42. Mr. President, I have already had occasion to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your election to the presidency. Allow me to add that the high personal qualities you have brought to bear on the deliberations of the General Assembly during the past weeks have justified the confidence that has been placed in you as President.
43. The General Assembly has once again been convened in an atmosphere of crisis and tension. Around the world there are areas where the scourge of war has brought untold sorrow to millions of people, areas where racist policies have engendered situations fraught with peril, and areas where national animosities could at any moment burst into open flames. Thus, all the world wants peace and yet there has been no peace in the hearts of men.
44. These grim facts are not, however, unrelieved by developments which should be greeted by the international community with hope and satisfaction.
45. It is gratifying, for example, to note that the relations between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia have at last taken a turn for the better. The campaign to “crush” Malaysia, inspired and abetted by the Communists, has now been called off. With the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party, the present leadership of Indonesia has successfully resolved its differences with its neighbours. This will bring benefit not only to Indonesia and her close neighbours but also to the entire South-East Asian region.
46. The cease-fire between India and Pakistan has been maintained. The general situation in Cyprus remains relatively quiet. It is our fervent hope that the parties concerned will soon find it possible to resolve the basic issues which have so long beclouded their relations.
47. In the Western Hemisphere, peace has happily come to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican people now seem assured of a period of peaceful development.
48. In spite of these welcome developments however, the over-all world situation does not encourage optimism. The war in Viet-Nam has shown no signs of abating. It is all too clear that the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam are determined to subjugate the Republic of Viet-Nam at all costs.
49. What is happening in Viet-Nam is not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent. It is a war of aggression conducted from across the northern border of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Viet-Cong guerrillas are the creatures of Hanoi. They are trained, armed, supplied and directed by the Communist North with the support of Peiping. Their mission is to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam’s will to resist, to erode its faith in the future, to paralyse its social, economic and political progress. Their favourite targets for murder and destruction include teachers, medical officers, village officials and local community leaders. In the countryside and in small provincial towns the number of innocent people murdered now runs into tens of thousands — and this is called a “war of national liberation”!
50. Yet the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam have not been intimidated into submission. Even in the midst of war, they have never ceased to make progress in the social, economic and political realms. In September this year elections were held for a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution. It is a representative assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage. Its members have come from all walks of life and every geographical area. This is no small achievement in a war-tom country and should give food for thought to those who are ready to believe the worst of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
51. The Republic of Viet-Nam is a small and militarily weak country. Faced with a situation with which it could not adequately cope, its Government was forced to call upon the United States of America to come to its assistance. The United States answered that call, recognizing and accepting the great responsibilities devolving upon it as the leader of the free world. We believe the purpose of the United States and its allies in Viet-Nam is to halt Communist aggression and to enable the people of South Viet-Nam to choose their own path into the future in peace and without outside interference. Communist subversion and aggression must be halted in Viet-Nam, just as it was halted in Greece and Turkey, Korea and the Caribbean.
52. My delegation sincerely hopes that the day will soon come when the brave people of the Republic of Viet-Nam, who have suffered so much and so long from external aggression, will once again be able to live in peace among themselves as well as with their neighbours. We are appreciative of the initiatives taken by various Governments and individual statesmen in an effort to bring the Viet-Nam issue from the battlefield to the conference table. But it seems to us that before any meaningful negotiations can be undertaken there must be a clear understanding of the ends to be achieved. Certainly the freedom and independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be bargained away in the name of peace. Certainly negotiation cannot mean any abandonment of resistance to communist aggression, thus leaving the Republic of Viet-Nam to the tender mercies of Ho Chi Minh. Certainly negotiation cannot be just another name for defeat for all the peoples of South-East Asia who refuse to submit to an unwanted fate.
53. Unfortunately, that is precisely what some influential people have been advocating. These people seem to believe that the conflict in Viet-Nam is just a United States war. They seem to think that peace will come to Viet-Nam once United States forces are withdrawn. That, if I may say so, is unadulterated appeasement. If the history of the Second World War teaches any lesson, it is that appeasement does not advance the cause of peace; it will only whet the appetite of the aggressor and encourage him to commit more and more aggressions until a time when there is no tolerable alternative to war.
54. The whole of South-East Asia needs peace. But it must be a genuine peace, a peace based on law and justice and not one that will deliver millions of free men to communist enslavement.
55. But Hanoi and Peiping want no lasting peace. Conflict to the bitter end is the stuff from which they draw their very sustenance. They are out, in the Republic of Viet-Nam, to win victory for communism. To achieve that victory they will stop at nothing. They do not believe that the United States, for all its military might, has the patience and perseverance to fight a protracted war. They are convinced that sooner or later the United States will be forced by pressures at home and abroad to withdraw. It is for that reason that they have rejected all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam war.
56. It is for this reason that they have spurned the offers of peace articulated by the representative of the United States in his speech before this Assembly [1412th meeting]. They have nothing but contempt for the suggestion that both sides take steps to de-escalate the war. Tire People’s Daily of Peiping, in an editorial dated 24 September 1966, declared:
“... The core of the present Viet-Nam question is by no means a question of ‘de-escalating’ the war, but a question for the United States aggressors to pack themselves off immediately from Viet-Nam, lock, stock and barrel.”
57. It is thus crystal clear that Peiping and Hanoi want no political solution of the Viet-Nam question and that the only language they understand is the language of force and violence. Peace, therefore, will not come to Viet-Nam until the communist aggressors are convinced that they cannot win by force and violence and that aggression does not pay. At present, they are not so convinced. On the contrary, they believe that they are already halfway to victory. All proposals for peace are in their view a “hoax” and a “bait” designed to induce the Viet-Namese to lay down their arms and abandon their struggle for “national liberation”.
58. So much for Viet-Nam. Let me now turn to the general problem of building peace.
59. The agenda of peace covers a multitude of items. It is not enough to prohibit the threat or use of force. It is not enough merely to resist aggression. As long as the conditions unfavourable for the building of peace exist, peace will remain precarious. Questions such as disarmament, colonialism, economic development and the protection of human rights are all intimately connected with the problem of peace. The views of the Chinese delegation on these subjects will be expressed when the appropriate items are reached. I content myself here with a cursory review of the broad principles which have guided my delegation in regard to them.
60. My Government is conscious of the dangers inherent in the arms race. We are particularly concerned about the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We regret that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to come to any agreement on this vital question. The Geneva discussions seem to have achieved some progress in this field, but the conditions for a speedy agreement are still lacking.
61. In this connexion, my Government strongly condemns the utter irresponsibility of the communist regime in Peiping which, in defiance of world opinion and contrary to the true interests of the Chinese people, has ventured into the nuclear field. We have more than once warned that, in the hands of such an aggressive regime, nuclear weapons become an instrument of political and psychological blackmail.
62. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly I had the occasion to state the following:
“Whether the Chinese Communist regime can succeed in its... blackmail against the small and weak nations depends to a large extent on the effectiveness of the United States nuclear umbrella over them. Indeed, the future security of the non-communist countries of Asia will test not only the courage and fortitude of their peoples to defend their . . . independence and freedom, but also the will and resolution of the United States, as the leading nation of the free world, to carry out its defence commitments.... Were the United States to withdraw from Asia, all the non-communist countries on that vast continent would feel the impact. The non-aligned or non-committed countries are no exception. For, after all, Asian neutralism is possible only as long as the United States and its allies are committed to Asia’s defence.” [1354th meeting, para. 112.]
63. I believe that this is even more true today than ever before. The Chinese Communist regime is opposed to any plan designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has attacked the “revisionist leading group of the Soviet Union” which, “.., in collusion with United States imperialism, is actively engineering a treaty on the prevention of nuclear
proliferation so as to maintain their nuclear monopoly, intimidate the oppressed nations and peoples and realize its dream of world domination through Soviet-United States collaboration”.
This quotation is from Chou En-lai’s statement on Peiping’s third nuclear test, 10 May 1966. It is thus sheer fantasy to expect this regime to contribute constructively to the problem of disarmament.
64. It is not a safe world when two-thirds of its inhabitants are destitute, undernourished, sickly and ignorant. Men now know that suffering and privation need not be their fate, and they can no longer be expected to endure them with resignation.
65. It is universally recognized that the principal responsibility for promoting the economic development of a country lies with the country itself. International aid and co-operation are no substitutes for national action. Nevertheless, the developing countries cannot be expected to achieve rapid economic growth without outside assistance. Nor can the developed countries ignore the needs of two-thirds of the world’s population. Economic development is thus a joint enterprise, an enterprise in which every nation, regardless of the stage of its development, is a partner.
66. The record of the United Nations in the economic field has been quite impressive. The specific measures taken by the United Nations are in the field of technical co-operation, financial aid, trade policies and a host of other activities. But the magnitude of the task calls for more resources than the United Nations can supply. In the course of 1966, however, as the Secretary-General has pointed out in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,
“... international aid is stagnating while the capacity of developed countries to provide such aid, measured in terms of an increase in their per capita incomes, has become greater.” [A/6301/Add.l, p. 6.]
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that in order to enable the developing countries to accelerate their rate of economic growth, the volume of external resources must be expanded and made available to them. Failure to ensure this may spell an actual decline in the standards of living of the bulk of humanity, with all the political consequences that decline may imply.
67. The Republic of China is a developing country, with a notably high rate of economic growth. In the province of Taiwan, agricultural as well as industrial production has increased many-fold in the past fifteen years.
68. We have, of course, still a long way to go. Like all developing countries, the Republic of China welcomes capital and technology from the industrially advanced countries. We seek private investment rather than external aid, not merely for the inflow of capital but also for the technology and technical skills which such investment inevitably brings.
69. We of the Republic of China have, in a modest way, been sharing our developing experiences, particularly in the agricultural field, with other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Our participation in the recently established Asian Development Bank bespeaks our interest in and devotion to the cause of international co-operation.
70. In the same spirit, the Republic of China has joined with nine other Asian and Pacific countries in the formation of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) at the historic meeting [14-16 June 1966] in the capital of the Republic of Korea for the purpose of promoting greater co-operation and solidarity among the free nations of the region and to safeguard their national independence and integrity against external aggression, as well as to develop their national economies. In the relatively short time since its establishment, ASPAC, as the Foreign Minister of Thailand has pointed out [1418th meeting], has already shown much promise.
71. The economic progress achieved in the province of Taiwan offers a glaring contrast to the deterioration of economic conditions in the mainland provinces now under communist occupation. The critical dislocation brought about by the disastrous “Big Leap Forward” launched in 1958 is still very much in evidence. The subsequent shift of emphasis from industry to agriculture has not helped to increase grain production. Competent students of Chinese communist affairs are agreed that grain production in 1965 was not substantially different from that of 1957. Meanwhile, there has been an estimated 15 per cent increase in population. Even with the vast quantities of wheat purchased from abroad, the Chinese masses on the mainland continue to suffer hunger and malnutrition, notwithstanding propagandist reports to the contrary.
72. No, communism is no short cut to economic development; it is a drag on it. As for Chinese communism, it is synonymous with stagnation and want.
73. But Mao Tse-tung and his gang are not in the habit of admitting defeat. They continue to brag about their victories on the economic front. Already there is talk about launching another “Big Leap Forward”. If so, they are in fact hastening their own downfall. Let no one presume too far on the patience of the Chinese people. The day may not be too distant when a convulsive burst of mass fury will sweep the communist tyrants out of existence.
74. Mac Tse-tung knows that his regime is hated by the people. Guilt-ridden by awareness of his crimes, he labours under special fears. He trusts no man except a few of his closest associates. Himself a master of intrigue and duplicity, he cannot for a moment escape the dread that there are always people who are plotting against him. Better than anyone else, he knows that even a relatively small body of “internal energies given propitious conditions, can overturn a seemingly impregnable system. It is in this light that the so-called “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”, which has created such an upheaval on the mainland of China in recent months, must be viewed.
75. This so-called “revolution” has been described by the official Communist Press as an “unprecedented life-and-death struggle” against the “anti-Party” and “anti-Socialist” elements within the Communist Party itself. The very fact that he cannot even trust members of his own Party shows that he is haunted by an acute sense of insecurity.
76. Fancying himself an intellectual of sorts, Mao Tse-tung is conscious of the influence wielded by the intellectuals in
Chinese society. “Without the participation of the intellectuals”, he wrote in 1939, “victory in the revolution is impossible”. It is thus not without reason that in the current purges the axe fell first of all on scholars, writers, cultural workers and Party propagandists, many of whom have served with him ever since the beginning of the communist movement. They are now hunted down as “monsters” and “demons” who are plotting “for the restoration of capitalism” and poisoning the minds of the masses.
77. The official Communist Press refers to the “anti- Party” and “anti-Socialist” elements as a “handful of individuals”. Yet the purge has been going on since April and the end is nowhere in sight. Even some of the most highly placed men in the regime-members of the Central Committee of the Party, ministers and generals-have come under suspicion. Without any formal announcement, many of them have mysteriously disappeared from the scene. The Party’s ideological journal, the Red Flag, asserted only a few days ago, on 3 October 1966, that there are still people within the Party who are conspiring to “usurp the leadership of the Party, the army and the Government”. There must be something basically wrong with a regime which is loaded with such a sense of doom.
78. Nothing is more revealing than Mao’s use of innocent young people as the main force of his campaign against the unreliable elements both inside and outside the Party. These so-called “Red Guards” have been rampaging through city streets and the countryside to create a reign of terror under the direction of Mao’s most trusted lieutenants, they are out to snuff out sedition, plots and treasonable activities to eradicate vestiges of “old culture, old thinking, old customs and old habits”. They ransack homes and interfere with the daily life of the people. They desecrate places of religious worship and subject the populace to extreme humiliation and often physical ill-treatment. They are against everything that smacks of the “feudal past” or bourgeois and foreign influence.
79. It is significant that the Red Guards are not part of the Youth Corps, the official Communist youth organization. That Mao has to rely on youths outside the ranks of the regular Youth Corps to do the dirty work for him is in itself symptomatic of a deeply-seated disease which has afflicted his regime. The violence of the Red Guards has aroused widespread opposition. Clashes between the Red Guards and the people have erupted in at least thirteen provinces, as well as in such major cities as Canton, Shanghai and Peiping.
80. Out of the turmoil and lawlessness has emerged the power of Lin Piao, whose pronouncements on the “people’s war” have already shocked the world. This, as the London Economist has rightly observed, is “bad news” for the rest of the globe. This heir apparent of Mao Tse-tung, this apostle of violence, this high priest of guerrilla warfare, can be depended upon, to use his own expression, to “push history forward” by force.
81. There are those who are inclined to discount the danger posed by the “people’s war”. The very stress on guerrilla warfare, they contend, means that the Chinese Communists do not intend to conquer the world through direct military action; on the contrary, they rely on the
indigenous Communists and their allies to do the job for them. But the encouragement, training, financing and equipping of guerrillas can be more of a menace to the independence and freedom of the small and weak nations than even open and undisguised aggression. The fact that Peiping has failed more often than it has succeeded is no cause for complacency. The war in Viet-Nam, to which I have already referred, is a case in point. In the eyes of the Chinese Communists, the war in Viet-Nam is a test case for the “people’s war”. If it can succeed in Viet-Nam, it can also succeed in other countries. Indeed, this is what the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had in mind when it said in a recent communique that “the people of other parts of the world will see that what the Viet-Namese people can do they can do, too”.
82. This is no empty rhetoric. To quote the Economist again: “Until and unless there is solid evidence” to the contrary, “the only safe assumption ... to make is that the Chinese Communists mean every word they say”.
83. Now, the United Nations was created to maintain international peace and security in conformity with law and justice, as well as to promote social progress and better- standards of life in larger freedom. The Communists of my country represent a negation of all the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Yet there are delegations in the Assembly who are bent on bringing them into the organization. If they are allowed to have their way, the future of the United Nations will be placed in jeopardy. Unless the majority of the Assembly recognize and accept the reality of the danger, the United Nations as we know it today cannot long endure.