Mr. President, although the Vice-Chairman of the Philippine delegation has already taken the floor to convey to you our congratulations on your election, you will permit me to add on this occasion the expression of my warm personal felicitations.
2. The eighteenth session of the General Assembly has so far been relatively quiet and even dull. As one who has attended fifteen sessions of the General Assembly since 1946, I can recall many far more exciting than this. Gone are the thumping of desks and the breaking of gavels, the angry words of challenge and the mutual threats of nuclear doom. Representatives seem to have grown tame, as though realizing at last that keeping the peace is much less a matter of winning debating points than of reaching, slow step by slow step, agreements in which humanity is the only winner.
3. We do not, therefore, miss the excitement of previous sessions. A quiet session this maybe, but hardly an uneventful one. It is as if the United Nations, upon coming of age in the eighteenth year of its life, has decided to forswear the meaningless and often dangerous diversions of its youth. Having lost its taste for fireworks and the circus, it is now ready to come to grips with the serious business at hand before it is too late namely, the survival of the human race and the improvement of the human condition. In pursuing this two fold task, it has wisely chosen an attitude of calm but steadfast dedication.
4. The recent conclusion of the partial nuclear test ban treaty encourages in us a sense of sobriety and a feeling of cautious optimism. By itself, the treaty means a sharp decrease in the deadly menace of atmospheric pollution, a check on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a slow-down in the feverish race to improve them. More important, however, this treaty has already shown its potentiality for starting a chain reaction leading to an ascending series of agreements. On 3 October 1963, barely two months after the initialling of the partial test ban agreement in Moscow, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland announced that they had agreed in principle to ban nuclear weapons from space vehicles in orbit.
5. The Moscow Treaty is not a disarmament measure, but the new agreement to denuclearize artificial satellites in space, taken together with the two-year old agreement to ban armaments from Antartica, shows that there exists among the great Powers a readiness to move into the field of actual disarmament under adequate safeguards. We look to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to capitalize on this receptive mood among the nuclear Powers and serve as an honest broker in negotiating further agreements in this field.
6. We have heard of war by "escalation". Let us hope that the Moscow Treaty represents the first step towards peace by "escalation".
7. This leads us to consider next the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. In the Congo, in West Irian, in Yemen, as earlier in Korea, Palestine and Suez, the United Nations has been able to undertake important responsibilities to curb aggression, prevent violence and maintain the peace. The Philippines contributed forces to the United Nations actions in Korea and in the Congo, and we provided civilian personnel to assist the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West Irian. We are prepared to pay our share of the costs of such operations to the extent of our financial ability and we have subscribed to the United Nations bond issue. We hope that equitable arrangements on a permanent basis will be worked out to ensure the success of current as well as future peace-keeping operations of the Organization.
8. Nobody wants to see an increase in United Nations responsibilities in this field. But in a period of nuclear stalemate, war ceases to be a safe instrument of historical change or for settling disputes or achieving national objectives. Only revolution remains in its several guises and variations. Whether we like it or not, the United Nations will increasingly be called upon to assume certain responsibilities in keeping such conflicts and upheavals under adequate control so that they do not spread or get out of hand and involve the great Powers. Realism requires that the United Nations be ready and equipped to perform these tasks.
9. It is fitting that we should pay a tribute to the decisive leadership exercised by the Secretary-General in this domain and we pledge to him our continuing support to the end that the United Nations may develop the requisite authority and capacity to cope with this responsibility.
10. The rapid pace of decolonization in recent years is a matter of deep gratification to us. Eighteen years ago, fully one third of the population of the world were subject peoples. Today, more than forty dependent countries have gained their independence. However, the struggle is far from completely won. Neo-colonialism and communist imperialism are still trying to subvert the freedom of peoples. At the same time, we are witnessing bitter rear-guard actions designed to delay the liberation of the remaining colonial peoples.
11. The question of the Portuguese territories is of great concern to the Assembly, for unless immediate practical steps are taken the situation in these territories, particularly Angola, may explode into open warfare with ugly racial overtones. We plead with Portugal not to misread the writing on the wall and to recognize before it is too late that its own interests, as well as the interests of peace, would be best served by quickly coming to terms with the aspirations of the people of the territories.
12. The same warning applies with equal force to the Government of South Africa. We have repeatedly condemned the practice of apartheid. South Africa is not the only country in the world where racial discrimination exists, but it is the only country in the world that enforces and defends racial discrimination as the policy of the State. This is intolerable in any State subscribing to the Charter of the United Nations. We have, therefore, given vigorous support to measures designed to exert international diplomatic and economic pressure on the Government of South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid. The Philippine Government has imposed a total embargo on goods from South Africa.
13. As regards Southwest Africa, we share the view that unless South Africa agrees to discharge its obligations in that territory in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, our only alternative is to revoke its mandate and transfer the administration of the territory to the United Nations. My delegation would support such a move.
14. Having dealt with some issues of universal interest, we would like to pass on to the serious problems of our part of the world, South-East Asia.
15. The people of the Republic of Viet-Nam are at present engaged in a valiant fight against communist subversion and aggression. They merit the support of the free world. In the discharge of their treaty responsibilities, some members of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization are rendering material assistance to the Government of Viet-Nam.
16. It is a matter for regret, however, that the capacity of the Viet-Namese people to wage war against their enemies is being compromised by an internal problem which vitally concerns their freedom and national survival. The problem of Buddhism in the Republic of Viet-Nam deserves to be considered separately, by itself, outside the context of the East-West conflict.
17. The Philippines believes that the violation of human rights is a matter of international concern and does not fall within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction clause (Article 2, para. 7] of the Charter of the United Nations. Such violation becomes more serious when it is the result of governmental policy or action. We believe further that freedom of religion can be assured under any system, whether there is a State religion or complete separation of Church and State.
18. We find it gratifying that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam lifted martial law some time ago and has now extended through the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, an invitation to some Members of this Assembly to visit Viet-Nam and see for themselves the true situation regarding the relations between the Government and the Buddhist community. It is rare for a Member State of the United Nations and rarer still for a non-member State to admit, let alone invite, United Nations observers or investigators within its borders. This is an earnest of the good faith of the Viet-Namese Government and proof that it has nothing to hide. We should therefore accept the invitation at once, and in fairness decide to suspend consideration of the agenda item pending receipt of the report of our observers.
19. As regards Laos, it will be recalled that fourteen countries assumed special responsibilities for its independence, unity and neutrality in the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962. However, this unprecedented action cannot be said to have relieved the United Nations, which transcends the personality of the fourteen States, of its duty to deal with any matter affecting international peace and security. We can readily understand why the Prime Minister of Laos reported the other day [1210th meeting] to this august body on the precarious situation obtaining in his country. He felt obliged to do so because his country is a Member of the United Nations, although he observed that its problems arose from agreements made outside the framework of the United Nations.
20. While the Charter encourages regional solutions to regional problems, the United Nations is not thereby absolved from its duty under the Charter to intervene or to use its good offices in the interest of peace, Moreover, the Geneva accords are not strictly regional in character. This is because the initiative was taken by the great Powers which have world-wide responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. Not all the countries of South-East Asia were represented at the Geneva Conference. On the other hand, nations from other continents which have no particular interests in South-East Asia participated in the meetings.
21. It should also be noted that the Geneva Agreement of 1962 virtually excluded Laos from the purview of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, which has assumed certain responsibilities for the peace of the Treaty area. My delegation accordingly considers that the United Nations may deal with the problem of Laos either on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State.
22. The Prime Minister of Laos informed us here that there has been no progress whatsoever towards the unity of his country as envisaged in the 1962 Agreement, so much so that its very independence as guaranteed in the 1954 Agreement has been jeopardized. He ascribed this sad state of affairs to continued infiltration and subversion by foreign elements. The International Control Commission has proved to be ineffectual because of the obstructionist policy followed by one member, while the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conferences have not been able to accomplish anything beyond addressing a pious appeal to all concerned to observe the letter and spirit of the Geneva agreements.
23. It may be that a change in its composition or the elimination of the built-in veto will render the International Control Commission more effective. It may also be that there is a fundamental defect in the coalition government called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1962. It should be noted that coalition is synonymous neither with unity nor neutrality. The Philippines has never believed that the "troika" system would work so long as one of the parties continues to receive orders from a foreign government or so long as its avowed aim is to subvert the established government by illegal means. That is why the Philippines chose to have nothing to do at all with the Geneva conferences or with the agreements reached therein. Nevertheless, we would like to see an improvement in the Laotian situation if only as a result of the relaxation of tensions engendered by the recent partial nuclear test ban treaty.
24. The Powers which signed the Geneva Agreement of 1962 should consider making a fresh effort to implement their decisions. Failing that, they should consider submitting the problem, the solution of which has eluded them for the past nine years, to the ultimate judgement of the United Nations. Laos is a Member of the United Nations and as such entitled to the full assistance and proctection of the Organization.
25. In justice to the Powers which signed the Geneva Agreement of 1962, however, we should give them credit for the great service they have rendered the Laotian people in preventing the dismemberment of their country. As a result, Laos has so far escaped the fate of the divided States which have been denied admission to our Organization.
26. We should also like to note with satisfaction the report that two next-door neighbours in our region, Thailand and Cambodia, are hopeful of reaching agreement on a solution to their dispute and on the terms for the restoration of their friendly relations. The credit goes not only to the leaders of the two countries concerned but also to the Secretary-General and his representatives on the spot, whose patient diplomacy is helping to bring about a reconciliation.
27. South-East Asia, with its 250 million people, its bulging rice granary, its abundant production of copra, sugar, rubber, oil, tin and other minerals, lumber, tobacco and spices, is one of the richest and most strategic regions of the world. For centuries it has been the valuable prize coveted, fought over and exploited by the major Western colonial Powers. Most of the latter have now departed. But to the north of this region lies Communist China which, through its southern borders that run from the Himalayas to the China Sea, has the capacity to infiltrate, subvert and attack its neighbours. It committed open aggression against India, which over the years had loyally cultivated its friendship. It is responsible for subversion and guerrilla warfare in Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam. Because of its ruthless pursuit of power, its contempt for the principle of peaceful coexistence, and its declared readiness to risk nuclear catastrophe for ideological reasons, Communist China has become the world's principal source and inspirer of the fear of war. But for the countries of South-East Asia, in particular, Communist China is the principal goad pushing them towards mutual help, co-operation and unity.
28. At this point, I trust I may be permitted to report with pardonable pride that Manila during the past year has served as a busy centre of regional diplomatic activity. The conferences held in the capital city of my country included the nineteenth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East which devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of promoting economic development and improving living conditions in the region. The familiar slogan of "trade, not aid", acquired new significance as the members of ECAFE wrestled once again with the well-known contrast between the low, unstable prices of raw materials and the ever-increasing prices of consumer and capital goods from the industrial countries. It was clearly shown that the entire amount of technical and financial assistance which the developed countries had given to the under-developed and developing countries in any given year was, in fact, less than the loss suffered by the latter due to the depressed prices of their export products and the steadily higher prices they had to pay for their imports from the industrial countries. This stern statistical fact seemed to make a mockery of the entire system of foreign economic aid and exposed it as a tissue of noble intentions nullified by the realities of trade and profit. There was talk in Manila of an Asian common market, but we know that at this stage such talk is little better than whistling in the dark. The night is too full of the established ghosts of economic and financial power, and we need the benign spirit of the United Nations to exorcise them from the economic world of the under-developed and developing countries.
29. We also celebrated in Manila the second anniversary of the Association of South-East Asia, organized by Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines to promote closer economic, social and cultural co-operation among them.
30. But the principal diplomatic event of the year in Manila was without doubt the holding there from 30 July to 5 August of the summit meeting between Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines and President Sukarno of Indonesia. On the initiative of the President of the Philippines, they met to resolve their differences about the formation of the new Federation of Malaysia, At the end of their meeting, they adopted the Manila Accord of 31 July 1963, which was the report of their Foreign Ministers; a Joint Statement, which set forth the details of the settlement of their dispute over Malaysia; and the Manila Declaration, in which they agreed to establish a consultative organization known as Maphilindo —Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. This last achievement, which was hailed around the world, was described by President Macapagal as the reunion of triplet brothers who at birth had been placed under three foster parents —Indonesia under the Netherlands, the Philippines under Spain and the United States of America, and Malaya under the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland— but who, having come of age, now need to discover anew their common origin and destiny. In effect, these three countries have a common Malay origin, and number together 140 millions.
31. This was the atmosphere in which the achievements of the Manila summit meeting were received amidst euphoria. The three Malay Heads of Government had agreed to resolve their differences over Malaysia: Indonesia was prepared to welcome Malaysia provided it was purged of its neo-colonialist taint, and the Philippines agreed to welcome it on condition that the inclusion of the territory of Sabah or North Borneo in the new Federation would not prejudice our claim to that territory or any right thereunder. Both Indonesia and the Philippines were prepared to accept Malaysia, and thus subordinate their doubts and misgivings, "provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative" —to quote the words of paragraph 10 of the Manila Accord.
32. At our request, the Secretary-General was good enough to accept the task of ascertainment. He sent a mission of nine members to the two territories of Sarawak and Sabah; the mission submitted its report to him; and on 14 September 1963 he made public his conclusions on the basis of that report. He announced that his team had found a majority of the inhabitants of the two territories in favour of federation with Malaya. Two days later, on 16 September, Malaysia was proclaimed. That was the day before the opening of the present session of the General Assembly.
33. The Philippines and Indonesia had certain reservations about the findings of the United Nations Malaysia Mission, which they respectfully communicated to the Secretary-General. As of today, they have not welcomed or recognized Malaysia.
34. Before explaining our position, I wish to reiterate emphatically our confidence in the integrity of the Secretary-General, in his good faith and sincere intention to comply with the letter and spirit of the agreement reached in Manila. The ascertainment operation fell short of its goal because of circumstances beyond his control. The facts indicate that the main responsibility for the failure of the United Nations survey teams to fulfil the terms of the Secretary-General's mandate rests with the United Kingdom authorities.
35. The terms of the ascertainment operation represented a carefully balanced structure of understandings and compromises among the Maphilindo countries. There were three important conditions: first, that the task should be carried out with a fresh approach, meaning that the ascertainment should not rely on previous British procedures and findings; second, that there should be complete compliance with the principle of self-determination in accordance with the requirements of principle IX of the annex to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), meaning that the ascertainment operation should be a genuine and thorough effort rather than a pro forma job; and, third, that observers representing the three countries should witness the ascertainment.
36. The Philippine Government went to great lengths to forestall any possible misunderstanding of these conditions, and to help facilitate the Secretary-General's task. Immediately after the meeting in Manila, we dispatched a special envoy to United Nations Headquarters to explain not only the agreements themselves but also their background, the compromises they represented and the understandings under which they were accepted —understandings which, though they were not in writing, were equally binding on the three countries in the Asian spirit of "mushawara".
37. One such unwritten understanding was that the ascertainment would take at least a month and that Malaysia would be proclaimed about the end of September. Another was that the sending of observers would be an integral part of the ascertainment operation.
38. Thus we sought to obviate the possibility of an unintentional misreading of the terms of the ascertainment. Nevertheless, its three essential conditions were not fully complied with. For instance, the time-table of the operation, which had been envisaged to cover four to six weeks, was drastically reduced to ten working days. This, in turn, rendered impossible not only the "complete compliance" but also the "fresh approach" called for under paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement. Obliged to operate within these crippling restrictions, the United Nations working teams had to rely heavily on the previous United Kingdom procedures and findings. They had no choice. They were under heavy pressure of time, and they could hardly be blamed for doing so. This was, however, contrary to the intent of the Manila Accord. The report of our own observers, carefully prepared and documented, clearly shows the extent of that reliance.
39. The unreasonable obstructions to the complete witnessing of the ascertainment operation was also a clear violation of the Manila Accord. The fact that the Philippine and Indonesian observers were able to witness only the last three days of the operation was a substantive and unjustified modification of that agreement, The irony of the situation is manifest in the fact that the first two thirds of the ascertainment operation was witnessed exclusively by representatives of the United Kingdom and Federation of Malaya, the two countries already committed to the incorporation of the two territories into Malaysia.
40. The squabbling and quibbling about our observers were beyond belief. For two weeks we haggled with the United Kingdom authorities about the number, the rank and the mode of transport of our observers. First, they agreed to two observers, then to four observers, then to four additional assistants, and, to cap it all, they wanted to dictate how junior the assistants should be. Finally, the United Kingdom, which, as an ally of my country, may fly its military aircraft into Philippine air bases at any time on request, refused landing rights to the one aircraft which was to bring our observers to Borneo.
41. The crowning gesture, however, of disregard for the Manila Agreement was the United Kingdom announcement, in the very midst of the ascertainment operation, that the new Federation of Malaysia would be proclaimed on 16 September, irrespective of the outcome of the ascertainment; I repeat, irrespective of the outcome of the ascertainment. This announcement was plainly contrary to the Manila Accord which provided that the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah should be ascertained prior to the establishment of the new Federation. The Secretary-General was so disturbed by this announcement that he later described it "as a slap on the United Nations".
42. In his statement here of 27 September [1219th meeting], Lord Home, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, challenged Mr. Palar, the representative of Indonesia, either to say that he impugns the integrity of the Secretary-General and his teams or to "keep quiet and accept the findings with good grace". Is anybody who deliberately obstructed the task of ascertainment, including the participation of our observers, and who himself showed such scant regard for the Secretary-General, entitled to stand here as the defender of the integrity of the Secretary-General? Does anyone who had publicly announced that he would disregard the findings of the United Nations teams have the right to accuse somebody else of ignoring those findings?
43. The Government of the Philippines could not set aside the findings of its own observers or close its eyes to the failure of the United Nations teams to implement faithfully the terms of the Manila Agreement. The Secretary-General was obliged to draw his conclusions on the basis of the findings put before him by his survey teams. We do not challenge his conclusions. But we do take exception to the manner in which the survey was conducted and the report prepared. This was a case where the conduct of the survey was perhaps even more important than the outcome of the survey itself. It was important that the ascertainment should not only be honest but should appear to be honest.
44. As regards the report of the United Nations Malaysia Mission, the internal evidence shows that it was prepared with undue haste, with considerably less than the care and objectivity which one expects of a United Nations document. I have accordingly registered with the Secretary-General our reservations in respect of the report. We have, however, deliberately refrained from taking any further steps in regard to this matter out of our deep regard for the Secretary-General's position and the difficulties under which he himself acknowledges he had to discharge his mandate. He is satisfied that we understand his position, and we appreciate his understanding of ours. He is aware that we do not question his judgement by deciding to hold the recognition of the new State of Malaysia under advisement, for this is merely our way of saying, in effect, that we are less than satisfied with the way in which the ascertainment was carried out and the report prepared.
45. In referring to Malaysia, I have used the term "new State" advisedly. It was so conceived by its founders. It was envisaged as such by the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 —the Cobbold Commission— which recommended its establishment in these words: "We have examined the Federation of Malaya Constitution and have concluded that it could be taken as a basis for the purpose of the creation of Malaysia. With the necessary amendments to the Constitution, we envisage the entry of the two Borneo territories as States within the Federation. With their admission, the Federation of Malaya would cease to exist as a political entity, and would be succeeded by the Federation of Malaysia."
46. For the Philippines, the question is not merely one of nomenclature or legal nicety. Vital national interests are involved, chief among these being our pending claim to Sabah or North Borneo, one of the territories which have been incorporated in the new State of Malaysia.
47. I shall not burden the record with a discussion of the legal basis and historical background of our claim. Our statement at the seventeenth regular session is adequate for this purpose. I only wish to point out that paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord states: "The Philippines made it clear that its position on the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia is subject to the final outcome of the Philippine claim to North Borneo", and that "the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia would not prejudice either the claim or any right thereunder."
48. The Philippine Government does not consider as adequate a simple statement that the new State of Malaysia accepts the commitments of the former Federation of Malaya under the agreement reached at Manila. What is required is a formal, explicit undertaking by the new State of Malaysia to co-operate in the peaceful settlement of the Philippine claim to North Borneo. It requires, further, that a mutually acceptable procedure for settlement be agreed upon.
49. It should be recalled that Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman signed the Manila Accord on behalf of the Federation of Malaya, a State which did not include North Borneo, and was therefore not directly involved in the dispute. Indeed, the commitment assumed by the Federation of Malaya consisted of a simple pledge to join Indonesia and the Philippines in requesting the United Kingdom Government to agree to seek a just and expeditious solution to the dispute, A statement, therefore, that the new Federation of Malaysia accepts the obligations of the former Federation of Malaya under the Manila Accord would result in an equivocation. The fact is that the new State of Malaysia has now, so far as control over North Borneo is concerned, succeeded to the United Kingdom Government, It is in this new capacity as successor to the United Kingdom Government in North Borneo that the new Federation of Malaysia has been requested by our Government to agree to a definite procedure for the settlement of our claim.
50. The United Kingdom Government, despite the fact that it considered our claim to be weak, nevertheless ignored our repeated requests to agree to any of the modes of pacific settlement mentioned in the Charter, and in particular to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over the case. We hope that Malaysia will accept more readily than the United Kingdom our repeated appeals to the rule of law.
51. The record of the United Kingdom in the domain of decolonization is admirable in many ways. Among the great colonial Powers, it has acted sensibly and with deliberate speed to set its numerous dependent territories on the road to freedom. In the particular case of Malaysia, it Is only fair to underline the fact that the United Kingdom, which had never before permitted United Nations personnel to enter and survey conditions in any of its Non-Self-Governing Territories, did agree to admit a United Nations survey mission in Sarawak and Sabah, But, having taken this unprecedented decision, the United Kingdom authorities either tried to nullify it or render it meaningless in the manner already described. It is a matter for regret that so hopeful a precedent was not permitted to develop fully and in good faith. The ridiculous dispute about our observers would seem to justify the suspicion that a trap had been deliberately set for Indonesia and the Philippines so that they would be compelled to question the findings of the United Nations teams and thus put our two countries at odds with the United Nations as well as with Malaysia.
52. This would be impossible to believe were it not that this is merely an example of the old imperialist tactic of "divide and rule". No colonial Power has ever of its free will and volition relinquished dominion over another country or people. When it does withdraw, under heavy threat or pressure, it tries to minimize the loss and to retain in some measure, under camouflage, its former power and influence. In certain cases, it plants booby-traps of suspicion, dissension and conflict among those it leaves behind. A perceptive commentary in this connexion is to be found in an editorial article entitled "Malaysia", in the issue of 19September 1963 of the newspaper Pawn of Karachi, Pakistan. I quote: "It is one of the lessons of post-war history that imperialism invariably leaves behind a legacy of strife and trouble in the lands it has controlled and misruled. Few in this country" —that is, Pakistan— "can ever forget that the British made a parting gift of the Kashmir problem to the two successors of the former British Indian empire, Pakistan and India, and sowed the seeds of permanent hostility between the two countries. With this memory of what colonialists do when they have to pack up and go back home still fresh in their minds, Pakistanis can well understand the motivation behind Britain's leave-taking policy in the North Borneo region. If colonialism leaves some trouble behind, there will be some scope for it to secure advantages which will otherwise be unavailable."
53. To say Kashmir and Malaysia, in this context, is to say Palestine, Indo-China and the Congo.
54. In the dispute over Malaysia, our choice was between a course which would have sown the seeds of enduring hatred amongst the three countries of Malay origin and completely destroyed Maphilindo, and another that might temporarily estrange the three countries from one another, while reducing Maphilindo to a state of suspended animation. More broadly, our choice was between a decision that would have made us a party to the act of confrontation, and a decision which enables us to help in moderating an explosive situation and discouraging outside intervention that could make South-East Asia the cockpit of a new war.
55. The role of the Philippines in the diplomatic "tour de force" that gave birth to Malphilindo was that of a mutual friend, fraternal intermediary, and faithful interlocutor. That remains our role today.
56. We have made a choice not between Indonesia or Malaysia, but between either of these alone and both of them together. We continue to place our faith in Maphilindo.
57. Maphilindo was a glorious improvisation. Yet, in fact, it was the fruition of the dreams of many generations of Filipino and other Malay heroes. These dreams found in President Macapagal their predestined architect and builder.
58. The new and still unfinished edifice of Maphilindo has suffered some damage at the hands of those who do not like it and never liked it. But, with faith and patience, with vision and energy we shall rebuild Maphilindo stronger and more stable than before, a more stately mansion for our peoples in South-East Asia than we planned in the beginning.
59. The present crisis over Malaysia constitutes the first real test of the capacity of the three Maphilindo countries to overcome their differences and to prevent them from hardening into permanent hostility. Therefore, in conclusion, may I say to our Malaysian and Indonesian brothers: "Heed not the counsels of those who wish to divide us and who intend to keep us divided. Too long have we listened to them. Too long have they profited from our division. They shall go away from here, but South-East Asia is our home, and here we shall live, stuck together, for all eternity. Here, then, let us make our pledge, in the face of all the world, by standing together as brothers and neighbours, erect and proud and unafraid".