A great number of speakers have expressed, during this general debate, their appreciation of the action taken by the Security Council to assist the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) when this new State, shortly after the proclamation of its independence, was threatened by internal unrest and ah extensive paralysis of its political and economic life. Many speakers have also warmly praised the energy, ability and impartiality shown by the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks entrusted to him by the Security Council. On behalf of the Swedish Government, I concur in these opinions regarding the United Nations action in the Congo. At the same time, I wish to express my sincere hope that it will be possible to pursue this action successfully in spite of the tremendous difficulties that will have to be overcome. This hope is founded on the fact, among other things, that we have had such favourable experience of the competence and the ability to take initiative displayed so far by the Secretary-General and his collaborators not only in the Congo but on earlier occasions as well. His efforts have been facilitated as a consequence of the independent position which the Charter has conferred upon the Secretary-General when executing tasks assigned to him by the policy-making organs of the United Nations.
56. It did not appear in the beginning that the problem of the Congo need give rise to special complications. Nevertheless, it has become controversial to a high degree. It has moved into the centre of all activities of the United Nations and is now in the focus of the world’s attention. The first intervention of the Security Council corresponded to a general wish to support the new State. It would appear that this was a case where co-operation might be possible, within the framework of the Charter, on the basis of mutual interest among the great Powers in avoiding the splitting of this important region by bloc conflicts. The Republic of the Congo was outside the regions of the world included in the great power-blocs. The action undertaken by the United Nations was intended to be of a local nature. At the same time, there existed a wider-spread feeling that the risk of complications would be much greater if the United Nations remained passive in relation to the events which were taking place in the Congo. There was a possibility that rival political leaders in the country might appeal to foreign Powers for assistance. Such a development could result in foreign troops facing each other on Congolese soil.
57. Unfortunately, in spite of the unanimous decisions of the Security Council about United Nations action in the Congo, differences of opinion gradually emerged not only in respect of certain measures that had been taken but also regarding the whole operation as such and the role which the United Nations was supposed to play in this connexion. It would seem that, after a while, the question of the Congo had become an international political problem of the first order and that a situation had arisen of exactly the kind that the United Nations had tried to prevent.
58. However, it became possible for the General Assembly, convened in an emergency special session, to agree on the continuation of the United Nations operation in accordance with the policies laid down by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It has been of particular importance that there has been a large degree of agreement among the African States on the advantage to the Republic of the Congo of receiving international assistance through the United Nations.
59. There may be different opinions regarding the suitability of certain measures or regarding the advisability of omitting the taking of certain steps in the Congo. I have no possibility of commenting upon such problems, which require a thorough knowledge of conditions on the spot. Instead, I shall mention a few words on some controversial question of a more general character.
60. A source of unrest and discontent has been the separatist movement which has come into existence in the Province of Katanga. However, it is a fact that this separatist movement has been forcefully condemned and counteracted by the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, by a large majority of the Governments of other African States, by the Security Council and by the Secretary-General. It is true that there has been some influence to the contrary from Belgian circles with interests in Katanga, but this cannot in the long run outweigh the wide-spread and firm opinion which is against the secession of this Province. The criticism which has been levelled against the Secretary-General for not having been sufficiently energetic in endeavouring to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops cannot be sustained in the face of the evidence of facts and documents. The international officials who, under difficult conditions, have to apply the directives given by the Security Council in general terms, are entitled to expect that we have confidence in their good intentions.
61. Another dispute is related to the attitude to be taken towards the rival political leaders who have claimed to represent the legal Government of the Congo. la international practice, we are familiar with the dilemma facing foreign Governments when there has been a "coup d’état” or rebellion in a country, but when none of the rival leaders involved has succeeded in obtaining full control. Usually, in such eases, other States delay their recognition of a new Government until the situation becomes clarified. In order to safeguard important interests and to protect nationals, however, circumstances may make it necessary to establish relations, on a de facto basis, with this or that authority exercising control of a part of the country, perhaps also with authorities subordinated to different Governments. As far as I understand, the Secretary-General has followed this diplomatic practice when two or several authorities have claimed to be the Central Government. This attitude has been in the interest of the population concerned and it has not implied any taking of sides in favour of one or the ether of the authorities involved. I hardly need to point out that situations of this kind can be most embarrassing to foreign States and can confront them with problems which it may be very difficult to solve. It would, indeed, not be surprising if, in exceptional cases, actions may turn out to be the cause of misunderstanding.
62. Can it be said, however, that any of these disputes are of such a character as to constitute a valid reason for preventing co-operation among the States Members of the United Nations in an action to assist the Congo? Are we witnessing a clash of interests between some big Powers, and is it necessary that an action to assist the Congo, undertaken by the United Nations, must lead to a taking of sides in favour of any one party in the cold war?
63. Sometimes statements are made that seem to mean that it is in the nature of things that the Republic of the Congo is to be the object of a struggle for power between various groups of States. It is assumed that the interests of the Western Powers and those of the Eastern bloc necessarily must go apart. Indeed, in this connexion, mention has been made of a bloc of neutral States as if the freedom from alliances of these States was to be sufficient reason for letting them appear as a homogenous bloc with special interests of their own in the Congo. At any rate, Sweden does not regard itself as belonging to a neutral bloc. Sweden, for its own part, does not expect to derive either direct profit or disadvantage from its participation in the operation to assist the Congo.
64. However, we warmly wish that the peoples of the Congo who have just obtained their political independence will be able to master the new problems confronting them and to increase their standard of living and to build up an orderly judicial system and a spiritual culture. We also sincerely hope that the Congo in the future shall escape the fate of becoming the scene of a competition between other Powers to secure influence ever that country.
65. It has been said that the Secretary-General, who has to carry out the decisions of the United Nations, necessarily will do this in a manner favourable to the interests of one group of States and to the detriment of other States. Possibly this view is an expression of a dogmatic, now somewhat antiquated, concept of the communist doctrine on the struggle between the classes. However, I regard assistance rendered to the Republic of the Congo collectively, and within the framework of the United Nations, as being in the fullest conformity with the principle of peaceful coexistence so often and so eloquently defended by the chief of the Soviet Government.
66. When the Swedish Government decided to accede to the demand of the Secretary-General to have a military troop from Sweden, it based its decision, among other things, on the information received on the rights, duties and tasks of such a troop. The United Nations Force should be stationed in the Congo at the request of the Government of that country. The Force should be under the exclusive command of the United Nations and it would not be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict. The United Nations operation would be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities. The Secretary-General had also referred to previously established principles for international forces in the service of the United Nations. The international units ought not to be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution. These units would be entitled to act only in self-defence. Men engaged in the operation should never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but would be entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupied under order from their commander. Altogether it was not a question of a military force designed for combat purposes, but of a police force with duties similar to those carried out by the United Nations forces set up in connexion with the Suez crisis of 1956 and the action in Lebanon in 1958.
67. Considering these rules regarding the tasks and duties of the military forces, it was natural and in full consistency with Sweden’s policy of neutrality that our country should participate in the United Nations operation in the Congo.
68. It has been said in some quarters that the United Nations forces should have been put at the disposal of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or that that Government should have been permitted to use them for the solution of domestic political conflicts. The Swedish Government cannot agree with this view. An intervention into the internal affairs of the Congo could, from a political point of view, easily lead to a spread of the unrest and to conflicts between States Members of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has indicated, in the Security Council, the principles guiding the military assistance that can be given by the United Nations in this case, and these principles have met with no objection on the part of the Security Council. It goes without saying that sometimes there may be some uncertainty as to the extent of the authority and freedom of action of the military forces. Mistakes can be made, and accidents may occur. However, it is not reasonable to doubt, because of this, the objectivity and the good intentions of those who bear the responsibility. It is of the utmost importance that there is no doubt whatsoever as to the functions which the United Nations forces are intended to fulfil. The experience already gained on the two previous occasions mentioned before, when police forces have been organized to serve the United Nations, is likely to make their functions clear.
69. If I may now turn to the problem of disarmament, I want first to note the existing agreement of opinion between the leading Powers regarding the possibility of disarmament and the. necessity of continued negotiations. In his recent speech before this Assembly, President Eisenhower said: “Some who have followed closely the many fruitless disarmament talks since the war tend to become cynical — to assume that the task is hopeless. This is not the position of the United States.” [868th meeting, para. 73.]
70. On his part, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union has characterized disarmament as this Assembly’s most urgent problem [869th meeting].
71. I also wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation at the fact, that the Three-Nation Conference in Geneva is carrying on its deliberations regarding a ban on nuclear weapons tests, and that considerable progress has been made lately. This is the only bright spot of the disarmament picture. There seems to be a real prospect that the three Powers at Geneva will before long be able to agree on the ending of tests. Such an agreement would not only in itself be of great importance, but would also prove a powerful incentive to the great Powers to reach agreement on nuclear production and conventional arms. Obviously, an agreement between the three States must be acceded to by the other States in order to give it the desired effectiveness.
72. I should also like to draw attention to the interesting proposal recently advanced by the United States regarding the suspension of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. President Eisenhower stated in his speech before this Assembly: “If the Soviet Union will agree to a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, some production facilities could be closed without delay. The United States would be willing to match the Soviet Union in shutting down major plants producing fissionable materials, one by one, under international inspection and verification.” [868th meeting, para. 71.]
73. The setting up last year of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament as an organ for continued efforts to solve the numerous knotty problems of disarmament has not been without benefit. Last June, the great Powers in the Committee presented new versions of their respective programmes and contributed thereby to a clarification of the differences existing between the programmes — differences which, incidentally, are quite considerable. The Government of the Soviet Union has, on 23 September 1960, submitted a revised programme [A/4505], A study of the programmes allows us to acknowledge that there also exist certain points of agreement between them, which are not insignificant.
74. Among the points in the programmes, which appear to correspond, I mention the following three and I here quote the representative of Canada in the Ten- Nation Committee: "(i) That disarmament should proceed by stages; "(ii) That at no stage of disarmament should any State or group of States achieve a military advantage over other States; "(iii) That disarmament measures should be balanced as, for example, between measures of nuclear disarmament and measures of conventional disarmament.” According to the Canadian representative's statement in the Ten-Nation Committee, these three principles had all been accepted by the representatives in the Committee.
75. Particularly, I want to stress the importance of the second principle. The reduction of armaments shall be effected in such a way as not to cause disturbances in the balance of military power between the latent opponents. Here lies one of the main difficulties; but it would surely not be technically impossible to ensure, when the plan is being drawn up, that neither side is favoured by the order in which disarmament is successively brought about.
76. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that an advance towards the common goal — a general and complete disarmament under effective international control — may possibly be facilitated by depoliticizing the preparatory studies which, in any event, are essential. We all know that every important step towards the goal requires a political act of will, a political decision. But after many years of debating disarmament in different organs, it appears not to be necessary to devote much further time to general debates, comprising the whole conglomerate of questions, until a number of problems of an essentially technical nature has been mapped and clarified by experts. This viewpoint has been emphasized by several speakers preceding me in this debate.
77. The three programmes which this year have been put forward by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, all envisage the convening of a general disarmament conference at a specific stage of the deliberations within the disarmament organ. But if there is to be any prospect of arriving, within a reasonable time, at positive results at such a conference, thorough examinations by experts must have been made before the conference is convened. To the Swedish Government it appears desirable that this Assembly give such directives to the Ten-Nation Committee that a rational organization of the work is brought about. There should be no insurmountable obstacles to reaching an agreement regarding the setting up of groups of experts, each with the task of reviewing a specific, important problem in the field of disarmament.
78. The argumentation I am now making was set forth last year by the representative of France, Mr. Jules Moch. On 22 October 1959, he stated in the First Committee: "Let us refer it all to the Geneva Committee. Let us also remind that Committee, without dwelling on a disappointing past, of the value of the work of experts. As long ago as 1957, I suggested in London that we entrust to such groups the technical study of clearly defined problems. In this very place last year, I suggested applying this procedure to the prevention of surprise attack, to the halting of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the study of defence budgets, to the reduction of troops and armaments, to the utilization of outerspace, and to the methods of control for each of these measures."
79. The mentioned example of questions which Mr. Jules Moch wished to have referred to groups of experts for consideration, is also found in the United Kingdom programme of March 1960 as questions which, should be reviewed during the first disarmament stage. In the United Kingdom programme is added as a subject for consideration "the structure of an international authority for keeping peace in a disarmed world", a problem which, it seems to me, should rather be put off to a later stage. The Soviet programme envisages during the first stage a common study of certain questions, namely of measures which should be carried out during the second stage and which relate to the suspension of production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. In the United States programme it is stated that, in the course of negotiating a disarmament treaty, the Ten-Nation Committee should arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies to work out effective control arrangements for measures to be carried out in the programme. These studies shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with the implementation of the measures studied at the appropriate stage. It is added that among the early studies shall be a technical examination of the measures necessary to verify control over, reduction and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery. The United States programme recommends also a study of the control system, necessary for the suspension of the production of fissionable materials.
80. Thus, already in the existing programmes submitted by the West and by the East the necessity of expert studies concerning a number of problems is envisaged. It is easy to mention other such problems.
81. Both sides suggest the setting up of a control organization for supervising various measures designed to a reduction of the military defence. In the programmes, this whole problem of control is dealt with only in general terms and could very well be referred to a special group of experts.
82. The concept of nuclear weapons carriers plays an important role in the programmes of both sides. The idea of indirectly bringing about an effective ban on nuclear weapons by a ban on nuclear carriers is originally French. An examination should be made with a view to establishing which categories of vehicles, artillery, etc. should be classified as nuclear weapons carriers. In this connexion, the question arises as to what extent a ban or a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons carriers signifies an entirely new method of tackling the disarmament question. It seems that there is here a great need for a closer examination by a group of experts. . ,
83. As I have previously pointed out, both programmes envisage that disarmament shall be brought about gradually, namely, in three stages. According to the proposal put forth by the East, the first stage is fixed at a period of twelve to eighteen months, whereas no period has been fixed for the first stage of the West's proposal or for the second and third stages of both proposals. However, it is emphasized in both proposals that all measures relating to disarmament shall be taken within specifically defined periods of time.
84. The fixing of the time for executing various disarmament measures is of the greatest importance when it comes to an appraisal of the significance of a programme. The proposed programmes can, as a matter of fact, hardly be compared if they are not drawn up in such a way that they cover the same periods of time. The Ten-Nation Committee should give directives to the various groups of experts on this point, naturally without anticipating its final position on the question. To give such directives implies a political decision, but a decision only designed to serve as a working hypothesis for the technical studies. If the first stage is set, for instance at five years, the task of the expert group will be to establish what decisions can be made and which actual measures can be taken in the course of five years.
85. Thus, I suggest that the Ten-Nation Committee, perhaps somewhat modified as regards its composition and brought within the framework of the United Nations, should begin its deliberations by trying to organize the work in such a way that prospects are opened for results as rapidly as possible. With the assistance of the United Nations Secretariat, the Ten-Nation Committee should consequently make a selection within the whole complex of disarmament problems of those questions of a preparatory nature which, with advantage, could and should be examined by experts without losing view of the final goal. It must be emphasized that the suggested method of work is designed to expedite and not to delay a result. Thus, a relatively great number of groups of experts should work at the same time and submit reports to the main group. Among the experts there may very well be persons belonging to none of the countries represented in the Ten-Nation Committee.
86. The proposed procedure may give rise to objections to the effect that the difficulties for the experts to agree on conclusions would delay the completion of the various studies. Naturally, the experts may sometimes be expected to adopt political attitudes, and political antagonism may thus enter the groups of experts. This is, no doubt, possible. But the procedure I have recommended would still lead to better results than those which may be obtained if the central organ considered directly the whole host of technical problems.
87. The United Kingdom Prime Minister concluded his speech in this Assembly a few days ago [877th meeting] by observing that, according to his experience, in all human affairs there are dangers in excessive pessimism as well as in too much optimism. As matters stand today, I hardly believe that there is any risk of the representatives in this Assembly giving themselves up to too much optimism. Evidently, Mr. Macmillan wanted above all to call upon us to avoid an exaggerated degree of pessimism. Indeed, it seems natural to me that the Members of the United Nations, as a working hypothesis, start from the assumption that the problem of disarmament, in spite of its tremendous difficulties, does not belong to the problems which are unsolvable. No doubt, it is this opinion that underlies the resolution [1378 (XTV)] adopted by this Assembly last year.