I should like first to congratulate the President on his election to his high office. It gives me particular pleasure, as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that I should be addressing this Assembly under the presidency of a representative of a country with which my own has so many close ties.
81. This fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations must be of great significance in world affairs. Indeed, never since the foundation of the Organization has one of the sessions been attended by so many international figures or commanded such wide public attention.
82. In this great Assembly, with nearly one hundred nations represented, there are bound to be different views. Some of the speeches that have been delivered have been partisan and even violent. I will try not to follow this example, for I feel that it would be out of harmony with the real mood either of the representatives as a whole or of the people outside.
83. Indeed, the sponge of public opinion is almost Saturated with the persistent flood of propaganda. It can pick up no more. Ordinary people, all over the world, in their present mood, are beginning to tire of the same conventional slogans and catchwords.
84. The Prime Minister of Canada, in an arresting speech on Monday [871st meeting], pointed out the choice before us. Are we to indulge in a sterile debate of charge and countercharge, accusation and rebuttal; or are we to seek, by reasoned argument, practical solutions to the many problems with which we are confronted today?
85. These problems will not be solved in the context of ideological warfare. What we have to judge, in looking at the merits of any particular proposal, is its practicability and the contribution that it will make to a settlement of the pressing difficulties of these critical times.
86. That was the great value of the remarkable speech which President Eisenhower delivered here last Thursday [868th meeting],
87. A period of crisis is always a period of opportunity. If this session of the Assembly is dramatic, it may well be historic. It may mark the beginning of a period of steady deterioration, ending, as far as human intelligence can foresee, in tragedy. Or it may be the beginning of better things.
88. We all feel in our hearts that as the world grows smaller it must, if it is to survive, become more united. But as each crisis underlines the difficulty of maintaining side by side the two principles of peace and justice, there are periods when all of us must have doubts. Nevertheless, whatever its difficulties and perhaps shortcomings, the United Nations is the best — indeed the only — organization which we have available. Its influence is continually growing. Like all organizations, it can no doubt be improved. The President of the United States made certain suggestions for this purpose, which I greatly welcome. Their object was to increase, not reduce, the power of the Organization to deal with crises as they may arise.
89. The proposal made [869th meeting] by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, if I may say so, seems calculated to have the opposite effect, for it would extend the veto, with all its embarrassments, into the realm of the Secretariat. It would freeze into the permanent structure of the Secretariat what we must all hope maybe only the temporary divisions among us. I therefore believe that it will be unacceptable to the majority of Members.
90. The present division in the world exists and in this situation the interposition of the United Nations is often the only way to prevent the spread of these rivalries into areas where they may be a source not merely of local disturbance but of world danger. For that reason the United Kingdom Government feels that what the United Nations has done in the Congo was timely and should continue. We do not think that the constitutional disagreements between the Congolese leaders are a matter for this Assembly. It is for them and the Congolese people to decide how their constitution should be interpreted and their disagreements resolved. But certainly it would be a tragedy if the Congo were to become the arena for the contest between the two great groups of Powers. I believe that the great majority here are convinced that the United Nations is the best instrument to prevent that happening. It is of the first importance to the people of the Congo themselves. It is of the first importance to Africa as a whole, where so many new nations are emerging. I will return, if I may, a little later to this wider issue.
91. As for the Secretary-General, I would like to associate myself with the wide expression of confidence in his energy, resourcefulness and, above all, integrity.
92. I said just now that this session could be a turning point to better things, and since I am by nature an optimist, I do not despair that that may be the result. At any rate it is for that purpose that I have come here. In recent years I have tried to make some contribution towards the reduction of tension and publicly to declare my belief in negotiation. My visit to Moscow, when I had long and important discussions with Mr. Khrushchev, led to a series of interchanges of visits between the statesmen of the protagonist countries. These visits seemed about to fructify in the Summit Conference in Paris. The very fact of the choice of that city rather than an international place of meeting like Geneva indicated the possibility of a series of meetings to be held successively in, let us say, Moscow, Washington and London. There would then have followed a period, if not of agreement, at least of sustained effort to agree.
93. We all know what happened at Paris, and there is no purpose now in recrimination. But the peoples of the world, who were deeply disappointed at that failure, expect us to overcome that setback and in due course start again. It was my hope, it was the hope of President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle, it was a hope which I believe was also shared by Mr. Khrushchev, that the setback would be temporary. The three Western statesmen issued on the night of the Paris meeting, on 17 May 1960, a statement from which I would venture to quote. This is what we said: "They remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation." We went on to say: "They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.”
94. Similarly, Mr. Khrushchev, although he permitted himself some forcible language, has seemed anxious to regard the path as temporarily obstructed and not permanently barred. At all events, it is in that spirit that I have worked during the period that I have been Prime Minister of my country, and it is in this spirit that I speak today.
95. At any given moment in the world’s history we tend, all of us, to be obsessed by our own ideologies. We may thus become prisoners of our own arguments.
96. The great division in the world must be seen in a wide, historical perspective, and what a strange contrast it is between the dramatic achievements of modern science and the melancholy failures of modem statesmanship! We throw instruments into distant space, which circle the earth. We put hardly any limit to the ambitions of discovery. I am told we expect soon to visit the moon. Yet if there are inhabitants in any other planets looking down on us, how strange they must think the antics of humanity. With all this immense knowledge, the results of thousands of years of effort, emerging from savagery and superstition to the most sophisticated techniques, how strange it must seem to see human beings fighting and quarrelling, attacking not the real problems which confront us — economic, social, medical, agricultural — but each other, and even perhaps risking their mutual destruction through the accident of nuclear war.
97. And yet while their leaders have been quarrelling there has never been a time when ordinary folk, if they were only let alone, were more agreed as to their requirements and aspirations. Materially they want peace, prosperity and advancement; and they want perhaps something more, the chance to think for themselves about the deepest problems on which man has to meditate during his short individual sojourn on earth — the relations between man and man, and the relation between man and God.
98. It is therefore as trustees for ordinary men and women whom we serve that we, the so-called statesmen of the world, should approach our tasks today. But if we are to free mankind from ignorance, poverty, and fear, we must at least free ourselves from old and worn-out slogans and obsolete battle cries. Let me take a single example. Words like "colonialism” and "imperialism" have been slung about here without much regard to the facts, at any rate of modem colonial and imperial history. Mr. Khrushchev made great play with this theme, but his exposition was demonstrably a complete distortion.
99. No one who heard the Prime Minister of Canada’s brilliant reply in his speech on Monday [871st meeting] can doubt where the truth lies.
100. Without repeating the comparisons which Mr. Diefenbaker drew with the communist record, I think it right to recall for a moment the story of my own country.
101. I could not tell this story better than in words I addressed to Mr. Khrushchev himself in reply to a communication in the summer of this year. I referred to "policies which British Governments of all parties have followed not only since the war but for many generations". I went on to say this: "For more than a century it has been our purpose to guide our dependent territories towards freedom and independence. Since the Second World War India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, comprising over 510 millions of people, have reached the goal of independent life and strength. We have aided this process both by technical assistance and financial contribution. All these States are completely independent members of our free Commonwealth association. Nor is this movement at an end."
102. Where are the representatives of these former British territories? Here they are, sitting in this hall. Apart from the older independent countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa — here are the representatives of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya. Here — in this hall. In a few days time, Nigeria will join us. Sierra Leone, and then the West Indies Federation will follow. And in due course others. Cyprus is already represented here. The problem of Cyprus, always an international rather than a colonial problem, has now been resolved. The Island has become an independent Republic as a result of friendly agreement between all the countries concerned. Who dares to say that this is anything but a story of steady and liberal progress?
103. Of course, even within our Commonwealth of independent nations there are bound to be differences. But, however acute these may be, the member countries try honestly and peacefully to resolve them. We have seen a recent notable example of this system. India and Pakistan have reached, after many years, with the help of one of the most potent organs within the framework of the United Nations, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, assisted by the generous support of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries, and also the Federal Republic of Germany and others, an agreement upon the difficult question of the Indus waters.
104. Similarly, the French Colonial Empire has changed into the French Community of Nations, and here are their representatives with us in this hall today.
105. In Africa, above all, we are in the presence of a dramatic political transformation: the greater part of this continent has already gained its independence. For this great credit must go to the great people of Africa themselves., Those of us who have helped them forward to nationhood feel that we, too, have a right to be proud, for we have been working with the people of these countries to help them realize their aspirations for peace, independence, prosperity and individual freedom. We know that they want these things in a form which suits them, and not according to some ideological pattern imposed from outside. We know that they want to avoid violence and chaos, for these things bring with them outside pressure and interference. New nations, to preserve their real independence, must be effective in protecting their own interests. In helping the people of these countries to advance to independence, we have devoted our efforts not to checking the forces of nationalising but to harnessing them in the creation of new, strong and vigorous nations, undivided by tribal, ideological or racial Strife, and imbued with the strength which only freedom and prosperity can give,
108. Of course, I accept that in this story of Commonwealth progress, there are Still difficult areas. There are the parts of Africa where Europeans and Asians and Africans all live side by side. Our aim is certainly clear and constant: to build the people of these countries, or help them build up, societies in which all these, the people, of whatever race, tribe or religious persuasion, may live and work harmoniously together. To that purpose we are pledged, and for that purpose we shall continue to work.
107. In this year of 1960, so great for the peoples of Africa, the consummation of this policy can already be seen in some countries; in others it is approaching. With our willing help the peoples of these countries are steadily proceeding to the goal of political independence; Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika are all examples of the harmony and agreement between us and the people's leaders by which this process has gone forward. But what the peoples of Africa and also those of Asia equally need, as well as freedom, are those things to which President Eisenhower referred in his speech — food, development, education, freedom from the arms race. On these people can build nations. Ideological war would destroy them. I venture to say, therefor e — I must say — that to my mind, these slogans are out of date.
108. And the same is true of many of the secular conflicts of Europe. There has been a great deal of communist denunciation, both at this Assembly and elsewhere, against the Government and people of the Federal Republic of Germany, Here again I am amazed at how backward-looking and reactionary much of this communist argument is. Both the Polish and the Czech representatives talked of the spirit of "revanche", which they alleged was reviving in West Germany, I am bound respectfully to say that I do not think their own speeches were flowing over with the spirit of reconciliation.
109. The representative of Czechoslovakia suggested that NATO "has become" — I use his words — "...an instrument of West German militarism for the preparation of new conquests" [871st meeting, para, 96], Well, what are the facts? The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, by its declaration of 3 October 1954, has formally assumed the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter to settle its international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. In the same declaration it has pledged itself never to attempt to carry through the reunification of Germany or to effect any change in its present frontiers by the use of force.
110. I will be frank. I represent a country that has no particular reason to regard German militarism with any special favour. Twice in my lifetime the British people have suffered most grievously both in blood and treasure as the result of German militarism. But we must look forward, not backward. Nor can you, to quote a famous phrase, "draw up an indictment against a whole people". Germany is divided into East and West, and so the German people, in spite of their great population and importance, cannot be represented in this Assembly today. East Germany is armed. Great Soviet forces are stationed there. That is part of the unhappy state of the world today. Yet at the same time, West Germany is condemned for rearming. We have an old proverb in our country about the pot calling the kettle black,
111. I know that some people tell us that East Germany is a communist heaven and West Germany a capitalist hell. I have, however, observed that during the last twelve years, 2.5 million people have voluntarily moved and are still moving from East to West Germany. No doubt there is some lesson to be learned from these dry statistics. At any rate, instead of talking so much about the right! of self-determination of peoples in general, I think the Soviet authorities might explain why they have So consistently refused this right to the people of East Germany. And then Western Germany is accused of seeking allies. It has at least sought them freely, of its own, will, and it has sought them among its natural friends, the countries of the world that are, broadly speaking, governed by free and democratic institutions, similar to its own. Moreover, as regards its rearmament, it has been willing and anxious to organize its defence forces entirely in the framework of an integrated Western alliance and to accept strict limitations as to the character of its weapons and the deployment of its forces. There is, therefore, no question of independent military action by the Federal Republic which might threaten peace.
112. Nevertheless I have thought it right to say these things; whatever our point of view, this is a case where we must surely try to free ourselves from the past and look to the future. There are great problems in the future of Germany. There is the difficult and delicate question of Berlin. But these problems, I would plead, should be resolved not by overriding and setting at nought international agreements, but by patience and honest attempts to reach agreement by negotiation. It was in this mood that considerable progress was made last year by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and if the same mood could prevail today there would be no crisis over Berlin.
113. If only we could recover the spirit that seemed to be at work even a few months ago, we could make a new start. The East-West conflict here or elsewhere cannot be resolved by weakness, by moral or physical, exhaustion of one side or the other. It cannot in this nuclear age be resolved by the triumph of one side or the other without the extinction of both. I say, therefore, we can only reach our goal by the gradual acceptance of the view that we can all gain more by agreement than by aggression.
114. The urgent problem before the world today is not, or should not be, the supremacy of one set of nations over another or of one ideology over another. The practical task should be to increase the world’s resources and to meet by public and private investment the needs of expanding and politically maturing populations. How can this be done and how is it to be done?
115. First of all, in many fields a great deal is being done by the United Nations itself. We owe a great debt to the Secretariat for their patient and devoted work in organizing the technical aid programmes. The Special Fund is now becoming effective. Moreover, the whole effort of the United Nations has been to spread a better understanding among the Governments and peoples of all the world, that; is, understanding of the essential unity of the world and the need to deal with economic problems, like political problems, on a comprehensive basis” And in addition, we must develop general recognition that the interest of all is the interest of each, that the whole world must grow and expand together, that nations cannot live or succeed in isolation. All these concepts are being popularized by the work of the United Nations,
116. We in the United Kingdom particularly welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposals earlier this year for assistance to newly independent countries, both in Africa and elsewhere. We must all, within the limit of our resource’s, make the greatest possible contribution in men, money and materials to the less developed countries of the world. We, therefore, in the United Kingdom Government also welcome the proposals made by President Eisenhower last week [868th meeting] regarding the African programme, the Special Fund, and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. We share, with the United States Government, the view that the Programme for the provision of operational, executive and administrative personnel must be expanded and made permanent. We equally welcome President Eisenhower’s emphasis on educational needs, for training and education are the essential tools of freedom and progress.
117. Inside our Commonwealth — I venture to speak once more of that — we have made considerable progress in these fields. The Commonwealth Education Scheme has been successfully launched, and a substantial share of it is for the African countries. Similarly, the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers which has just ended in London resolved to initiate a special Commonwealth Assistance Plan for Africa, to help to meet the need to raise the standards of life in the less well-developed countries of the Commonwealth.
118. I say, therefore, it is also right to take some courage from these things, for they are moving; and it is right, also, to recognize the immense efforts made since the war on such a huge scale by agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and their associated bodies. This is now to be supplemented by the new International Development Association. Although all these are within the framework of the United Nations, it is a fact that their vast operations have depended upon the efforts of only a few countries — and those not the communist countries. The United States, of course, has been by far the largest contributor. The United Kingdom comes next; Many other countries have helped. So far I regret that the communist countries have not contributed.
119. According to the most recent figures which I have seen the total flow of finance during this period from the Governments of North America — that is, the United States and Canada — and the Governments of Western European countries, including the United Kingdom, has totalled $14 billion net — $14,000 million. That is an average of $3.5 billion a year. That is the amount actually spent by these countries, either individually or through the international organizations. It excludes entirely, of course, the large flow of private finance to the developing countries.
120. Just to make the comparison, not necessarily to underline it, Russia and the other Eastern European countries entered the field of providing assistance in 1954. Over the whole period since then the sum total of the assistance promised or committed is not more than, $3 billion in all — less than the amount actually spent, not promised or committed, by the Western Governments in a single year.
121. I do not make this comparison to attack the Soviets. I had always hoped that this great problem of world economic development might have been discussed at a summit meeting. Indeed, General de Gaulle had publicly proposed that some complementary and co-operative efforts might be undertaken oh an East-West basis, to start with no doubt in a limited field, but perhaps growing with experience. At any rate I believe that if we could revive the spirit of last spring this would be a fruitful source of discussion. Certainly it must be true that the emergent and under-developed countries would be the beneficiaries of a political “detente” between the great rival forces of East and West. Any new summit conference, therefore, would be bound to be economic as well as political.
122. We ought, of course, to turn away from our internecine struggle and concentrate our efforts on the universal problem of development. What prevents us? Not the lack of technical resources; they are very great and growing year by year. What prevents us is fear and suspicion. And the problem, therefore, is how to remove these fears and these suspicions. I know the Soviet powers are always attacking the defensive alliances of the West. On what are they based? On one thing: fear.
123. What formed the NATO alliance? The fear that, after the events of 1948, communism would spread over the whole of Europe, not by persuasion but by force. The countries of Western Europe drew together by a natural and instinctive gesture. They turned to the United States and Canada for help. The same expansionist policies led to CENTO and SEATO. Let us face it. It is from fear that the great deterrent forces of the West have sprung.
124. And on the other side, the Russian people no doubt believe — incredible as it seems to me and to my friends — they no doubt believe that they may be attacked by the West. And this is human — perhaps understandable. They too have their memories of invasions throughout the centuries, from Poltava to Stalingrad. So long as fear exists, so long as each side believes that it must rely on its own right arm to defend its own rights, so long will the tension continue, so long the “detente" becomes more difficult, so long will the great .armaments of the world represent an ever-increasing burden on our resources of money, science and technique. That, therefore, brings us to the key of the problem — disarmament.
125. Some of the older ones here will remember that disarmament projects go back a very long way. The debates of the old League of Nations are filled with them. Plan after plan has been put forward in the last fifteen years in the United Nations. Only last year a comprehensive proposal was launched [798th meeting] by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, then Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom. The next day [799th meeting] Mr. Khrushchev set out another full plan. We have had committees and sub-committees, meetings, debates, year after year, in every variety of forum and by every variation of discussion. Mr. Khrushchev has spoken once more at this session [869thmeeting], and made it the main reason for his coming, of the vital need for world disarmament. Well, why have we not already reached some agreement? Why have none of the plans reached fruition? The reasons which I have given we all know — fear and suspicion. These are the causes, not the effects, of world armaments. So the problem remains. How can this fear and suspicion be removed? How can we make some real progress this time?
126. One thing is clear: word are not enough. The nations require some assurance of safety before they will act. If this is given, the rest will follow. It is very easy to say: "We will get rid of all cur armaments whether nuclear or non-nuclear, whether conventional or non-conventional, if others do the same.” But the key of it all is faith, and in the present state of the world faith cannot grow on its own. It must be strengthened, fortified, buttressed by practise, I ask any member of this Assembly honestly to face the problem with himself and in relation to his neighbours. In the vital matter of national survival it is not enough just to sign agreements. It is absolutely essential to have the assurance that these agreements will be rigorously adhered to. That leads us straight into the problem, the question of international inspection and control.
127. The Assembly has heard the dramatic declarations, first by the President of the United States, then by the Prime Minister of Canada. President Eisenhower said: "...we are prepared to submit to any international inspection, provided only that it is effective and truly reciprocal" [868th meeting, para. 66]. Mr. Diefenbaker said: "Canada is prepared to make available for international inspection and control any part of Canadian Arctic territory in exchange for a comparable concession on the part of the Soviet Union" [871st meeting, para. 204], Yesterday the representative of Denmark said [875th meeting] that his country would be ready to consider making the same offer in respect of the vast area of Greenland. I will add this: the United Kingdom will gladly allow any form of inspection and control that is accepted by the Soviet Union.
128. So, if these offers could be taken up — and no doubt they will be taken up — this session of the Assembly could not fail. But can they be taken up? Is there some obstacle, and if there is, can we help to remove it?
129. We have, I think, to recognize that some governments believe — and this is the objection that the Soviet representatives have often expressed in the past — that inspection and control might be just a kind of cover for espionage. Of course, let us be frank — none of us would particularly welcome into our countries the large number of officials from abroad who...
130. I should like that to be translated if he wants to say anything.
131. I say, that none of us would particularly welcome into our countries the large number of officials from abroad who might be necessary to inspect and control all the variations of armament production in its widest form, the atomic plants as well as the factories for making aeroplanes, guns, warships and the rest. Add I realize also — and I want to be fair in this — that some countries, partly because of their historical traditions, partly because of the very state of world divisions, regard with suspicion, natural suspicion, and would wish to reduce to a minimum, any international inspectorate. Yet, if we are to succeed, we may as well be realistic. We have somehow got to overcome these doubts, however reasonable they may be. Fear of espionage, fear of strangers, resentment of the fact that words are not enough, that each nation needs to be reassured and reinsured by effective inspection and control — all these misgivings are very human. But they must not stand in the way. And if we succeed, if disarmament can progress step by step, keeping time with the setting up of the controls, then these fears and suspicions will begin to fade. They will wither away.
132. How then can we get over this difficulty? I would venture to make what I hope is a practical proposal. Let us recall what has been our experience regarding the matter of nuclear test explosions. Happily, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, in spite of the somewhat worsening atmosphere of recent months, is still going on and still making progress. Of course it has taken a long time. But when it started the views of the different parties were very wide apart. Now they are very much closer, and it is essential that we should bring this matter to a successful conclusion. It is essential, not only to prevent a resumption of nuclear tests with all that that involves, but to show that settlements can be reached, in spite of their technical complexity.
133. But let me recall how the Geneva Conference started. It started by reaching agreement between the three Powers concerned that, in the initial stage, our representatives who were meeting together were not to play a political role. They were to study the problem from the scientific and objective point of view. They were scientists, not diplomats or politicians, and they were to report whether, in their view, effective measures could technically be devised by which, if an agreement were made to stop nuclear tests, the agreement could be enforced. It was the agreement of the scientists that was the first step. I would venture to submit that there is a lesson to be learned here.
134. We should apply this principle to the wider field of disarmament It is the best, and perhaps the only, way to make practical progress.
135. Of course, it may be easier to do this in scone sectors than in others. Nevertheless, there is, first, the problem of preventing what I might call the expansion of armaments — trying to prevent the present situation from getting worse. We need to prevent the use of outer space for military purposes, and President Eisenhower has made some wise proposals in this respect. We need to call a halt to the manufacture of fissile material for military purposes. Proposals have also been made in this respect, and I am very happy to see that the Soviet Union has now accepted the need for joint studies in this connexion. We want technical experts to tell us what measures could in fact prevent the extension of armaments and the clandestine storage of fissile material, without giving rise to the problem or the fear of espionage. This examination should, therefore, be largely scientific and technical.
136. That is the first set of problems. Then there is the problem of ensuring against surprise attack by one side or the other. That is what all are afraid of, or feel they ought to protect themselves against. It would be an immense relief to people all over the world, including the admirals and the generals, if this could be done. We could all sleep more soundly in our beds. And here, perhaps the experts, both technical and administrative, could work out a scheme against surprise attack, either upon a limited or upon a wider scale, mid tell us how it would work.
137. And then, thirdly, there is the task of reducing to a minimum all forms of armaments — obviously a very complicated problem. But here again, if we could give administrative experts some guiding principles, they should be able to tell us what measures of inspection and control would be effective and fair to all countries. We should tell them that their measures must not give at any stage a significant advantage to either side, and must at all stages provide effective verification.
138. I therefore want to develop and to give my support ty the suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of Denmark yesterday, [875th meeting] and to make the specific proposal that there should be appointed a group of technical experts, scientific, military and administrative, to prepare a report, an agreed report, as to how we are to do this. That is the first step. That period need not be very long, for a great deal of work has been done on this subject by the various committees that have sat over all these years. Some of it has been largely lost and buried in those discussions, but valuable material exists on which a new inquiry could draw.
139. This practical procedure is not in any sense a proposal to institute control without disarmament. No country could be committed at this stage to implementing any of the measures which the technical experts might suggest until there was a subsequent agreement about the disarmament measures related to the system of control. Of course, if confidence is to be maintained it is obvious that control must be concurrent with disarmament and that it must be effective.
140. The great advantage of this report, I would suggest, is that it would not, at any rate in the first stage, be political or controversial. It should say, from a purely technical and objective basis, what measures would be appropriate, in the fair interests of all nations, and in the various aspects of disarmament which I have mentioned. The experts would make a report which would provide a basis for political action, , just as it was the scientists' report which provided a basis for the Geneva Conference — certainly I hope to be effectively concluded, but at any rate far the most hopeful conference which we have had in all this field. This report would therefore be of the greatest value in the work of the negotiating body, whatever that body might be. It would enable the statesmen or their representatives to translate into action what the technicians tell us is technically possible.
141. I venture, therefore, to make this proposal. I trust that it may receive favourable consideration and approval, and if we can agree to it in principle I cannot believe that the appointment of the experts and the terms of reference under which they are to work can present any grave difficulty.
142. Of course, this proposal, if accepted, would be only a modest step, but it would be a step in the right direction, and it is the first practical step which counts.
143. I have to thank the President and the members of the Assembly for their attention to what I have said. I will venture to end with one general observation, ft has been my experience that in all human affairs there are dangers in excessive pessimism as well as in too much optimism. It is foolish to deny the existence of the great divisions of the world today. There are those who accept them as inevitable and irreconcilable, I believe that they are wrong.
144. Equally, there are those who think they can be removed by mere words. This, alas, is a delusion. I am sure that a less dramatic but more practical way is this. The only way forward is by gradual approach, working step by step in practical ways to improve the position. We need to work patiently and sincerely, and all the time we need to remember that the hopes of millions of people are fixed upon us in this Assembly, and for their sake we must not fail.