Sweden

We must note with deep regret that this Assembly meets in a politically far colder atmosphere than has been the case during preceding sessions. 22. If I may begin with a few words about the Egyptian question, I would like to point out what a painful surprise it was to most of us that the United Kingdom and France, in handling an international issue, suddenly resorted to the old-fashioned methods that were outlawed even by the Covenant of the League of Nations and that are wholly incompatible with the United Nations Charter. No explanations and attempts at justification can disguise the fact that the military action taken against Egypt constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter. Long before the Israel invasion of Egypt, official statements from the United Kingdom and France as well as military preparations made by these countries seemed to indicate that military action was in the minds of the two Governments. The public debate left the impression that we were taken back to the times when the great Powers made military demonstrations to recover financial claims from weaker countries. 23. The news of the United Kingdom and French action brought to my mind an earlier case, which I had reason to follow closely as a Swedish representative at the League of Nations. I am thinking of the time when Mussolini occupied the Greek island of Corfu as security for claims for compensation considered to have arisen from the murder of an Italian general by Greeks. 24. It seems to me, however, that we cannot but acknowledge the willingness with which the two countries complied with the Assembly’s request for an immediate cease-fire. I hope that in the future, too, they will draw the natural conclusions from the Assembly’s decided disapproval of their unilateral military measures, taken in order to attain national or international ends. 25. I will say in this context that my Government completely agrees with the Secretary-General’s interpretation of the task of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, which the General Assembly has sanctioned. Thus the task of this Force must not be to remain in Egypt to put political pressure on that country with the intention of bringing about a settlement of the Suez Canal issue. 26. May I be permitted to add that it has been of the greatest importance that the United States during the discussions on the Egyptian question so unequivocally and firmly based its stand on the United Nations Charter and so clearly defended its basic principles. 27. Israel’s preventive war against Egypt cannot be justified. That Israel has been subjected to numerous provocations from its Arab neighbours for many years is indisputable. But that did not entitle Israel to resort to war on Egypt. In my country we have always felt a deep sympathy with Israel and its energetic, industrious and brave people. We now deeply regret that Israel by its offensive military acts has damaged its own cause. 28. There have been reports these last few days of deportations of Jews from Egypt. I would like to express my sincere hope that these reports are unfounded or exaggerated. No doubt the Secretary-General will feel entitled to establish facts in this matter. It would be a terrible blow to our Organization and to the principles it stands for if we once more would have to register anti-Semitic feelings and facts, adding to the tragedy we are witnessing in the Middle East these days. 29. With regard to the tragedy in Hungary I fear that the Soviet leadership does not quite understand the indignation to which the crushing of the incipient revolt has given rise all over the world. 30. I realize that Hungary, from the Soviet point of view, is looked upon as part of the security zone the Soviet Union considers itself as having formed by imposing Communist regimes upon the border States. 31. The Soviet political leaders want us to believe that all opponents of the present regimes in those countries are Fascists and that the Soviet Union obeys a higher political law by suppressing with violence every attempt to bring about a change in the existing Communist regimes. The Soviet Union seems to tolerate the modified form of Communism in the Border States that we have grown accustomed to call “Titoism”. But there the limit is apparently set. Titoism in Yugoslavia and a similar regime — “Gomulka-ism” — in Poland does not mean, according to the doctrine now adopted by the Soviet Union, that Fascism has come into power. But when the Hungarian Government under Imre Nagy went a few steps further away from the only true Communist regime, that Government was branded as being under the influence of Fascist counter-revolutionaries. 32. But these assertions are, as everyone knows, completely untrue. The choice for Hungary is not between Fascism and Communism. There are other alternatives. Should not Hungary be given the chance — if the majority of the people so wish — to establish a regime similar to the democracies in Austria, in Finland, in Sweden and in the other Scandinavian countries? We are not Fascist countries. Must the great and powerful Soviet Union find its security at stake because the border States or some of them establish democratic political systems different from that of the Soviet Union? 33. In my country we look at it this way: the security of the Soviet Union and of all other European States would be strengthened by an increased amount of independence and freedom for the border States. By a generous policy towards these States — generous in a political sense — some areas of friction in Europe would be eliminated. Tension would automatically be relaxed and the danger of war reduced. It is an antiquated belief that a country adds to its security by trying to preserve a decisive political influence on neighbouring countries against the will of their peoples. 34. The Nagy government announced in a circular note the establishment of a neutral status for Hungary as its programme. In answering that note, the Swedish Government expressed its interest and sympathy with regard to this programme. We still hold the view that Hungary, neutralized like Austria, would be a factor of security in Europe. Even if I disregard all other aspects of these events, the Soviet Union has made a grave political error in refusing to tolerate a popular movement in Hungary that has aspired towards greater political democracy. As I indicated before, the Soviet Union made another mistake in failing to realize the indignation that would be created by the violence used against the Hungarian people. 35. It is futile to have us look upon the Soviet troops in Hungary as mere guardians of law and order, corresponding to an ordinary national police force. These troops represented the naked power, not of their own country, but of a foreign Power, acting as self-imposed guardian and protector of Hungary. The sympathies of the whole world went out to those who made such heroic efforts to win greater freedom for their country and people. 36. I fear that the effects of what has happened in Hungary will be felt for a long time. If the Soviet leaders wish to pursue the policy of relaxation that was perceptible before the events of the last months, this wish cannot be realized by their remaining blind to what has so shocked the world. Only a new policy on the part of the Soviet Union, aiming at greater political and personal freedom as well as national independence for the Hungarian people, can be a new starting point for a policy aimed at a lessening of tension.