BEL

Allow me first, Mr. President, to add my congratulations to all those already tendered to you on your election. Permit me to say that we are happy to serve under your orders this year, and I hope that your star, which appears to be a good star, will enable you to direct the deliberations of this Assembly in an atmosphere of harmony and understanding throughout. 100. In the statement I made from this rostrum at the seventeenth session [1138th meeting], I spoke mainly on three topics —East-West relations, the remaining problems of decolonization, and the problems of the Common Market. I shall not display any originality this year, but rather-with apologies for repeating myself— I intend to address you on the same subjects. I propose to discuss what has transpired since last year, but I shall take up my subjects in a different order, because it seems to me that their importance has changed. Less is heard of the Common Market these days, but infinitely more of East-West relations, and I am therefore going to begin with the Common Market, leaving the problems of the relaxation of tensions until the end. 101. I do not propose to give you a lengthy account of the internal history of the Common Market during the past year, nor shall I speak to you of the crisis through which we passed, of the break down of negotiations with the United Kingdom. I shall simply tell you that, despite that break down, and despite the difficulties we have encountered, the life of the Common Market continues almost as usual. We have made further reductions in internal tariffs, we have signed an Agreement of Association with Turkey, we have finished drafting and have signed the important Agreement of Association with eighteen African countries and, despite difficulties, we have made some progress with regard to agriculture, 102. Our success is reflected in the figures. Between 1958 and 1962, trade within the Community —that is, trade among the partners who make up the Six— increased by 97 per cent. I know, however, that that is not your main concern. Last year, many representatives expressed their fears of a selfish and protectionist Common Market, and I tried in my statement to show that I understood those fears and misgivings but that I also considered them groundless, at least for the time being. 103. This year, I can confirm that diagnosis, which I think was an optimistic one. The fact is that, despite —or perhaps even because of— the spectacular growth of our internal trade and the high standard of living which has been achieved by the countries of the European Six, our development has not harmed international trade —quite the contrary— and our trade with the outside world has increased by 39 per cent, which is more than the average increase of international trade. 104. A point which may be of greater interest to you, and which in any event appears, to my way of thinking, to be a decisive argument showing —I think I may say proving— that the European Economic Community is not at present pursuing a protectionist policy, is that imports into the Community have increased a good deal more rapidly than exports. I said a moment ago that imports had increased by 39 per cent; exports, however, increased by only 29 per cent, and the most striking fact —in my view, the decisive fact— is that the deficit in the Community's balance of trade with the rest of the world is still growing. In 1958, the deficit was $245 million. It increased to $1,700 million in 1962, and for the first six months of 1963 it reached $1,574 million —an impressive figure, which shows decisively that the Community is at present confronted by the problem of a deficit in its terms of trade and that thus far, as I have said time and again, outside countries have no grounds to complain of our policies. 105. I will not deny, however, that there is perhaps one shadow in this picture, or, to be more precise, that there is perhaps one anxiety which might justifiably increase. Like many other countries, Europe today has agricultural problems. Perhaps the most important sociological phenomenon in our region is the present insistent mood of the farmers; quite properly, they are demanding a decent life and calling for the same advantages as are enjoyed by the working class. This is a great economic problem, but, first and foremost, it is a social problem. 106. There is a way of entertaining their demands and meeting them fairly easily; all that is needed is to fix remunerative prices for farm products. That would be a satisfactory solution if, at the same time, output could be restricted; but such a policy of restriction is wanted neither by the farmers nor by Governments, with the result that, in our countries, the farm surplus problem is now becoming acute. The danger of farm surpluses is that they lead, almost inevitably, either to subsidized exports or to protectionism. We cannot deny that all these dangers exist; but they are not dangers peculiar to Europe. The same features of agricultural policy are found in almost every large country, and I therefore believe that we must-seek a world-wide solution. Besides, a world-wide solution is essential in a world where some countries have surplus problems while a great many are still grappling with the more difficult, formidable and cruel problem of finding how to feed their peoples properly. A solution worthy of this age can be found only at a major world conference, at which agricultural problems will be studied by all, 107. The success of our Common Market must not impair our will to study and solve the other problems. I personally am in favour —strongly in favour— of the world trade Conference to be held under the auspices of the United Nations, I hope that Conference will not be confined to a discussion of certain tariff problems and technical matters. What is needed is for the conference to tackle —and to tackle courageously, boldly and imaginatively— the main problems facing, in particular, the under-developed countries. 108. The three main objectives, in my view, should be to find solutions to the vital problem of stabilizing the prices of certain agricultural products, to the problem of progressive industrial development in the developing countries, and to the problem of reducing considerably the financial burdens which weigh too heavily on those we have helped in the past. In any event, it is in that spirit of sincere co-operation that the Belgian Government expects to participate in this great world conference. 109. I now turn to African problems, and I note that the restrained optimism I was able to express from this rostrum last year has been confirmed. I think I may say —and I hope that the Prime Minister of the Congo, who will be speaking shortly, will confirm my view— that during the past year relations between Belgium and the Congo have continued to improve, although there are still major problems to be resolved and some difficulties to be overcome. 110. Since the last session, we have settled what was the main crisis in the Congo; we have put an end to the secession of Katanga. In that connexion, I should like to pay a special tribute to the Secretary-General and to declare before this Assembly that the solution which finally prevailed could not have been found without him. At one time or another, it is true, we exchanged many cables; at times we engaged in controversy by communique. What I wish to say is that we had the same good will and the same good faith, that we were seeking the same thing, and that, in the end, the operation was concluded as well as could be hoped. I was then glad to be able to resume the co-operation with the United Nations which, in my view, is one of the basic elements of my country's policy. 111. Belgian assistance to the Congo has continued. We are still providing technical assistance, and we have been confronted with the problem of providing some military assistance. I believe that the Prime Minister of the Congo was quite right to come to the United Nations, to explain his problem and his difficulties, and to indicate his desire that a number of countries should give more direct assistance in the reorganization of the Congolese national forces. 112. For my part, while I can appreciate some of the reasons that were advanced, I regret that the Advisory Committee on the Congo was unable to authorize the Secretary-General to take over the direction of and assume responsibility for that operation. I believe it would have been preferable for it to be carried out under the auspices and responsibility of the United Nations. 113. Since agreement could not be reached, however, Belgium did not feel that it could fail to respond to the direct request made to it by the Prime Minister of the Congo. We are therefore participating, cautiously and on a moderate scale, in the reorganization of the Congolese forces. So far as I am concerned, at least, I keep the Secretary-General regularly informed of everything we do; for I would not wish the slightest possible doubt to prevail regarding the spirit in which we have undertaken this task, which is not without difficulties internationally and psychological difficulties domestically. 114. As you are aware, we also supported in the Fifth Committee [1010th meeting] the request which was made by the Congolese Government. We believe it would be wise to allow the United Nations to continue its military effort in the Congo, at least for six months more. In taking this position, of course, we had to accept the logical consequences and naturally we decided —reversing a policy we had pursued since 1960— to assume our share of the costs; thus, for the future, our position has been regularized. With regard to the past, there are still a number of financial matters which we have to discuss with the United Nations. I hope, however, in view of the present relations between the Secretary-General and the Belgian Government, that we shall soon find a solution and be able to reach a full and final settlement of past problems, thus resuming our rightful place, which we were forced to leave only on account of unhappy events. 115. I should like, in passing, to say a few words on behalf of Rwanda and Burundi. When we were discussing the necessity of granting independence to those two countries, the Belgian Government and I myself repeatedly warned the Assembly of the economic and financial difficulties with which the two countries, over which Belgium had exercised trusteeship, would be confronted after independence, We knew that they were poor countries, we knew that they could not live by their own resources, I should like to pay a most sincere tribute to the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Burundi, I may say —I truly believe— that they have governed prudently and economically and that they have tried, in a situation that was by no means easy, to apply right principles. Prudence, however, has not been quite enough and their economic and financial situation remains difficult. I cannot but note with some regret that so many cordial promises made to them when they were seeking their independence, so many promises of financial and economic assistance, have not been fully kept, I believe that Belgium has done what it could. It has continued its technical assistance and its financial aid to Rwanda and Burundi, but it cannot shoulder alone the burden of the budget deficit and of economic difficulties. Allow me to say that I do not think it would be right for the countries which formerly exercised trusteeship to be the only ones to give effective aid to countries which have now achieved independence. I believe that it would be much better if there were international, multilateral assistance, which would give those countries the fullest protection from any undue political influence. For that reason I should like the United Nations to remember that this is a problem which they promised to consider and to settle. The problem is not a tremendous one. It is primarily a question of a foreign currency deficit. The amount involved for the coming year will be, at the most, $15 million. This is a vital problem for the two countries; but it is really not too great a problem for the United Nations as a whole. I hope, therefore, that it may be solved. 116. I should now like to say a few words concerning African problems, in which Belgium is no longer directly involved but which still persist, Fortunately, colonialism no longer gives rise to many problems in Africa. Great and rapid progress has been made, but the last of these problems are certainly the most difficult to solve. I refer to the questions of Angola and South Africa. It is my hope that the resolutions we adopt on these two questions will be strong resolutions, but at the same time temperate and wise. If the resolutions resulting from our deliberations are resolutions that can be Adopted unanimously, thus showing the countries involved in those problems that the whole world —European, African, Asian, communist, and the rest— thinks as one, I am confident that these temperate, strong and wise resolutions, adopted unanimously, will have more effect and greater impact than certain resolutions which might go too far and create differences, when the time comes to vote, even among those who share the same feelings. 117. Having made this appeal, which I believe can be heeded by the Assembly, whose spirit of wisdom and moderation cannot be questioned, I would say that Portugal and South Africa must understand that there are some policies which cannot prevail and some principles which cannot be accepted. The issue in Angola is not a question of law, but a question of right. The question is whether the general process of liberation and independence for the countries of Africa can stop short at the borders of Angola. I do not think that this conception of history can possibly be accepted, and that is why I say that certain policies, even if backed by legal arguments, cannot stand. 118. The problem of South Africa is even more serious, for here we are not concerned simply with a policy that is probably doomed to failure; it is a question of the United Nations making clear its disapproval of principles that run counter to the fundamental principles of the Charter. In this connexion, I endorse everything that was said by my distinguished predecessor at this rostrum, my friend, Mr. Lange, the representative of Norway. I believe that there is positive action which the United Nations can take. We must realize that there are two great problems to be solved, but that the United Nations, acting unanimously, can play a part in their solution, and it is to be hoped that it will play its part, as it is in duty bound to do. 119. I now come to my last topic, the one which this year I regard as the most important, namely, East- West relations. I myself am somewhat surprised to note that, to a certain extent, this subject, which ought to have been the easiest, is actually the one presenting some difficulty. At the seventeenth session, I ventured —although this is always dangerous for a diplomat and a speaker— to make a cautious forecast, I said: "Nevertheless, as regards East-West relations, there are a few signs —a few glimmers of light, as yet still faint— which would seem to indicate that the situation is in the process of being settled. It seems to me that the two groups have indeed shown a greater desire for understanding, a greater desire for agreement." [1138th meeting para. 135.] 120. I was being cautious; but I am happy to see that I was not mistaken and that the situation in which we find ourselves today confirms what was both a prophecy and a hope on my part. The Moscow Treaty and the undeniable atmosphere of "détente" and of attempts to reach understanding which exists in this Assembly are, it would seem to me, clear proof of what I am saying. Yet I must admit, with some dismay and some surprise, that this policy of " détente" does not seem to me to be welcomed with the unanimity I had expected. Indeed, there are in the western world important voices, authoritative voices, warning us against what they term undue optimism or the hazards for us in a policy of relaxation of tension. To them I should now like to reply from this rostrum. 121. Some say: "There is no relaxation of tension, since the main issues have not been resolved". I find this a strange argument and a grave error. I do not believe that, in international politics, the relaxation of tension should be an end in itself. The relaxation we seek, the relaxation in which we mean to co-operate, is essentially a method, and probably the only method that can lead to a solution of the main problems; for who can believe that a solution of the main problems which divide us could be found in an atmosphere of mistrust or rigidity? 122. Others tell us: "Be cautious; communism remains true to itself, its fundamental objectives have not changed; the communists still hope that the whole world will one day be subject to their rule and that their principles will become universal principles". I do not intend to dispute whatever truth there may be in this argument. I do not, in fact, believe that peaceful coexistence and the policy of "détente" mean that the communists have renounced their ideal or their profound convictions, any more than I have renounced what I believe is just and good for all men when I defend such a policy. What must be said and repeated is that the spokesmen of the communist world —and of the Soviet Union in particular— have not tried to deceive us; we must read once again the definition given by Mr. Gromyko, following Mr. Khrushchev, in his speech the other day in this very hall, of what he considers peaceful coexistence to be. He said: "The Soviet people are imbued with the unshakable belief that the example given by the Soviet Union and other countries building socialism and communism is convincing and will increasingly convince nations that this is the system which offers man the best opportunities to develop his abilities and be completely free from any kind of exploitation and oppression, want, or fear for this future. "However, this does not mean the imposition of one's own system on other States, but peaceful competition, competition by example and by force of conviction, competition which completely excludes the use of force to affirm one's own views. It is on this foundation, according to the profound conviction of the Soviet Government, that relations between States should be built." [1208th meeting, paras. Ill and 112.] 123. As far as I am concerned, there is nothing in this definition to which I am opposed. I accept such a definition of the field. I never thought that, by accepting peaceful coexistence, the communists would forsake their convictions any more than I am prepared to forsake mine. But there was a time when we had reason to fear —whether we were right or wrong is something that I no longer even wish to consider— that communism would establish itself in the world through the cataclysm of a war or by subversion. We are told today: "That is not the case". An experiment is proposed to us. Mr. Khrushchev proclaims himself the apostle of peaceful coexistence and of the idea that war is avoidable. In taking a stand on these two points, he assumes enormous responsibilities, even in the communist world. It seems to me that it would be a terrible and unforgivable mistake to give him the lie or to discourage him; it would also be an obvious sign that we are wavering in our own convictions if we did not accept this sincere challenge. 124. This policy of "détente" has found its expression in the Moscow Treaty. The Belgian Government unreservedly approves the Moscow Treaty and the policy affirmed in that instrument. The Belgian Government thanks the United States and the United Kingdom —as also the Soviet Union— for having desired this policy and for having concluded the Treaty. For its part, the Belgian Government is ready in its relations with the countries of the East, to do everything in its power to contribute to the success of the policy of "détente". I hope to be able, before the end of the year, to conclude cultural agreements with the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and I am prepared to widen the scope of this policy in other fields and with other countries. 125. "But there is nothing substantial in the Moscow Treaty", say the sceptics. Well, they are only partly right. It is true that if one studies closely the precise terms of the Treaty, one would become convinced that it is not a definitive step on the road to disarmament, that it is not a powerful additional guarantee that peace will be maintained. But the way in which the Moscow Treaty was discussed and concluded, and the assistance which the three signatories requested from all the countries of the world —assistance which has been willingly given-all this has created a certain atmosphere and invested the Treaty with symbolic importance. As far as I am concerned— and I should like to make this quite clear-the Moscow Treaty is only a beginning. Since it is only a beginning, the policy which it endorses must be continued, for a policy of "détente" cannot be stopped. If it were to be stopped, it would be a serious and a dangerous mistake and a great victory for the sceptics. It now appears, however, that further progress can be made along the road we have taken. The work begun must of course be continued at Geneva in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is to be hoped, with an improved atmosphere and greater confidence in general and controlled disarmament, important decisions or solutions can be reached and important steps taken. However, we must not seek to solve problems all at once or too hastily. Building the peace —as it has often been said and quite rightly so— will be a long-term task, and one that will require patience. We must therefore also work unceasingly to find solutions to certain more specific and more limited problems. Numerous ideas have already been advanced, and we have only to choose from amongst them. 126. One very important idea is that of fixed observer posts located in Europe, the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, which would probably make impossible any conventional war by surprise —and perhaps any surprise war. There is the possibility of crowning our efforts with a non-aggression pact. I will be told: "That would add nothing; we already have the United Nations Charter". That is true. But it is never useless to reaffirm, for the benefit of certain parts of the world, principles which have already been accepted in international relations. 127. I firmly believe that every idea —any idea— must be explored, that we do not have the right to let the situation remain as it is without seeking in all good faith and sincerity to understand one another, and thus gradually, and perhaps definitively, to improve a situation which has recently undergone a change. 128. Lastly, I should like to say that the spirit of "détente" should not be limited to relations between the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Pact, between communist and non-communist countries. A policy which is good for Europe is also good for the rest of the world; and if, after having so often given the world cause for concern and apprehension, Europe today adopts the course of wisdom, other continents should follow this good example. We must emphatically reaffirm that this policy of "détente" is a normal and natural application of the principles of the United Nations Charter, according to which all conflicts can and must be resolved by peaceful means, and that these are the principles we wish applied throughout the entire world. I should like to see all vestiges of the cold war disappear from the speeches made here. I should like to see what applies in Europe apply, in particular, in the case of the Middle East where the most injurious language of the worst moments of the cold war appears still to be fashionable. 129. I have the feeling that this is an important period. The policy of "détente" which is the expressed will of the most powerful countries in the world and is supported by the overwhelming majority of other countries, reflects a very important transformation in international life. The old divisions are about to be abolished. Tomorrow the line of demarcation will no longer be drawn between communists and non-communists, between countries which were colonized and those which colonized them. No longer will ideology or race place us in one or the other camp; but we shall witness a struggle between the sceptics, the opportunists, and the inhuman doctrinaires on the one hand, and, on the other, those who have kept their faith in progress and have not been ashamed to hope; the sceptics and the doctrinaires do not wish to believe or cannot believe that, the world will one day be different from what it has always been, that the old quarrels —almost always the result of selfish nationalism— are now obsolete and that the new problems confronting those who have mastered the atom and conquered outer space require solutions which have never been envisaged or even imagined. Let them therefore repeat their abstract formulae in which we find no trace of the realities of life and none of the hopes of mankind. Let us, on the other hand, show some audacity and even take some risks, if need be, to defend the cause of peace. Realism does not lie in an obstinate attachment to the past, but rather in a continuing confidence in the future. 130. In our Organization, which is now happily almost universal, we have lived through great hours of hope, but also through grave hours of doubt. We have been engaged in desperate struggles, in fights that were as violent as they were often sterile and useless. Can we really not do better than that? Today our Organization is presented with a great opportunity to become what it hoped to be when it was born and what we proudly named it: the "united" nations —united in the same ideal of international justice, understanding and human brotherhood. Gentlemen, do not let us miss this great opportunity.