61. At this stage of the debate, I shall confine my remarks to two major issues.
62. The first concerns the tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. The second is of a more general character. It deals with some essential elements in the work of the United Nations and concerns our long-term efforts to create a lasting basis for universal, peaceful coexistence.
63. Several previous speakers have given an evaluation of the developments in Viet-Nam, Some have also passed judgement on the policies pursued by several of the parties involved. I shall not myself engage in a similar judgement on the past. What Is now of paramount importance is to turn our attention to the future prospects and the future possibilities of finding a solution to the conflict.
64. The general debate has revealed a consensus that a military solution is not possible, and that, in any case, such a solution could never he satisfactory and lasting. What then are the chances of reaching a negotiated solution? And a still more pressing question is, how can a way be found to start such negotiations?
65. Even those countries which, like my own, have remained outside this conflict are keenly interested in finding a clear answer to the following two questions: first, which are the requirements of the respective parties for agreeing to meet at the conference table? Secondly, what long-term aims have the various parties to the conflict set forth as their final objectives?
66. It seems to me that, Mr, Goldberg, in his statement [1412th meeting], contributed to a certain clarification of the United States position with regard to these two questions. I have the impression that some of the subsequent speakers have tended to regard his presentation as a sort of verbal camouflage for the real intentions of the United States. I do not find it justified to reject in this way a further discussion of the basis for a solution which has been presented by the United States. The United States representative has actually invited the Members of this Assembly to comment upon his statement, to express criticism, and in general to present their own points of view. Why should we not accept that invitation? Why not subject the United States conditions and objectives to a careful analysis and to searching criticism?
67. With respect to the conditions for initiating negotiations, it seems to me that the position of the United States is the following.
68. The United States has declared its readiness to come to the conference table without stipulating any preconditions as to the course of the negotiations and their final outcome. As to the status of the National Liberation Front in these negotiations, Mr. Goldberg used expressions which seem to imply a readiness to accept the participation of its representatives and their right to express their points of view.
69. Mr. Goldberg also dealt with the key question of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. He stated that an end to the bombing would be tied to an assurance of a corresponding de-escalation by the other side.
70. But statements by official United States representatives, including Mr. Goldberg, indicate a certain flexibility in the United States position. Mr. Goldberg's statement left me with the impression that a cessation of the bombing might be effected if and when there are any indications of a possible approach from the other side. If this impression is correct, we might be right in assuming that the United States position is now approaching the opinion expressed on various occasions by our respected Secretary-General in the form of a three-point programme. This raises the important question of whether these two positions are still so far apart that they cannot be bridged.
71. The clarification given by Mr, Goldberg of the long-term United States objectives in Viet-Nam also deserves careful study, and I think a searching analysis. Without going into detail, there is reason to emphasize the declaration by the United States that it seeks no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances and no permanent United States presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam. This formulation of the main objectives is by necessity of a rather general character. This should not, however, discourage anyone, I think, from entering into negotiations.
72. I now turn to the position of North Viet-Nam and the National Liberation Front on the same two questions, and particularly the question of their conditions for opening negotiations. We fully understand the difficulties inherent in obtaining precise clarifications from Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. There are, however, in this Assembly many Members who are in a position to assist in the communication of viewpoints between the parties. These Members have, I think, the particularly important task now of assisting in seeking further clarification of the position of North Viet-Nam and the National Liberation Front.
73. Leaving the subject of this tragic conflict, I shall now turn to some of the long-term tasks of the United Nations, the tasks aiming at the creation of a lasting basis for peaceful co-existence. These objectives can be reached only by seeking patiently to remove potential controversies which might provoke future crises.
74. First and foremost, we should try to obtain an increasing control over, and a reduction of, armaments. Secondly, we should furnish the United Nations with adequate means under the Charter to play an active role in alleviating friction between States and thereby neutralizing latent conflicts.
75. As regards arms control, it is the conviction of my Government that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be given top priority. In their statements the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union [1413th meeting] and of Czechoslovakia [1416th meeting] touched upon the particular problems which arise within alliances when some of the members possess nuclear weapons while others do not. They addressed themselves particularly to one of the defence alliances. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should also apply to existing and future alliances. Members of a defence alliance must, of course, consult each other regarding basic principles, including strategic questions. However, such consultations can take place without any transfer of the control of nuclear weapons within the alliance. I agree with the Foreign Minister of Canada when he states [1413th meeting] that on the central issue of the definition of proliferation, the formula must prevent nuclear weapons from passing into the control of additional States or groups of countries, and that this should be combined with legitimate measures of collective defense.
76. In accordance with the basic views I have outlined above, the Norwegian delegation has co-sponsored the draft resolution presented by the Soviet Union, requesting States to refrain from actions which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and asking them to take all necessary steps for the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [see A/6398], This draft resolution has also been sponsored by the United States of America.
77. I will not attempt a detailed analysis of the various efforts to arrive at effective methods of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. To reach concurrent agreements on non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban would, of course, be the ideal solution. This would satisfy the nuclear Powers as well as States which are at the threshold of mastering the technology for producing nuclear weapons, and those States which are far from that stage. I fear, however, that it will not now be possible to combine these two basic elements of arms control in one single stage, and that the most realistic procedure is to accept partial solutions.
78. During the tenth session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held at Vienna from 21 to 28 September 1966, the Norwegian Government raised a question of a more limited character. The idea was that States which do not possess atomic weapons might voluntarily place all their peaceful nuclear activities under the safeguards system of the Agency. This would obviously be a very limited measure which should in no way be seen as competing with more comprehensive solutions. Such a step might, however, lead to more comprehensive arrangements. We are considering ways of following up the idea presented at Vienna. The Norwegian Government would be ready to place its own nuclear activities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
79. In concluding this part of my statement, I would like to emphasize my Government's warm support for the idea presented by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization [A/630l/Add.1] that the time has come for an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons.
80. Parallel with, and as a supplement to, its efforts towards disarmament, the United Nations should utilize all adequate means under the Charter to prevent international friction and to settle disputes which might otherwise lead to a breach of the peace. In this field of peace-keeping operations the United Nations has proved itself useful and viable.
81. In our view, the peace-keeping functions of the Organization should be further improved in accordance with the proposal advanced by the Secretary-General in 1964. This proposal aims at a study of the various preparatory measures of national and international character that are desirable if the United Nations is to act swiftly and effectively to preserve peace. We are aware that serious misgivings have been voiced with regard to this aspect of the Organization's activity. With due respect to this view, we nevertheless have some difficulty in understanding these apprehensions. There is every reason to believe that we shall also in the future have to rely on the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations. We should not continue to rely on improvisations in this field. We can only regret that the efforts to improve the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations have, for political reasons, come to a standstill. We do hope, however, that it will be possible to overcome the obstacles and reach a satisfactory solution, I associate myself in this respect with the points of view expressed so clearly and comprehensively by the Canadian Foreign Minister [1413th meeting].
82. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the Norwegian Government's attitude towards the United Nations and how we view the future of the Organization. Ever since the Organization was founded, the United Nations has been one of the cornerstones in our foreign policy. We feel convinced that the United Nations, in spite of its weaknesses, has a great potential for influencing future international developments and promoting world peace.
83. Our serious concern about the future of the United Nations has motivated the Norwegian Government's urgent requests to the Secretary-General to continue in his office, I repeat this appeal, combining it, however, with another appeal addressed to the members of this Assembly. It is up to each and every one of us to give the Secretary-General the necessary tools to enable him to fulfil the mandate conferred upon him. It is up to us, through our policies, to assist him in reaching the high objectives which he has set forth for our Organization, The Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will do their utmost to this end. We are fully aware that our effort can only be a very modest one. But there are other Members here in a position to play a more important role in this respect.