Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you whole-heartedly, on behalf of the Austrian delegation, on your election as President of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. We are all convinced that, with your wealth of experience in the United Nations, you will bring the proceedings of this session to a successful conclusion.
121. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General for his unflagging efforts in the cause of peace. The Secretary-General, U Thant, has succeeded, with great skill and circumspection, in steering the international Organization through difficult and challenging situations. I should like to mention, in particular, the United Nations Operation in the Congo, the role played by the world Organization in solving the problem of West Irian, and many other activities which I am unable to outline in greater detail within the context of this statement.
122. This session of the General Assembly —and this is something to which many of the speakers who preceded me have already drawn attention— is starting in auspicious circumstances. The partial nuclear test ban Treaty, concluded in Moscow on 25 July 1963, came as an immense relief to mankind; it also paved the way towards further solutions of the disarmament question, which has been a source of concern to all of us for many years. The idea of peace among nations is as old as the annals of history. But for the first time the idea of peace among nations has acquired a genuine meaning in practical politics, and it is a strange paradox that the ability of the human mind to destroy utterly and completely vast regions of our planet has brought peace closer to us than ever before. The joy we feel is two-fold —firstly, because the great Powers have succeeded in agreeing once again, which, unfortunately, has seldom been the case up to the present; and, secondly, because they have succeeded in finding at least a partial solution to such an important problem.
123. A further step towards easing the tension between East and West might be possible in connexion with unsettled questions of outer space. An agreement along the lines of the statements made by President Kennedy [1209th meeting] and Foreign Minister Gromyko [1208th meeting] that outer space should be kept free from weapons of mass destruction would certainly have a profound psychological effect on the peoples of the earth in their earnest desire for peace. In the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Austria has endeavoured to promote an acceptable solution to the questions which have not yet been settled, and I think I can state that these efforts have found a positive response.
124. But all this should not blind us to the fact that the biggest part of this task has yet to be done: the achievement of genuine and controlled disarmament. The question of control seems to me to be particularly important here, because at this first stage of negotiations this is the only way to overcome mistrust. Many believe that this problem is insoluble because it implies a major encroachment on the sovereignty of the States concerned. Nevertheless I am of the opinion that it is quite possible to combine the principles of sovereignty with the need for control.
125. At one time, when the cold war was very close to becoming a "hot" war, the four great Powers found in Austria a system which, despite the great tension between them, proved to be strikingly effective. This system, widely known as the "Four in a jeep", was actually based on a very simple principle, that of self- control under observation by other parties interested in this control. Self-control takes account of the principle of sovereignty: observation by other parties, of their need for security. The successful functioning of this system suggests that, under admittedly more complicated circumstances, a similar principle could indeed be applied. Since the end of the Second World War, a solution has been found to only two international problems without involving any loss of position or prestige. These were the Austrian State Treaty and the question of the partial banning of nuclear tests. The Austrian State Treaty served as an example to show that after a marathon series of meetings, at which the situation seemed to be deadlocked time and time again —the Deputy Foreign Ministers and the sub-committee set up by them held a total of 360 meetings —at long last a successful solution could be found. Under the State Treaty, Austria became completely free. Its full political and economic sovereignty and its neutrality have contributed towards establishing peaceful relations in Europe. Ever since then, Austria has done its utmost, within the range of its possibilities, to contribute to international co-operation. It has furthered the decolonization effort, it devotes great attention to collaboration with the new nations of Africa and Asia, and it has given its full support to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has its headquarters in Vienna.
126. Since its establishment, the International Atomic Energy Agency has done valuable work. I consider it important that the activities of this Agency, which the General Assembly has entrusted with the major role in the preparation and organization of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, should continue to receive the full support of all Member States. In this context, I should like to refer to the need for efficient co-ordination of the activities of the various United Nations bodies, in order to avoid duplication of work.
127. Austria takes the obligations deriving from its permanent neutrality very seriously, but it is at the same time always prepared to be of assistance whenever called upon to make a contribution to the cause of peaceful understanding. The Sunday in June 1961 on which President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev met in Vienna for the first time stands out as one of the great days in our recent history.
128. The most important task of Austrian foreign policy is to do everything possible to promote peaceful collaboration and co-operation among nations, particularly in the region in which we live,
129. Austria, which was once one of the large empires of Europe, is now one of the smaller countries and has common frontiers with many States. Fortunately, it has succeeded in establishing amicable and cordial relations with most of its neighbours.
130. We have much in common with Switzerland and, especially in recent years, the policy of neutrality. These two neutral Republics, stretching from the lowlands of Pannonia to the mountains of the Jura, certainly have exercised a stabilizing influence in this part of Europe. All outstanding questions between ourselves and the Federal Republic of Germany have been settled to our mutual satisfaction, and we enjoy the good neighbourly relations of two States which respect each other. Solutions have been found for practically all our differences with Yugoslavia and we have achieved a noteworthy measure of economic and cultural cooperation. The same is true of our relations with Poland, although it is not our immediate neighbour. There has been a similar positive development in the relations between Austria on the one hand, and Romania and Bulgaria on the other. We hope that it will soon be possible also to settle the open questions with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which would pave the way for a similar development.
131. As will be observed from this outline of Austria's foreign policy, it is the desire of the Austrian Federal Government to establish the best possible relations with all States, especially with our neighbours.
132. Austria —and this is precisely what makes its position unique— lives in the centre of the European continent on the line of demarcation between the two great military alliances, and it shares hundreds of miles of its frontiers, on the one side, with States which profess the principles of communism and, on the other, with States which adhere to the ideas of democracy. It is gratifying that it has been possible to establish these good relations irrespective of the fact that individual States may belong to different military blocs or political ideologies.
133. It is all the more regrettable that I am not yet in the position today to report to the General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, something I would have liked to report, namely, that a satisfactory solution had been found by the parties concerned to the question of South Tyrol, which was the subject of General Assembly resolutions 1497 (XV) of 31 October 1960 and 1661 (XVI) of 28 November 1961.
134. As Members are all aware, the Austrian Federal Government brought the question of South Tyrol before the United Nations on two occasions, first in 1960 and then in 1961. After thorough discussion in the Special Political Committee, in which forty representatives participated the first year and thirty-four in the second, resolutions were adopted unanimously on 31 October 1960 and on 28 November 1961 respectively.
135. Resolution 1497 (XV) urged Austria and Italy "to resume negotiations with a view to finding a solution for all differences relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement". This agreement in its letter and content provides not only for complete equality of all South Tyroleans with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, but also the granting of autonomous legislative and executive regional power.
136. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly confirmed and reiterated this decision of its fifteenth session. This resolution is of particular significance. Until then the Italian Government had declared itself willing only to discuss the problem of South Tyrol, but denied Austria's legitimate right to negotiate, a right it has by virtue of the Paris Agreement. This right to negotiate was now clearly established by both United Nations resolutions. It will be appreciated why we therefore regard the two United Nations resolutions as essential progress in the clarification of the matter.
137. Furthermore, the resolution recommends that, should the bilateral negotiations fail, the two States:
"... should give favourable consideration to the possibility of seeking a solution of their differences by any of the means provided in the Charter of the United Nations, including recourse to the international Court of Justice or any other peaceful means of their own choice."
Accordingly, the United Nations did not recommend one specific peaceful means, but all the means set forth in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. That too was very important progress because it makes it possible to select the most suitable means for settling the differences. But more important than anything else was the reference in the resolution to the Paris Agreement, which as I have already stated, establishes a system designed to guarantee the German-speaking inhabitants of the Province of Bozen "complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnical character and the cultural and economic development to the German-speaking element. The claim of South Tyrolean minority has thus been newly and solemnly confirmed, for there is no more important forum with greater moral reputation than the General Assembly of the United Nations when it unanimously expresses its will in this way. On that occasion, the Italian delegation, too, expressed its satisfaction with the resolution.
138. It is not my intention, at a session which, we all hope, will prove to be one of the most peaceful in the history of the United Nations, thoughtlessly to stir up a dispute and to disturb the favourable atmosphere that has characterized our deliberations so far. But I consider it to be my duty to inform the General Assembly, which on two occasions has adopted resolutions of such decisive importance to the population of South Tyrol, of what has been done up to now to implement these resolutions.
139. Immediately after the end of the governmental crisis in Italy in March 1962, the Austrian Government proposed to Italy, in pursuance of the two United Nations resolutions, that bilateral negotiations should be resumed at the earliest opportunity. This proposal was repeated several times in the course of the following months. Finally, in July 1962, the Italian Government agreed to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. This meeting was held on 31 July 1962 at Venice. On that occasion, mainly procedural points were discussed and it was envisaged that the substantive negotiations would
continue in the autumn, if possible in October 1962.
140. During the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and I agreed that the negotiations should be resumed on 30 October or 6 November 1962. On 18 October of that year, it was agreed to schedule a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Salzburg on 7 and 8 November 1962, It came as a complete surprise when, a few days before that date, the Italian Government declared that because of the proposed composition of the Austrian delegation —it was to include two members of the Tyrolean provincial Government, which is one of the nine Austrian provincial Governments— the character of the negotiations, as held at Venice, would be changed and that a further period of preparation would therefore be required by the Italian side. The meeting therefore could not take place.
141. On 20 November 1962 —parliamentary elections had been held in Austria on 18 November— The President of the Republic of Austria called upon the Government which had been in office hitherto to continue to discharge its functions until a new Government was formed. The Austrian side was therefore ready and willing to negotiate at all times.
142. Immediately after the new Austrian Government was formed, it again proposed, on 9 April 1963, that the bilateral negotiations should be resumed. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the Austrian Government's proposal corresponded to the wishes of the Italian Government, but that they would have to wait until a new Italian Cabinet was formed. On 24 July 1963, the Austrian Government again submitted specific proposals concerning a date for negotiations, and at the end of July an Austrian delegation proceeded to Rome for preparatory discussions. At these discussions agreement in principle was reached on the agenda for the foreign Mininsters' meeting, the composition of delegations on both sides, and the date —the Ministers would meet between 2 and 5 September 1963 at Salzburg.
143. On 6 August 1963, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed us that, in view of the recent bombing incidents in Italy, it did not consider it opportune to hold the scheduled Foreign Ministers' meeting, and suggested holding the meeting in New York, where the two Foreign Ministers would be during the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Austrian Government replied that it could in no circumstances agree to the proposed procedure, since it was the obvious intention of the subversive activities to prevent negotiations.
144. On 8 August 1963, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed us that he was prepared to agree that the planned meeting of Ministers should take place in the first ten days of September. On 26 August 1963, however, we were told by the Italian Government that a meeting of Foreign Ministers between 2 and 5 September 1963 would not further the objective that both sides wished to attain. The following reasons were given: first, the continuation of the terrorist activities and the lack of certain co-operation from the Austrian authorities in the search for the perpetrators; and, secondly, the critical attitude of the Austrian Press towards Italy.
145. On the following day, the Italian Government was informed that its position had created surprise and astonishment on the Austrian side, for the following reasons: first, for almost one year repeated efforts had been made by the Austrian side to arrange a Foreign Ministers' meeting, but these efforts had so far failed, solely because of the objections raised by Italy; secondly, the continuation of the subversive activities could not be given as a reason for a third postponement of the negotiations, because it would be tantamount to enabling some few extremists to continue indefinitely to prevent such negotiations. The reference to the attitude of the Austrian Press was no reason for postponing or deferring the meeting, because it was well known that there was freedom of the Press in Austria, and the Austrian Government could not be held responsible for what was printed in the Italian Press; thirdly, it is well known to the Italian Government that the Austrian prosecuting authorities acted without delay and irrespective of the persons involved whenever they were informed of activities in Austria connected with subversive activities in South Tyrol. These measures have in several cases led to the conviction in court of persons found guilty. On the other hand, it is a universally recognized principle that legal assistance to foreign countries is not granted in cases of a political nature.
146. In reply to the Austrian proposal that the negotiations should be resumed immediately after the return of both Foreign Ministers from the General Assembly —the Austrian side suggested the period between l4 and 18 October 1963— the Italian Government stated that it agreed in principle, but repeated the conditions it had already put forward. The Austrian Government took note with satisfaction of this agreement in principle, but rejected the conditions that Italy had again attached thereto.
147. I feel bound to point out that it is not complying with the United Nations resolutions when one side repeatedly attaches conditions to the mere holding of negotiations, conditions which cannot be fulfilled because they are outside the sphere of influence of the Austrian Government, or if demands are made on us to take action against the Press, which is contrary to the principles of our Constitution, or, finally, if we are given instructions concerning the composition of the Austrian delegation which are incompatible with our sovereignty.
148. I wish to repeat in unequivocal terms that the Austrian Government, the Federal Chancellor and I myself have always shunned terror and violence. I am convinced that we can find a solution for this unhappy situation only if we remove all the obstacles to the holding of negotiations at the earliest possible date. I feel sure that if more determined and energetic efforts to hold negotiations had been made by all sides during the two years since the last United Nations resolutions, a more peaceful atmosphere would prevail today.
149. It is most regrettable that the differences between Austria and Italy with regard to the question of South Tyrol have caused loss of human life.
150. We do not wish to dramatize the dispute. We want a settlement through negotiations. But there must finally be the will to negotiate on the Italian side, too.
151. Two years ago in the Special Political Committee [296th meeting] I drew attention to the fact that the Austrian Government had documentary evidence testifying that South Tyrolean prisoners had been tortured by members of the Italian police.
152. Since 1961, we have shown the greatest restraint, in order to enable the Italian authorities to take appropriate action of their own accord. This they failed to do. One might ask whether Austria is entitled to draw the Assembly's attention to such events which occurred in another State. Indeed it is.
153. The United Nations considers itself competent to deal with questions regarding the violation of human rights —as is demonstrated by Item 77 of this year's agenda. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stipulating that no one shall be subjected to torture, corresponds to Article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention, to which Austria and Italy are parties. This Convention also provided for the establishment of appropriate organs for the protection of human rights. The Austrian Government therefore reserves the right to submit the matter to these organs for consideration.
154. The purpose of the extensive statement I have made here on behalf of the Austrian Government concerning the question of South Tyrol is to inform the Assembly of the state of implementation of the two unanimously adopted resolutions and to demonstrate that Austria has done everything to make negotiations possible. And we do want to negotiate. Only in this way can we comply with the idea expressed by President Kennedy in his memorable address to the Assembly on 20 September 1963:
"It is never too early to try; it is never too late to talk; and it is high time that many disputes on the agenda of this Assembly were taken off the debating schedule and placed on the negotiating table." [1209th meeting, para. 42.]