I should like to begin by associating myself with those representatives who have already congratulated Prince Wan Waithayakon on his election to the office of President of the General Assembly.
138. We are clearly passing through a crisis in international relations, due chiefly to events in the Middle East and Hungary. This crisis has occurred following a period in which international relations had taken a turn for the better, and we had accordingly been led to view the future development of those relations with greater hope and optimism. A possible end to the “cold war” appeared to be in sight.
139. A series of encouraging developments had taken place in a relatively brief space of time. Hostilities had come to an end in Korea and Indo-China. The Austrian question had been settled. The Bandung Conference had consolidated peace in a part of the world as important as it is large. The Geneva Conference of Heads of State had demonstrated the possibility of a rapprochement and practical co-operation among the great Powers. Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union and with other Eastern European countries had returned to normal and were continuing to improve.
140. These were among the most striking signs of a favourable trend which, at that time, was becoming increasingly apparent. They actually reflected the growing interdependence and community of interests of the present-day world in every sphere of activity, as well as a growing awareness of this interdependence. The other, more general, signs of this trend were the gradual lowering of the economic and political barriers dividing the world, the accession of a growing number of peoples and countries to national independence and the increasing influence exerted by those peoples and countries on world events.
141. Consequently, my delegation, like many others, was last year able to note the existence of conditions conducive not only to peaceful coexistence, but also to the conversion of such coexistence into active and constructive co-operation among States with different political, economic and social systems. This justified the hope that we could gradually resolve other outstanding problems and thus bring about an increasing reduction in world tension.
142. While noting that tensions had eased and international relations had improved, and while doing everything within its power to contribute to those developments, the Yugoslav Government, like others, was fully aware of the instability of the world situation. At that time, it emphasized that the mere realization of the fact that a general conflict would be tantamount to collective suicide was not in itself a guarantee of or a basis for lasting peace. My Government had also, on many occasions, stressed the fact that any balance based upon the division of the world into heavily armed blocs would be extremely precarious.
143. Events in the Middle East and Hungary have shown how precarious that balance is. I do not propose to review these events, with respect to which my Government’s position is well known. It was restated forcefully by President Tito in his speech of 11 November 1956. I should prefer instead to interpret them and to draw the appropriate political conclusions.
144. While there has been a crisis in international relations, it should be borne in mind that there has been a no less acute crisis in the policies which have given rise to renewed tension. If it is realized that we are passing through a period of transition, hence of readjustment and readaptation, it will be seen that, despite all that has occurred, this is a favourable development.
145. It would, of course, be wrong automatically to equate the events that have taken place in the Middle East with those which have taken place in Hungary. It seems to me, however, that the same lesson may be drawn from both.
146. Various arbitrary explanations of these events have been given, particularly by the parties directly concerned. But let us make no mistake. The truth regarding the scope and meaning of these events, as well as the responsibilities involved, could not be suppressed. It has become common knowledge.
147. Let us take the question of the aggression against Egypt. The representatives of certain States, and particularly of those directly responsible for the aggression, have attempted in vain to justify their action. None of the series of contradictory explanations has succeeded in convincing us. And for good reason.
148. For instance, we were asked to believe that the invasion of Egypt was necessary in order to prevent a general conflagration, which was alleged to be imminent. We all know very well that the contrary is true, that it was the war in Egypt which had jeopardized world peace.
149. The other argument, no less surprising or spurious, concerns the alleged difference in the proposed treatment of the “democracies,” on the one hand, and the “dictatorships” on the other. In urging the need for equal treatment, this argument at least has the merit of acknowledging some resemblance between the misdeeds it seeks to compare. Secondly, this argument makes much of the fact that the parties concerned deigned to consent to a cease-fire. However, the invading forces are still on Egyptian soil. Thirdly, this argument clearly reveals the arbitrary nature of such distinctions, because aggression cannot be regarded as less reprehensible simply because it has been committed by one or more countries with a “democratic regime”.
150. The conclusion to be drawn is that international relations cannot be truly democratic less the use of force is excluded. It is therefore particularly alarming to see certain ruling circles in these same countries arrogating to themselves the right to impose conditions and endeavouring unreasonably further to aggravate the general situation by the use of ideological slogans and watchwords designed to bolster their own position, which has been seriously weakened by their own previous ill-considered actions.
151. With respect to the so-called long-term problems of the Middle East, we cannot but admit that they figure prominently among the causes which have led to the present crisis. We are also aware that we must, in due course, set about solving them. It would, however, be quite intolerable if advantage were taken of the presence on Egyptian soil of foreign invasion forces — whose withdrawal has repeatedly been urged in General Assembly resolutions which must eventually be complied with — in order to exert pressure upon the Egyptian Government with a view to obtaining concessions from it. Today, it would be more intolerable than ever to take any action which might prevent Egypt, the victim of aggression, from exercising its full sovereignty.
152. The problems of Algeria and Cyprus belong to the same category. Here, too, we are faced with the pernicious consequences of the “survival of colonialism” and the “desire of certain Powers for domination”. These have been denounced from this rostrum [590th meeting] by Mr. Bourguiba, the representative of the Tunisian Government, who is probably better qualified and more competent to do so than anyone else. The Yugoslav Government supported the demands of the populations concerned, in principle, but, as it also wished to adopt a realistic approach, it endeavoured to display the utmost moderation to avoid jeopardizing the prospect of an agreement freely entered into by the two parties concerned.
153. However, we feel today that that stage has been passed. Such an agreement is being prevented not by the Algerians or the Cypriots, but by the opposition of the Governments of the old colonial Powers. So far as Cyprus is concerned, the events in Egypt have finally demolished one of the British arguments which was considered by many to be the most compelling, the one based on strategic considerations, those events having raised the basic question of the interests and the policy served by the strategy in question.
154. Nor has anyone been convinced by the explanations put forward in the case of Hungary by the Governments directly concerned. We continue to hope, however, that calm and normal conditions will soon be restored in that country, so that the Hungarian people may be able to realize their legitimate desire for full national independence and the democratization of their social and political life.
155. On the other hand, it is essential that certain foreign political circles should refrain from taking advantage of the present difficulties of the Hungarian people for purposes of propaganda or political strategy which are hardly compatible with the interests of peace.
156. Is such a favourable trend of development possible in Hungary? We firmly believe that it is. We believe that this trend is already under way, dramatic though the form it is taking may be. A readjustment of relations between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe is taking place, because it has become a necessity. The movement is towards mutual respect, sovereignty, independence and co-operation on an equal footing — principles which were all embodied in the declaration made by Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in Belgrade on 2 June 1955, and in the declarations published after President Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956, and reiterated in the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956. The results of the recent negotiations between Poland and the USSR provide further evidence of this trend.
157. All these facts confirm our conviction that there is no longer any possibility of a return to the old order in the countries of Eastern Europe, whether it be a return to what is termed “Stalinism” — save in the event of a grave deterioration of international relations — or a return to the previous regime. It should, of course, be understood that, in these countries, the peoples’ demands for full national independence and a broad measure of social democracy are but two aspects of tbs same desire for social progress.
158. The weaknesses and shortcomings of what is called the “free world” are obvious. Serious weaknesses and shortcomings have also been revealed in the socialist camp. Once we discard the explanation, as convenient as it is misleading, that these difficulties are. primarily due to foreign intrigues, several things become apparent.
159. First, there is an unmistakable movement for peace on both sides of any barrier separating different parts of the world, despite ideological or other divisions.
160. Secondly, no country with a particular social system or association of countries based on a similar system is thereby protected against internal difficulties and unheavals; this is particularly true of relations among the States concerned. In fact, although the problems of the two camps are naturally different, there are in both cases serious shortcomings in relations between States belonging to the same camp, in relations between the camps, and in the relations of the two camps with other countries. Moreover, these relations are not viewed correctly.
161. Thirdly, these relations cannot develop favourably unless they are based on progressive forces and processes.
162. For these reasons, the appeals and demands made in both camps for unity or internal solidarity are perforce illusory. Before such unity could be achieved, relations themselves would have to be modified in the direction of greater democracy. But that objective once attained, the resulting unity, which was previously artificial, would no longer have any point, because democratic relations would obviate the need for opposing blocs and camps. These would be replaced by peaceful competition and by joint action to maintain and strengthen peace.
163. It is for these reasons that I referred a short time ago to the crisis of certain policies. The moulds in which such policies have long been set are obviously cracking under the pressure of clearly marked trends towards coexistence and co-operation. It is therefore no coincidence that the military alliances upon which the policy of blocs is based are undergoing a serious internal crisis. This crisis is solely due to the fact that the alliances and the policy are no longer adequate to cope with international problems.
164. In this new situation, the theory has been put forward that recourse to force in localized actions was feasible inasmuch as the threat of a general war was receding. We have seen that it is precisely such historically and politically unsound theories that have led to the present crisis and to renewed tension in international relations. The aggression against Egypt is an example as tragic as it is instructive. It has already been recognized in this connexion that, apart from the fate of the military action, the intervention was, politically, a complete failure.
165. From what I have just said, it is clear that I do not share the view of those who contend that the present crisis in international relations has vitiated the policy of coexistence. I believe that the contrary is true.
166. The main factors responsible for the favourable trend in international developments continue to operate. The fact that we have had a closer look at the face of a nuclear war does not make it any less terrifying. The general tendency towards greater interdependence and co-operation among all parts of the world, as well as the yearning of mankind for peace and security, have not weakened but, on the contrary, grown stronger. Neither the feasibility nor the necessity of coexistence and co-operation has been diminished. On the contrary, it is more than ever obvious today that they represent our only alternative to war. In the final analysis, it is our responsibility to ensure that this alternative is adopted.
167. We know that we are not alone in this view. Mr. Hoover, the United States representative, made the following statement from this rostrum a few days ago: “Our goal must be a world in which nations and peoples can live side by side, whatever their internal political, economic and social systems, without fear and with real hope for self-fulfillment!” [581st meeting, para. 99.] Mr. Shepilov, the Soviet Union representative, after rightly criticizing the theory of a balance of power among the great Powers armed to the teeth, emphasized that: “What we need ... is no temporary patching up of the edifice of peace, but a fundamental solution of the problems that agitate mankind.” [589th meeting, para. 97. Many other representatives have expressed similar views.
168. I may be told, of course, that words are not always borne out by deeds. But I also know that statements are binding, and that the greater the number of explicit statements, the harder it is to repudiate them. We realize that the great Powers will not readily give up the positions and privileges they hold in spite of the fact that the general course of development calls for such action. But we also know that, although they may only pay lip-service to the spirit and exigencies of the time, they little by little comply with its dictates in practice also. This does not mean that the other specific problems with which we were faced before the present crisis have been relegated to the background. Far from it.
169. Let us consider the problem of disarmament, Following a period marked by a substantial reconciliation of conflicting views, we appear to have reached another deadlock. In this connexion, I should like to make two observations.
170. First, my Government maintains the specific proposals it made in the Disarmament Commission [DC/92] providing for certain initial measures with respect to both conventional and nuclear weapons, together with the necessary system of control.
171. Secondly, the Government of the USSR has just made a new proposal [A/3366]. We urge that this proposal should be studied with the attention it deserves. We note with satisfaction that the United States representative has also drawn attention to some of its favourable aspects.
172. In view of the importance of the matter, I should like to emphasize my view that proposals of such importance should not be labelled as propaganda even before they have been considered. In order to achieve favourable results, we must agree to move from the abstract to the concrete, in other words, from the plan to its execution, from intention to action. Any specific solution proposed may present certain advantages or disadvantages for one of the parties concerned. In that case, other proposals — equally specific and detailed-
173. should be made. However, we must recognize that we cannot continue indefinitely to appraise any specific plan for gradual disarmament in terms of the advantages we should like to obtain from the over-all balance of armed forces it would establish.
174. In other words, any plan, from whatever quarter it may emanate, must be judged in terms of its effect upon the strengthening of peace and not in terms of an inevitable war. We must remember, in this connexion, how at different times during a particular period each of the two large blocs considered the settlement of the Austrian problem a strategic defeat.
175. Among the urgent problems before us, I should like also to mention the removal of economic barriers and the increase of international trade, the development of under-developed countries, the project known as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, the International Atomic Energy Agency dealing with the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and the question of the universality of our Organization.
176. With regard to all these problems, my Government firmly adheres to the views it has expressed on many occasions. In the case of SUNFED, it was glad to note the favourable attitude taken a few days ago by the Soviet Union, one of the largest potential contributors. We hope that the United States will also take a favourable decision on this matter in the near future. Indeed, it is only through large-scale international co-operation under United Nations auspices that this problem of such vital importance to world peace can be solved.
177. Before concluding, I should like to emphasize that the United Nations has emerged from its recent ordeals with added stature and authority. It has become evident that where major international problems are involved the United Nations can no longer be disregarded, nor the principles of the Charter ignored. I wish to refer particularly to the active and most valuable role that Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General, has played throughout, and even long before, the present crisis.
178. The principles I have just outlined will guide my delegation in its consideration of the items on the agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly. These principles are also at the root of our whole foreign policy, which is entirely aimed at safeguarding peace and strengthening international security and cooperation on the basis of the independence and sovereign equality of all States, in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter.