including the Middle Eastern countries themselves. 65. The roots of the present immediate trouble in the Middle East must, however, be sought not only in the unsettled state of Arab-Israel relations, but also in the lack of a satisfactory settlement of the problems created by Egypt’s unilateral nationalization of the Universal Suez Canal Company. Those of us who are important users of the Suez Canal — and, as a user, my country comes second — cannot rest Content until a solution of these problems has been worked out on the basis of the six principles [S/3675] agreed upon by the Security Council at its 743rd meeting on 13 October 1956. 66. A mere return to the situation as it existed immediately before the opening of hostilities on 29 October offers no basis for stable, peaceful conditions in the area. There is urgent need for the United Nations not only to see to it that the Canal is cleared with the utmost speed possible, but also to exercise its good offices with a view to bringing about direct negotiations between Egypt and the principal user nations on the future regime of the Canal. 67. The exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of Egypt and the Secretary-General [S/3728], following their exploratory talks in October, would seem to indicate that, given good will on all sides, a framework for the implementation of the six agreed principles could be worked out. In view of the fact that withdrawal of forces other than those of the United Nations has now been initiated, the time would seem to have come to consider action by this Assembly towards initiating the preparation of a plan for the operation and maintenance of the Suez Canal and freedom of passage through it, as outlined in the draft resolution submitted by the United States [A/3273] on 3 November 1956. 68. I turn now to the situation in Hungary. We cannot but deeply regret and reprove the attitude of the Hungarian authorities and the Soviet Union in flatly refusing to comply with the repeated urgent requests of this Assembly — voted by overwhelming majorities — to allow observers, appointed by the Secretary-General, to enter Hungary and investigate freely what has happened and is still happening there, to cease forthwith any deportations and repatriate all persons who may have been forcibly removed to the Soviet Union, and without delay to withdraw Soviet troops from the country. 69. Short of military action — and no one in this hall contemplates such an alternative — the only way in which this Organization can exert any influence on events in Hungary is by keeping up a constant moral pressure, on behalf of world opinion, on the Soviet Union Government and its Hungarian helpers, and by ever-renewed appeals to them to comply with their obligations under the Charter and other relevant international agreements to which they are parties. 70. Such pressure has succeeded in opening access for Red Cross relief from the outside world. But those millions of private citizens in my country and in other countries, who have responded so generously to the appeal of this great humanitarian relief agency, will not feel confident that their help is reaching those who are in greatest need of it until the authorities in Hungary accept the presence in the country of representatives of the United Nations, with powers and facilities to supervise the distribution of outside assistance. 71. In my country, with a population of not quite 3,500,000 about $1,500,000 have been collected through fund-raising campaigns for the people of Hungary. Half of this sum will be used for relief inside Hungary, the other half will be used to relieve the sufferings of Hungarian refugees and to help them create a new existence for themselves. In addition to these sums collected from private citizens, the Norwegian Parliament has granted another $70,000, of which sum $42,000 will be placed at the disposal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 72. Before attempting to draw from our recent experience of United Nations action in Hungary and in the Middle East certain conclusions with regard to the future of our Organization, permit me to touch briefly on one or two of the other matters on the agenda of the General Assembly. 73. I first turn for a moment to United Nations activities in the economic and social fields. In this field, our major objective must be to further the economic growth of the materially under-developed areas of the world. The steady progress of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the recent establishment of the International Finance Corporation, with increased lending by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the economically backward areas, give reason for considerable satisfaction. 74. These activities go some modest distance towards meeting the requirements of the under-developed areas. The fact remains, however, that the present rate of economic growth in these areas is far below that of the more industrialized countries, with the result that — contrary to our aims — the gap between the standard of living and economic well-being of the two areas is still increasing. 75. Faced with this enormous problem, great emphasis has been placed on the necessity for intensified efforts by the United Nations to provide economic aid and technical assistance. Most representatives here no doubt would, like to see a great deal more being done in this field, and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development project has received considerable support from most countries. We on our part have consistently worked for an early establishment of SUNFED, and we have tried to be helpful by indicating our financial contribution to it. There are, however, many reasons why an immediate success remains as doubtful as a few years ago. Recent political developments, and among them the sudden and untimely nationalization of the Universal Suez Canal Company, have not contributed to further progress. We are, however, still giving the project full support and we hope that something may be achieved in the not too distant future. 76. In our discussions of economic development problems within this Organization, too little attention has perhaps been given to measures taken by Member countries on a bilateral basis to assist economically under-developed areas. 77. Last year, in the general debate on economic development in the Second Committee, my delegation ventured to give an indication of the amounts which such bilateral economic assistance represented and of its increased importance, and we stated on that occasion that from a vantage point like the United Nations, we ought to look at the total picture. 78. I think that this year the United Nations, acting along the lines suggested on several occasions by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Pearson, might usefully decide to collect all relevant data and work out a comprehensive survey of the multilateral and bilateral efforts of Members States in the field of economic assistance. Many persons and institutions have recently become interested in this total picture of economic assistance and have provided valuable information. 79. I am afraid that the prestige of the United Nations might suffer if over a period of years it continued to concentrate its efforts in a limited field of action, such as the establishment of SUNFED, without perhaps being able to record success in that direction. Even if there is no intent to multilateralize the assistance rendered bilaterally, the working out of a general survey, as suggested, might create a situation where the need of a special multilateral fund might be better understood and clearly appreciated. It is my hope that the Second Committee might find it possible to initiate action along the lines suggested by Mr. Pearson. 80. Another item of a general nature on the agenda; of this Assembly, which in the opinion of the Norwegian Government is of paramount importance, is disarmament. I am, of course, very much aware that the great Powers are and will remain primarily responsible for what will eventually be achieved in respect to disarmament. Nevertheless, the problem certainly concerns us all. I therefore believe that it is fitting for me, as the representative of a small country to try to explain in this general debate, before the more specific problems of disarmament are tackled in the First Committee, the general approach of my Government to the present phase in the disarmament negotiations between the great Powers. 81. The not inconsiderable progress achieved in those talks during the last two years was, of course, a reflection of the general improvement in international relations during that period. It would seem premature to assess how far the dramatic and tragic happenings of the last few weeks may prevent further progress towards disarmament in the near future. However, we have had the shocking revelations of how close we have come to the brink of disaster and how easily a spark may blow up the powder-keg on which we are virtually sitting in these days of super-bombs, and I hope and believe that these events will make us all realize that time is running out on us, that, as far as disarmament is concerned, it may be now or never. 82. I hope that such a realization — and I do not believe anyone would contend that I have overstated the urgency of starting positive action for disarmament now — will more than counterbalance the drastic worsening of international relations and the reduction of mutual trust of which we are all of us painfully conscious. 83. Mutual trust is, of course, the key to the whole problem, more than ever now that such trust has been so suddenly and drastically reduced. Disarmament “by proclamation”, without effective control of compliance, is consequently of less value than ever before. We still believe that the formula “neither control without disarmament nor disarmament without control”, as aptly phrased by Mr. Moch, must constitute the basis for a solution. This formula is the backbone of the elaborate British-French disarmament plans submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission [DC/ 71, annexes 9 and 13]. Combined with President Eisenhower’s “open-sky” proposal [DC/71, annex 17] and Mr. Bulganin’s suggestions for control of key points and areas [DC/71, annex 18], this formula should now make it possible to contract a package solution, offering the security of compliance, which in the absence of genuine trust is necessary. 84. I regret to say, however, that the latest Soviet proposals, although they seemingly indicate a modification of previous Soviet resistance to President Eisenhower’s “open-sky” proposal, are put forward in the framework of such unashamed propaganda, and are linked with what appear to us as purely propaganda proposals to such an extent that they hardly represent any serious step towards a solution. 85. I said a moment ago that mutual trust was the key to the disarmament problem. We should be aware, however, that the setting up and getting in motion of a disarmament machinery in itself will be an important factor towards creating that mutual trust which will be necessary to carry a planned disarmament process to a successful close. 86. In its careful examination of the present disarmament proposal, my Government has come to the point where we have asked ourselves whether this consideration has not to some extent been overlooked. We feel, anyway, that disagreement about details of the later stages of the disarmament process should not prevent us from at least getting the process started. We believe that a start might take us out of the blind alley where we have for sometime found ourselves, and to some extent contribute to the reduction or elimination of the technical and political difficulties now envisaged for the later stages of disarmament. 87. We have, I believe, a workable blueprint for such a start in the first stage of the British-French proposal. There is, however, as far as we can see, one basic concession that must still be made by the Soviet side before we can embark on this first stage, that is, willingness in principle to accept international control for future production of nuclear weapons. Is it too much to hope that such willingness will now be forthcoming? 88. I could not very well leave this subject of disarmament and mutual trust without touching on another move that, as far as we can see, might contribute to giving the disarmament talks a chance of making progress. I would like to refer to what the representative of Norway, Mr. Moe, said in the disarmament debate of the First Committee here at the United Nations last year, on the subject of nuclear tests. Mr. Moe referred [804th meeting] to the fact that such tests can be easily spotted. In fact everybody seems to agree that tests of nuclear weapons over a certain size cannot be carried out in secret. Would it not then be possible to embark now on the task of achieving an early regulation and, if necessary, reduction of these tests, independently of the setting up of an elaborate, and for this purpose unnecessary, control system? 89. I would like to suggest that a first and immediate step might be to let the United Nations require advance registration with the Secretary-General or the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation of any planned weapons tests expected to cause measurable, world-wide radioactive fell-out. Such advance registration should give the United Nations a possibility of alerting Member States in case competent scientific authorities deem the planned test programme to exceed the limits of absolute safety. 90. There is a strong desire among ordinary men and women in my country, and all over the world, that steps be taken to safeguard against radioactive contamination of man and his surroundings by increased uncontrolled national atomic activity. It is far from me to want to exploit this state of opinion for any scare-propaganda. It seems that the genetic effects from radioactive fell-out, from tests carried out at the present pate, are not, for the time being, giving rise to great anxiety, even though the, differing opinions among scientists on this subject are in themselves disturbing. Gravest concern has, however, been expressed among Scientists as to the effects of radioactive materials taken up in food materials and thereby entering human bodies. This effect of the fall-out may, as I understand it, represent a danger in a future dose enough already to warrant serious consideration today of precautionary measures. 91. This is the background, then, for our belief that an early agreement concerning these tests would not only in itself be of immense value for the future security and wellbeing of mankind, but would, just because of the strong public feeling on the matter, be a major factor in re-establishing some of that mutual trust without which other steps towards a full implementation of the disarmament plans will not be possible. 92. In conclusion, let me, in the light of our experience in the last few weeks, stress once more what to me appear as the salient features of this world Organization as a peace-preserving and peace-making agency. 93. In the absence of agreement on internationally controlled disarmament and of agreement between Member States and the Security Council on forces to be placed at the disposal of the Council, the United Nations does not possess any means of its own to force Member States to restore peace once they have resorted to acts of war. The possibilities of action through our Organization are entirely determined by the willingness of Member States to live up to their commitments under the Charter and to comply with requests made to them by the duly authorized organs of the Organization. In other words, the main means of action at our disposal is the pressure of world public opinion, as expressed in resolutions of the Security Council and of this Assembly. 94. The lesson we can draw from recent experience, it seems to me, is this: where democratic institutions inside Member States enable this moral authority of the United Nations to make itself fully felt, Member States will abide by the decisions of the Organization. In Member States where national institutions are such that they do not all allow the pressure of world opinion to become freely and fully effective, there is no assurance that Governments will comply with United Nations decisions. Beyond moral condemnation, our Organization has very limited means of penalizing Members for non-compliance. But, on the other hand, the pressure of world opinion may at times be tremendous, in fact irresistible, if applied with determination and in the appropriate circumstances, and no Government should underestimate the power of such expressions of opinion on the part of the General Assembly. 95. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East constitutes a momentous new institutional development. It does not, however, alter the fundamental character of our Organization. Tremendously encouraging though it may be to see a large number of Member Stales hasten to put under direct United Nations command armed forces for the purpose of facilitating compliance with our Organization’s appeal for a cease-fire and for withdrawal of troops from Egypt, the United Nations Emergency Force does not and cannot have the mission to enforce such compliance, should the parties concerned reverse their present course of action. 96. Nevertheless, it would, in the opinion of my Government, seem worth considering the establishment on a permanent basis of United Nations forces in readiness for emergencies such as the one with which we are now faced. Such forces would not, in the proper sense, constitute an international police. They might, however, be considered an international fire brigade, available for use in situations where there is reason to fear that existing international tension might result in brush fires. 97. I have ventured to touch upon a few of the issues which confront the United Nations today. I have done so in, what I hope may be appreciated as a constructive and realistic spirit. The United Nations, because of its responsibility for dealing with these issues, has become a focal point of the hopes and the fears, the expectations and the despair of men and women during the anxious days which we have lived through over the last three weeks. They may have seen a major war averted by action through the United Nations, but they may also have seen injustice triumph in defiance of the United Nations. These two events reveal both the potentialities and the limitations of the means now_ at the disposal of the Organization. Thus they constitute a double challenge to all Members to work patiently to develop and improve these means, a challenge to which I hope we all will respond with vigour and determination.