Mr. President, I should like immediately to say what a pleasure it is for me, representing my country here, to sit under your chairmanship. We are confident that your great gifts of intellect and your natural authority will guide this Assembly well during all its sittings. Therefore I wish you every success in your high office and I pledge that the delegation of the United Kingdom will always co-operate to help you and to further the purposes of our Organization and the smooth working of our affairs.
52. For a number of years those of us who have spoken to the Assembly have done so against a background of cold war, and on any analysis it has been the deep schism in ideology between the communist world and the rest that has accounted for the comparative failure of the United Nations to develop collective security and peace-keeping machinery —at once the ambition of the authors of the Charter and in the long run the only sure guarantee for the peace of the world.
53. I have never concealed from my colleagues who sit here where, in my belief, the blame for our frustration has lain. I have placed it firmly on that part of the Marxian-communist doctrine which permitted the use of force in order to promote and assert a political creed. National jealousies and national rivalries bear a heavy share of the guilt. But since the last war it has been subversion, backed by the threat of armed action, that has been at the root of the world's fears.
54. Now there are signs which herald anew chapter of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the West and that, in turn, may have the most profound effect on the influence and usefulness of the United Nations. If that is so, the reason for it is very largely this. Mr. Khrushchev has said time and again in recent months, and declared on behalf of the Government of the Soviet Union, that in modern conditions to interpret the communist doctrine as leading inevitably to war is not only wrong but is folly. So strongly has be held this view and —if I may use the wrong metaphor— stuck to his guns in public that he has been willing to split the communist world in half rather than compromise on his statements.
55. If I may say so, with respect, the Soviet Union is right to take this uncompromising stand against war, and when Mr. Gromyko, when I was visiting his country a short time ago, allowed me to broadcast and to speak on television to the people of the Soviet Union, I told them that this was the key for which the world had been waiting, and indeed the only key which could open the way to genuine coexistence. Therefore I welcome it, as I do the approach to peace through negotiation, which was the theme running through the speech of Mr. Gromyko when he addressed this General Assembly on 19 September [1208th meeting]. For the plain truth is that since the nuclear bomb has been developed and perfected, war is unthinkable either as an instrument of national policy or as a means of propagating political doctrine. The more we know about nuclear weaponry —and now we know a great deal— the more certain it is that man will have to think again about his traditional habits and attitudes in respect of his relations with his neighbour.
56. On paper, the communist doctrine, as I understand it, and the communist theory, may include the use of force, but in fact Russia's national interest cannot endorse it, The Chinese may persuade themselves that, following a nuclear holocaust, they might inherit the earth. But nuclear dust knows no frontiers and all China's millions will not save it from that. China too, in due course, will need to drop force from its national programme if it wishes to survive. Mr. Khrushchev said recently in Moscow that at the end of a nuclear war no one could say what the fate of the survivors might be, and he asked the question: might not they envy the dead? It was vividly put; it could hardly be better put, because it is no exaggeration, I believe, of what the effects of a nuclear explosion and a nuclear war might be on mankind.
57. But good as it is, it does not go quite far enough. To renounce war is good, but to advocate neighbourliness is better. As a start, I think that we would all do well to realize that all roads lead neither to communism nor to capitalism, nor indeed to any other kind of "ism". In my country we have a mixed economy where private enterprise and public enterprise combine for the advantage of both. There are, I am sure, enough divisions in the world without trying to create any more which are artificial.
58. So while I agree with Mr. Khrushchev's renunciation of war, I perhaps show even more enthusiasm for another statement which he made, again only a short time ago. He said: "The construction of communism in the Soviet Union is tantamount to the fulfilment of our international duty to all the revolutionary forces of the world." In other words —and Mr. Gromyko will correct me if I am wrong— Soviet communism from now on, according to Mr. Khrushchev, will proceed certainly on its strength, but not through acts of power, not through acts of subversion, nor of exploitation of other people's quarrels, but by the force of example. If Soviet communism can convert the world by that kind of fair competition, no one can have any quarrel with it. I and my country may not approve of communist philosophy or practice, but if communism wins on those terms then it has won by fair means.
59. It would be optimistic to think that, at this stage in our history, even though there may be a very much better atmosphere between the great Powers and a lessening of tension, we can avoid fighting of all kinds in the world, The dissolution of the empires of Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands has meant that the countries of Asia and Africa today are faced with the need to contrive harmonious relations between each other. Rivalries and jealousies are, it is true, already emerging —everybody knows that and everybody sees them— but there is a dawning perception of the truth that war between African or Asian countries may easily lead to catastrophe.
60. In Africa, for example, many of the newly independent countries realize what chaos there would be in that continent if there was an attempt to alter boundaries by force. If I read the conclusions of the Addis Ababa Conference aright, there certainly seemed a recognition of the red light in that respect. Yet perhaps I may be forgiven if I give one word of caution, for surely in contemplating wars of liberation, either to alter the direction of Portuguese colonial policy or to compel the South African Government to abandon its policy of apartheid, some are in danger of falling into the error which they have so vigorously denounced in others, For the lesson of the twentieth century and of the nuclear age is this —and it is the same for African, Asian and European— that force can never solve anything, and that the political emotions which inspire the desire to employ it however strong they may be must be resisted. Wars of liberation are none the less wars, and it is the duty of countries to avoid wars and of the United Nations, if it can, to stop them —wars of all kinds.
61. It is true, of course, that every nation has the right of self-defence, and that is necessary should a neighbour run amok, but example and negotiation, patience and persistence, are the only legitimate means of altering the status quo. That is the truth which nations everywhere, great and small, have to accept because, let me repeat, a nuclear explosion may take place in Europe or the Soviet Union or America, but nuclear dust has no frontier and unless that truth is accepted all men will die.
62. The nations of the world therefore must accept that truth —and, if It is accepted by the West and by the Soviet Union, that could alter the prospects for the whole of mankind. It could start to alter them now because the emphasis of the meetings between other countries and the Soviet Union would be changed. It would change because, instead of there being meetings to avert a series of recurrent crises, very often of an imminent nature, there would be meetings where we would look for mutual advantage. If the Soviet Union and the United States and the countries of Europe can set that example of peaceful change, it will be an example in the place where it is most needed. And then a new readiness to negotiate should almost immediately be reflected in easier relations within the United Nations, and a start could really be made towards realizing the ambitions of the authors of the Charter, when they held that the role of the great Powers was to combine together to help all the rest of the nations keep the peace.
63. I must, unhappily —but it is only realistic— express myself conditionally because, although I believe that the Soviet Union has publicly and finally renounced force, and although I endorse very much of the message which Mr. Gromyko brought to the Assembly, it does not help to gloss over the situations in which the communist and Western philosophies still confront each other on the ground. I am happy to say there are few of these places. But the Berlin Wall is still there, which is a denial of peaceful coexistence, either between West Germany and the Soviet Germany or between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Treaty. Self-determination, which is preached for others, is still denied to the East Germans.
64. The Soviet Union claims that East Germany is independent and deserves recognition, but so little confidence do the Soviet authorities have in the regime and in the people that they forbid those free elections which alone can decide the future of that country.
65. Those disputes are there, and we must not overlook them. And there is little evidence that they can be settled now. Nevertheless, it is all gain if the Soviet Union and the allies of the West have decided that from now on these problems, as well as all others, should be settled by negotiation and not by force, however long that negotiation may take. If that is the difference between 1962 and 1963, that is the most notable advance. And what I want to be able to do in the Assembly at the nineteenth session next year, is to be able to look back and say that the eighteenth session marked the beginning of the end of the cold war.
66. I should like to say more; I should like to be more ambitious in any proposals that I may make on behalf of my Government. But I believe that we are at the beginning of a period in which we can organize peace and that meanwhile, although an agreement upon the main issues may not be in sight, nevertheless there are certain things that we can do, and should do, which would create a climate that would enable the so far unresolved political problems to be considered more objectively and more calmly. I believe that what we should do now is to agree on certain collateral measures which could contribute to an atmosphere of confidence, and I shall try to analyse very shortly what I believe the possibilities to be.
67. I think it is true that no country which has nuclear weapons today would hand over the control of those weapons to another country which has not. I am certain that that is true of all nuclear countries. In no circumstances would my country consent to hand over the control of nuclear weapons to another country which does not have them now. Nevertheless, although that is in fact the position, I believe there would be value to the world in an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and I believe that such an agreement would reduce the risks of future war.
68. Then, in the field of anti-surprise-attack, I believe it would be a contribution to peace to place observers, even if they are in a comparatively static role, over the whole area of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and, if other countries are interested in joining such a plan, perhaps further afield. It would, I take it, reduce the fears constantly expressed by the West German Government and constantly expressed by the Soviet Union that there might be a surprise attack, either from East or from West. I believe that, for the months immediately ahead, this is the most promising follow-up to the nuclear test ban treaty, and it should certainly be possible to work out and adopt such a plan.
69. Then, again —although this affects, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union more than anyone else— I believe it should be possible to prevent nuclear weapons taking charge of space. If the United States and the Soviet Union were able to come to such an arrangement, I hope it would be left open-ended in case others, at a later stage, were interested and wished to join.
70. If we could achieve all of these measures, or even some of them, then the atmosphere for general disarmament would be immeasurably improved.
71. The secret of the success of the Geneva Conference, and the success indeed of any disarmament plan, is still the same —still identical with the principles agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union and ourselves two years ago. It is that the process must be balanced and the programme must be phased. If we could arrive at general and complete disarmament in one jump, which is the constant plea of the Soviet Union, well and good. But I think all of us agree that the confidence for such a move is simply not there at present. Therefore we have to be content with a rather less ambitious programme, although our aim, of course, must be general disarmament under effective international control.
72. In the context of a phased disarmament, I have given close attention to Mr. Gromyko's speech, and I welcome very much the constructive passages in it on disarmament, and particularly that passage in which he said that the Soviet Union would be willing to see a certain number of missiles retained on both sides in the third phase of disarmament. It removes, in my opinion, one of the objections to the proposals of 1962 made by the Soviet Union, and incidentally illustrates the value of discussions in Geneva, because in such ways and through such means we are able to modify our own proposals.
73. There are some others of Mr. Gromyko’s suggestions to which I could not give so much approval. But it may be that we are getting nearer to the point now when we can make a beginning with the physical destruction of some weapons. That is what my Government wants to see —the physical destruction of some weapons— because, if that takes place, it will begin to turn the rising graph of armaments downwards. We intend to use the Geneva Conference for the most intensive study of the proposals now made by Mr. Gromyko and the general prospects of getting on more quickly with at least phase one of the disarmament programme.
74. Mr. Gromyko said that in order to bring about a radical shift in the disarmament talks, it might be convenient to bring together the leading statesmen of the eighteen countries, and I think he was thinking in terms of the Prime Ministers. We see some value in such a meeting. The best would be if it could meet to record progress; the next best would be to lay down clear directives to produce programmes of physical disarmament under a number of specific headings. But I hope I am not being irreverent when I say that such exalted gentlemen, on past form, have rather tended to be above the business of detail and the market place. Above all things, balanced disarmament requires precision,
75. Therefore, I suggest that the best way in which we should proceed would be to select certain objectives now, to subject them to intensive study either at Geneva or by some other machinery set up by our Governments, as is necessary. I would say that observers against surprise attack, non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and progress on Stage I of disarmament, including the immobilization or the destruction of some nuclear delivery vehicles, is the practical programme which we could undertake. We would gladly join in discussions of any kind which would give us a chance of showing results. I would add that I think that, if the principals who have really to deal in disarmament can agree on the measures of disarmament among themselves, it would not so much matter what kind of meeting you had, either to record them or to point the way to future progress.
76. But I have used the word in the past, and I use it again now in default of a better, that we should not after the test ban treaty lose momentum. Because it would be easy, fatally easy, to relapse once more back into the armed dangerous stalemate of recent years. I do not subscribe to the view that there is no scope for settlement between East and West, or that if we go in for negotiations the result must always redound to the advantage of the other side. I am sure we can assure results which give us mutual advantages, because doctrine is changed by the facts of life, situations are not static, fresh opportunities arise which it is the business of statesmen to seize. If I believe, as I believe, that the mind of the Soviet Union is now moving in the same direction, then I can say nothing better than let our minds meet.
77. There is another aspect of United Nations practice, closely related to the problem of peaceful change, about which I would like to say a word. Inspired very largely by the newer Members of the Organization —and I understand the reasons for it— more and more of the Organization's time is being given to accelerating political change in dependent territories. We have always held in the United Kingdom that our dependent colonies should be made independent and that the territories should stand on their own feet in the world. That we have accepted long ago. But, frankly, there are certain repercussions deriving from the policy of decolonization by our country which we have lately found it rather difficult to understand.
78. I would like to illustrate this by two topical examples. Kenya's passage to independence has been marked by a rupture of diplomatic relations between Somaliland and the United Kingdom. Why? Because the United Kingdom refused, before Kenya achieves its independence, to dismember Kenya and has insisted that if there is to be any alteration in Kenya's frontier, that must be decided by the people of Kenya and the Government of Kenya after independence and not before. I doubt if anybody would quarrel with the United Kingdom on that. Yet it has led to a breach in diplomatic relations between one of our great friends and ourselves.
79. Then again, we have proclaimed the independence of Malaysia, thereby giving complete independence to three former colonial territories. The result of that has been a vicious attack on us by the country of Indonesia.
80. I am only asking today that the Assembly should ponder these things because they seem to us to be strange by-products of the grant of independence which is urged upon us as a policy by every Asian and African country. And, you know, imperialism can come about in any guise. I only leave that thought with you today.
81. But it inspires me to restate British objectives in a few short sentences, because the issue for us is not whether any territory should gain its independence; the issue is when it should gain its independence. The only check on the transfer of power from the United Kingdom to the government of the country concerned is that we want to be sure that when independence is granted, the country will be able to make both ends meet economically and that it will accept a constitution, from the day of independence, which will work for the well-being of every section of society in that country. Therefore, all we want to be sure of is this: that I or any other spokesman for the United Kingdom standing at this rostrum, or in any other international forum, can say to the world with a good conscience that we have provided the country concerned with responsible government within, so that it may be a good neighbour without.
82. Now is that wrong? Is there any member, for instance, of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four who would quarrel with what I have said? Yet we in the United Kingdom constantly find ourselves in the dock on matters of colonialism. I hope that from now on —and that is the reason I mentioned this matter to the Assembly today at all— that we can go along with the majority of the United Nations in these colonial matters, for this reason. We have accepted the principle of self-determination without qualification; We have accepted that the majority should rule. We insist, as far as we are able to do before independence, that minorities must be protected. I do not think that any of you would quarrel with that. But if having established the rule of majority, and because of our scrupulous care to safeguard the interest of minorities —because that after all is the essence of democracy— we are going to be put into the dock, then I or the representative of my Government here will stand in the dock with our heads high.
83. I should like to say a word about what is called neo-colonialism, and I want to say it in good time and in good temper —so far. I should very much like to have a definition of "neo-colonialism"; I have never understood what it means, and I doubt if the authors of the word understand it either.
84. But my answer to the charge of neo-colonialism against my country, or indeed against any other country which still has colonial possessions, is crisp and direct, and I hope to the point. I shall put it in the form of two questions. Do the newly independent countries want capital for development or do they not? Is the world's greatest problem the gap which is developing between the earnings of the countries that are rich and the earnings of the countries that are poor, or is it not? My Government believes that the greatest problem before the world today, as the representative of El Salvador has hinted just now, is the gap between the rich and the poor countries. We believe that that gap must be bridged. And if the gap is to be bridged by means of capital for development, where is that capital to be found?
85. Now, if the cry of "neo-colonialism" was just a parrot-cry of adolescence the countries possessing the capital at present could shrug their shoulders and invest. But it is not. It is coming to be the prelude to the seizure of assets. A few more cases like Indonesia —this is why I want to make these comments in time to this Assembly— and the supply of capital will dry up, and not only there but further afield as well. It will not be the desire of Governments that this should happen. Our Government passionately desires to spare a portion of the national income for investment in under-developed countries. As I say, it will not be the desire of Governments that the capital should dry up, but what will happen will be that the investor will put his capital in places —and there are many such places in the world— where that capital can fructify.
86. I therefore hope that the countries of Asia and Africa in particular will heed this warning in time, and that we shall hear less about neo-colonialism. It is at best, I believe, a synthetic grievance, and at worst it is deadly dangerous because it encourages poverty and racialism —and those are two dangers which we should eschew like the human plague.
87. As I believe that East and West can come together, so I believe that there is no reason why Britain and the Members of this Organization should quarrel about colonialism any more. We mean to achieve the orderly transfer of power, and that is your wish too. We wish to achieve it by peaceful change, and that, I take it, is your desire too. And I tell you that we intend to transfer power with speed, but to do it in good order, recognizing everywhere —there is no exception to this— the rights of majorities, while at the same time protecting the rights of minorities in so far as we are able to do so.
88. Finally, I should like to offer the Assembly a few reflections arising from the expansion of the United Nations and the impact of that expansion on our procedures.
89. I think most people would agree that membership of the United Nations must be universal. I see no alternative to that, and I doubt if any other representative here sees one. If that is so, then Communist China and South Africa should be Members of this Organization, and so should any other independent country which establishes its identity to our satisfaction. If singly or in groups we carry the process of deploring the politics of one country or another to the point where eviction is allowed by majority vote, this Organization will simply cease to represent the realities of the world. No one asks that the United Nations should tolerate wrong. But our influence on each other should not be achieved by eviction or boycott; it should be achieved by example.
90. If universality is a rule of membership, then there are universal obligations which are a necessary counterpart to it. There are two obligations, as I see it, which are paramount. One is to keep the Organization solvent, and the other is to equip the Secretary- General with the means of keeping the peace and of taking peace-keeping action.
91. The United Kingdom does not always approve of the methods of the United Nations. We did not, for instance, approve of some of the ways in which the Congo operation was conducted. But we supported the Organization with finance; we paid. We support the opinion of the International Court of Justice. If the United Nations Forces have to remain longer in the Congo, we shall again pay our share for that. We are always willing to pay our share of the general expenses of the Organization. But I think it is well that we here should recognize that this issue is coming to a head, and coming to a head quite quickly. In January, if matters continue as they are at present, under Article 19 of the Charter certain countries will forfeit their right to vote.
92. By a special effort of the free nations, the Secretary-General was able to launch a successful bond issue to pay the bills for half of 1963. That was possible only because the United States and the United Kingdom, among others, agreed to bear more than their share of the burden. I think that the great majority here will recognize that that is wrong. But the fact remains that it seems almost certain that some countries will refuse to pay, facing the Members of the United Nations with alternatives, all of which are bad, I shall list those alternatives as follows. Either we must abandon peace-keeping operations, or the whole cost of those operations will fall on those who really care for peace and stability, or by their own hand some Governments will deprive themselves of the right to vote. All those alternatives are bad, and we must try to avoid them. But what I think would be a situation in which some countries, having refused to pay their assessed contributions, at the same time claimed the right to vote on matters concerning peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, Such a position, I repeat, would in our opinion be intolerable.
93. Somewhat back in history, I seem to remember, the cry was raised not far from here; "no taxation without representation". I am going to turn that round and suggest that there should be no representation without taxation, And I hope that the fact that I make the suggestion from an extra-territorial platform situated in an ex-colony will make it respectable in the eyes of my audience.
94. I trust that all Members of the United Nations will help to maintain its existing operations so long as they are needed and will equip the Secretary-General with funds enabling him to accept those assignments which help to avert war and keep the peace.
95. I do not wish to keep the Assembly, and I shall therefore put in only a few words what I want to see. I want to see the element of improvisation removed from the peace-keeping operations of the Organization. In particular, a start should be made to strengthen, on a permanent basis, the chain of command at the disposal of the Secretary-General. If certain operations have to be undertaken, surely it is better that they should be undertaken efficiently.
96. I should be very reluctant, and so would my country, to accept the position that the United Nations could do nothing but talk —although I must say that we are not bad at it. But to abandon peace-keeping operations would, in my opinion, be very bad, for we should be abdicating our duties, which include the promotion of peace and peaceful change —and they lie at the centre of the Charter.
97. We shall gladly share in the months to come with our colleagues in trying to avert this crisis in the United Nations, because should we fail in one of the main purposes of the United Nations our consciences would be heavy with failure.
98. President Kennedy in his speech on 20 September 1963 [1209th meeting] showed us other ways in which the United Nations can respond to the fundamental needs of man. We shall co-operate in trying to lower tariffs and expand trade, and above all, in what he said about the offensive against want, again emphasized by the speaker who preceded me. In that the United States has taken an outstanding part. My Government will line itself up with any activities of the United Nations in this crusade.
99. But wherever I turn to this or that aspect of international living, I always come back to the fact of the nuclear bomb and its impact on man's thoughts and actions. It is the most difficult of all things to reverse the thinking and the habits which have governed man's actions for thousands of years. Yet nothing less will do, because words like "annihilation", "extinction" and "holocaust" are this time real. That is the truth for East and West, for race and race, for coloured and non-coloured, and it is a truth which we must accept. If we accept it, we therefore cannot afford to indulge in the threats of force, the jealousies and prejudices which have been recurring features of international living.
100. The question which I am posing to you now at this General Assembly in 1963 Is this: when we can certainly mark a reduction in tension which has so long bedevilled our affairs, can our minds now grasp the whole truth, and can this Assembly help man to cut through the habits of ages? Because in fact there is no choice if man is to live at peace. And if that is so, and only If it is so, and I pray it be so, man will live to see another and a brighter day.