The General Assembly of the United Nations is assuredly meeting a time of crisis. This crisis was foreseen by the smaller countries, which understood how precarious and uncertain were the grounds for the assumption that there would be unanimity among the great Powers; they realized that as soon as the balance of power was disrupted, one of those States might adopt a policy based on the discredited theory of the balance of power, notwithstanding the principles enunciated in the Charter.
141. The smaller countries considered that possibility, as well as the difficulty resulting from the paralysing effects of the veto. Hence they strove resolutely in support of two institutions which, to my mind, constitute the safeguard of the Organization. The first is the General Assembly, with its extensive powers; regional agreements constitute the second of those institutions. The purpose of those agreements is not only to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes, but also to provide for collective defence in case of an unforeseen attack.
142. This has been a tenacious and difficult struggle. Many delegations were in favour of keeping the Security-Council, as was the case in the former League of Nations, in a position of theoretical supremacy. So far as responsibility was concerned, we accepted that supremacy, but could not admit it from the point of view of the general functions for promoting international peace and security.
143. The regional agreements were opposed in the name of universality, because it was thought that a prudent and reasonable geographical differentiation was; incompatible with universality, when really it was nothing other than the application of the obvious and recognized sociological principle of the division of labour.
144. But the smaller nations won the day and the Assembly of the United Nations took on that perfect legal form proper for the body which was to represent the universal conscience of mankind in complete fulfilment of all the principles and purposes of the Charter.
145. This does not mean that we were so ingenuous as to think that in establishing an Assembly with such wide powers we should be setting up a sort of superstate. Not at all. We believed that there could be no exercise of national or international functions, whether or not they were considered sovereign, except on the basis of strict respect for law and international morality. We thought that the Assembly, however great its powers might be, should respect the law in force, that it should use and endorse the regional agreements and, above all, that in its work it should be inspired by the highest standards of international ethics and world public opinion.
146. But within these reasonable limits of an immense I field of action, there still remained to the Assembly all those elements which militate in favour of peace, which draw the peoples of the world closer together by means of culture or economic co-operation and which enable them, at any moment, to unite to defend what is right and to oppose aggression. We place the functions of the Assembly precisely in this field of action, which does not offer the limitless scope of a super-State but a narrower range of authority, as clearly laid down in the Charter. Since the proposal submitted by the United States representative deals precisely with this subject, one of the main topics which we have to discuss and on which it is essential that all delegations should keep a clear mind is that of the functions of the Assembly.
147. I do not desire to abuse your patience, nevertheless I urgently request you to give me your attention while I make a short study of these functions.
148. We may say that the functions of the Assembly have been accorded varying importance. It has been said that there is some redundancy or repetition in the different Articles which deal with this question. A careful analysis of these Articles shows, however, that there is no redundancy. Occasionally some expression is repeated but there is a definite idea of the relative importance of the various functions of the Assembly. Article 10 states categorically that the Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter, or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Charter. I was glad to note that the United States Secretary of State, the leader of the United States delegation, referred to Article 1 of the Charter, because that first Article should be considered in connexion with Article 10. Article 1 is quite specific and states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to take effective measures to ensure peace, which means that not only the Council but also the Assembly may effectively take or recommend such measures.
149. Moreover, there is a very important part of Article 10 which we may call the structural part. It deals with the powers of the organs of the United Nations. I wonder: if any doubt should arise regarding the competence of these organs, would it have been possible to leave the problems unsolved, or do we not find in Article 10, which defines the powers of the Assembly and provides that it may make recommendations to the various organs relating to their powers, the solutions to many problems which might arise in the event of defective functioning of the Security Council?
150. But the Charter provides that the Assembly may discuss not only all questions relating to what we might call the letter of the Charter but also, as is clear from Article 11, paragraph 1, questions concerning international co-operation and the maintenance of international relations.
151. It has rightly been pointed out that in Article 11 the word “consider” is used, and this has a wider meaning than the word “discuss”. But it will be seen that so far the Assembly has only general functions, either to apply the principles of the Charter or to ensure cooperation in the maintenance of international peace. But that interpretation would be mistaken, since paragraph 2 of this same Article 11 does not refer to a general discussion but gives the Assembly the power to discuss and to consider any questions, and to make recommendations. This means that, where a matter is not already being dealt with by the Security Council, the General Assembly is not only, as General Romulo, representative of the Philippines, said, a debating society and an organ reflecting public opinion, but a body which can take positive measures on certain concrete problems.
152. It is clear that if these positive measures require effective action, not just “action” in the general meaning of the word, but “effective action”, they are within the competence of the Security Council; and since there cannot be a double jurisdiction, the Assembly must waive its own and must make a recommendation or refer the question back to the Security Council. If the Council has assumed responsibility for the matter, the Assembly cannot intervene, unless requested to do so by the Council, or at the time when it is notified by the Secretary-General that the Council has ceased to deal with the matter.
153. Finally, let us remember the famous Vandenberg amendment. I should like to pay tribute to that great personality, Mr. Vandenberg, who is not only an American politician but a figure of world-wide repute. Taking note of the recommendation of all the younger countries that the Assembly should be made an effective institution, he proposed the amendment which now appears as Article 14 of the Charter, under which the Assembly may discuss any situation, regardless of its origin, in order that it may recommend measures for the maintenance of peace, and extend its jurisdiction to include violations of the provisions of the Charter.
154. Thus the Assembly is clearly competent to discuss, consider and make recommendations, if the Council does not itself make recommendations in the limited field of concrete, coercive action on any question; the Assembly not only has competence with respect to powers, to the purposes of the Charter and to international co-ordination, but can also examine all violations of the Charter itself.
155. This means, then, that the Assembly has the widest legal powers; but it is clear, I repeat, that these wide powers must always presuppose a respect for the laws in force. The Assembly was established to ensure respect for the law, and therefore it cannot assume a power incompatible with the sovereignty of a State, because the law imposes absolute respect for this sovereignty. The Assembly cannot assume any function which lies within the domestic jurisdiction or the constitution of any State. The Assembly cannot modify a situation resulting from bilateral or multilateral agreements. On the contrary, it must use its authority to approve and encourage recourse to the measures elaborated by the parties to these agreements. Finally, the Assembly cannot modify the scale of values established by regional arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
156. The Assembly’s jurisdiction is thus clearly defined; it constitutes what may be called the, legal foundation for any proposal for convening the Assembly in case of emergency to deal with the exigencies of peace when the Council is paralysed. I must point out that this is a question with which we have always been much concerned. At San Francisco, in the debates in Committee II, we asked: can we accent an Assembly which is impotent when confronted with a paralysed Council? It would be tantamount to accepting that the United Nations was at the mercy of a single Power.
157. The veto has obviously gone far beyond the purpose for which it was devised. As I have already indicated here, the veto was not a right but an obligation; an obligation to seek unanimity, to explore every avenue of agreement and to sacrifice, minor points of difference. There is a great difference between a right exercised as a privilege and the rule of unanimity considered as a constant obligation to ensure peace and to find a fitting solution to international problems. Even if such an agreement were not reached, if the great Powers were not under an immense moral obligation to make a constant effort of readjustment in order to achieve the desired unanimity, it is obvious that the fate of this Organization, which was conceived by men who had fought for peace, which reflected the ultimate achievement of international law and was, as it were, the ornament of civilization, could not be left to the capricious will of one Power or at the mercy of irreconcilable disagreement. If the Assembly were powerless and did not possess the full powers, which I have indicated, to discuss, consider and, in certain cases, to make effective recommendations, then the veto would have brought about the paralysis not only of the Security Council but also, in some measure, the paralysis and disintegration of the Organization itself. It would have justified the terrible irony with which a representative, perhaps too ironical or too prophetic, said that the conflicts among the small Powers disappeared in the United Nations and that the United Nations itself disappeared in the conflicts among the great Powers.
158. That was not the true intention and the spirit of the founders of the Organization. The Latin American countries, however, perceived clearly, from the outset, that at some stage the veto would paralyse or hamper the action of the United Nations by paralysing the Security Council. And since they felt that the defence of the continent, which was in some ways a basis — perhaps the principal basis — for a peaceful future, should not be left to the mercy of shifts in the balance of power, they proposed regional arrangements. It was said that regional arrangements would destroy the universal character of the Organization. It was said that they would be unworkable and would lead to the formation of separate and hostile blocs. We replied that the division of labour did not imply disintegration but that sociologically it was an affirmation of unity and integrity, and the facts have borne this out.
159. The regional arrangements have been fruitful. Not only have they saved and strengthened the fifty-year old Pan-American Union and, in some measure, guaranteed the peace of the continent against intracontinental and extra-continental conflicts and aggression, but also, illustrating, perhaps, Nietzsche’s dictum that he who acts does not trouble himself about principles, they have had the far-reaching effect of opening the way for the North Atlantic Treaty and the agreements between European countries for their own defence.
160. We who owe so much to Europe and who feel that spiritually we are its children, nurtured in its culture, must welcome the fact that Europe has grasped, as the American institutions have done, the principle of these regional arrangements which are a safeguard against possible aggression in the future.
161. I know that some may say that these regional arrangements, which imply defence and mutual support and co-operation in enforcement measures, are to some extent a return to the old policy of armed peace and the balance of power, which was always precarious and unstable and which has been supposed — often without justification, for there are many instances in which the balance of power has prevented aggression — to be the cause of past wars.
162. However, this is not a question of a policy of aggression. The United States Secretary of State gave a very clear definition of collective security. In the balance of power, everything depended upon power itself: if the balance was destroyed there was no limit to the influence of the State which had become predominant. What is needed today is to establish power in a reasonable manner and to distribute it in defence of right, under the authority of an international body. Only those who were tragically naive could have believed that by the mere signing of the Charter of San Francisco and the eloquent proclamation of certain principles, a fundamental change would be wrought in human nature and that, either individually or collectively, the psychological laws of that unfathomable phenomenon called the will to power would be changed.
163. We made provision in the Charter for possible violations. The Charter laid down the principle of the limitation of armaments; but from the beginning we also knew that the application of the judicial principle of the limitation of armaments would encounter many difficulties. In point of fact, the Assembly was given the power to make recommendations with regard to armaments and the regulation of armaments. But we well knew that many interests might be opposed to such limitation. And finally a situation arose which in the future will be examined by historians and philosophers studying our civilization when they compare our peace with that of Westphalia, Utrecht, Paris or Vienna. This was the tragic situation: while the western Powers, which had suffered so much through the war, and in particular the European Powers which had been devastated, were reducing their military strength to a minimum and devoting themselves entirely to the work of reconstruction and the heavy programme of social reform, the great Eurasian Power was maintaining or increasing its reserves of manpower in an effort to substitute for the guarantees of the Charter the other guarantee of a chain of Powers or of nations which were subject to its influence and on which it endeavoured in every way to impose its ideology, in spite of the fact that those nations possessed a cultural heritage based on the supreme dignity of man and not on the absolute supremacy of the State.
164. It is not in rancour or in a spirit of acrimony that we are recalling this lack of equilibrium today. We well know that it is the desire of every delegation that this debate should preserve and, if possible, strengthen the spirit of understanding and good will, and that it should afford all nations an opportunity of vying with each other in their love of peace and above all in their sincere co-operation for the attainment of peace. But I must draw attention to the facts as they are. I must stress that disequilibrium which has of course made it impossible to adopt certain measures for the limitation of armaments, or to adopt any such measures which would not simply fix an inequitable ratio or a ratio which, while resulting in a reduction in numbers, would lead to the continuation of this very disequilibrium which we condemn.
165. What we have to do, in fact, is to create the necessary enforcement organs within the framework of international authority; in a way, that means the creation of a new equilibrium, but this time of an equilibrium for peace and justice. I say a new equilibrium for peace and justice because our idealism cannot be naive, because we must have a sense of reality and because it is true that right is endowed with immense moral force; for, though we shall never be able to accept the theory that might is right, we also know full well, and of this we are certain, that right has need of might. “We who have the right; we shall have the might; then there, will be justice” was an old saying in England. We have the right; we must have might in order to have a living, breathing justice.
166. But to do this we need first strengthen the moral factors which fortunately do exist, and thus renew the spirit of confidence in our hearts; we must turn to the very countries from which we seem to be separated by an unbridgeable gulf and say to them: “Certain concepts of life cannot be spread by mechanical and revolutionary means, the idea that order can be forced upon nations by means of warfare or material influence was a utopian belief. It was also utopian to think that power would make them accept glorious freedom. It was equally utopian to believe that a particular concept of social justice could be imposed by force. Any policy which advocates the subversive spreading of certain principles leads only to an attack on the sacred right of nations to self-determination. Order, freedom and justice are happily reconcilable, but they can develop in a nation only thanks to the spontaneous forces of the native soil and vitality.”
167. Let us impart this conviction of ours to the countries which have conjured up ideological theories about us; let us tell them that we shall never attempt to impose our system and our way of life on anyone, but that neither shall we tolerate that a regime based on force, and which seeks to develop, should impose on us, and on the peoples who are united to us by the sacred bonds of the Charter, a concept of life which destroys human dignity and bases the structure of society on the play of blind forces or on the material imposition of power. And above all, let us avail ourselves of this moment to define that juridical position in which we can exert all our strength in favour of peace.
168. Let us have faith in our mission; let us have faith in that mission which is to support, encourage, and endorse by the verdict of humanity, the efforts which have been made to give effect to the Charter and to respect the territorial integrity of nations which have been subjected to force, efforts which have to some extent been given universal sanction. And let our attitude serve to encourage us to accept future sacrifices, with the conviction that in fighting for the rights of each nation, we are fighting for universal peace, because there can be no peace without justice.