Australia

First of all, may I offer the warm congratulations of the Australian delegation to the President on his election. We from Australia are familiar with his work as the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand, one of Australia’s closest friends and neighbours. Our two countries co-operate closely in a number of regional organizations in South-East Asia. As President of the General Assembly, Prince Wan Waithayakon will bring further credit to himself and to his country. To the former President, Señor Maza of Chile, we extend our thanks. The Australian delegation is happy to have served under him. 2. We meet under circumstances that make it difficult to speak of anything much other than the two big issues dominating the world situation: the urgent need to find a solution to the critical problems in the Middle East; and the tragic situation in Hungary. 3. Of the Middle East situation, it is essential to try to see things in perspective. It is dearly wrong to judge any one particular international incident by itself and to ignore all that proceeded it. To use an analogy, when one man assaults another, there is usually something that went before. When the alleged aggressor comes before a magistrate, evidence is collected to establish the background, as to whether there was provocation and, if so, the nature of it, and whether or not the alleged aggressor was justified in taking the law into his own hands, for instance by reason of the police being either absent or unable to provide the necessary protection. This analogy is relevant to our consideration of the Middle East situation. 4. Do not let us lose sight of the real origin of all the strife of recent weeks. That origin was the arbitrary, unilateral and abrupt seizure of the Suez Canal by President Nasser. Until that day, 26 July, the Middle East, though unsettled, still presented a manageable situation in which any local violence or fighting could be restrained or kept localized. I do not want to argue here whether President Nasser had a legal right to nationalize the Canal, although the Australian view on this has already been clearly and publicly stated. It is undoubted that, irrespective of the rights of national sovereignty, Egypt was a party to international undertakings which, to say the least, should have inhibited an arbitrary, unilateral act of nationalization without any prior consultation with other countries with important interests in this great international waterway. Was it not reasonable to expect that, if Egypt wished to revise its position in relation to the Suez canal, an action fraught with such wide international implications, it would at least have consulted in advance with other countries, that it would have seen that Egypt’s national interests, however interpreted, had to be fitted in and asserted in a way that took account of other interests and rights already existing in the area? 5. Just picture the situation in the Middle East as it was a few short months ago. There was the Suez Canal, which was so vital a part of the economic life stream of more than half the countries of the world. There were many vital national interests centred in the Middle East. There were many persistent causes of difference between Israel and neighbouring States: the absence of a peace settlement; the Egyptian blockade of Israel shipping and cargoes through the Suez Canal; the long continued Egyptian commando operations into Israel. There is such a thing as a slow motion aggression that is never quite recognized as the real thing but which can build up to what becomes uncontrollable proportions. 6. It would be utterly wrong to picture President Nasser as a man who had been walking along quietly, minding his own business, when suddenly somebody hit him. The plain fact of the matter is that it was Egypt that upset the balance in the Middle East without any prior consultation with other countries in the region or with others having interests in the region. 7. In short, a delicate and sensitive balance of interests was violently upset in the Middle East by the action of President Nasser. No reasonable person could have objected if Egypt had asked for reconstruction of the Canal arrangements if it considered them unsatisfactory; but no such approach was ever made. Most Governments read of the act of nationalization for the first time in the newspapers. It was this unilateral and violent upsetting by Egypt of working and generally accepted arrangements that has led in due course to the recent fighting. In other words, there was a great deal of dry tinder lying around, into which President Nasser threw a lighted match. 8. Before I speak of the longer-term objectives in the Middle East, let me say something about the immediate situation which is still critical and which could still flare up again at any moment. It is plainly most urgent that all haggling over the admission of the United Nations Emergency Force should cease and that the Force should take up its duties at once and in such numbers that it inspires confidence and creates some stability in the area. It seems to me quite absurd that there should be a long argument about what contingents are acceptable and what are not acceptable. Such objections, if pursued, make a farce of the very idea of a United Nations operation and a United Nations Force. 9. There is also the deplorable situation of the Canal itself. It has been wantonly blocked. It must be quickly cleared. Are objections, similar to those which Egypt has raised about the composition of the Force, to be raised about the clearing operation? If so, those who welcomed the overthrow of international control of the Canal and the assumption of exclusive responsibility by Egypt now have an excellent example of what this means in terms of the interests of the world community at large. First, Egypt sabotages the Canal as an act of spite, not an act dictated by the needs of war, and then it makes difficulties over its clearance in the shortest possible time. This is something which the United Nations must not accept. We must insist on the most rapid clearance possible, so as to limit the vast economic loss that is being borne by half the countries of the world, including my own country. 10. At the same time, we must get the United Nations Emergency Force performing the function for which it was intended; otherwise we risk a possible recrudescence of fighting in the area. Passions are still high, and there must be created what is in effect a demilitarized zone between Egypt and Israel, which it will be the particular function of the United Nations Emergency Force to achieve. 11. So far as Suez is concerned, it is easy to castigate the United Kingdom and France for their action if one comfortably ignores the fact that such action was the lesser of two evils. When the Israel invasion of Sinai occurred, something had to be done quickly and in a practical way. The prospect was that the Suez Canal area would be a continuing area of armed conflict, which would have stopped Suez Canal traffic indefinitely and for which there was no reasonable prospect of practical United Nations remedy. As has been pointed out from the start, the Anglo-French intervention had limited aims. We should now move on rapidly to the next stage — the placing in position of the United Nations Emergency Force and the cleaning up, under United Nations auspices, of the sources of the trouble, namely, the Egyptian-Israel relationship and the problem of the Suez Canal. 12. If we shirk this, or if we half do it, then the world will almost inevitably face the prospect of another crisis — and the world and the United Nations cannot stand another shock of this prospective magnitude. 13. One lesson of all this is that our machinery for maintaining international stability in the Middle East — and probably elsewhere — was defective and that, if peace is now to be preserved, we must try to evolve machinery that is more in line with realities. But machinery is not the whole answer; it is not even at the real root of the problem. Many of our troubles in the Middle East stem from the refusal of Egypt and others to recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist. 14. As regards the Suez Canal, the main purposes that the great body of international users of the Canal seek to achieve, in the interests of freedom of world trade, are these: internationally guaranteed freedom of passage without discrimination; fair cost of transit through the Canal; proper provision for maintenance and expansion of the Canal; and its insulation from any national political interests. 15. There can be no substantial argument in the mouth of any country against these principles. They contain nothing that is inconsistent with the legitimate expression of Egyptian sovereignty. The problem is clear-cut and urgent. The United States has covered these principles in a draft resolution which I expect will be before us very shortly. 16. In respect of the slightly longer-range problems, I believe that at this time we must again in this Assembly examine the decisions that we took when the State of Israel was established pursuant to a resolution [181 (II)] of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947, To avoid a continually running sore, we have to work to ensure that the continued existence of Israel is an accepted thing in the area. To attempt anything less would be to deny one of the facts of international life, which would be sure to boomerang on us in the future. 17. Israel and the Arab States at present look like irreconcilable entities. If they are to be brought together, the only way will be to work by stages — one step at a time. In any case, it seems to me that an essential preliminary to any reconciliation would be for this Assembly to seize this opportunity of examining the whole situation in the Middle East and to work out the main lines of a new settlement on the basis of what seems to be fair and right. We know very well that any such settlement would not be anything like 100 per cent acceptable to everybody, but we cannot let a search for an obviously unattainable best be the enemy of the good. This operation would entail an examination of the original arrangements approved for the establishment of Israel and the directions in which these arrangements have not been carried out. In this we have to have in mind the politically practicable which will be some way short of the ideal, we may be sure. 18. I believe that an important part of our duty at this present Assembly is to insist on watertight arrangements for the physical security of the countries concerned in the Arab-Israel dispute. Only when both sides are convinced that there is nothing to hope for or to fear from the use of force, will they be prepared to make a real peace. As an immediate measure, I think that the expansion this year of the United Nations observer group under General Burns was a good move. I would like to see more widespread use of United Nations observers and their complete acceptance by each side. We might also well consider the establishment of adequate demilitarized zones in all the areas of particular tension. 19. The two problems — the Palestine question and the economic development and well-being of all the peoples of the region — have been considered exhaustively inside and outside the United Nations for several years, and many countries have made strenuous efforts to help bring about a settlement, and yet comparatively little, if any, real progress has been made. We must make quicker and better progress, and we must regard the latest flareup in the Middle East as being not a deterrent to such work, but a warning against the perils of failure to make progress, and as a spur to further efforts. 20. I do not see how economic welfare and political contentment can be achieved in the Arab States while the very large body of nearly a million Arab refugees from Palestine remains unsettled and unsatisfied. Nor do I see how there can be real economic advancement in the area until, where appropriate, more of the resources of the region — such as the Jordan River — can be used to the advantage of several States. To achieve these purposes Israel must make a contribution; the Arab States must make a contribution; and countries outside the area must make a contribution. 21. Up to now we have had a series of piecemeal approaches and nobody could pretend that we have achieved much more than a series of unsatisfactory palliatives. So far little progress seems to have been made in achieving a permanent and firm settlement of the refugee problem. This basic aspect of the question of the resettlement of the Arab refugees, as distinct from their mere maintenance — keeping them alive — has to be tackled as part of a comprehensive approach to the region. Even Australia; a geographically very distant country, has contributed nearly $1,250,000 towards the maintenance — the keeping alive — of the Arab refugees. In such a comprehensive approach, perhaps we should remember that the original idea for the partition of Palestine envisaged an economic union: is it entirely fantastic to hope for some form of economic association of the Middle East States, which could open the door to substantial economic aid from abroad, which present discord and conflict is making impossible? 22. I hope that before the present session of the General Assembly adjourns some real progress will have been made in approaching these basic, region-wide problems. At the recent emergency session of the General Assembly the United States introduced a resolution [A/3272] pointing in this direction — establishing a committee to make recommendations to the parties or the United Nations for a settlement of outstanding problems, and asking the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties. I know that this may be a controversial question, but it is precisely because it is controversial and involves so many fundamental differences that it is urgent for us to tackle it. I hope that the Assembly will support something in the spirit of this American approach, which will offer a hope of a lasting and just settlement of the problems of the Middle East. 23. From a practical point of view, I would believe that we are unlikely to reach any practicable, workable solution of Egyptian-Israel relations in other than a small body. Indeed I would not be without hope that the two parties principal might be brought into direct contact, with the aid of a small committee of this Assembly in association with the Secretary-General. 24. Now on another subject. A most important matter in the Middle East situation is the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. This relationship is not something that concerns these two countries alone. It is of world-wide importance that there should be the most confident and unshakeable trust between these two great democratic countries. Any disturbance of this intimate relationship must rapidly be bridged. This is of urgent and crucial importance to 90 per cent of the countries represented here, including of course my own country Australia. 25. I would like to turn now, if I may, to other matters connected with this present Assembly. First of all it is good to see so many Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers leading their respective delegations this year. The value of close personal relations is undoubted between responsible persons in various countries, many of whom are dangerously ignorant of each other and of each other’s countries. By no means the least part of the value of the United Nations Assembly is the opportunity for us all to meet and to mix and to discuss privately. Personal contact is a considerable solvent. 26. On still another question. More than ever before it is the result of our debates which counts, not the debate itself. The experience of the past leads me to say that I hope we shall be able to curtail the tendencies which have grown in recent years for the Assembly to interfere more and more in what might be called in plain terms, other people’s business. 27. For my part, I do not come to the Assembly to inject Australia into what may reasonably be held to be essentially domestic and regional interests of countries sometimes half the world away from us. I think we would get on with our work far better if countries concerned themselves less here with matters of which they have no first-hand knowledge and in which, frequently, they have no direct and immediate interest. 28. I believe it would be a very good thing if there were more decentralization and specialization in the work of the General Assembly, particularly in the political field. To do this effectively would probably involve the elaboration of new techniques, such as, for example, the establishment of sub-committees comprising specially interested Member States to report to main committees on particular problems. 29. I think there is a great deal to be said for having those primarily acquainted with a problem and primarily concerned with its solution sitting down together to discuss it; at least in such circumstances one might have a chance of a solution which dealt with the real facts of a situation as they impinged upon the countries principally interested. 30. What I say is particularly relevant, of course, to the new type of item which seems to be becoming more popular in the General Assembly — problems, one might call them, of acquisitiveness in which one Member State says in effect to the Assembly, “I want a piece of territory which at present is attached to another Member State, I want to ask the Assembly’s moral support in furthering my claim.” 31. The present philosophy in the Genera! Assembly is based on the assumption that if enough people get round a table and talk about a particular problem — even though they may know little about it and are almost wholly unaffected by it — a solution will be forthcoming. We are all in favour of having full, free and frank discussion of problems which are legitimately brought before the United Nations, but the trouble is that, in the circumstances of the General Assembly, one does not get full, free and frank discussion. As I see it there are three pre-conditions for any chance of success of a conference to solve international problems. First, there must be understanding of the problem; second, there must be good faith; and, third, there must not be irreconcilable national interests. 32. Very often in the General Assembly there are national interests which are completely irreconcilable. This is particularly the case when territorial claims are made, no matter how specious the guise under which these claims are presented — the most popular here being the magic words “self-determination” and “anti-colonialism”. But take off the wraps, take off the disguises, and you will often find a barefaced national interest. It is surprising that in cases where anti-colonialism is invoked to justify claims, too little account is taken in most cases of the provisions of the Charter which safeguard the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. 33. The provisions of the Charter on colonial matters were drawn up primarily to safeguard the interests of dependent peoples against abuse by the sovereign Power concerned. There is also the important point that peoples which are for the time being dependent should be protected from becoming pawns in international conflicts for control over the colonial territories themselves. The Assembly should encourage the emergence of all lands and peoples to or towards self-government or independence and thus bring colonial rule — even in its modern and enlightened form — in due course to an end. But it would be disastrous to our purposes if, in the name of ending colonialism, we encouraged the development of new colonial aspirations and withdrew from the dependent peoples the Charter safeguards assuring them a free life in the years to come. In short, the Charter was designed to bring colonialism to an end by fair and orderly means and bearing the interests of the dependent peoples in mind. The Charter provisions should have ended all new claims to colonial territories by other sovereign Powers. 34. The past year has brought many changes in the over-all international situation. A year ago, at the General Assembly, I ventured to speak about peaceful coexistence and the conditions under which it might be possible. Since then such evidence as has been forthcoming from Communist sources leads one to believe that peaceful coexistence will come about and continue only so long as it is regarded as in Communist interests! for it to do so. In other words, peaceful coexistence, even in such limited areas as it may be found to operate, is a temporary tactic — which does not engender any confidence in the hearts of democratic countries. It is surely bitter and bloody irony and hypocrisy to find Soviet leaders writing this very month to the Prime Minister of India to reaffirm the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” while at the same time they were ordering Soviet forces to wipe out bloodily the political freedom of the Hungarian people. 35. A situation now exists in this Organization which must be regarded, in the perspective of history, as one of the most incredible examples of international delusion of all times. The one great Power which since the last war has denied freedom of political choice to a great many millions of people is permitted to pose here, in this Organization, as the champion and protector of those who, during those same years, have been honestly given national independence, real sovereignty, genuine political freedom and generous economic assistance. The attitude and actions of Soviet Russia are the very antithesis of all that the United Nations stands for. 36. As we look out upon the world, we in Australia are impressed by the fact that there are still great mental barriers between the peoples which were until recently under colonial administration and the countries that previously ruled them. This is understandable. I certainly do not attempt to defend all that was done by colonial rulers in other parts of the world in the past. Whatever may have been, on net balance, of advantage or disadvantage, of good or of bad within countries under colonial rule in the past, it is understandable that the memories of foreign rule should not be expected to disappear quickly. In particular, the failure to achieve good human relations in former days has now to be paid for. We are all suffering from the whip-back of past resentments. 37. For our part we in Australia sincerely offer our friendship to all peoples on a basis of complete and frank equality. We are determined to continue to work with our friends, in Asia and elsewhere, for the strengthening of mutual security, and for the improvement of understanding and of social and economic conditions. 38. I have a fear, however, that resentment against alleged exploitation by colonial Powers in the past is still colouring the minds of even young people with but little personal memory of colonial days. I would appeal to our friends in Asia and in other under-developed areas to accept our friendship in the spirit in which we offer it. I would ask our friends if they are helping the cause of peace and stability by maintaining resentment and adopting a posture of suspicion. We all want the good life; we all want to survive and build up what is good in our own countries. Yet none of us can ensure this by the strength of our own right arm alone. Let us expand the area of friendship and mutual confidence, and not diminish it. 39. Another point occurs to me in this regard, and that is the peculiar fact that the concept of colonialism is usually only applied to rule from overseas and not to cases where two territories have a common land frontier. This narrow concept of colonialism as being something that comes only from overseas would, of course, rule out Russian and Chinese colonialism. I believe one has only to point out this anomaly for it. to be appreciated. 40. This difference in man’s attitude of mind to what may be called “overseas” and “overland” colonialism no doubt springs from the fact that in the past almost all the ex-colonial countries in the United Nations have experienced foreign rule from overseas. Perhaps it is worth remembering, however, that throughout history colonial expansion overland has been just as frequent and more permanent than sea-borne colonialism, and that overland colonialism has vastly increased in the last generation at precisely the time that colonialism from overseas has vastly decreased. 41. I have enough imagination, I think, to understand an emotional feeling which associates colonialism exclusively with rule from overseas, but this does not provide a rational basis for consideration of this general subject of colonialism. What remains of sea-borne colonialism today is subject to the benevolent and ever-vigilant eye of the United Nations — whereas the vast area of land- borne colonialism of the Soviet Union and the tens of millions of human beings who are subject to it are totally and wholly removed from the protection of the United Nations and indeed made a mockery and a sham of our benevolent efforts. One need only mention, of course, the name of Hungary in this regard. 42. I have devoted some little time to matters that I like to believe are of some importance. We shall explain our point of view on the large agenda of items before this session as the work of the Assembly develops. I would not wish it to be thought that, because I have not dealt with a particular subject this evening, Australia does not attach importance to it. The Australian delegation will make every effort to contribute constructively to this Assembly’s work. 43. There are, however, a few things which I should like to mention very briefly — almost in telegraphic form — in order to save the time of the Assembly. Australia welcomes the great advance made towards universality of membership of the United Nations. We look forward confidently to the admission of Japan to the United Nations during the present session of the Assembly. 44. Australia takes most seriously its present responsibilities as a member of the Security Council and the Disarmament Commission. Australia pledges its best efforts to assist in finding a safe way to control modern weapons, with their fearful destructive power. 45. Australia heartily welcomes the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and will contribute as actively as possible to its success. 46. Australia supports an expansion of the Security Council by two non-permanent seats, and will deal with proposals for the expansion of other United Nations organs on their merits. 47. Australia has pledged itself to develop the people of New Guinea to the stage of running their own affairs, and we shall carry out our tasks with vigour and in good faith. Meanwhile, we are strongly opposed to any doctrinaire application of the concept of “attainment targets”, as they have been called, for various stages of development — particularly when this concept is applied to stages in political development. Drawing up time-tables is particularly unreal in a primitive and fragmented society such as New Guinea, where social and psychological factors make any such approach to development unwise and, indeed, dangerous — if not impossible. 48. Australia is confident that the International Finance Corporation will conduct its business with the same efficiency as its related agency, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The new Corporation has the full support of Australia, which earlier this year announced the Australian contribution to the Corporation — nearly two and one quarter million dollars. 49. Australia appreciates the great work of the International Law Commission in the study of the law of the sea, and supports the Commission’s proposal for an international conference with a view to the preparation of suitable conventions or other instruments on the subject. 50. Australia will continue its Contributions to voluntary programmes. I am glad now to make known the Australian contributions to other voluntary programmes of the United Nations: to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, for the year ending 30 June 1957: $436,800; to the United Nations Children’s Fund for the calendar year 1956: $448,000; to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the year ending 30 June 1957: $112,000; to the United Nations Refugee Fund, for the calendar year 1956: $112,000. 51. These contributions are in addition to Australia’s part in the Colombo Plan, which, during the current year, will amount to the equivalent of well over ten million dollars. Thus, the, total Australian contribution to international projects of economic aid, technical assistance and humanitarian relief will amount, during the financial year 1956-57, to about twelve million dollars in addition to our contribution to the International Finance Corporation. 52. Australia has also given the equivalent of $67,000 to the relief of the people of Hungary and has announced its readiness to receive 3,000 refugees from Hungary. Actually, the first group of seventy is to leave Vienna by air for Australia in the very near future. These contributions are an earnest of our firm and continuing belief in the value of these voluntary programmes of international aid. 53. We stand at a time of crisis in the development of the United Nations — and I use the word “crisis” advisedly. There are those who have great confidence in the United Nations, and there are those who have no confidence at all in its ability to cope with the great task of bringing stability to the world. On the one hand, this World organization offers what should be magnificent opportunities for co-operative action in the maintenance of international stability and in the solution of international economic and social problems. It can open the way to great advances in the living conditions of countries that are still economically weak, through the generous assistance of more fortunately placed countries. On the other hand, the United Nations could easily be reduced to a mere forum for futile bickering — and for the attempted forwarding of national interests at the expense of the confident international stability on which the security of the world depends. If we want this United Nations to survive, let us be on our guard against those who, for whatever purposes, would sow distrust or dissension or half-truths.