This eleventh session of the United Nations General Assembly is of special importance not only because of the gravity of the issues before it but also because we are conscious of the fact that we face the question of the effectiveness, and even the very existence, of our Organization.
2. This is not the first time the United Nations has faced difficulties, but experience in recent years shows that an effort has been necessary to try to surmount them, in all too many cases without success. The point to remember, in order to understand the history of the past eleven years, is that the respective roles of the General Assembly and Security Council were clearly defined in the Charter. The General Assembly is empowered only to make recommendations; the Security Council, where a small number of delegations are represented and each of the five great Powers possess a right of veto, being alone empowered to take decisions which may even involve the application of sanctions and the use of armed force. Whereas none of the Members of the Organization are ever legally bound to accept Assembly recommendations, they are required, in acceding to the Charter, to accept and carry out Council decisions.
3. During the early years of the United Nations, the Security Council acted to some purpose, as in the cases of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and the aid given by the “satellite” countries to the Communist uprising in Greece. Since 1947, however, the Council has been paralysed whenever there has been a conflict of opinion between the Soviet Union and the West.
4. It was to overcome the drawbacks of an unrestrained use of the right of veto by the Soviet Union that the United States delegation, in 1950, put forward a system in the “Uniting for Peace” resolution [377 (V)] whereby the General Assembly could be convened almost immediately in the event of the paralysis of the Council. It was not until a case arose in which the United Kingdom and France were involved that this system was put into effect. We note this fact without bitterness but not without misgiving.
5. If we look back on the main issues discussed by the United Nations, we find that it has been unable to resolve most of the questions referred to it. For example, the Security Council asked the Military Staff Committee in 1946 to study the possibility of establishing a United Nations armed force but the Committee reported two years later that it had been unable to continue its task because of Soviet opposition.
6. The problem of the independence of Korea was brought before the General Assembly by the United States in 1947 and the Assembly proposed the establishment of a temporary commission, but this proved incapable of functioning because of Soviet obstruction. The only reason why the Council was able to act in 1950 when South Korea was invaded by the North Korean army was that the Soviet Union was not in a position to use its veto, having withdrawn in January 1950 in protest against the presence of the representative of Nationalist China. But when the United Nations Command informed the Council a few months later that its forces were in contact with Chinese Communist units in North Korea, action against Communist China was completely balked by the Soviet Union veto.
7. The question of Kashmir was brought before the Security Council at India’s request on 1 January 1948. The Commission set up to investigate the matter succeeded in establishing a cease-fire but later proved incapable of ensuring the progressive demilitarization which was to precede the plebiscite due to be held under United Nations auspices.
8. In March 1948, the Security Council considered a request by the permanent representative of Czechoslovakia concerning the violation of his country’s independence by the Soviet Union, and once again United Nations action was as could have been expected paralysed by the veto. Listening the other day to the Czechoslovak representative’s reference to Hungary, we were able to gauge what the moral effects of our impotence have been.
9. In September 1948, France, the United States and the United Kingdom called the Council’s attention to the action by the Soviet Union in its occupation zone in Eastern Germany and Berlin, but a draft resolution approved by nine Members was rejected as a result of the Soviet veto. Similarly, a commission set up by the General Assembly on 20 December 1951 to investigate the conditions under which free elections could be organized in Germany was unable even to establish contact with the authorities of the Soviet Zone.
10. On 9 September 1951, the Yugoslav Government asked the General Assembly to put an end to the pressure which for three years had been exerted against the independence and integrity of Yugoslav territory by the Soviet Union’s “satellites”. On 14 December 1951, the Assembly adopted a resolution [509 (VI)] on the proposal of Yugoslavia but the Soviet Union and the other countries concerned completely ignored the recommendation made. A similar failure was registered [resolution 613 (VII)] on 20 December 1952 in regard to the Austrian Peace Treaty.
11. Nor did the United Nations meet with any greater success when it took up the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.
12. If we consider the question of Palestine, which is today a particularly burning one, we find that the Palestine partition plan adopted by the Assembly on 29 November 1947 [resolution 181 (II)] was rejected by the Arab Higher Committee; that after the Security Council adopted a resolution [S/714, resolution I] urging the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine to accept a truce the Arab States refused to heed it; that Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, and his deputy were assassinated near Jerusalem; that hostilities broke out between Israel and the Arab States in October 1948; that on 11 August 1949 a Security Council resolution [S/1376, resolution II] urged the parties to negotiate a peace settlement but this never materialized; and that no success was registered in finding a satisfactory solution for any one of the questions discussed by the Security Council or the Mixed Armistice Commissions.
13. I hope you will bear with me in recalling these difficulties and failures at some length, but my purpose was not to show despondency regarding the role that our Organization could and should play but to draw lessons from shortcomings that have become apparent in practice. The main causes of these failures are undoubtedly the abuse of the right of veto by the Soviet Union; the General Assembly’s inability to make a sufficiently objective study of the problems and compel respect for its recommendations; the fact that the effects and not the causes of the political crises which come before us for discussion are considered and the difficulties — and I shall revert to this point in a few moments — of choosing between conciliation and intervention in disputes in progress.
14. This year, two problems have arisen which are so acute that the United Nations has been severely shaken; I refer to the questions of Hungary and Egypt. The French Government does not recognize any basis of comparison between the two questions. It would, of course, be offensive to France and the United Kingdom to compare them with the Soviet Union and it would be even more offensive to Hungary to compare it with Egypt.
15. If we examine Egypt’s action during the past few months, we note a stream of threats directed both against Israel and the Western Powers.
16. As far as France is concerned, these threats were all the less justified in that the French Government in face of certain of Colonel Nasser’s actions, had consistently shown itself to be long-suffering to a degree which often earned it the censure of French public opinion. In particular, at no time did we reply to the harangues delivered by the Egyptian dictator, the interference of the Cairo radio or even the practice of training large numbers of agitators in Egypt for subsequent despatch to North Africa. Yet the complaints we are making have proved to be more than justified, as the Athos incident has established the fact of direct interference by Egypt in French affairs. The loading of a ship by uniformed Egyptian soldiers with seventy tons of arms to be used for fomenting agitation against France constitutes interference in a country’s internal affairs in the most blatant form.
17. But the issue which overshadowed all others and showed the Egyptian problem in its true light is, of course, that of the Suez Canal. I argued the legal aspect of the case against the nationalization of the Canal in the Security Council, and I believe I proved that Colonel Nasser had no right to take the unilateral action he did, In the General Assembly, however, I feel that it is the political aspect that should be mainly stressed. Many nations have actually coupled the nationalization of the Canal with the question of national independence, as if an independent country could in no circumstances be bound by its international obligations. Were that the case, international co-operation would cease to be a practical proposition in the present world, and the only thing left to each of our countries would be to close its frontiers, The wealthy nations would live prosperously within their own borders and the poor ones in poverty within theirs, There would be no further question of international solidarity. This point is of such importance that I shall revert to it later when I take up the question of assistance to under-developed countries, which also features on the General Assembly’s agenda.
18. On the Suez question, the first London Conference, held from 16 to 23 August 1956 had led us to hope that a settlement would be reached. But for Soviet Union opposition, we would undoubtedly have succeeded very quickly in arriving at a system for operating the Canal that would have been acceptable to all. The outcome was the Eighteen Nation Plan which Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, submitted in Cairo without a favourable reply being forthcoming. I am firmly convinced that it was still possible at that time to avoid any conflict and to settle the affair in the best interests of the Egyptian people, if not of Colonel Nasser. The sequence of events at the second London Conference held from 19 to 21 September 1956 clearly brought out the Canal users’ weakness in face of the arbitrary action of which they had been the victims, thus encouraging Colonel Nasser to take an uncompromising stand.
19. The United Kingdom and France then came before the Security Council, where they once again encountered the traditional Soviet Union veto. What I found interesting at those meetings, however, was not so much the adoption of the six principles, on the application of which there will be lengthy discussion, as the organization of closed sessions and the holding of meetings in the Secretary-General’s office at which the possibility was afforded of freely discussing a number of problems.
20. The general feeling in mid-October was that there was a great vacuum — a vacuum which very largely justifies the fears Israel may have had as to Colonel Nasser’s next moves. It had received credible information indicating that it might be the next victim of aggression, What we have here is an Israel tragedy which we must try to understand: because of our failure to find a settlement of the problems of the Middle East and put an end to certain threats, we have, as it were, condemned Israel to the necessity of waging preventive war.
21. Marshal Bulganin’s recent statement of 5 November 1956 raising the question of Israel’s continued existence as a State is a political blunder of the first order, for its effect can only be to drive the Government of Israel to acts of desperation. A country in danger of being wiped off the map overnight will scarcely hesitate over methods,
22. If we say this today, it is not because we have chosen between Israel and the Arab countries. We do not agree, in fact, that any such choice has to be made. However, we consider it essential to achieve conditions for peaceful coexistence between the two sides.
23. To return to recent events, the question facing France and the United Kingdom was this: what could and should our two countries do in face of a conflict that had become sooner or later inevitable? Our Governments were guided by the following considerations: the need to take account of the facts of the situation and the impotence of the United Nations in the Middle East; the avoidance of any discrimination in principle between the Arab countries and Israel but without forgetting Colonel Nasser’s persistent threats; the desire to try to protect the Canal zone (because of circumstances we were unable to prevent Egypt from blocking the Canal without any military justification and breach of the 1888 Constantinople Convention) ; the desire to avert Soviet intervention, which for several months had taken the form of large-scale shipments of arms of all kinds and which might ultimately have resulted in the outbreak of a world war.
24. We have been sharply rebuked for taking the initiative in launching military operations Without having been directly attacked. While I am prepared to concede the cogency of that criticism from a strictly formal point of view, I would like to suggest an analogy at this point. Speaking one day in a small rural commune in France, I put to my audience the following argument: “Suppose the French Government had been able to take action against Germany in March 1936, when Hitler’s armies invaded the Rhineland. It would have touched off a minor conflict which would probably have soon been over. Nevertheless, some lives would have been lost and the Government would have been held responsible for its action in the eyes of the world. No one would have known that by acting as it did it had averted the loss of twenty million lives in the Second World War. The problem is not always that of putting off settlement day.”
25. There is little to be said that you do not already know about the military operations which have taken place in Egypt. Contrary to Colonel Nasser’s assertions, the Egyptian army showed little enthusiasm in battle; the fact that Israel lost only 170 men in putting two Egyptian divisions out of action speaks for itself. We also noted the great wisdom of the Arab countries which gave Egypt moral support, as was natural, but refrained from direct intervention in the conflict.
26. The most important feature of this short campaign is the vast amount of military equipment of Soviet origin captured by the Israel army in the Sinai desert. It is impossible to believe that this could have been utilized by the Egyptian army alone, which everyone knew had very few specialists and technicians. Everything warrants the belief, therefore, that this stockpiled equipment was awaiting the volunteers who would at the appointed time have put it to more effective use. I shall leave it to the Government of Israel to supply the exact tally of its war booty, but I cannot refrain at this juncture from expressing some concern at the way in which the Soviet Union claims to organize world peace while criticizing others for jeopardizing it.
27. As far as the Anglo-French action is concerned, the main concern was to destroy the aircraft which had also been abundantly supplied by the Soviet Union. We bombed airfields and destroyed aircraft on the ground, but we always gave due warning so that personnel could take shelter, which they always very carefully did. The one episode in this campaign in which casualties were unfortunately heavy was at Port Said, but for this the false reports broadcast by the Cairo Radio were partially responsible. Port Said had surrendered and it seemed that all would be quiet when the announcement that London and Paris had been attacked by Soviet atomic rockets and that Russian troops were about to land had the effect of driving the local inhabitants to futile actions which could have been avoided.
28. From the rapid summary I have given, it is at all events clear that the action of Israel on the one hand and that of France and the United Kingdom on the other, although they by-passed the United Nations — for which you may reproach us — had absolutely nothing in common with the Soviet action in Hungary. Hungary was not threatening Russia; it merely wished to gain its independence and freedom. The purpose of the Soviet action was to change the country’s internal political life, which was not true of France and the United Kingdom in Egypt. The Soviet action sought not to destroy dangerous military targets, but to break a people’s resistance to oppression and poverty. In carrying it out there was no attempt to avoid loss of life as refugees’ reports of the atrocities committed all too clearly show. Lastly, we have only to compare the attitudes of Colonel Nasser and of Mr. Imre Nagy to see how unlike the two cases are.
29. If we now look at the part played by the United Nations in the two crises, the comparison reveals a picture quite different from what we might have expected. The French Government and French public opinion regret, first, that the Security Council and the emergency special sessions of the General Assembly regarded the problem of the Suez as more important, more urgent and more serious than that of Hungary; and, secondly, that the effects of the crisis were discussed at length whereas its causes were consistently neglected and nothing was done to prevent their recurrence. We were shocked by certain votes. I am not thinking of the votes of the Soviet Union and the “satellite” countries, which have never shown much respect for the United Nations, but of those cast by friendly countries from which we might have expected a different stand on the Hungarian question. Nevertheless, I wish to give the United Nations credit for the idea of creating an international Force, although I deplore the fact that this Force has an opportunity to act in Egypt but not in Hungary, so that the value of its action is inevitably lessened.
30. The point I believe must be emphasized is the attitude of the various Powers concerned towards the recommendations made to them by the General Assembly.
31. The Government of Israel quickly accepted the cease-fire although it could easily have exploited its victory to protect itself from any future surprise attack. It agreed to withdraw its troops from the Sinai Peninsula just when it was taking stock of the large amount of Soviet material there, to which I referred a moment ago.
32. France and the United Kingdom agreed to a ceasefire at a date which many of our opponents themselves regarded as premature. It would perhaps have been desirable to ensure the protection of the entire Canal and to prevent the scuttling of any more ships there by Egypt. This could have been done without further bloodshed, in view of the virtual absence of resistance on the part of the Egyptian Army.
33. The Soviet Union has shown two different attitudes. In the case of Hungary it airily ignored the General Assembly’s recommendation [resolution 1004 (ES-II)] and then, during the recent debate, blamed its victims for its own acts. In the case of the Suez, however, it has tried to prevent any settlement from being reached and to revive the conflict in the Middle East by reports that Soviet volunteers might be sent to Egypt and by increasing its deliveries of arms to Syria.
34. The Egyptian Government itself has agreed to the parts of the recommendations of the United Nations which were favourable to it, but not to those which were not to its liking — for example, the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Canal zone. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to deny the Force its role in supervising the clearing of the Canal and ensuring the protection of a waterway which is still international. We have good reason to fear that Egypt may make no effort on its own to ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. I have not forgotten the statement made long ago by an Egyptian statesman that Egypt would not be independent until the Canal was filled in. A moment ago I pointed to the dangers of such a notion of independence, but it is a notion which is still alive, we fear, in some minds in Cairo.
35. Two conclusions, the seriousness of which must be apparent to all, can be drawn from the differences in attitude on the part of Governments and the different attitudes adopted by the United Nations towards the problems raised.
36. The first is that there is a vast difference between the attitude of the democracies and that of the dictatorships towards the recommendations of the United Nations. If the impression should become too strong that only the democracies are bound by the recommendations and decisions of the World Organization, it will not be long before public opinion in the democracies will not accept participation under such conditions. The United Nations must resolve to impose its decisions on all or resign itself to imposing them on none.
37. Moreover, it would appear that the United Nations cannot permit itself to take the same stand with regard to Powers which possess the atomic bomb and threaten to use it as with regard to Powers which do not. We are not prepared to forget Mr. Bulganin’s message and its direct allusion to the use of the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union. If such a factor were to continue to influence the application of the decisions of the United Nations, each country, including the smallest, would feel compelled to make atomic bombs itself to ensure that its rights were respected in international crises. In a few years, when atomic energy becomes less expensive, the manufacture of atomic bombs will be easy. We may well ask in all seriousness what will become of peace when each nation possesses the atomic bomb and threatens to use it. The mad will then be the masters of the world, I apologize for painting such a prospect, but the United Nations cannot afford to ignore the fundamental aspects of the problems whose consequences it examines,
38. We have discussed Hungary. We shall no doubt revert a number of times to various aspects of the Suez problem, but if in dealing with these questions we ignore the considerations I have mentioned we shall accomplish nothing. Despite our good will we shall not organize world peace.
39. Other problems are going to claim our attention, in the first place, disarmament. The recent Soviet proposals contribute nothing particularly new to the solution of the problem which has been the subject of so much discussion in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The truth is that we shall achieve nothing substantial or permanent until world-wide agreement has been reached on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The need for agreement on that issue does not, of course, absolve us of the responsibility of seeking means to reduce the considerable sums still being expended throughout the world for conventional weapons, or the responsibility of seeking an early solution of the fundamental problems which divide the nations — whether they concern the Middle East, the Far East, the reunification of Germany, or the freedom of the “satellite” countries, What we must at all costs avoid is that the debate on disarmament in our Assembly should be made an occasion for mere propaganda. Rather than spectacular proposals, we must seek practical solutions. France is willing to continue to play the role of mediator in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission which it has played in recent years through its representative, Mr. Jules Moch.
40. We shall also take up the problem of Algeria. It might be asked why France agreed to the inclusion of this question in the agenda this year when it opposed it last year. Let there be no misunderstanding on that point; we have not changed our view that this is a French domestic problem which is outside the competence of the United Nations, and is in no way comparable to the problems presented by Morocco and Tunisia. In the case of those two countries, whose presence I welcome with great pleasure and good will, we did everything possible to find the liberal solution which was called for, and it is our desire to continue to conduct our relations with them in a spirit of co-operation and friendship, despite the difficulties inherent in such a swift and far-reaching change in our relations.
41. On the other hand, we intend — certainly with every justification, after the seizure of the Athos — to raise the question of interference by other countries in the Algerian affair, which is a violation of the United Nations Charter and which, by fostering terrorism and stirring up unrest has helped to delay the peaceful and liberal solution we all desire. The world must understand how difficult the Algerian problem is, ethnically, geographically and politically, and must realize that there can be no question of a theoretical solution which everyone would recognize from the start as unfeasible.
42. Another problem which will be taken up in the General Assembly is that of assistance to the underdeveloped countries. I am particularly interested in this since I am credited with the authorship of a plan which provides for the organization of assistance under the auspices of the United Nations. I sincerely hope that this plan will be discussed and adopted, but I must confess that I am more pessimistic regarding that prospect now than I was last spring, despite the support the plan has received from a number of countries.
43. For any plan of assistance to the under-developed countries to be effective, three conditions must be fulfilled.
44. The first is acceptance of the principle of the interdependence of nations — a principle which is very different from that of an independence tinged with racism, autarchy or imperialism. In this connexion, I am ready to acknowledge the mistakes made by the Western Powers in the nineteenth century, but these would hardly seem to justify other Powers in making the same mistakes in the middle of the twentieth century.
45. The second is scrupulous observance of undertakings given. There is a current tendency which we find alarming — the readiness with which certain countries raise the cry of colonialism or imperialism whenever they wish to break international commitments unilaterally. It is difficult to see what treaties and what agreements will be possible in future if they are to be denounced almost immediately in the name of independence or colonialism.
46. The third is the maintenance of order in the beneficiary countries. In addition to financial problems., there are practical problems, which require the presence in the territories concerned of technical experts and a considerable amount of equipment and the uninterrupted execution of large-scale projects. No one can be expected to embark on a programme of technical co-operation without an assurance that it will be possible to work in peace and security.
47. We must study this problem together in a spirit of co-operation. Certainly France is willing to do so, regardless of political and military considerations. It is surely significant, that after bitter conflicts French economic and cultural influence is being revived in Indo-China. This proves that independence is not incompatible with collaboration in the common interest of the parties concerned.
48. In my opinion, it would be unthinkable for the General Assembly to disperse without considering the question of the reorganization of the United Nations. As I have said before, we must choose between two methods. Either the decisions of the United Nations must be enforceable, in which case they must be enforceable in respect of everyone, and no one must be able to use independence as an excuse to evade their application or deny to the international Force the means of performing its functions. Or, lacking the power to enforce its decisions, the United Nations will be purely an organ of mediation.
49. The United Nations must, then, make every effort to examine problems more objectively and seek realistic solutions rather than utter academic condemnations. Along this line of thought, I believe we could instil new life into the Security Council by making use of closed sessions — that is, sessions in which statements are not made for propaganda purposes. We could also develop the role of mediator which the Secretary-General has played so well and which can still be of great service to world peace.
50. We must also avoid the existence or the formation of groups within our Organization whose sole purpose is to oppose other groups. We are a world Organization and not merely the arithmetical sum of regional organizations. We have, of course, the right to organize regional systems of co-operation outside the United Nations but in so doing our primary concern should not be to oppose other similar organizations.
51. Lastly, we must not forget that our role, as it was defined in 1945, is not merely to preserve immediate peace whenever the occasion arises while allowing the seeds of war to remain, but to base our action on the notion of international justice. We cannot abolish war unless we abolish its causes,
52. I believe that we are in duty bound, before this eleventh session comes to an end, to examine among ourselves, in a spirit of co-operation different from that which has hitherto brought us together, the means of attaining our common aim: peaceful and friendly coexistence among all the nations of the world.