1. Mr. President, your name has been closely linked to many of our Organization's activities and we know how hard you have worked to enable the General Assembly to resume its normal operations and to help the United Nations to overcome the constitutional and financial crisis which threatened its existence in 1964. In recalling your important contribution to the life of this Organization, to which we are all so steadfastly devoted, I should like to pay a sincere and deserved tribute to you as you take over the heavy burden of the distinguished statesman, my colleague and friend, Mr. Fanfani, who guided the debates of the twentieth General Assembly with so much dignity and tact. Mr. President, I wish you every success in this important task.
2. To you, Mr. Secretary-General, I wish to express Belgium's appreciation for all that you have accomplished and also our hope of overcoming, if possible, your reluctance to remain in office. I know that your conscience rather than our appeals will dictate the final reasons for your decision. This morning I hope to help substantially to convince you of the strength of your influence by taking up several specific points in your report [A/6301 and Add.1], to support your suggestion for a study of all the consequences stemming from the invention of nuclear weapons, and to follow you in your search for a peace strategy. Throughout the world, in hundreds of military academies, military thinkers devise war strategy to guide the generals on the battlefield. When shall we, for our part, be able to build — here or elsewhere, but on our initiative — a peace strategy which will show us how to prevent conflicts from arising, how to stop them in time, and how to bring about and guarantee a truce?
3. I should also like to follow your report and examine with you the means to rally to our side those who have not yet joined us, in such a way that they wish to do so, so that they will deserve our general confidence and so that we shall then be generous enough to grant it.
4. I should like finally to follow you in stressing at this point the importance we attach to your views on co-operation and development. We believe in the role of the United Nations in these areas, wh ch are true actions for world peace. In this central task, the Organization should be guided above all by criteria of effectiveness and while this requires steadfastness in the pursuit of our goal we must be very flexible in the means we use to achieve that goal, Geography and history have created circumstances in the world which are too diverse for us to base our action on excessively rigid rules. Several representatives who preceded me at this rostrum have expressed, for example, the hope they place in various forms of regional co-operation. My country, which immediately after the war played a pioneering role in this area through the union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, can only share these hopes and encourage these initiatives.
5. We feel that the United Nations should extend moral support and material aid to regional groups of developing countries and that it should use them as a channel for its activities. We also feel that the Organization should use, as a channel for its activities, all generous offers of co-operation — public or private — from various countries. Our experience has taught us that the most fruitful and successful development efforts are those supported in a country or group of countries by institutions which are already strong and which carry on beyond their own borders the work they have been able to accomplish.
6. Finally — and this task can be achieved only at the international level — we must ensure the coordination and correct evaluation of the total aid which so many countries need, so that we can ensure that it will be shared out as fairly as possible.
7. Europe thus attaches particular importance to the future work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and we are planning our role in the second Conference with great care which, we hope, will enable definite results to be achieved. The influence which this Conference could have on the development of international trade would thus support and complement the direct effect of technical assistance and financial aid in the developing countries. All these activities are valuable and are not mutually exclusive; they are complementary and should be encouraged simultaneously.
8. In a few moments I shall speak of European problems. But I should first like to emphasize our firm conviction that Europe's obligations are not limited by its geographic boundaries. The idea of a group of relatively wealthy countries living in isolation is repugnant to us. Belgium has given proof of that fact by its assistance and co-operation which, relatively speaking, are equaled by few other countries. For historical reasons, a substantial part of this effort is concentrated in the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. We have maintained this effort even in the face of difficulties; yet we are not indifferent to the economic and social problems of other countries, whether Asian or African States or those Latin American countries to which Europeans feel particularly close through history and the common sources of their culture. We firmly intend, within the limit of our means and with respect for our commitments, to extend our cooperation to an every-increasing number of countries. The Belgian delegation will take up these points in the various committees; I merely wished to stress how important they are to us.
9. During the general debate my country will develop two themes which we consider to be central; I shall speak in turn of Europe, where a detente and cooperation are becoming possible, and of Asia, which causes us such deep concern. This may not be a novel choice but do not present circumstances dictate it and should we not state publicly our positions on such grave matters?
10. It is well to note that Europe, once the source of so much anguish in this century, is not now experiencing any serious conflict. On the contrary, it seems that circumstances are encouraging us to move prudently but firmly towards improving relations between European countries under different regimes and, even better, towards intensifying and increasing all kinds of exchanges between them. This will foster a favourable climate for the solution of the important problems still facing our continent, and I am referring particularly to Germany.
11. What favourable circumstances enable us to look forward with definite optimism to the development of European relations? First, there is the desire and the need for peace which all Europeans share, together with their common anxiety in the face of the deteriorating world situation and the enormous and terrifying means of destruction which States possess. Next, we see a source of progress in this part of the world in the consolidation of certain regional groups. This is putting an end to the fragmentation of nationalist policies which are often selfish and sterile. We also see progress in the relaxation of ideological confrontations brought about by a kind of civil oecumenism known as "peaceful coexistence". Finally, there is progress in the relative balance between the defensive systems of the two European groups of people. In this respect, it must be recognized that, since defensive weapons will be required at least until international security has been established, it is better for this defence to be organized within the framework of large groups in which big, medium-sized and small nations combine their efforts and, above all, restrain one another. Otherwise, the defence of the less powerful nations would become illusory. Until collective Atlantic security was established, we were afraid and we explained why. We now believe that this establishment has helped to create and foster the idea of mutual respect in both camps.
12. For all the reasons I have just mentioned, Europe, which is more peaceful than it has ever been during this century, can and must now set the example for peaceful co-existence, for a detente, and for increased co-operation among its peoples and the outside world. Indeed, we do not envisage this more united Europe as isolated or self-centered but on the contrary as all the more prepared to co-operate with the rest of the world and to play a role in its development because it has overcome its own divisions. Thus, without delay and in order to set an example, the two European groups should initiate — if possible, for the whole world, but in any case for Europe and its Governments — a three-pronged drive aimed at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of underground nuclear weapons tests, and the stabilization, followed by the gradual and necessarily parallel reduction of armies and military budgets.
13. Two of these points involve our country. Belgium is ready to sign any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which establishes an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the present nuclear Powers. We appeal to these Powers to speed up the conclusion of such an agreement. Next, in the spirit of the detente, Belgium wishes, in harmony with the efforts of its Atlantic allies, and to the extent that the detente will benefit, to stabilize its armed forces and its military budget. Finally, in a broader context, Belgium is determined at every level to expand the scope of its relation in Europe with peoples under regimes different from its own.
14. We shall do so because we believe that the conditions for peace on a continent are threefold and interdependent. They depend on a military defence system adjusted precisely to needs; on political conditions founded on respect for the United Nations Charter and on acceptance of its golden rule, namely, the rejection of so-called preventive or ideological wars; and finally, on social conditions requiring increased exchanges.
15. Why must we now turn to Asia? Because world peace is an indivisible concept, and that is why our concern goes beyond Europe's geographical limits. It is logical and inevitable for each of us to be concerned with a matter which affects us all, because it involves peace not yet attained in Viet-Nam. Like many representatives who preceded me at this rostrum, I should like briefly to explain our position on this problem. The Viet-Namese war distresses small countries such as ours, although we are far from those fields of suffering and death. We think about that war every day and, like all of you, we passionately seek a way to attain peace.
16. I feel that the most useful contribution countries like mine, which are not directly involved in the conflict, can make to the building of peace, is our objectivity and impartiality. We must not seek to ascribe truth to one side and falsehood to the other, for we refuse to believe that the situation can be reduced to such over-simple terms. How do we view the real situation?
17. On one side, the United States and other countries are providing the Government of South Viet-Nam with the help it has asked of them; it is obvious that those countries cannot allow South Viet-Nam to be crushed. On the other side, North Viet-Nam is helping the National Liberation Front and, because of the way the situation has developed, is worried about losing its independence to its neighbours.
18. In this situation, of which we are all aware, the United States representative has just unequivocally set forth his country's position from this rostrum [1412th meeting]. It seems to us unthinkable — and we, for our part, could not agree — to doubt the sincerity of his views. Did not Mr. Goldberg state that his country was ready to halt the bombings in North Viet-Nam if that gesture were promptly followed by an appropriate and corresponding de-escalation by the other side? Did he not suggest that the gradual and controlled evacuation of all foreign forces from Viet-Nam could be regulated in accordance with a negotiated time-table? Finally, did he not solemnly state that his country was ready to discuss with the other party a settlement based on strict respect for the Geneva Agreements?
19. And for your part, Mr. Secretary-General, you also advocated the cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam, to be followed by a substantial reduction of the military activities of all the parties involved in South Viet-Nam as a prelude to a negotiated settlement with the participation of the National Liberation Front.
20. And from this rostrum, Mr. Gromyko insisted upon the unconditional cessation of bombing, the withdrawal of United States forces and those of its allies, and on the need to ensure that the Viet-Namese people will be able to settle its own problems [see 1413th meeting, para. 120],
21. We have carefully studied these important statements. What can we conclude from them? We certainly must note that while these positions are still far removed from each other, they are not irreconcilable and do not rule out hopes for a negotiated settlement of the conflict; in fact, they seem to point to such a settlement.
22. We are thus now faced with a major choice, more political than military, which President John Kennedy described in the fall of 1963, just a few weeks before his death. In his fragile and ill-fated life, he, more than anyone, embodied the courage so essential to the leaders of great Powers, who bear an extraordinary burden of responsibility. Like you and like us, President Kennedy realized that from the standpoint of international policy we would have to reach this conclusion; we are now very close to that critical moment when we will have to choose once and for all between the risks of a more extensive war and those of a reciprocal de-escalation and a negotiated settlement. Everyone wants to choose de-escalation, but no one wants to take that first decisive step without, at the same time, having a reasonable hope that others will follow suit.
23. It is certainly clear, and we must all admit this, that once that first step has been taken, results can be attained only if the parties involved immediately begin a realistic discussion. We believe that circumstances are ripe, at this critical moment, and that the leaders of the great Powers involved in Asia — the Soviet Union and China — must act. It would be incomprehensible if, in an area where they are so deeply involved, these countries did not back up the action of whatever country or countries were to make the first peace move. History would severely judge the nation which, by its inaction, would have let slip the prospects for peace thus briefly glimpsed.
24. That is why all nations — great or small, close to or far away from this theatre of war, whatever their loyalties — must ask themselves here how they can make the second step easier, that is, how they can ensure firm negotiations more certain to succeed. Since our Organization can accomplish this, let us call for negotiation, let us make a solemn collective appeal, combining anguish and confidence, for an immediate opening of negotiations between the parties involved, and let us make it clear to all that negotiation does not mean surrender. It is not too early to discuss the terms for such negotiations. The first step, de-escalation, must lead the way to negotiation, which should be prepared at once.
25. But the prospect for a guaranteed peace in Viet- Nam would be short-lived unless a more general feeling of security were created in that part of the world. That guarantee cannot exist without China's co-operation. I must mention that for us, one of the greatest international problems is the fact that continental China, with the largest population on earth, remains outside of every agreement with the countries that surround it. In Asia there is no de facto situation, or even less any legal system, which guarantees the peace of other States.
26. Is it therefore impossible to hope to put an end to this situation? As President Johnson and the Secretary-General have stated, security in Asia obviously cannot be achieved without China, What will China do in turn to reassure its neighbours? It might offer them guarantees by saying to them, as others have said here to China: We have no intention of invading you nor of carrying out any acts of violence or subversion on your soil, we have no desire to try to overthrow the regime now in power in other countries. Is it really impossible to attain such an essential goal through regional negotiation? Among other statements, is this the meaning we must attribute to this comment Mr. Chen Yi made in Peking: "There is no doubt that China will make an important contribution to the safeguarding and strengthening of world peace."
27. We believe that China's important contribution should aim first of all at the security of Asia. Many of us are awaiting positive signs in this direction. We shall then be anxious to see China play a greater role in establishing peace through the United Nations. We trust that at that time, no one will set the 13 million Chinese of Taiwan against the 700 million Chinese on the mainland by acting as if the former did not count Because they are less numerous. A country like mine, with 9 million inhabitants, could not accept such a sordid calculation!
28. That is what I thought I should say to this Assembly on the problems of peace in Asia, which also are the problems of peace in the world. I believe that we must continue, beyond our differences and our interests, to explore all the paths of negotiation and all opportunities for peace. We shall thus perform that duty of conscience which Pope Paul VI mentioned in his encyclical letter Christi Matri Rosarii. made public on 19 September 1966, echoing his unforgettable address to us here one year ago:
"Those in whose hands rests the safety of the human family ... should carefully examine their moral record and obligations... stop! Men must come together... A settlement should be reached now, even at the expense of some inconvenience or loss; for it may have to be made later in the train of bitter slaughter and involve great loss."
That was the thought which inspired me a moment ago when I outlined my country's hopes.