May I say at the outset, Mr. President, how happy the Irish delegation was at your election to the Presidency. We wish to express to you our most cordial congratulations on your election to preside over the present session of the General Assembly. Your eminent personal qualities, your distinguished record as the representative of your country to the United Nations, and your long experience of the practical working of the Organization afford ample guarantee that you will fully justify the confidence that the Assembly has reposed in you by your discharge of the duties of the high office which you occupy.
2. I should like at the same time to pay a tribute of respect and gratitude to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Muhammad Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan. By the manner in which he conducted the debates at the seventeenth session, he demonstrated how much a President of the Assembly can contribute to the efficient dispatch of the Assembly's work by the judicious use of the authority of his office.
3. Coming now to the matters before the Assembly, I should like my first words to be words of welcome for the conclusion of the Moscow test ban treaty, for indeed it is the first break-through in the long search for some agreement in the field of nuclear weapons.
4. Members of the Assembly may recall that the Irish delegation has for several years past called for an immediate agreement to stop all tests which cause radioactive fall-out and thereby kill and injure the living and cripple generations yet unborn. We appealed to the nuclear Powers not to make a ban on those tests conditional upon agreement on the more difficult problem of stopping underground tests. We realized only too well that serious political difficulties stood in the way of a limited test ban treaty. Many years of rancorous debate and prolonged negotiations had made that manifest. Now that those difficulties have been surmounted and the Moscow test ban treaty has been successfully concluded, we extend our cordial congratulations to the Powers concerned on their achievement.
5. The Irish Government was one of the many which showed their appreciation and gratitude for the wisdom and courage of the negotiating Powers by the speed with which it welcomed and signed the limited test ban agreement. We realize, of course, that the Treaty is limited; that —as the signatories are still free to carry out underground tests— it leaves potential nuclear Powers at liberty to test underground. No one would seek to underestimate the value of the agreement reached, above all from the point of view of its psychological effect on the world political climate. On the other hand, it would be a mistake not to recognize that the Treaty, though valuable in itself, presents no insurmountable barrier to the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
6. It is said, of course, that underground testing demands much greater skill and experience than other nuclear tests; but, with the growing number of nuclear scientists in many countries and the constantly developing use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, I greatly fear that before long additional States will be technically capable of producing nuclear weapons without testing them in the atmosphere —or perhaps even without testing them at all.
7. However, though the Moscow Treaty may not have entirely precluded the possibility of further Powers developing nuclear weapons, surely it justifies and encourages the continuance of all possible efforts in that direction. We sincerely hope, therefore, that this initial tripartite success in obtaining a limited agreement in the nuclear field will spur the four Powers concerned to use every possible endeavour to secure the conclusion —before it is too late— of the basic agreement to stop once and for all any further spread of nuclear weapons.
8. The resolutions passed by the General Assembly in previous years, and the enthusiastic welcomes with which the test ban treaty has been greeted, are a clear indication that, once the nuclear Powers conclude a draft treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, they will have the whole-hearted support and co-operation of the United Nations in implementing it and, if necessary, in enforcing it. We owe it to our children to come to grips with this problem firmly now and not to bequeath to them a world in which nuclear weapons will have become conventional arms in international —and perhaps even in domestic— conflicts.
9. I submit that if the further spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented it is a question of now or never. It is an unpalatable but unquestionable fact that, as times goes on, more and more countries are learning and practising the art of producing fissionable material as a by-product of certain types of nuclear power plants. It is possible indeed that cheaper and more surreptitious methods of producing such material may gradually come to be developed. There are countries in the world today which are spending resources greatly needed for economic development upon missile and nuclear weapon research, and their Governments will be pressed —vigorously pressed— by their military staffs to produce or acquire nuclear weapons with all possible speed, not only for reasons of prestige but on the ground that other Powers, including potential enemies, are already equipped, or may shortly be equipped, with similar weapons. In those circumstances, if steps are not taken, and taken now, which will effectively prevent any additional State, however, wealthy and powerful, from producing or acquiring these weapons, there is nothing more certain, I believe, than that the possession of nuclear arms will before long commence to spread, and to spread in geometrical progression in ever widening circles throughout the world, I can think of no case in which the acquisition, or the threat of acquisition, of nuclear weapons by an additional State would not immediately drive at least one other State to seek to acquire similar weapons by hook or by crook. We must at our peril use all the influence and power at the disposal of the United Nations to close the door of the nuclear club now, no matter how insistently aspiring members may demand admission. If we can prevent It, there must be no fifth member.
10. In a problem as critically dangerous as the spread of nuclear weapons, it is vital that we should have no illusions about the basic factors involved or as to where the real power to solve it lies. I submit that the responsibility for taking the necessary steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons lies primarily and essentially on the four nuclear members of the Security Council. On behalf of the Irish delegation, I appeal to them to take Immediate steps, inside and outside the Geneva Conference, to promote the agreements required to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. No apprehension that in spite of our collective efforts some other State may in future come to possess nuclear arms should be allowed to stand in the way of the erection now —because there is danger in delay— of the strongest possible moral and legal barriers to the production, possession or control of nuclear weapons by additional States.
11. Members will recall that on 4 December 1961 the General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution on the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The operative paragraphs of that resolution [1665 (XVI)] read as follows: "1. Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons; "2. Urges all States to co-operate to those ends.”
12. In their official statements made both before and since that resolution was passed, most of the nuclear Powers have given high priority to the importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Those statements encourage us to hope that, now that the test ban treaty has been concluded, the Geneva Conference, which did so much to prepare the ground for that agreement, will crown its valuable work by giving special priority to the problem of preventing any wider dissemination of nuclear arms.
13. It must be clear that, in the circumstances of the world today, the very survival of humanity depends to a vital degree upon stabilizing the present uneasy balance of power in the world by restricting the possession and control of nuclear weapons to the States which already possess them. The Cuban crisis last year showed us how easily that balance can be upset and what can happen If it is threatened. The Cuban crisis showed also, I think, that, much as we might wish to have it otherwise, the non-nuclear States must rely on the enlightened self-interest of the nuclear Powers to save the world from a nuclear holocaust. Our ultimate aim, I submit, must be to develop step by step the rule of law and international law enforcement to the point where all nations can be assured of protection against aggression without individual national control of nuclear arsenals. Obviously, however, we are still very far from that point. In the meantime, surely it would be absurd if the acceptance of the status of a non-nuclear State were to be regarded as implying any degree of national sacrifice or loss of prestige. Surely, on the contrary, there is much to be gained both in moral prestige and in actual national advantage from helping to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby helping to eliminate fears and suspicions and the danger of local situations escalating into nuclear conflicts.
14. All reasonable men recognize that the Powers which negotiated the test ban treaty did so in the hope of creating the climate for further negotiations to end the vicious spiral of the arms race. The danger now, it seems to me, is that the nuclear Powers may become again bogged down in prolonged and inconclusive negotiations and that the psychological advantages resulting from the Moscow test ban treaty may be lost.
15. We would hope, however, that the negotiation of an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear arms would present that danger in far lesser degree than any other effort in the disarmament field. Such an agreement should be negotiable without any great delay if we remember that it involves no inspection of the territories of the nuclear Powers, that they have agreed that it is deserving of high priority in their further disarmament negotiations, and that the United Nations has unanimously called upon them to conclude such a treaty. We hope and pray, therefore, that advantage will be taken of the favorable climate created by the Moscow treaty to negotiate and conclude an international agreement which will prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons during the period required to build a stable world based on law and justice and collective law enforcement.
16. In concluding my remarks on this subject, let me say that I wholeheartedly agree that the nuclear Powers, and indeed all the Members of the United Nations, should keep probing for agreement on any issue which tends to create tension and on any project which helps us to learn to work in harmony. I would add, however, that we should not forget that a successful strategy for peace must not fail to provide for sustained pressure on central problems while seeking valuable tactical gains on the periphery. And one of the central problems of today, I submit, is how to secure and enforce an agreement which will prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.
17. The non-nuclear States can, I submit, do something more than watch and pray while the nuclear Powers negotiate, or fail to negotiate, the agreements required to avert the dangers which threaten them and all of us. One thing we can do is to improve the capacity of the United Nations to conciliate differences and to maintain peace. Every international dispute settled, every conflict ended, is a step away from total war and a step towards stable and lasting peace. History shows that clashes between smaller countries seldom remain localized but tend to erupt all too easily into wide conflicts. If that has been so in the past, it is doubly likely to prove to be the case in a world in which science and technology have annihilated distance. We are all aware that there are areas in the world in which outbreaks of hostilities between smaller Powers would entail a serious risk of involving the nuclear Powers. It is clearly, therefore, in the interest of us all that the smaller Powers should reduce or eliminate the danger of conflict between themselves.
18. For this reason, I would again suggest that, wherever possible, regional groups of States should combine to organize and establish areas of law and limited armaments. Such groups, I would urge, should agree to settle their disputes on the basis of law or by means of conciliation, and should also agree to restrict their armaments to police level and to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or amassing major offensive weapons such as heavy tanks, planes and missiles. Such groupings based on mutual co-operation, restricted armaments and the rule of law, would constitute major contributions to world peace and stability. It should be the special interest of the United Nations, including the nuclear Powers, to foster their development and to defend them against outside interference in their affairs.
19. The time is now ripe, I submit, for the United Nations to adopt a more positive role in international conciliation and to improve the efficiency of our peacekeeping machinery. While the great majority of Members recognize and appreciate the magnificent and self-sacrificing work of our Secretary-General, U Thant, and of his eminent predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, and the devotion and sacrifices of the United Nations civilian staff and military forces, we realize that up to now our peace-keeping efforts have had of necessity to be improvised to meet each new problem as it arose. The improved climate in the United Nations following the Moscow treaty gives us, let us hope, the opportunity which we have heretofore lacked to place our conciliation and peace-keeping machinery on a more systematic footing. We must not let slip any such opportunity as may offer.
20. It would be a considerable advance, I believe, if we could organize our conciliation machinery somewhat along the lines suggested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia on 26 September in the Assembly [1217th meeting]. As a means of anticipating and heading off any threatened conflict, we should, at the earliest possible moment, send a conciliator to the area concerned with the sole duty of bringing the potential opponents to the negotiating table to hammer out a peaceful settlement. Even if conflict should arise, we should —as I believe at one time in her history Switzerland used to do where conflicts arose between the cantons— send a conciliator, or a succession of conciliators, to sow the seeds of peace among the opponents. The conciliators should have no responsibility for the control of any United Nations civilian or military operations in the area. Their task should be purely and exclusively conciliatory. They should, I suggest, carry no blueprint for peace. Their duty would be solely to bring the opponents together to search for a settlement on which they could agree.
21. Needless to say, what I have just said is in no sense a criticism of the many missions of conciliation undertaken by the late Secretary-General and by his successor and their assistants. Indeed, the world is deeply indebted to them for their work in the Congo, in Cuba and other areas. We should, however, at this stage of our development, realize that the principal offices of our Organization are so seriously overburdened by every-day administrative tasks that the Secretary-General and his assistants may often be tied to Headquarters at times when there is dire need for the whole-time, and perhaps prolonged, efforts of a conciliator thousands of miles from New York, I submit that our administrative structure should be such as to make it possible, whenever a local situation threatens to erupt into conflict, for a senior officer of the Secretariat, or any other representative whom the Secretary-General decides to choose, to give his whole and undivided attention to the task of resolving the situation by conciliation, free from all other duties for as long as the necessity for his efforts exists.
22. We should also consider, I think, what measures we can take at this stage to strengthen the Organization's peace-keeping machinery and to make it more effective. Representatives will remember the suggestion made by the Prime Minister of Canada earlier in this debate [1208th meeting], that national units should be especially trained and held ready for instant dispatch on peace-keeping missions. The availability of such units in adequate numbers would indeed be a valuable step forward, and the gratitude of the United Nations is due to the States which have announced their decisions to keep such units in readiness. But, whether or not there are enough such military units immediately available, it is absolutely essential to have at United Nations Headquarters sufficient civilian and military personnel appropriately trained to supply the necessary Headquarters and local staffs for operations in the field.
23. I fully agree with the proposal in this connexion made by the former Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, Mr. Andrew Cordier, in the important address which he delivered at the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania earlier this year. Mr. Cordier suggested that military and civilian officers should be organized at United Nations Headquarters and trained to work together in planning and preparing for the various kinds of eventualities likely to arise. These officers would thus become well known to each other and to their superiors and could be promoted or reassigned according as their personal and professional suitability was discovered. To keep such staffs in being and training would undoubtedly cost money; but their professional experience, and their intimate knowledge of each other, of the working of the United Nations, and of their duties as United Nations officers, would be invaluable if the Organization were called upon to intervene in a critical and complicated situation, particularly if contact between them and with Headquarters were difficult. If, through lack of funds or for any other reason, we were compelled to improvise to meet critical situations, we should at least, I suggest, spend as much as is necessary to have these combined staffs trained to make the best and most effective use of whatever resources may be at our disposal.
24. Speaking of the expense of peace-keeping staffs brings me to the problem of providing the Secretary-General with the funds required to carry out the peacekeeping duties imposed upon him by the Security Council or the General Assembly. I have no intention of repeating all the arguments which I used on this subject in the general debate last year [1142nd meeting], but I would again strongly urge that the Secretary-General should be empowered to borrow from all willing lenders —government and non-government— the funds necessary to implement the resolutions of our Organization if receipts from assessments fall short of the budgeted expenses. This Organization faces many problems with which it will have to live and struggle for many years to come. But if it should betray the confidence of those States which sought our help, or if it should fail to complete its peace-keeping efforts for lack of the will to raise sums amounting annually to no more than a few cents per head of our populations, I doubt whether future generations would feel that it deserved to live.
25. As a former Minister for Finance I realize, of course, the political difficulty of imposing taxation for any purpose, however worthy or essential. I realize that it may be, from time to time, politically embarrassing for some Governments to pay their assessments to the United Nations, particularly when these assessments can be postponed for two years without loss of vote. This is a situation which every loyal Member should, I suggest, be prepared to meet by lending its proportionate share of the defaulters' arrears until the two-year rule comes into play. If the United Nations paid a reasonable rate of interest, its loans would impose no great burden on those who subscribed to them. In any event, when we think of the efforts and sacrifices which we have already made to avoid falling down on our commitments to the Congolese Government and people, and when we remember that this Organization is the best and perhaps the last hope of building a peaceful world, it does not seem too much to expect that Members should be prepared to subscribe their appropriate share of whatever loans might be necessary to ensure the smooth and effective working of our Organization.
26. Before I conclude, there is one other matter with which I should like to deal briefly: that is the question of international trade and payments. As we are all acutely aware, this is a field in which problems arise not only between highly developed States, but between such States and countries still in the course of development. Problems also arise between States with completely government-directed systems of production and trade and those with freer economies.
27. As we have not yet begun to trade with the moon, the countries of the world can only live and develop and enjoy the full fruits of their labour by exchanging their goods and services for the goods and services of others. In the short run, countries with surplus balances of payments may arrange to postpone repayment for them by granting loans or gifts, or making investments; but eventually, they must import a surplus of goods and services if they wish to be repaid for those which they have exported.
28. With certain exceptions, such as goods in short supply or "strategic materials", all States are normally anxious to export more than they import in order to achieve a favourable balance of payments. But if a number of States impose an undue strain on the available means of international payment by refusing to buy or invest as much as they sell or receive from past investments, total international trade must tend to shrink and prices on international markets must tend to fall. It is as important for world trade to have a reasonable sufficiency of world currency in active circulation, as it is for a national economy to have money in active circulation in sufficient volume to meet the needs of traders and people. One of the best ways of preventing an insufficiency of international liquidity and for keeping trade at the highest desirable level, would be for all countries to buy or invest promptly and willingly all the surplus liquid reserves which they acquire on foot of current exports and receipts from past investments. What is required, I submit, is some agreed system under which this would happen automatically.
29. The idea of establishing such a system of regulating payments between States is not new. It was discussed in the report of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Employment and Economic Stability, published in 1949. It was partially tried out by the European Payments Union established in 1950, and the experiment was very successful, for within a few years the volume of inter-European trade rose by 40 per cent. Before the European Payments Union was established, inter-European trade was strangled by a web of bilateral payments arrangements; but when the members of the European Payments Union were compelled by the obligations which they had undertaken to spend within their area 75 per cent of their surplus balances arising out of inter-European trade, or have them frozen indefinitely without interest, they quickly proceeded to spend these balances by importing from other member States or by making loans or investments within the group.
30. I suggest that the time has come when the feasibility of establishing a world-wide payments union based on similar principles could be usefully studied. I submit that in a world in which two thirds of mankind is hungry, ill-housed, illiterate and under-employed, and in which a very high proportion of production resources continue to be unused, it must surely be our aim to increase production in all our countries and to keep the growth of international investment and trade at the highest obtainable level.
31. I appreciate the value of current proposals for expanding international trade and investment by measures designed to increase international liquidity. But the question is whether, in order to obtain the maximum development of the human and material resources of the world as a whole, something more is not required, something in the nature of a world payments union by the operation of which international trade, visible and invisible, could constantly be maintained at a high and rising level and international payments kept automatically in balance by the full use of excess surpluses for foreign investment, loans or gifts.
32. I believe that if it were found feasible, the establishment of a world payments union would help to smooth out many of the difficulties which stand in the way of fullest possible expansion of world trade on an equitable basis. I believe, moreover, that under such a system in which international payments were balanced automatically and on a reciprocal basis foreign trade would cease to be regarded as a weapon for use in economic or political cold wars and would come to serve more and more as an instrument for promoting world development and international co-operation.
33. In conclusion, I would hope that in view of the growing need for remedying the existing imbalances and inequities in the world economy, it may now be possible to have the establishment of a world payments union considered more objectively and on a broader basis than in the past. It is in that hope that I venture to put forward the suggestion, because in my belief the expansion of international trade on a fair and reciprocal basis would give all of us a greater and more enlightened interest in each other's welfare and prosperity. And in the age of nuclear weapons this is surely a consummation devoutly to be desired.