1. The election of the Foreign Minister of Guatemala to the high office of President of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session is eloquent testimony both to his high personal qualities as a diplomat and a statesman and to the very important and constructive role that the Latin American nations are playing in international affairs. The fact that his candidature was put forward unanimously, by the Latin American nations shows in what high esteem and regard he is held in a continent which can count a great phalanx of world renowned diplomats and statesmen. It was therefore natural that that
assessment of his qualities as a leader and a diplomat should have been confirmed unanimously also by the Assembly.
2. It is also appropriate that I should pay a tribute at this time to the outgoing President, Foreign Minister Corneliu Mănescu of Romania. The calm dignity and efficiency with which he presided over the deliberations of the twenty-second session of the Assembly were positive factors which were ever present in our deliberations at that session.
3. Since I am a representative of an African country, it goes without saying that it gives me great pleasure to welcome to United Nations membership the Kingdom of Swaziland. We know that the Swazi people and their Government will bring to bear on our work a fresh outlook, youthful zeal and idealism. We look forward to working with their representatives here at the United Nations, as well as in the Organization of African Unity, for the ideals which both Organizations represent.
4. We also look with joyful anticipation to the impending independence of Equatorial Guinea. I should not like to let this opportunity pass without noting with appreciation the co-operation which the Spanish Government has always given to the United Nations since the question of Equatorial Guinea came before the Organization, and especially when the last stage of consultation with the people was conducted.
5. As the General Assembly once again embarks on an exercise in introspection, the brutal fact emerges that the international situation has further deteriorated over the past year. Such indeed has been the extent of this deterioration that it has now begun to affect the fabric of international law and order so painstakingly constructed in the post-war years. True, this edifice has never been completed to anyone’s satisfaction; it has never been really strong and firm. Yet, unstable as its foundation was, and even as it moved and swayed with the forces that pulled it in all directions, it nevertheless provided some shelter to all of us. This edifice is now shaken to its foundation by developments that have continued over the past year and by new ones that have occurred: a growing cynicism seems to be eating at its very roots.
6. What we are witnessing today is, in fact, not only a revival of the cold war, ominous as that may be, but, most significantly — and, I believe, with more far-reaching consequences — a gradual acceptance and institutionalization of a system of politics based on spheres of influence. Roughly speaking, this is politics based on geopolitical considerations which take into account only what the super-Powers believe to be in their vital interests, as they see and define them from their particular vantage points. It is politics that, consciously or unconsciously, but nevertheless vainly, seeks to establish a semblance of order on a mutual recognition and accommodation of those so-called vital interests of the big Powers. It matters little that such interests might be based on false premises.
7. Under this emerging pattern, what the big Powers — especially the super-Powers — think or fancy to be in their interests becomes the guiding rules of international relations; their security needs become so overriding and justifiable ends in themselves that, in the interest of what they allege to be the preservation of peace, the super-Powers are permitted to violate or bend strenuously accepted principles of international law and the Charter. In such a reverse order of priorities, the interests of the weak and the small, which make up the vast majority of the international community, assume at best a secondary role. What is even alarming is that, in the name of so-called realism, the international community has increasingly come to acquiesce in the ground rules of this re-emerging politics of spheres-of-influence.
8. This pattern of international relations is not altogether new; it is, in fact, a reversion to a situation that existed before a sustained effort was begun at the turn of this century to organize intercourse among States on a rational ground based on rules of conduct that reflect a community of mutual interests. It is obvious that, as spheres-of-influence arrangements have not worked in the past, they cannot work now. Whatever semblance of order such politics may lead to will inevitably be a bogus order that will no sooner be established than it will disintegrate into something of a free-for-all. The so-called realism that allows this type of politics to proceed is also a bogus realism which does not appreciate the fact that there can be no lasting
order without justice.
9. My Government believes that it is time that we, the small nations, raised our voices high in defence of the principles of the Charter and international law when those principles are tampered with or violated—the more so when the violator is a big Power, only because our voices and collective conscience are the only weapons we have against it. It is imperative that we should do so for unless the rules of the Charter and international law are applied with equal force to the big Powers, we shall end up by having no Charter and no laws.
10. Be it in Viet-Nam or in Eastern Europe or in any other part of the world, no consideration of national security or Other compelling reasons of vital interest can be so overriding as to justify a big Power’s taking unilateral action that violates the sovereignty and the right of self-determination of nations, and hence also the United Nations Charter. My Government fervently believes that even now, where the Charter has been violated or bent, it is not too late to remedy the situation by minimizing and mitigating the damage already caused. This can be done now only by applying all principles of the Charter without exception. It is also the hope of my Government that the problem that has arisen with regard to Czechoslovakia will be resolved with due respect for that country’s sovereign rights.
11. Despite the talks under way in Paris between the United States and the Democratic Republic of North Viet-Nam, an end to the war in Viet-Nam does not seem nearer than when the Assembly met last year at this time. The high hopes which those talks raised when they began some four months ago are now at a low ebb. It has now become obvious that, in the absence of real and meaningful steps to reduce the level of the hostilities, no real progress can be expected at the Paris talks.
12. It is no secret that my Government has felt for a long time — and we said it here in the Assembly last year — that a halt to the bombing of North Viet-Nam could be a realistic and meaningful step that would lead to a process of de-escalation of the hostilities as well as to genuine negotiation. Since the last regular session of the Assembly we have seen that a partial curtailment of the bombing of North Viet-Nam led to the beginning of talks. We are even more convinced now that it is reasonable to expect that, if the suspension of bombing covered the whole of North Viet-Nam, the Paris talks, which so far have been more of a soliloquy than a real discussion, would move to a stage of realistic negotiation of the real issues involved. It also has to be recognized that, if an acceptable solution is to be worked out, all the parties to the conflict will have to be brought into the discussion at some stage or other.
13. In the long run, however, there can be no denying the fact that the Viet-Nam problem has to be solved on the basis of the free expression of the will of the Viet-Namese people. It is also important that this expression should not be tampered with or forcibly bent in any direction by outside forces if the decision is to be that of the Viet-Namese people alone, and thus binding on all concerned. We have always believed that the Geneva Accords of 1954 could serve as an acceptable practical basis for the expression of the Viet-Namese people’s choice as regards their future and the political and social organization they want to adopt.
14. The lack of any appreciable progress in the solution of the problem of the Middle East has no doubt contributed to the prevailing international mood, which can be described only as one almost bordering on helplessness and resignation. Even as the Secretary-General’s devoted and tireless Special Representative is, shuttling from one capital to another in search of a hopeful sign and a break, the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council has, on several occasions, been punctured by artillery duels and, on some occasions, even by air actions. Uncertainty seems to hover over the entire region; nobody seems to know what to expect next, where the next exchange of gunfire is going to take place. It almost seems as if the preservation of the fragile cease-fire arrangements is consigned to a blind interplay of incidents rather than the dictates of international obligations or even of self-interest. The Organization appears almost impotent to control or influence the inexorable march of events unmistakably shaping up into yet another conflagration.
15. It is obvious for all to see that, unless some beginning is made right away on a process of diplomacy that could immediately lead to an alleviation of tension, thus paving the way to a realistic solution of the outstanding issues, an outbreak of large-scale hostilities any day is a distinct possibility. Time is therefore of the essence; a further delay can only militate against a possible solution as it is bound to add more complications and more frustrations to a situation which has been infinitely compounded by three tragic wars in less than twenty years.
16. My Government believes that the only way such a beginning can be made is by supporting the Security Council resolution of November 1967 authorizing the mission of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and by assisting the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to succeed. That resolution contains a delicately balanced mutual set of obligations that could provide a basis on which and a framework within which a realistic solution could be found. What matters most now is that all the parties to which that resolution is addressed should accept all the obligations that are contained in it, and that each side should be ready to perform forthwith those parts that pertain to it. If there is such an acceptance by all the parties, my Government sincerely believes that the implementation of the principles of that resolution, and particularly any controversy as regards the timing of the implementation of its various parts, will pose no insurmountable obstacle.
17. Eventually, a resolution of the problem of the Middle East will have to be based on the renunciation of any state of belligerency and any claim of rights arising from it and the acceptance by all of the existence of Israel as a sovereign State with rights which, like those of all other States, must be respected by all. The Palestinian refugee problem should also find a just solution on the basis of past United Nations resolutions and the right of those refugees to compensation and restitution.
18. While these two cardinal points should form the hinge around which the final solution should revolve, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they now occupy as the result of the June war is an obligation which has to be fulfilled.
19. The tragedy that has befallen the brother people of Nigeria, with the needless high toll of lives and the wide destruction of property that it has already exacted, the incalculable injury and deep scars it is leaving on the spirit and the soul of that people, have filled the hearts of the Ethiopian people with deep sorrow. No words could be adequate to describe the deep anguish that the plight and trial of the whole Nigerian people have given rise to in my country.
20. It is thus understandable that as a mirror of the conscience of his people, and consistent with his own long history of dedication to a peaceful resolution of human conflicts, my august Sovereign, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, should have tirelessly laboured over the past few months, together with five of his fellow African Heads of State, to bring about a peaceful solution to the civil strife that has of late bedevilled Nigeria. While my Sovereign’s efforts and his personal intervention have already led to the first series of serious dialogue between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the secessionist authorities, as it is becoming increasingly obvious to all sides that no lasting solution can be found except on the basis of the will of the Nigerian people as a whole and of extending justice and security to all elements of the population, it is our fervent hope that the second round of dialogue will lead to a resolution of the strife. A preponderance of force might perhaps bring about suppression of the strife, but it must be clear that it cannot heal the deep wounds already opened, nor will it restore a sense of confidence and security, the lack of which is at the root of the present crisis.
21. It is our belief that a solution to the Nigerian crisis should be essentially left to the Nigerians themselves. Those who have the interest and welfare of the Nigerians at heart, if they want to assist, should do so on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on 16 September 1968 which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the solution of the problem within one Nigerian sovereign personality. Any departure from that principle would be tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of Nigeria; it might also introduce into this tragic situation elements of the cold war and commercial and other rivalries.
22. The same resolution of the OAU Heads of State also calls on Member States of the United Nations to extend to the Nigerian people humanitarian assistance in a manner and through arrangements that will not compromise the sovereign rights of Nigeria, so that the introduction of complications into a situation which is already delicate and complicated may be avoided.
23. I have every confidence that all the humanitarian organizations which have shown such commendable concern for the suffering and the deprivation of the Nigerian people, regardless of the side of the strife on which they may be, will always keep those twin objectives in mind, for I know how much they themselves realize that partisanship is inimical to their lofty goals.
24. While much of mankind remains alarmed by what has continued to happen and by the new events that have taken place in the past year, some amongst us — in fact an overwhelming majority in number but a minority in terms of economic and military power — have for a long time Kept our fingers pointing to the big fire that is building up now in southern Africa.
25. The refusal of a few but powerful States to recognize for what they are the pungent smell of burning already in the air and the sparks of fire that are already evident has been, in the view of my Government, one of the major factors that have created despair and cynicism in the international community; so much so that, in much of the world today, there is a feeling — now almost burgeoning into a belief — that the United Nations is incapable of bringing about a peaceful resolution of the remaining colonial problems. True, some progress has been made over the past year in the field of decolonization, as evidenced by the independence of Mauritius, Nauru and Swaziland, but this should not hide the essential fact that independence was conceded to these Territories by colonial Powers that had already for the most part divested themselves of Territories several times as large and wealthy.
26. The remaining colonial problems in southern Africa are, however, of a different character. What the peoples of Africa and the United Nations are confronted with is a diehard colonialism mostly spearheaded by minority settler régimes espousing and practising a racist philosophy, which has set out to push as far back as possible the frontiers of independence and liberty in Africa. In this undertaking of challenge, Portuguese colonialism, the rebel minority régime of Ian Smith and the racist apartheid régime of South Africa have created a military alliance the aggressive nature of which has been amply demonstrated by events over the last two years.
27. No progress has been discerned in any of these Territories despite the many calls issued by the United Nations. Portugal’s reply to the legitimate demands of the African peoples for independence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) has been to send more guns, and to perpetrate more burning and looting and still more bloodshed. There is no sign whatsoever that Portugal wishes to lead the African peoples in these Territories to the road of self-government and independence. On the contrary, the African peoples in these Territories are continually being told that they have to be Portuguese if they want to be independent; the fact remains, however, that these peoples do not want to become Portuguese.
28. For over two years and a half now, the minority white settlers in Rhodesia have taken the law into their own hands and have imposed on the indigenous people of the Territory a rule of terror which has now developed — as has been dramatically demonstrated by the assassination of freedom fighters—into a mob lynch rule. This has come about in the first place because the Government of the United Kingdom, which had and continues to have administrative responsibility for the Territory, refused to live up to the full measure of that responsibility when confronted with the threat of a rebellion. Brushing aside our protestations, and pleading constitutional incompetence despite its clear responsibility, the United Kingdom Government made it unmistakably clear to the people who were preparing a rebellion that nothing effective would be done to enforce the laws which they were supposed to observe. Since the rebellion, Britain has continued its policy of double talk and vacillation, coupled with a clear indication that the use of force will not be contemplated, even when Ian Smith and his cohorts in Salisbury are assassinating people who are fighting for their freedom. Aided and abetted by forces from without — notably from South Africa and Portugal — and in circumstances which have given them an insurance against the use of force, the rebels have continued to consolidate their position. They are now succeeding in installing a copycat version of the apartheid experiment of
South Africa.
29. The same United Kingdom Government which pleaded constitutional incompetence to do anything to remove the threat of a rebellion and which also opposed United Nations interest in the matter, has lately turned to the United Nations for assistance. But the type of assistance Britain seeks from the United Nations is a far cry from being an effective remedy. First, foreclosing any possibility to use force, Britain opposed the imposition on the rebel régime of comprehensive mandatory sanctions. When it came around to accepting comprehensive mandatory sanctions in Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, it was not ready to contemplate effective measures against the sabotage by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and the Government of South Africa, which had made a mockery of the earlier selective mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
30. Given South Africa’s avowed policy of helping Ian Smith’s régime and Portugal’s policy of duplicity and complicity in this respect, no prophetic knowledge was required to see that comprehensive mandatory sanctions would not work either. The majority of the members of the Security Council — especially the African and the Asian members — did not entertain any illusion on that score when the question of Rhodesia was taken up in the Security
Council last May, but the choice that was given to them at the end of a very prolonged negotiation was to have either these mandatory sanctions, imperfect as they were, or no action at all.
31. It can be said already, after the so-called comprehensive mandatory sanctions have been in force for over three months, that they have proved to be very ineffective. The Secretary-General’s latest report on the application of sanctions is ample proof, if proof was ever lacking, of that fact. Analysing replies as regards the application of the mandatory sanctions received from countries which in 1965 had received 79 per cent of Rhodesia’s exports and supplied 68 per cent of its imports, the Secretary-General reported that imports by those countries from Rhodesia fell from $330 million in 1965 to $40 million in 1967, while their exports to Rhodesia likewise fell from $187 million to $54 million. If the story told by these figures were true no country — particularly a small country like Rhodesia, with limited resources — could have survived for so long the impact of such a severe punishment on its economy. If the Rhodesian economy has thus survived up to now, it certainly is not due to divine intervention or a miracle. Surely Rhodesia must have been receiving and sending out goods through intermediaries — and in this regard no one needs to stretch his imagination to know who the culprits are.
32. The repression in South Africa is continuing unabated. In this regard, it should be realized that it is perhaps misleading at this stage to look at the question of apartheid and the policy of racial discrimination merely as a problem of violation of human rights. Whatever historical validity such a perspective may have had, it should now be recognized that what we are confronted with in South Africa is a situation where the right of an entire people to freedom and independence is trampled on. The question of apartheid in South Africa has thus become essentially a colonial question.
33. Moreover, this colonialism is on an aggressive move. It has already usurped in broad daylight a ward of the international community — the Territory of Namibia. Having refused a United Nations presence there, South African colonialism is now engaged in the ignoble enterprise of stretching the net of apartheid over that Territory.
34. The peoples of Africa and the international community at large are thus confronted by an alliance of colonial forces. This alliance is out to frustrate all efforts by the United Nations on behalf of the rights of the indigenous peoples. A move against any one of them is considered by the members of this unholy pact as a move against all of them.
35. In the circumstances, my Government has felt for some time now that the world should recognize the confrontation imposed by colonial forces in southern Africa for what it is and be prepared to deal with it accordingly. There should therefore be a disposition to recognize the interconnected nature of the problems and thus to seek interconnected solutions.
36. In the judgement of my Government, nothing short of comprehensive measures of economic sanctions against South Africa — the main bulwark of the colonial alliance in southern Africa - could be effective; anything short of such measures would be only a palliative which South Africa and its colonial allies could successfully undermine.
37. Confronted as they were, for the most part, over the past year with situations that were potentially explosive, Member States simply did not have the peace of mind nor the time to address serious thought to the other important aspect of the work of the United Nations, namely, that of promoting conditions for peace.
38. At a time when the need for United Nations peace-keeping efforts and the actual and potential usefulness of such efforts have been dramatically demonstrated, the United Nations is bogged down in a quagmire of legal controversy which obscures more than enlightens the real political issues. As a result of this, the fate of the United Nations peace-keeping experiment, as we have known it, now hangs in the balance; and unless the international community wakes up to its responsibility it may well be on its way to extinction. If that comes to pass, we shall have thrown away one of the most imaginative instruments for peace fashioned by the United Nations over the years. The historical significance of our inability to resolve this issue
thus cannot be too strongly emphasized.
39. A significant achievement in the field of arms control has been registered over the past year by the General Assembly’s acceptance, in resolution 2373 (XXII) of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and by the increasingly wide adherence it has so far obtained. Coming as it did after long and protracted negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the agreement reached on that Treaty was one of the few dramatic proofs that indicated the imaginative use to which the process of diplomacy and negotiations under the umbrella of the United Nations could still be put.
40. Much as we may congratulate ourselves for this signal achievement, we should at the same time keep in mind what still remains to be done. First of all, we should not lose sight of the fact the the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear Powers, but not of nuclear weapons themselves; for, by tolerating the further refinement of nuclear weapons, the Treaty allows the nuclear arms race to proceed at a more sophisticated level which will make eventual disarmament even more difficult to achieve.
41. The viability of the non-proliferation Treaty and its historical significance will also depend on what will happen in the immediate future; it will depend, first, on the speed with which the nuclear-weapon Powers follow this agreement with real measures of disarmament; second, on how soon nuclear technology will become the technology of the day and to what extent a non-proliferation arrangement will meet the demands for non-discriminatory scientific and technological co-operation.
42. Finally, there is the question of security. This is as much a psychological problem as it is a question of providing tangible guarantees against nuclear aggression to those countries which, under the treaty, will have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It is psychological inasmuch as the desire of non-nuclear-weapon Powers to acquire nuclear weapons is proportionate to the insecurity which they feel. Thus, the necessity of maintaining a climate of international confidence, a readiness to solve problems by negotiations rather than by force, and to strengthen the United Nations cannot be overemphasized.
43. Above and beyond that, the collective security system enshrined in the Charter should be readapted to enable it to meet the exigencies of the nuclear age.
44. It was thus natural that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which just concluded its deliberations in Geneva, should have addressed itself to the twin problems of the security of non-nuclear weapon Powers and international co-operation for harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The Conference was a success in that it brought to bear a wide range and a searching exchange of views on those two aspects. The recommendations which evolved from the Conference bear testimony to the efforts involved and the wide concern felt. My delegation is ready to examine, in the course of the present session of the Assembly, ways and means to follow up the recommendations issued by the Conference.
45. My Government believes that, if the momentum generated by the acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty is to be maintained, some crucial problems in this field need to be tackled immediately. There is, in this connexion, the urgent necessity to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments. As a matter of fact, the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty itself is vitally and immediately linked with such an agreement, for further testing could only contribute to the proliferation of nuclear arms. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should also afford the nuclear Powers a framework within which they should negotiate a reduction in the deployment of ballistic missiles.
46. We cannot but concur with the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General that the development of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare is potentially and more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they are very cheap to develop and, moreover, their development could be effectively concealed, thus making control and disarmament in this area extremely difficult.
47. Finally, before the world is overtaken by technological development, agreement must be reached not to put military installations on the ocean floor. Not only should the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof be used for peaceful activities, but their resources should also be exploited in the common interest of the international community.
48. In this respect, there is need to evolve an equitable régime of international law concerning the resources of the sea, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof before powerful nations with technological means stake unilateral claims. Once conflicting claims arise, as they are bound to arise, our task will be infinitely complicated. The task of legal engineering in this area, therefore, is something which the United Nations should urgently undertake.
49. All told, the efforts of the United Nations in the economic and social field do not present an encouraging picture. The shortcomings, in all fairness, cannot be attributed to the United Nations as an organization nor to the various instruments for action which it has fashioned. The problem has been one of the slackening of will on the part of Governments — especially Governments of countries which have the means to put adequate resources behind these efforts of the United Nations.
50. Paradoxically, this has come about at a time when the need for more resources has been keenly felt and the ability and the capacity of the United Nations and its family of agencies to use additional resources effectively have vastly increased.
51. It took almost two decades for the United Nations to reach the point where it is now in developing a framework of concepts for economic and social development and the institutional framework for action that it now has. What has been achieved in this respect is a result of a great historical process — one of the signal achievements of the United Nations — of a confrontation over those two decades of human ideas and concepts representing the wide range of experiences of the peoples which make up the United Nations.
52. The tragedy is that, at a time when the international community has developed deeper insights into the problem of economic and social underdevelopment and its implications for international peace and security, the will to engage in action in the manner and of the magnitude necessitated by the seriousness of those problems is slackening.
53. The second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which convened in New Delhi at the beginning of this year, has amply demonstrated how far the will to engage in further action has lagged behind the awareness of the international community of the seriousness of the problem. In much of the developing world it had been cautiously hoped on the eve of the second session of UNCTAD that perhaps some beginning could be made in solving certain specific trade problems, that some promise for action could be elicited from the industrialized countries. The Conference not only dashed that flicker of hope but, in point of fact, only confirmed our worst fears.
54. The race of food production with population growth has not yet been won but, if we are to judge by the latest report of the Secretary-General [A/7201/Add.1, para. 61-71] the situation in this area is improving as far as production is concerned. But the other problem of food, which is almost as serious as production, has become acute. This relates to critical imbalances and shortage of certain essential elements in the world food supply, some of which could be as crippling as hunger itself. The shortage of protein has been felt acutely everywhere n the developing countries, and particularly so in Africa. My Government believes that protein deficiency is an area in which the United Nations could make a worth-while contribution by co-ordinating international efforts.
55. After two decades of continuous debate at the United Nations one thing has emerged clearly: that is, the recognition that the causes of economic and social under-development are varied and many and that, quite often, they interact on one another. As the problems are thus multifaceted, it should be recognized that the strategy for economic and social development should likewise be multidimensional. At the international level, this strategy
would require that not only developing nations should co-ordinate their development efforts at the national level, but the efforts of the developed and the developing nations should converge on a common policy of international action.
56. I do not wish to finish my statement without calling attention to the significance of the International Year for Human Rights. Even as we celebrate in our respective countries in various ways our attachment to the ideals of human rights, the massive assault against human rights which the international community has decried for some time now is being intensified in South Africa. Lately, this assault has been extended to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.
57. It is obvious that there are two opposing forces, one bent on setting standards for the respect of human rights, while the other is bent on destroying any semblance of such rights. At a time when we are rededicating ourselves to expand the frontiers of human rights, no task would be more worthy and deserving than to assist those peoples in the world which have been denied their human rights as individuals and their collective rights to freedom and independence.
58. Let me say, in conclusion, that no amount of disparaging could help the United Nations. Those who attribute the inaction of the United Nations to specific faults of the Organization are certainly misplacing their criticism. The fault certainly does not lie with the Organization. The fault lies with each of us. Thus the contribution that we can make to the United Nations should start with the question: in what way can each one of us help?