At this stage of the general debate, after the full discussion we have had, it is not without some reluctance that I venture to make a few comments on behalf of the delegation of Ceylon on only a few world problems that concern all of us vitally. Our agenda is a heavy one. It contains items on important and basic issues which deal with world peace and security and the political, economic and social welfare of all peoples represented here at this General Assembly. I should like to deal with most of these, but shall refrain from doing so, as I realize the great volume of work this Assembly has yet to do and the urgent need to get down to business in plenary as well as in the Committees at the earliest possible time.
89. Permit me, however, to digress for a moment to mention to this Assembly a domestic event which also has an international interest and significance. Last year, in September, Ceylon lost a great leader in tragic circumstances and the country went through difficult and uncertain times for a short period, but, in July of this year, a general election was held on the same basis as we have held Parliamentary elections since 1931, that is, on the basis of universal suffrage. The election had a happy result in that a political party emerged as the leading party with a strong majority. The head of this party was a lady, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who was called upon to form a Government. This she did, and she became the first lady in the world to become a Prime Minister. We are naturally proud of this unique distinction, and I am sure the world would like to know, particularly at this time, and would be interested in the fact that we can look forward to an era of political stability and to the wise guidance of a Prime Minister who is capable of and devoted to bringing about the unity of our peoples and their political , economic and social welfare and who will also maintain close and friendly relations with all countries. I know that Mrs. Bandaranaike, had hoped to attend this session, but unfortunately she could not free herself from urgent and pressing problems which need her presence at home as she had just assumed the responsibility of her office. She would like me to express to this Assembly her deep regret that she was prevented from being here with us and her hope to join in our work in the future, and also to convey her greetings and good wishes for the success of the work of this Assembly.
90. May I now proceed to deal with a few specific problems that have claimed the special attention of this Assembly. I should like, in the first place, to make only a few comments on the Congo question, to try to clarify the United Nations position in the light of the relevant facts. It is not necessary to go fully into this question now, as it is included as an item on our agenda. Until the question came before the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly on 17 September 1960, it was dealt with by the Security Council, whose decisions are to be found in three resolutions adopted by it unanimously on 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960. These decisions have not been criticized or challenged as lacking in any way in regard to the situation as it first emerged and as it developed during that period. I think it necessary to point out that the Soviet Union itself, which supported the position taken up in these resolutions, has not at any time impugned the action taken by the Security Council and has conceded that the action taken by the Security Council was right and proper. That the Security Councils decisions were right has been borne out also by the convincing vote taken during the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly which upheld these decisions by adopting resolution 1474 (ES-IV), the original draft of which was co-sponsored by all the African States and several Asian States. I shall now quote operative paragraph 1 of that resolution: "Fully supports the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 of the Security Council." At that session, the General Assembly also endorsed the implementation by the Secretary-General of the Security Council resolutions. I quote operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution: "Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions...." That sets out the position with regard to the facts of the situation in connexion with the action of the Security Council.
91. The situation in the Congo still continues to be far from satisfactory, and it is incumbent on us to take such further action as may be needed to bring about speedily the restoration and functioning of a stable government which will be able to ensure security and law and order and to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo, At its fourth emergency special session the General Assembly called for the appointment of a good offices committee. I hope that this committee will be appointed soon.
92. The Secretary-General personally has come in for some criticism on the ground that he was biased or prejudiced in the implementation of the Security Council’s decisions. We do not think that, except for some errors of judgement, he has failed honestly to carry out those decisions. We are satisfied with his bona tides. We have known his views on and his work for the freedom and independence of dependent peoples, and we know that he has worked hard and with an admirable single-minded devotion to duty to carry out the Security Council’s decisions on the Congo. It must be noted that, whenever he was in doubt, Mr. Hammarskjold did not hesitate to come to the Security Council, as for example when, in attempting to send the United Nations Force to Katanga Province, he encountered resistance and felt that he should not push his way through by the use of force. This, he felt, he was precluded from doing according to the principles on which the United Nations Force had been assembled, principles which had been followed in previous operations and principles which had been approved by the Security Council in respect of the Congo. He therefore did the only thing he could do in case of doubt. He returned to New York and submitted the position to the Security Council.
93; The Council’s resolution of 9 August 1960 is well known. The United Nations Force was authorized to enter Katanga Province but not to interfere in the internal conflicts, constitutional or otherwise, in the Congo. On that same occasion, after considering his report, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s position and actions.
94. We cannot ignore the fact that, in the implementation by him of the Council’s resolutions, he had to take actions on which there could be honest differences of opinion. Some might consider that a certain situation that existed, or suddenly arose, in the course of these operations should have been dealt with in one way, while others might have thought that the action should have been different. Some may even go to the length of considering that the course adopted by. him. disclosed a partisan or prejudiced attitude. I myself stated in the Security Council that some actions of the Secretary-General, in my view, would appear to be due to errors of judgement, but we do not think that these were due to any partisan attitude. We also have to recognize that mistakes of this kind are inevitable in a situation of such magnitude and complexity as the Congo situation has turned out to be. I might even state that the Security Council resolutions themselves might well have been much clearer and more precise.
95. We do hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to appreciate this point and continue to retain the confidence which it had in the Secretary-General. It was no doubt the Soviet Union's loss of confidence which prompted its Chairman of the Council of Ministers to suggest the abolition of the office of the Secretary-General and to replace it by a triumvirate or collegium of three persons representing the Western Powers, the Eastern Powers and the neutralist Powers. We regret that we cannot accept this suggestion. First, its acceptance would require an amendment of the United Nations Charter and we ourselves know how strongly opposed the Soviet Union is to a revision of the Charter. Last year, when my delegation proposed the revision of the Charter to deal with what might be considered a merely technical matter — to permit an increase in the number of the members of the Economic and Social Council — in the course of a debate in the Special Political Committee, the representative of the Soviet Union objected to it for the reason stated by him. I quote from the official record of the proceedings of that Committee on 14 October 1959: "Mr. Sobolev noted with regret that the area of agreement essential to a revision of the Charter was still lacking in the General Assembly. The chief reason for that state of affairs was the absence from the United Nations of the lawful representatives of the Chinese people,...."
96. The same reason still holds good. How then can the Soviet Union expect its proposal to be implemented without a revision of the Charter, especially when the proposal deals with ah important aspect affecting the structure of the Organization as laid down in the Charter? Quite apart from this, it is our view1 that the establishment of a triumvirate to take the place of the Secretary-General will not contribute in any positive way to the better working of the United Nations. The collegium or triumvirate — call it what you will- composed as suggested, would not, if it is at the same time hamstrung by giving the right of veto to each member, be capable of effective or prompt action or oil discharging the responsibilities which, as successor to the Secretary-General, it would be called upon to assume under the Charter. The Secretariat, if it is to be able to maintain the impartiality of the United Nations in the cold war and to further the interests of peace, should remain and act independently of cold war pressures and also serve as a kind of buffer, as well as a bridge, between the cold war groups. The body envisaged in the Soviet proposal would be much too much of a product of the cold war to function with any independence, even if it could function at all.
97. Abolition of the post of Secretary-General would, in our view, weaken considerably the position of file United Nations and impair its future. We are, of course, not unaware of the damage that could ensue from the loss of confidence in the Secretary-General by any major Power group or by any other substantial section of opinion. We trust, therefore, that, in the interests of the United Nations itself, further consideration will be given to this matter.
98. I wish now to devote a few minutes to a subject which, in the view of my delegation, is of considerable importance in the international field. I refer to the item on the agenda of the present session of the Assembly dealing with the question of Algeria. The position of my Government in regard to the situation in Algeria does not permit of any ambiguity or equivocation. Its policy has been clearly stated on several occasions. We have always maintained the right of peoples to self-determination. If such self-determination can be realized by peaceful methods based on negotiation and the principles of pacific settlement of disputes, none will be happier than, ourselves. Unfortunately, the struggle of the Algerian people has dragged on over the last six years in a manner which can only be described as tragic in the suffering which it has caused to a people fighting against heavy odds for their freedom and independence. The General Assembly has had the Algerian question on its agenda at each of its regular sessions since 1955.
99. At its eleventh and twelfth sessions, the Assembly unanimously adopted resolutions [1012 (XI) and 1184 (XU)] expressing the concern of the United Nations at the continuance of the Algerian conflict and urging that the problem be solved in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the thirteenth session, a draft resolution [A/4075, para. 4] recognizing the right of the Algerian people to independence and expressing concern at the continuance of the war in Algeria as a situation endangering international peace and security, and urging negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with our Charter, failed to be adopted by the Assembly only by a single vote. The memories of what happened at the fourteenth session on this matter are too fresh to require repetition here. The tragic events in Algeria continue to cause deep concern to my Government. The armed conflict in that country, which has necessitated almost the entirety of the French army being maintained in combat strength in Algeria, and has displaced over a million Algerian civilians, continues to embitter international relations and to increase international tensions.
100. In our view, in the context of the vast fermentation going on at present in the African continent, any further delay in a settlement of this problem is fraught with grave danger to the peace of the world. When General de Gaulle came to power in 1958, it was under circumstances which led us to believe that a speedy and satisfactory solution of the Algerian question was at hand. We welcomed the statements he made and we looked towards an implementation of his promises. Two years have passed, and the fighting in Algeria goes on with unmitigated vigour. We were heartened a short time ago, however, by what appeared to be a constructive prospect of "pourparlers” between the French Government and the representatives of the Algerian national liberation movement. General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, in his address to the nation on 14 June 1960, Stated: "Above all, it is no longer contested anywhere that self-determination for the Algerians regarding their destiny is the only possible outcome of this complex and painful tragedy. "In this respect, it is granted that the choice will be completely free….”
101. These were heartening words, words of statesmanship, coming from so weighty and authoritative a source. We were therefore all the more dismayed when the chapter which was so hopefully begun, ended in a most regrettable and unproductive manner, especially in view of the fact that the issues at stake were so vital for the peace and security not only of Africa but of the whole world. We regret that the Melun meeting held in June 1960 to which the Algerians had sent delegates proved abortive. The Government of France must recognize the imperative need of negotiating with the only body of Algerians capable of speaking for the Algerian people — the National Liberation Front.
102. It was in that same speech that the French President said: "There is no policy which is worth while apart from realities." What are these realities? It is a war which will not, and cannot, end except with the triumph of the aspirations of the Algerian people for political freedom. That is one reality. The inexorable will of a people for freedom cannot be destroyed by arms. This is a reality. France has to take account of the realities of the mid-twentieth century, particularly the realities of the happenings in the continent of Africa, and to fashion its policy on Algeria in a manner worthy not only of the ideals which the French Revolution gave to the world, but also worthy of the realities of political liberation of today. Most French people, especially the intellectuals, have recognized these realities. These are not people who love France less, but whose passion for freedom and right conduct has been more. They have been strong enough to try to save France — the country they love, the country which had such a glorious past and which can look forward to a great future — from pursuing a path which involves the denial of freedom and the infliction of injustice to a people whose only crime is their love of their native land, a people who were and still are prepared to discuss and negotiate an honourable settlement. If France is unable or unwilling to do so, we sincerely hope that the Assembly, at this session, will finally face its responsibilities and act in such a way as to put sin end to the futile, tragic and meaningless loss of life which the Algerian war has caused over the last five years. The time has now come for a final settlement of this problem. We cannot, and we should not, procrastinate any longer. My delegation will support any measure the United Nations may deem fit to take to put an end to the bloodshed in Algeria and to ensure to the people of that land a free and untrammelled opportunity to decide for themselves the kind of government they wish to set up and live under. This is the right of self-determination as we understand it, and this must indeed be the meaning of the self-determination that was promised to them by General de Gaulle himself. If these people decide for independence, let them have it. It is their right which no one can deny.
103. Now I should like to say a few words on an item of considerable importance on the agenda which my delegation would like to examine more fully when it comes up for consideration in plenary meeting or in Committee. I refer to the question of the independence of all colonial and dependent countries. At this stage, I need only say that my Government is wholly opposed to the continuation of colonialism, which is an anachronism in the mid-twentieth century and has to be ended. It is a system which is repugnant to our conceptions of freedom and the fundamental rights of human beings. No doubt, there are some colonial Powers which do a great deal for the improvement of the conditions of dependent peoples. Such humane considerations we applaud and we do hope that they are only steps in preparation for the total emancipation of these peoples. We urge, therefore, that urgent steps be taken to make the whole world free, so that, when we refer to the free world, we shall be referring to a reality.
104. However good a colonial government may be and however much it may do to improve the lot of the dependent peoples, there is no justification for the continuance of a system of colonial domination. Good government can never be a substitute for self-government. We are glad to note in this connexion that very recently no less than fifteen countries have advanced from colonialism to freedom and independence and have been admitted into the United Nations as sovereign and independent States. We have all felicitated them and wished them success. The present Assembly which the President rightly termed as the "Assembly of Humanity" will always be remembered for this unique event. When the history of the United Nations comes to be written, there will be a chapter regarding this unique event which recognized the freedom of so many countries, most of whom come from the one continent of Africa.
105. We therefore fully support the declaration [A/4502] calling for the abolition of colonialism and ask that all dependent peoples should be freed from any form of colonial domination.
106. Last year, when we met at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, it seemed to be a propitious beginning. International tension was perceptibly lessening; the international climate was brightening and the skies were beginning to be clear of the dark clouds that earlier that year had been ominously gathering. The great Powers had agreed on a new disarmament committee of ten thus establishing for the first time parity between East and West, and thereby overcoming a formidable obstacle which had, up to that time, ever since the failure of the talks in 1957, prevented the United Nations Disarmament Commission from functioning, and which had also prevented any joint disarmament discussions. Even earlier, the nuclear Powers had agreed to meet to discuss a ban on atomic tests and their meeting was beginning to show positive results. It was for these reasons that I said that the international scene showed signs of improvement.
107. Then again, at the fourteenth session, the United Kingdom, through its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, submitted a concrete disarmament plan [A/C.1/ 820], and this was followed a few days later by another disarmament plan submitted to the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union [A/4219]. The two plans differed in several respects, but both were based on the concept of general and complete disarmament. Before the session ended that year, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted a resolution [1378 (XIV)] accepting the principle of general and complete disarmament which Mr. Khrushchev had urged so convincingly when he submitted his plan.
108. This was not all. Mr. Khrushchev was here on an extended visit to the United States as an honoured guest of the President. He was well received throughout the country; then, he met Mr. Eisenhower in Washington and left with him to talk in peace and quiet at Camp David and explore the fundamental problems of the world and to find the way to world security and peace with harmony, good-will and justice to all. Apparently, their talks had been successful. Apparently, they had understood each other better and, in their joint communiqué, they proclaimed to an anxiously waiting world that they had agreed that international differences should be settled by means of peaceful negotiations and not by war. Before Mr. Khrushchev left, he had invited Mr. Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union, and Mr. Eisenhower had accepted. Plans were also made to have a summit meeting in the early part of 1960. That was the international climate in the latter part of 1959, and I have referred in detail to the meeting of these two great men only to express the ardent and anxious hope that, although the five-Power draft resolution [A/L.317] was not accepted recently in this General Assembly, these two great men will make up their minds to meet, because it is only by meetings of that kind that the same atmosphere which was generated in 1959 could be brought about at a time like this when good-will and harmony are so much in need.
109. All this we considered at that time as amounting to a great achievement, and the world heaved a sigh of relief. It is known that Mr. Khrushchev himself made every effort in his country to prepare a welcome for Mr. Eisenhower and to propagate the idea of peaceful relations between the two countries. Of course, this is history which we know. Out of the blue, like a thunderbolt, came the incident of the shooting down over Soviet territory of the United States reconnaissance aircraft. Mr. Khrushchev considered this flight perfidious conduct. He considered that all his efforts to improve relations between his country and the United States had been seriously prejudiced; and from that time, all the good-will that had been so laboriously built up evaporated into thin air and the relations between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. The consequence was the failure of the summit meeting in Paris even before it had begun, and, from that time to this, international tension has mounted and today the prospect for peace has become dismal and gloomy indeed.
110. It is in this atmosphere that the present session of the General Assembly has begun. This session is different from any held before, in that many Heads of State have attended it, in addition to other distinguished leaders from many countries. Their efforts, whatever they were, do not seem to have immediately resulted in improving the situation. But we do know of one real effort, to which I have referred, which some of them made, but which failed to bring about the meeting which all felt would have been desirable at the present time — that is, that the two great leaders of the two most powerful countries of the world should meet and try to revive what has been referred to often as the Camp David spirit. However, that opportunity has passed. The leaders, or most of them, have gone, and we are left in the encircling gloom of the international climate of today, to plough wearily through our task, heavy in spirit and tired in mind. But we cannot give up; we dare not give up. We, therefore, hope that we shall undertake the work that faces us in the belief that failures are the pillars of success and that soon a way may be found for the creation of a better atmosphere.
111. It seems to my delegation that there are two ways in which we can fruitfully continue our efforts. I have in mind the two most important issues which vitally affect the question of world security and peace. I refer to the need to stop the arms race and to stop the discontent and dissatisfaction which exist and spread rapidly through the world, particularly in the under-developed areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, caused by the presence of hunger and want, ignorance and disease, and by so many of the other social ills of our modern society. These two problems, which are usually referred to as the problems of disarmament and of economic development, are the main problems we have to deal with. If I were cynical, which., of course, would, be inexcusable in view of the gravity of the present situation, I might be inclined to ask myself whether there is any use in thinking of economic development, however important that may be, when the prospect of the complete destruction of all humanity is not too remote a possibility. Of course, we cannot allow this defeatist attitude to take possession of us. We have to go on hoping and praying and actively working for a speedy settlement of the disarmament problem.
112. The question of economic development is closely connected with disarmament, because the financial resources of countries involved in the arms race are committed, almost to the maximum of their capacity, to the building up and maintaining of the best and most modern weapons of destruction. Economic development, to be effective, must be tackled in a large and comprehensive manner, not in little efforts. It must be an attack on all fronts, conceived and prepared with greater imagination and larger resources than were devoted to the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Are not Asia, Africa and Latin America of at least equal importance? In fact, more people live in these regions. They are poorer and more handicapped by the lack of technology and capital than were the people of Europe. We are glad of the assistance that was provided for the peoples of Europe, but we hope that the needs of these other countries will be kept in mind. This can be done only if we put an end to the arms race and transfer a major part of what is so lavishly spent on weapons of destruction — built solely With the object of destroying humanity on a mass scale — to the constructive humanitarian purpose of improving the standards of living of all people so that they may live in dignity and contentment.
113. I must not fail to recognize that some effort is being made by the United Nations and by individual countries to aid economic development. This is good and is welcome, but how meagre is this effort and how totally out of proportion to the great need. In the United Nations, we have the scheme of technical aid. We have the scheme of expanded technical aid. We have the Special Fund. We know how limited are the financial resources available to these schemes. Take the proposal to set up a capital development fund to expand the work of economic development. It has been received with so little warmth or enthusiasm that one wonders whether the whole objective of the world is to destroy and, incidentally, to be destroyed in the process, and not to build. Last year, I discussed this question fully, but, for want of time, I do not propose to do so on this occasion. I only wish to draw the attention of this Assembly once again to the need for comprehensive and large-scale action for the sake of humanity.
114. Finally, I come to the question of disarmament. This is today the most vital and most important matter this Assembly has before it. On its solution hangs the fate of the world. The tragedy of the arms race that is going on is that either it will disrupt severely the economy of countries which have entered the race or lead to a clash which could result in the destruction of the world. The arms race is man's most colossal folly. It is an absurd monstrosity. We hope, therefore, that sanity will return and enable us to see the danger in time so that we may take such measures as we can to avert a catastrophe.
115. History has a habit of repeating itself. We should therefore learn the lessons which history has to teach. If we ignore them, we do so at our peril.
116. One is alarmed at the leisurely and almost indifferent way in which we stand at the threshold of the most horrible danger that faces mankind. It would seem that, when disarmament is the subject, there is no hurry. Since the failure of the London talks on disarmament in 1957, nothing had been done, except to accelerate the pace of arming, until August 1959, when it was decided to establish a new disarmament committee; but the first meeting of this committee did not take place until March 1960, only to breakup, without any solution, in a few months.
117. Obviously, the most important task confronting us is to find the means to halt the arms race and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. This cannot, of course, be done by unilateral action. The nations of the whole world, and especially the nuclear Powers, must make a superhuman effort to reach agreement as soon as possible. Let us not wait until the house has burnt down to become interested in adequate fire protection. In our country, we have an old saying which we might well take to heart. It runs like this: "Don't repair the leaks in your roof when it begins to rain." I think that there is a good lesson in that saying.
118. History teaches us that wars happen with uncomfortable regularity. Knowing how the arms race led to the First World War in 1914, we should see that, if we continue to drift along as we are now doing, another major war — and this time a nuclear war — will be a certainty, with consequences so terrible that one shudders even to think of them.
119. Similar procrastination was also one of the important causes of the Second World War. Let me quote a passage from Sir Philip Noel-Baker's book The Arms Race. He says: "But the Governments, and in particular the Governments of Britain and France, delayed too long in putting forward proposals on which a general disarmament could certainly have been made. The Geneva Disarmament Conference ultimately met in February 1932; it was not till March 1933 that the British Government laid before it a comprehensive Draft Convention which Sir Anthony Eden had prepared. There was a general consensus of opinion at the time that, if this had come at the beginning instead of at the end, the Conference could hardly have failed... But Britain and France took too long to make up their minds that disarming itself was better than allowing Germany to rearm; by the time they had done so. Hitler was in power and the Conference was dead." Let us not allow a repetition of a situation of that kind to happen again. There is a lesson here for us.
120. It is true, of course, that, in our case, we do not lack plans of disarmament. What we have to overcome is the paralysis that seems to set in, caused undoubtedly by fear, suspicion or even hatred, which postpones or prevents action. The United Nations must realize its responsibility and do something to get the disarmament talks out of the rut into which it has fallen and commence meaningful discussions in a better atmosphere than seems to prevail at present, as we have seen ourselves at this Assembly.
121. Disarmament is particularly needed at this time because of the danger of a nuclear war. We know that neither side wants a war. The people of the world want peace. The smaller countries do not want war. But we cannot rest assured from this knowledge that a nuclear war will not break out. It can happen by accident or by design.
122. Neither can we depend too much on the thermonuclear weapon as a deterrent. There was a time, between 1945 and 1949, when the United States was the only country which had an atomic weapon. It was then truly a deterrent. Now, both the United States and the Soviet Union are known to possess large quantities of the most destructive atomic weapons, with a perfected system of delivery. But, as the arms race continues, it is not impossible for one of these countries to gain a definite superiority over the other, which might induce it to launch an attack. I do not suggest that it would happen, but it could possibly happen when a point had been reached of superior power. Retaliatory power no doubt is still a deterrent, but it may be thought that a first surprise blow may destroy the retaliatory power.
123. Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility of accident, which is possible in so many ways. Mr. Sobolev, the Soviet representative in the Security Council, made a simple statement of such a possibility. He said: "American generals point to the fact that up to now the United States aircraft have returned to their bases from half-way as soon as it became clear that the alarm was false. But what will happen if United States military personnel, watching their radar screens, fail to perceive in time that the falling meteor is not a guided missile and the flock of geese not a squadron of bombers? Then the United States aircraft will continue their flight and approach the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In this event, the Soviet Union will find itself compelled, in order to protect the security of the Soviet people, to take immediate counter-measures to eliminate the approaching threat." This was said in a light vein, but there is a serious point to be noted there with regard to the possibility of mistakes and accidents.
124. We can, of course, multiply instances of the possibility of mistakes being made or even accidents occurring which will set off a nuclear blast. We should also not exclude the possibility that another Hitler might arise who, drunk with a lust for power and believing in the invincibility of his own arms, may decide to take a gamble. Therefore, disarmament becomes a matter of paramount importance.
125. In recent times, we have, of course, made a distinct advance towards disarmament. As I said before, at the fourteenth session, the General Assembly adopted the resolution [1378 (XIV)] on general and complete disarmament. The two main parties have put forward plans to achieve this purpose. There are many points of agreement between them, particularly on the important question of control; but there are, at the same time, points on which they are still diametrically opposed.
126. We should, of course, try not to underestimate the complexities of the problem. One of the most serious difficulties appears to be tied to the question of the effectiveness of control. Disarmament cannot be based entirely on trust. There must be an acceptable control scheme. It is the general belief of experts who have examined this aspect of the question that a satisfactory scheme of inspection and control could be formulated which would be effective. It might, however, be impossible to formulate a scheme which would guarantee 100 per cent effectiveness. Some risk has to be taken; otherwise, it would not be possible to formulate any control scheme which would be acceptable to all sides.
127. In a report to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Centre of Johns Hopkins University, made on 6 December 1959, it was stated: "In a totally disarmed world, even a small number of secreted or clandestinely manufactured nuclear weapons could disrupt the international order and allow one Power to dominate its more trusting adversaries." The passage which I have quoted indicates the kind of thinking even among people who must know that a certain element of trust is required, provided, of course, that every effort is made to draw up a scheme of control which is as perfect as it can humanly be made.
128. But this is an important point to remember: that at a time when the questions of control and inspection are both accepted points, the discovery of a plan which is acceptable to both sides should not be difficult if we were prepared to drop the demand for absolute certainty that the plan of control mid inspection be 100 per cent effective.
129. If we do not agree to that, we shall never get disarmament with adequate control. We are then faced with a situation where the parties most directly concerned — that is, the nuclear Powers — are willing to accept disarmament, but are unable to agree on some vital aspects of it. We in the United Nations cannot let the matter rest there. We have to consider what we can do in this situation. That is why the subject of disarmament is before the General Assembly, and my delegation hopes that we shall succeed in finding a way to achieve an effective disarmament agreement. I do not propose to discuss any of the plans that have been submitted, because that is a matter which we can leave to the Committee stage of the discussion of the disarmament question. But there is one point that I should like to make in this Assembly.
130. Beaching a disarmament agreement is not something that we can leave to the great Powers and be content to stay outside. Undoubtedly, effective disarmament will not be possible without great-Power agreement, and especially without the agreement of the two greatest Powers; but we, the medium or small Powers, have a vital stake in it ourselves. A nuclear war will affect the whole world, and we must have a voice in the efforts to prevent such a cataclysm. It is here in the United Nations that we can make our most useful contribution. The United Nations has appointed a Disarmament Commission, in which all Member States are represented. Here is the opportunity which we should seize. In this forum, we should ourselves, as Members of the United Nations and as representatives of the smaller countries, discuss the problem in detail, in a detached, sober and objective manner. I am sure that the concentrated wisdom of all the countries represented there, guided by the Commission’s most experienced Chairman, will be able to produce proposals which might help the great Powers to reach agreement on disputed matters. It is in this field that the smaller Powers which have no direct interests in armaments or the maintenance of power politics can be of help to the great Powers.
131. My delegation therefore suggests that the Disarmament Commission should meet soon after the end of this session of the General Assembly and continue to study the problem until a solution is found. We hope that the Commission will not go to sleep for another year and awake just before the session of the Assembly only to register feebly that it is still alive. The smaller Powers must see to it that the Disarmament Commission is used to the best advantage. The United Nations should also, at the same time, make every effort to get the great Powers — including, of course, the nuclear Powers — to resume their disarmament talks in the Ten-Nation Committee or in any other forum they may wish to set up. Theirs is a heavy responsibility to all humanity, and theirs is the primary responsibility. It is our hope that they will overcome their mutual suspicions, create an area of understanding and good-will, and genuinely seek an agreement which will bring an end to armaments and lead to peace on earth.
132. My delegation, as I said a moment ago, does not propose in this general debate to discuss the disarmament plans put forward by the big Powers. We are glad that both sides have shown a willingness to modify their plans to meet points advanced by the other side. That is one of the most hopeful features for the success of the impending talks. I shall illustrate this point by one important reference, namely, the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the French proposal to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We are well aware of the inclusion of that proposal in the Soviet plan submitted at the Geneva Conference. This was a far-reaching proposal, but there was one difficulty. In accepting the proposal and including it in the first phase of the Soviet disarmament plan, the Soviet Union omitted to include in that phase the question of conventional armaments. This naturally led to objections from the Western Powers, which could not agree to a plan whose first phase contained provision for destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the elimination of bases and yet retained the superiority in conventional armaments.
133. We were glad therefore to note that, in the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union before this Assembly, in the course of the general debate [869th meeting], he agreed to take that point into account and to include conventional arms reduction also in the first phase in order to make the scheme a balanced and therefore more acceptable one.
134. I refer to this only by way of illustration, to indicate that both sides can show a willingness to meet each other as far as possible to find that accommodation that is necessary to reach agreement. I could point to several other instances if I had the time. I would only refer briefly to the statement of President Eisenhower from this same rostrum [868th meeting], when he, too, made certain changes in the plan submitted by the United States — even the last one, which was submitted just at the time the Ten- Nation Committee on Disarmament broke up. Even to that plan there were certain changes suggested by the President in the course of his statement here, as an accommodation necessary in order to reach agreement.
135. What the people of the world want is an agreement without any delay, as they realize that they are on the brink of a precipice. The voice of the people should be raised in angry protest against any further procrastination. This Assembly must see to it that the voice of the people of the world prevails in this matter. That is the clear duty we have before us at this session.
136. I referred at the outset to the apt description by the President of the General Assembly of this Assembly as the "Assembly of Humanity". Let our deliberations and our decisions make it such a session. If the Charter obliges us to do all we can "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", let us take whatever action we can in this direction in the field of complete and total disarmament. If the Charter obliges us "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and "in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small", let us fulfil that obligation by deciding to put an end to the last vestiges of colonialism, wherever and in whatever form they still survive. If the Charter obliges us "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”, let us prove to the world that we are neither insensitive nor indifferent to the vastness of the social and economic problems that face mankind. If we make some impact, however small, in each of these three major areas of international obligation, then this Assembly, which opened under the most unprecedented and historic circumstances, will surely deserve to be named by history also, as the President has named it, the "Assembly of Humanity".
137. It is the earnest hope and prayer of my delegation that, in the coming weeks and months, we shall dedicate ourselves to these tasks and to these ideas, fully aware that the life, happiness and welfare of our fellow human beings are really in our hands.