On behalf of the Argentine delegation, I should like to refer first to the general problem of the maintenance of peace, and later to the concrete question of the greatest obstacle facing the United Nations in the effective accomplishment of its specific functions.
The two problems are linked together. I am sure that if we could solve the second, even partially, we should be able to make swift progress towards the solution of the first. K minds were at peace and men were freed from physical fear, they would be able to find harmonious if not identical means whereby all peoples might ensure peace at home and abroad.
Let me consider these questions in turn.
On 6 July 1947, almost on the eve of the anniversary of our independence, President Peron issued an appeal to the whole world and especially to the peoples of America. The Argentine delegation feels that it is doing its duty by repeating that appeal in the Assembly where the majority of the nations of the world are represented.
The main idea of this appeal is contained in a single word: solidarity. Solidarity must be our basis for achieving internal and international peace, and peace is the only atmosphere in which civilization may exist and develop.
To achieve internal peace we must overcome the difficulties artificially created by man.
Inequality is a law of nature and man cannot escape it; he does not escape physical inequality; nor can he escape spiritual inequality. Atavistic traits transmitted by heredity, environment, inadequate or badly directed education, the imponderable factors that colour human personality, all these, combined in different degrees, create diversity in the human species. The applied sciences have not yet found efficient methods of correcting these inequalities and reducing the diversity to a common denominator.
Hence the difficulties to which I have referred are created by the instinctive end inevitable expression of each personality. Fortunately, those which may be considered discordant dements are in the minority.
Our most efficient method of dealing with such difficulties so far has been general, public education — and I would add: free, compulsory education at State expense. But all other methods of awakening and developing in man the concept of good neighbourliness, tolerance and respect, first within the family and then within the community, should be tried and encouraged.
Furthermore, we must end, or at least mitigate, the sufferings of the “have-nots”. Social security should ensure protection for all human brings, from the cradle to the grave; safeguarding tire health of mother and child; looking after the education of the young; providing work for the adult and ensuring the tranquility of the aged, so that even the most humble may enjoy at least the essential minimum compatible with human dignity. Social security is the great remedy for creating internal peace and solidarity.
The climate of social injustice is too harsh to compel man to live in it without rebelling.
Poverty and plenty cannot live together; that is why the fortunate ones who have more should hasten to give a part of their surplus to better the lot of the needy. Indeed, they should realize that by such action they are taking out an insurance policy, so that they may enjoy in greater tranquility what remains to them.
What I have just explained with regard to internal affairs should serve as an example for international affairs. In the name of the Argentine Government I wish to state that we are ready to add our resources to those provided in the general plans for the material and spiritual rehabilitation of the world, and especially of Europe.
Spiritual forces and, if need be, material strength and wealth must be placed at the service of the powers of good, to counteract the efforts of those who, through vice or temperament, conspire with what is evil.
To achieve peace in the international sphere, we must first condemn all aggression, whether territorial, economic, or political.
Those who have power in the world should realize that fate has placed in their hands all that they need to bring happiness to their peoples. There are many small and medium sized States which have inscribed in their tradition and in their history their desire for peace and a tranquil life within the hereditary domain that fate has allotted them. Such conduct should be respected and Imitated by the great Powers, so as to give an impressive example to those smaller States which are less peace-loving.
What I have said about solidarity at home, in speaking of poverty and plenty, can by analogy be applied in the international field to the «nail and great Powers of the world.
Another means of ensuring international peace is respect for the right of determination of peoples, a fundamental principle which we have always upheld and which is inscribed in the sacred tablets of Chapter I of the United Nations Charter.
Finally, we must strive for all the States Members of the United Nations to give up a little more of their sovereignty by accepting arbitration as a compulsory method of settling disputes, whatever their magnitude.
We believe that we have preached by example, for this peace-loving attitude has always been the policy of Argentina in international affairs.
With the object of promoting the implementation of this programme, we must encourage humanity’s spiritual disarmament. A concerted effort by the men, women and children of all nations, especially the women and children, can banish the ideas, words and acts of the victims of an aggressive psychosis, which is a real disease and one that we must fight until it disappears.
Let us not forget furthermore that man is on a higher plane than the systems he has created, and that those systems should be made to serve him. To promote aggression or to unleash war in defence of certain systems is an outrage against humanity and in present circumstances is liable to lead to its destruction.
Let us abandon systems if they do not help towards progress; let us save man, who, when all is said and done, is the best system, material or spiritual, yet created, since he is the work of God and not of man. To save him we must try every social action that is compatible with public and private resources. Such action may vary with each country, but it must create an atmosphere of well-being at home, which in the international sphere will make war hateful as a means of reconciling differences between nations.
Such is the programme outlined in the appeal made to the peoples of the world by the Argentine Government. To those who accuse this appeal of being too ambitious or too theoretical, I would say that even the most insignificant programme appears ambitious when indolence deters us from making the effort to carry it out, and that any programme is theoretical if people do not wish to take the trouble to apply it, I should like to add that many of the items m this programme could be carried out immediately if, instead of continually losing sight of the purposes and principles of the Charter, we re-read it every day as though it were a Bible inspiting our actions which are for the most part strongly influences by our selfish interest as individuals, and by the desire for expansion and domination in the world community.
To illustrate this point, I propose, in this second part of my speech, to discuss a concrete problem of an international nature related to our Organization, and one which in our opinion should be reviewed immediately.
The delegation of Argentina has asked for a reopening of the discussion on the privilege of the veto granted to those States which are permanent members; of the Security Council. It should be noted that the States enjoy a dual privilege. On the one hand they hold permanent seats on the Security Council, and on the other, they can nullify its resolutions, even those to which all the other members of the Council have agreed.
The veto is contrary to the principles of the Charter. I do not think that this statement needs any explanation; but, to put it bluntly, the United Nations is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members, and therefore any political discrimination, such as the veto, violates that principle.
No discrimination could be more glaring. Under the Charter, the eleven members of' the Security Council represent all the Members of the United Nations and act on their behalf; nevertheless, a single State has the power to nullify the will of the other fifty-four. Even if we assume that each of the eleven members of the Security Council represents five of the fifty-five States in the United Nations, it could still be said that a single State is able to nullify the will of fifty.
The veto was established because of contemporary political circumstances which were likely to change and, as everyone knows, have in fact changed. At that time, and in spite of favourable circumstances, only thirty States voted for the veto and seventeen against it; I am sure that if the question were reopened in the present circumstances, that proportion would change fundamentally and the decision would go against the privilege.
At the time the head of the Argentine delegation stated that the court of experience would judge which side wag right. He certainly did not expect that court to pass a final and unfavourable judgment within two years. I said “unfavourable” and that is what I mean. To obtain the majority required to approve the proposal for convening a conference for the propose of reviewing the Charter is one thing; what each of the Member States thinks of the veto is another. I venture to assert — and this is my personal impression — that the majority is now convinced that the inclusion of the veto in the Charter was a grave error, but there are some who believe that we can still wait and they recommend palliative measures, although I do not think they have much confidence in the success of such measures, even if they should manage to impose them.
Worst of all, the veto has been used improperly. Under the provisions of the Charter and in accordance with the San Francisco declaration of the four Powers which upheld the voting procedure agreed upon at Yalta, the veto is only to be applied in matters dealt with in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII, that is, in matters concerned with assuring security and maintaining peace. Indeed, that is the specific function of the Security Council. The use of the veto is restrictive; it should be restrictive. Its sole object is to prevent the United Nations from exerting pressure on one of the great Powers, for fear that such pressure might endanger peace.
Nevertheless, the Security Council has allowed the veto to be applied in matters concerning the admission of new Members, and now the world looks on with amazement as peace-loving nations such as Ireland, Portugal, Transjordan, Italy and Austria wait at the door of the United Nations, because the Security Council persists in maintaining that their requests for admission must obtain the favourable recommendation of all five of its permanent members.
With regard to the admission of new Members, the Security Council’s task is to make a recommendation, for or against; but it can only recommend; the only organ of the United Nations which can and should decide, for or against, is the General Assembly. We shall see whether the Assembly this year will defend its rights and exercise its powers when the Argentine delegation proposes the admission, of the five nations I have mentioned, all of which have obtain is seven or more favourable votes in the Council, which, in my view, is equivalent to a favourable recommendation. The Security Council can recommend the non-admission of new Members, but the use of the veto in this matter cannot be sanctioned, since in that case it would be a Security Council and not an Assembly decision.
Apart from the fact that the text of the Charter is explicit, I shall mention only one argument in support of my thesis. When the Charter wished to authorize the use of the veto by the so-called “Big Five” in matters unrelated to security and international peace, it expressly said so. It did this in the case of the ratification of amendments, which cannot be considered as approved without the concurrent votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
If we pass from the Security Council’s action with regard to the admission of new Members to a consideration of the performance of its other functions under the Charter, it must be confessed that matters have fared no better.
Four countries, two of which are Members of the United Nations, are in conflict. Each blames the other for what has occurred. A commission of the Security Council has confirmed the facts; the Press has criticized the effectiveness of that commission. Yet the Security Council, after numerous and prolonged meetings, has not been able to decide what to do. The Council was expressly created to maintain peace and avert or eliminate conflict; yet it spends its time carrying out tasks which are not within its province, and fails to fulfil the specific obligation imposed upon it at San Francisco, despite the wide powers granted to it at that time.
The Security Council is to prepare agreements for the regulation of armaments; the Assembly last year made recommendations to this effect. Up to now it has not been able to take any decision on the matter. The Council, furthermore, ought to set up the “international police force” which is necessary to enforce compliance with its resolutions; up to now it has not fulfilled this obligation. We must conclude that its behaviour has been dictated by the “do-nothing” policy which it has pursued up to now, and for which, of course, a police force is hardly necessary.
I need not add that all this is due to the veto power; the power which authorizes any one of the permanent members of the Council to paralyse the action of that body.
To attain such results, the great Powers did not require the privilege which has been granted to them; while the small and the medium sized nations would not have approved a Charter containing this privilege, if they had known it was going to prove useless in achieving the ends for which it was intended.
The great Powers have always enjoyed what I might call a “free” veto, to differentiate it from the “legal” veto provided by the Charter. Whenever one or more States attempted to act against the interests or the rights of a great Power, that Power felt itself entitled to use its “veto”, to complain, to negotiate, to hold up the action of the other great Powers and request the convening of an international conference in order to satisfy its aspirations or its vanity. In the absence of this recourse, the great Powers resorted to armed conflict to impose their will, if the fortunes of war seemed to favour them. I will only recall two cases. One of Germany’s vetoes brought about Sedan and the fall of the Second Empire; another the Algeciras Conference. Yet neither Bismarck nor Wilhelm II possessed the “legal” veto which the San Francisco Charter has established.
Now, however, if one of the great Powers decided not to carry out in good faith its obligations under the Charter, it could paralyse the action of the Council that was set up at San Francisco as a panacea for maintaining peace. Furthermore, it could, by dilatory manoeuvres, by the use and abuse of the “legal” veto, distract the attention of the other great Powers, complete its military preparations and launch the conflict when it was most convenient to its own interests.
Was it for this that forty-five nations met at San Francisco and voluntarily tied their hands by a treaty from which — so it is said — they cannot free themselves without dissolving the Organisation?
The great Powers were in a better position before signing the Charter, since they were not bound by a covenant compelling them to act in good faith.
It follows that' the veto is an excellent method of doing two things: preventing the United Nations from adopting resolutions for the maintenance of peace and security; and favouring any of the great Powers who decide to act in bad faith.
Meanwhile, it would seem that the other nations are obliged to remain passive while they contribute their money, their efforts, the time lost in conferences, in the drawing up of rules of procedure, fixing terms of reference, constituting “committees and sub-committees, drafting wordings and rewordings” to the possible establishment of a world dictatorship. If any of the great dictators of the past had suspected that good faith could lead to such extremes, he would certainly have decided to take the lead in setting up an international organization as the exclusive instrument of Ins campaign for domination.
Some will argue, no doubt, that to counter such eventualities, we may resort to Article 51 of the Charter, which authorizes legitimate individual or collective self-defence, independently of the Security Council. I accept this and in that connexion I applaud the decision of the nations of the Western Hemisphere to form an indissoluble union by virtue of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro for the purpose of availing themselves of this right in case of aggression. But the argument is valueless. Before signing the Charter all the nations, great and small, enjoyed this same right to repel aggression, cither individually or collectively.
From all this it follows that before San Francisco the great Powers enjoyed the right of veto on terms of equality and of full freedom of action. The small nations on their part enjoyed the right of individual or collective legitimate defence, depending on whether or not they had allies. On the other hand, the veto, having been legalized by the Charter, can only benefit potential aggressors. It was not worth while establishing an international organization to achieve such a result.
In their eagerness to defend the interests of the great Powers, the authors of the Charter forgot those of mankind. The veto is useful chiefly as a means to inaction, an attitude which may be desirable in some cases. For example, if the United Nations were to seek to exert pressure on one of the great Powers, inaction could be used to avoid friction which might lead to war. But in the majority of cases action is required for the maintenance of peace.
To offset the misuse of the veto, what should have been established was a counter-veto placed in the hands of those nations now lacking the authority to exercise the veto or of those entitled to use it, who believe that this is a time for action. In that case, the veto would have served to defend the legitimate national interests of the great Powers, and the counter-veto to defend the interests of mankind and peace.
I consider that one of the most serious errors committed by the Security Council with regard to the veto is the attempt to conceal its use. It has been said that this is a political manoeuvre intended to mitigate the attacks levelled against the veto.
In order that decisions taken by the Security Council on matters of substance should be valid, they require an affirmative vote of seven members including — and here I quote the actual words of the Charter — “the concurring votes of the permanent members”. When a vote is to be taken on a resolution before the Council, if one of the permanent members abstains because, he does not wish to vote in favour of it but has no special interest in its rejection, and if the seven required votes are obtained, including those of the other four great Powers, the resolution passes as though it had been legally approved. In this way the number of vetoes is reduced and a smaller target is exposed to the attack of hostile critics.
But such a decision has no legal value, nor has any resolution of the Security Council on matters of substance within its competence which does not obtain the affirmative vote of the “Big Five”, even if it does obtain the affirmative vote of the six nonpermanent members. Abstention by one of the great Powers is therefore sufficient to prevent the adoption of decisions.
If the Security Council persists in adopting this method of interpreting the abstentions of permanent members, it will be abetting a form of deception tending to cloak the harmful effect of the veto, and the great Powers which resort to abstention for this purpose will, in the end, encourage this attitude in open contravention of an explicit provision of the Charter. Without consulting the Assembly and without awaiting ratification by the States Members, the Security Council will have amended the Charter and granted its permanent members a third and new privilege, for the amendment will be a de facto amendment.
Sir Carl Berendsen, our distinguished New Zealand colleague, pointed out a short while ago how the veto might operate when he referred to the possibility of a representative of the “Big Five” being detained at a party, at his hotel or on the golf course.
Nor should we forget — and this is much more important — the futile conflict which would inevitably arise if a State affected by an illegal decision of the Security Council refused to obey it We must avoid anything which might undermine the prestige of the United Nations, and nothing can undermine it more than the adoption of capricious resolutions in violation of the Charter.
The veto is often referred to as the unanimity rule. The name is resonant and expressive, but far horn concealing the drawbacks of the veto, it makes them more obvious. In passing, I might point out that the unanimity in question is the unanimity of five members out of eleven, which is a unanimity sui generis.
Experience shows that when the decisions of a corporate body depend upon the will of one of its members, it is very difficult to prevent that one member from trying to bring everyone round to his way of thinking. He knows that without him there can be no solution, and if he suspects that the others are anxious to find a solution, he creates difficulties in order to impose his will, or to obtain as neatly as possible what he wishes. He becomes an arbiter. The discussions arc prolonged, the arbiter conceals what he thinks until the last moment; the Press tries to guess the enigma from his most trivial statements, until finally he either kills the proposal with his negative vote or magnanimously accepts the “compromise” most favourable to his interests from among the many compromises offered to secure his consent.
The five-member unanimity rule established in the United Nations Charter is intended to force the majority, however large, to waive its rights mid bow to the will of the minority which, its purpose achieved, proclaims to the world that everyone thinks as it does, when in reality the exact opposite is true. Thus the unanimity rule may be very useful as a tool to construct a “new style” democracy, but it is of no use for the establishment of security and the maintenance of peace. On the contrary, it will inevitably lead us to war.
At the time of the Rio de Janeiro conference, Argentina’s attitude was represented as contradictory, far defending the unanimity rule at Petropolis while attacking it at Lake Success, Such a contention is not merely wrong; it is childish. The unanimity supported by Argentina at Rio de Janeiro does not constitute a veto, or a measure making it impossible to adopt resolutions, as occurs in the case of the rule requiring the unanimity of five members out of eleven in the Security Council. The nations which favoured the resolution would have been entitled to put it into effect, however many States had dissented. In the League of Nations unanimity prevented action without the previous approval of all. The unanimity of five members out of eleven required by our present Charter prevents action without the previous approval of those five members. The unanimity advocated at Rio de Janeiro does not prevent the American nations, whatever their number, from taking action if they consider it desirable. And as the Pan- American system has no international police force, there would be no difficulty in proceeding in this way. But we shall discuss this matter in the Political Committee; I make this explanation only to put an end to mistaken interpretations and possible intrigues.
I should not like to conclude this critical statement showing our lack of faith in palliatives without at least suggesting the remedies which I personally should be inclined to advise.
This is a subject which falls within the province of the conference which we have proposed and which would be convened, not to please Tom, Dick or Harry, but to discuss the matter at length and to adopt the most appropriate decisions, not excluding those likely to protect the interests of the great Powers. However, this is no reason for not putting forward some suggestions, even though they are only the result of personal study.
There are two methods of breaking the deadlock created by the veto. The first would leave decisions in the hands of the Security Council and require the affirmative vote of three-fourths of its members, without veto. The second would give any of the great Powers the right to object to a resolution adopted by two-thirds of the members of the Council; the resolution would then remain pending until a permanent committee of the Assembly, composed of all the States Members, had ratified or rejected it Resolutions not supported by two-thirds of the States Members would be void.
The permanent committee would have to take a decision within three days on the pending resolution, voting for or against it without debate after bearing two statements: one by a representative of the majority which adopted the resolution, and the other by a representative of the great Power or Powers which objected to its adoption.
The organization of the permanent committee would not entail any expenditure or inconvenience for Member States, since those Members not having permanent delegations accredited to the United Nations could be represented by their diplomatic or consular agents in Washington or New York.
The only decisions which could be referred to the committee would be those adopted in accordance with the powers granted to the Security Council in Chapters VII, VIII and XII of the Charter. The only one of their present privileges which would be retained by the “Big Five” would be the right to a permanent seat on the Council.
By the first method, three members could force the Security Council to take no action; on the other hand, nine members would enable it to take action.
By the second method, four votes would be required to take no action and eight votes to take action. In the latter case, if one or more of the great Powers objected to the action proposed, the decision would rest with the States Members as a whole.
As may be seen, both methods take into account the interests of the great Powers and the interests of world peace. The second method is more democratic, but the first is more expeditious.
If the General Assembly does not amend the Charter in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 108, or does not decide to convene a conference to discuss the whole subject fully as provided in Article 109, there is only one course that gives hope of progress within the framework of the Charter. The “Big Five” must determine to use the veto strictly in accordance with the Charter and, as agreed at San Francisco, with the sole purpose of avoiding coercive action or the use of force against themselves. In that case, we could temporarily overlook the disadvantages involved and get on with our work.
But if the veto is persistently used to exempt Member States from compliance with the decisions taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of peace, the veto will serve only as a device to win adherents and to divide the world into two or more blocs. The United Nations, first formed in 1942 to win the war and organized in 1945 to win the peace, will cease to exist and will be replaced by the “Disunited Nations”, unless tine majority decides to take drastic action to show potential aggressors that such adventures may cost them dear.
Let the great Powers bear this in mind, and let them for one moment forget their selfish interests and think of the welfare and the fate of mankind.
As for the Members of this Assembly, you may begin work without prior revision of the Charter by considering the applications for admission from new Members, bearing in mind the results of the various votes taken in the Security Council and without concerning yourselves with the illegal and vicious procedure which the Council seeks to impose on the General Assembly in defiance of express provisions of the Charter.
I was not a little surprised to find that among the many bouquets Mr. Vyshinsky distributed yesterday in his amiable speech he thought it necessary to present one to us. In accordance with the diplomatic practice still in use, I must therefore, before concluding my speech, express my thanks.
Fortunately I was present and can vouch for the calmness with which he referred to Argentina after his giddy flight round the world which began in the United States, crossed the Atlantic, traversed several countries of Europe: the United Kingdom, France, Greece and the Ruhr; of Africa: Egypt and the Sudan; of Asia: Turkey, Iran, China and the Korean peninsula, and returned via the Pacific to his point of departure where, according to the representative of the Soviet Union, people are cynical and everybody has taken to conspiring against the USSR.
As he had overlooked Australia, a country which is situated in the southern hemisphere in the same latitude as my own, I presumed that we might also escape his notice. But it was not to be. Just then, the aeroplane in which the representative of the Soviet Union was travelling, driven by a hurricane like that which has unfortunately just devastated the State of Florida, encountered an air pocket and went down as far as the River Plate just long enough to reprimand Argentina for not having consented to withdraw its Ambassador from Madrid.
Mr. Vyshinsky knows as well as I do why we did not withdraw him, and he knows better than I do that the Assembly’s recommendation regarding Spain was adopted in disregard of the San Francisco Charter. I maintain: in disregard of the Charter; for Mr. Vyshinsky remembers the provisions of that Charter when the action of his colleagues annoys him; but the Soviet representatives, beginning with himself, have not the least objection to violating those provisions when it suits them.
For example, they are complaining now of the United States’ action in bringing the question of Greece before the Assembly after it had been withdrawn from the Security Council’s agenda. They have no cause to complain. They showed the way last year when, in order to help their comrades in the wandering Spanish Government, they requested the withdrawal of the Spanish question from the agenda of the Security Council in order to bring it before the Assembly.
There is this difference, however: while the case of Spain does not threaten world peace, that of Greece — as Mr. Vyshinsky is well aware — may be the powder keg which will once again touch off a weald war.
In thinking over these matters, I remembered that one of the Soviet representatives in the Security Council referred to those of us who attacked the veto as “hot-headed”, and I thought sadly how much we, on our side, fed the lack of a representative capable of marshalling all the arguments against the veto with the serenity with which Mr. Vyshinsky defends it.
That is all I have to say for the moment.