Belgium

Having paid in its turn its tribute to the President and assured him of its co-operation, the Belgian delegation wishes to make a substantial though brief contribution to this debate. Perhaps the best way to achieve this result is by not repeating what has already been said. 293. At this exceptional session we have been privileged to see in our midst most of the world’s leading figures, many of whom have already delivered their messages to us. We are replying to them because it is, after all, the fate of the medium-sized and the small Powers to play, so to speak, the part of the chorus in classical drama; no doubt, it is a modest part but if we sing in unison we can drown the voices of the protagonists. Even the biggest know that it is difficult to try something on their own; they need our approval in order to succeed. 294. We are at present faced with three principal topics which we cannot avoid in our debate. The first one, obviously, is the reorganization of the United Nations, whose structure, functioning, even vitality and, perhaps, very existence are being called in question. 295. The second one, quite clearly, is the question of relations between the Communist world and the Western world. This is a matter of peace or war, and it concerns us all. 296. Lastly, this twofold crisis has been exacerbated, at least partially, if I may say so, by the troubled continent of Africa and, particularly, by the Belgian Congo, which has now become the independent Congo in search of its destiny. 297. Let us deal first with the re-organization of the United Nations. Rarely has a question of this importance been introduced so dramatically at the very beginning of our session. To follow the sequence of events I shall quote first President Eisenhower, who said [868th meeting]: "We believe that the right of every man to participate, through his or her vote, in self-government is as precious as the right of each nation here represented to vote its own convictions in this Assembly”... "Thus we see, as our goal, not a super-State above nations, but a world community embracing them all, rooted in law and justice and enhancing the potentialities and common purposes of all people." 298. A few hours later [869th meeting] Mr. Khrushchev put forward the contrasting argument which I shall now quote: "The executive organ of the United Nations should reflect the real situation that obtains in the world today. The United Nations includes States which are members of the military blocs of the Western Powers, socialist States and neutralist countries. It would therefore be completely justified to take that situation into account, and we would be better safeguarded against the negative developments which have come to light in the work of the United Nations especially during the recent events in the Congo." 299. Things are therefore very clear. On the one hand we are shown a democratic world which this Assembly must reflect and express. Admittedly, all the nations are not of equal power; but it was precisely for the purpose of putting an end to the rule of force that we set up this Organization. Each people has the right to choose quite freely its way of life, its civilization and its destiny. 300. Mr. Khrushchev, on the other hand, has drawn for this Assembly the picture of a hierarchical world which, in his view, is the only realistic one. He envisages great blocs facing one another, each under the leadership of the major Powers. Just noting how faithfully the Soviet Union’s arguments are being repeated and amplified by the USSR's attendant States is enough to make us realize the degree of discipline implied in the world "bloc”. 301. To propose to us this reform which, in a way, would put the blocs on to an institutional footing seems to me to be the height of audacity. After all, most of the delegations in this hall represent small and medium-sized Powers. Were we to believe that we shall have to don once and for all the livery of one or other bloc, we would not be here wasting our time in discussion. It would be enough to inform us by letter of the decisions to be taken. 302. In actual fact, we do not belong to the United Nations in order to let ourselves be dragooned, but so that each one of us can defend his legitimate interests and contribute, on a footing of equality, to the creation of a better world for us all. 303. The small and the medium-sized Powers have everything to lose in a war and they are more attached to peace than any others. The small and the medium-sized nations cannot gather all the wealth and all the talent within their narrow frontiers and they therefore understand the virtue of solidarity better than any one else. The small and the medium sized nations know that the world does not revolve around them, and they are trained to practise the virtue of tolerance and to understand the other's point of view. Lastly, the small and the medium-sized nations, being the most numerous, can assemble a sizeable force in support of a balanced judgement and a policy of moderation. 304. The policy of blocs is the very negation of the United Nations, which will not succeed unless everyone refuses to take any orders except those of his own conscience, and unless every one is capable of keeping in check all his passions except the passion for justice. We must all submit to the will of the majority; Belgium has done so, and you are all doing it in your turn. If someone thought that he could depart from this rule, he would simply be imposing slavery on the many to the advantage of the few. In saying this, I am pleading the cause of the medium sized Powers and, indeed, that of the United Nations itself against those who, with incredible effrontery, have thrown off the mask to reveal the real imperialism of the present day. 305. But the Soviet Union delegation went even beyond that. What it has proposed, in effect, is that these three blocs, the great Powers, should be represented within the Secretariat and that all decisions, even executive ones, should require the assent of these three heads. 306. If I have understood it correctly — and I have done so, because the necessary commentary has since been provided — it is the veto that is being introduced not only into the taking of decisions but also into their execution. The Soviet Union specializes in the veto. If I am not mistaken, on ninety occasions since the inception of the United Nations it has frustrated the will of the majority. And now what it wants is to impose a similar check on the execution of decisions, too. 307. As I have just said, the rule must be the same for all because otherwise it means the enslavement of those on whom it is imposed. Today, when the Organization numbers almost one hundred members, no one can say that the majority is that of a particular bloc. It is, and must be, the majority of the whole world. 308. It is painful indeed to hear this suggestion made precisely when new nations, proud of their independence, have taken their seats at our side and I greet them in my turn. They are here, full of confidence, fully intending to exercise their newly acquired power in the international community. They are more jealous of their sovereignty than others and they must tolerate no press-ganging. Together with us they must defend their freedom of judgement and the dignity of this Assembly. 309. I now turn to the second topic in my statement: East-West relations. They involve disarmament and that is a disappointing question. It occupied the League of Nations; the United Nations has been concerned with it ever since its inception and yet never before have armaments been heavier, more unbearable financially and more dangerous militarily. But we must believe in disarmament, we must will it. We must never throw up the sponge. How could we do so in the full knowledge that in a nuclear war there would be no victors but only vanquished? 310. In order to succeed we need a method of work and, first and foremost, a starting point. It seems to me that this was brought out in the remarkable opening statement made by Mr. Lafer, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs [868th meeting]. According to him this starting point should be everyone's readiness to recognize that the others may have a system of government and, more generally, an ideology different from what he would like for himself. This reminds me of what Bernard Shaw once wrote very irreverently: "Do not do unto others as you would they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same". This does not mean non-involvement. When it comes to its conception of man, the State, civilization and progress each people is entitled to believe in its own mission, I am not speaking of indifference but of tolerance, Peaceful coexistence must mean exactly that: not struggle by all possible means — except force of arms— but tolerance and mutual assistance. 311. One can agree with Marshal Tito [868th meeting]— and I have told you that I am replying to the previous speakers — that the requisite progress cannot be reconciled with the perpetuation of the status quo. But it is also necessary that each people, secure from all interference, should choose freely not only its present regime but also its future path. I am not alone in fearing the indiscriminate proselytizing by those who proclaim that they have found the universal truth and constantly speak of bringing happiness unto others according to their own national prescription. 312. If we are all genuinely actuated by this spirit of tolerance, we can try disarming. After listening to so many delegations I think that it would perhaps be possible to work out a practical approach by differentiating between the final goal on the one hand and the first practical step and the method of work on the other. 313. The final goal is general, complete and multilateral disarmament at the earliest possible moment. On that we are all agreed. Is there anyone who wishes to maintain armies, even of a limited size, beyond a certain period? 314. But is it reasonable to pursue a policy of "all or nothing"? Asking for the lot in order to concede nothing is rather a facile method. In French, when we want to calm down people in a hurry, we tell them that God took seven days to make the world. Complete disarmament would be a miracle for mankind and it cannot be achieved instantaneously. Not that the technical operations would necessarily take long. The weapons can be quickly disposed of and the men can be discharged at once. The real problem is to find a new basis for the nations' feeling of security, which today is based on their own arms. This takes time, a great deal of time. This feeling of security must be recreated in a new guise. International disputes will always be with us and those in danger of being unjustly despoiled must have a reliable means of obtaining justice. It should be noted that even control by itself is not enough to produce this feeling of security, because the large nations, by sheer weight of numbers and economic might, will always remain a perpetual danger to the others, unless something is done about it. 315. This brings me to my second point. If we are agreed on the goal of complete disarmament at the earliest possible moment, if we admit that this urgency must not be taken to mean almost instantaneous action, let us also reach agreement on a first step which can be taken immediately. We must advance step by step towards our goal. Let us take the first step in that direction; and the second will then be easier to take. Our momentum will carry us on. 316. Eminent representatives, such as President Eisenhower [868th meeting] and Mr. Diefenbaker [871st meeting], have put forward various attractive proposals from which we can make our choice. The cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the banning of armaments from outer space, the simultaneous closing-down of equal numbers of war plants in each of the two camps, are all concrete and practical ideas worthy of initiating disarmament. It is not enough to retort that they do not bring about disarmament, since we are saying from the outset that they are but partial steps. Nor can one object on the grounds that they favour one or other of the parties, since these partial measures are limited in scope. Nor, for the same reason, can one cavil about petty details of control. From the soldiers' point of view these would no doubt be but small steps in terms of disarmament, but their importance from the politicians' point of view would be enormous because we would have dared to take the first step and begun to build up confidence. 317. Lastly, after the goal has been defined and the first practical step chosen, it will be necessary to determine the method of work. I listened very carefully to what Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had to, say [877th meeting]. He referred to an experiment which proved successful in the past. He suggests that experts, scientists, should be entrusted with the task of preparing practical and, therefore, non-diplomatic and non-political schemes. It might perhaps be possible in this way to find methods of disarmament and methods of control that could be applied by the two camps to these first measures. 318. We have reached a stage when we must be modest as well as realistic. The peoples we represent are disheartened by our mutual protestations in favour of disarmament which, though repeated, have led nowhere. They are demanding that our intentions, if they are indeed genuine, should be translated into action, even on a very limited scale, that would at least give them back hope. 319. In connexion with these military problems the Belgian delegation feels that it must define its position on one particular point, that is to say, the rearmament of Germany. Since the Federal Republic of Germany is not represented here, it has not been able to defend itself nor to exercise the right of reply. It is, however, associated with us in international organizations and in our view it would be dishonourable to leave unanswered the criticisms levelled against it. 320. I would remind you that our testimony has some value, seeing that we have twice been unjustifiably invaded and that we have spent nine years under military occupation. Incidentally I would remind the Soviet delegation that in 1917, while our country was still occupied, Russia made peace with Germany, and that in 1940, when we were invaded, Russia, having signed a treaty of friendship with Herr Hitler, broke off diplomatic relations with us. But what is to be gained by recriminations? Do you believe that we can build a future with memories, even of the recent past? We hope and believe that after two terrible ordeals a new Germany has arisen which, as we can bear witness, has proved itself a loyal associate. I believe it is unjust to attribute to it a desire for revenge. Its Government has solemnly affirmed in public statements— the only authentic ones — that it renounces the use of force to further its claims. It is not that Government which proposes unilaterally to alter the status of Berlin. Lastly I would emphasize that the whole of its armed forces are integrated in a defensive alliance whose policies are formulated and controlled by a group of Powers which includes such peaceful nations as the Benelux countries. 321. In the concluding part of my speech I should like, in all simplicity, to give the Assembly some information about the matter of the Congo. You will understand the feelings with which I mounted the rostrum following the violent attacks upon my country. I do not wish now to continue this controversy. Nevertheless it appears to me that for the sake of objectivity, for the honour of my country and for your information I must recall a number of facts which I realize are unknown or have been forgotten. 322. In 1958 the Belgian Government sent to the Congo a commission of political men. They interrogated all the Congolese leaders in order to ascertain their wishes. Following the publication of this commission's report, on 13 January 1959 the Belgian Government declared that independence would be granted. In January 1960 a Bound Table Conference — an expression which immediately conjures up the idea of equality and freedom — consisting of Belgian and Congolese politicians met to formulate jointly the political structure of the independent Congo. I think the Congolese delegation was a good one; it included all those people who today figure in the world Press. Conclusions were unanimously or almost unanimously adopted. 323. Take good note of this. In 1960, throughout the entire Territory, free elections were held by secret ballot and with universal suffrage. I have not, and for good reason, heard the slightest criticism of the organization of these elections. Certain countries might well bear this in mind as a precedent for their metropolitan territories. 324. In June 1960 the King of the Belgians, constitutionally covered by the responsibility of his Ministers, who were themselves responsible to Parliament, set up a Congolese National Government which seemed likely to enjoy the confidence of the Congolese Parliament. Here again, no one has denied that the operation was absolutely correct and perfectly straightforward. Those who today criticize us most severely are the very ones who would like this first Congolese Government, appointed by the King of the Belgians, to be maintained in, or rather returned to, power. That fact shows how impartially and independently we acted. What these critics do not say is that, they are now attacking not Belgium, since we are not responsible for the subsequent events, but the genuine representatives of the Congolese people itself. 325. Belgium has consistently and strictly refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo, whose independence it has recognized, or from showing any preference for one party or another. It distrusts the zeal with which certain delegations make their choice or support one candidate. Are they observing the wishes of the Congolese people or are they playing their own game? After all, Mr. Kasa-Vubu was appointed Head of State by the Congolese, not the Belgian, Parliament. All the countries which have relations with the independent Congo appointed Ambassadors who presented their credentials to him. It was he who by virtue of his constitutional powers exercised his right to dismiss the first Government and replace it by another. Under Congolese public law, as under that of any civilized country, Parliament has no power to recall a government which has been dismissed. It can express its confidence in a new government or refuse to do so; above all it cannot reach a decision when there is no quorum because a large number of deputies have fled and because Parliament is surrounded by soldiers and threatened by machineguns. 326. Since it is impossible to criticize the procedure followed up to 30 June 1960 — for I have never hoard any criticism on that score — our intentions are called in question. That is a very easy thing to do. It is alleged that from 10 July on — I repeat, from 10 July on — moved by tardy regrets, we endeavoured to take back, what we had granted on 30 June; that haying set up a unitary State, we tried to divide it; that having held free elections by secret ballot with universal suffrage, we tried to dislodge those who had been elected. In a word it is stated that, after granting complete and unrestricted independence, we tried immediately afterwards to resume control, which it would have been so easy for us not to relinquish. Naturally never a grain of proof has been forthcoming. 327. Those are the facts as far as the political process is concerned. I would add the following: the Congo was well equipped to cut an impressive figure as an independent State. I shall not refer here and now to its economic and social development, which stood in high repute and with which a number of you, and particularly the African delegations, are familiar. But I must recall that this stage of advancement was reached not only because the soil is fertile and because the African people are industrious and intelligent — we know that and they will demonstrate it — but also on account of certain features of the policy we followed. 328. Are you aware that under our Constitution everything coming from the Congo belonged not to Belgium but to the Congo? Under the regime we established there were separate national patrimonies, separate currencies, separate gold and foreign exchange reserves; absolute freedom to buy and sell anywhere at the most advantageous prices, without any gain to Belgium; an entirely separate administration, independent of the metropolitan administration, so that officials had no hope of being able to continue their career in the other administration; no alienation of indigenous lands, the transfer of which was strictly forbidden by law, even against payment; lastly, the shares which concessionary companies were obliged to give free of charge to the public authorities were, and remained, the property of the Congolese State and not of the Belgian State. In these circumstances it is not surprising that development was rapid and that the credit of the then Belgian Congo was high. 329. We were amazed to read in a Soviet note that the Congo has hardly emerged from a state of illiteracy. Let me tell you, gentlemen, that in that country, which covers an area equal to one third of the United States and where the population numbers only 14 million, despite the difficulty of communications and the number of people living in the bush, more than half of the children were attending school; that situation is, and will remain, the foundation of truly democratic institutions. Furthermore, in 1952 and 1954 the secondary school system was rounded off by the establishment of two universities of the highest rank, in the European sense of the term, and on a footing of absolute equality with our own universities, since all the faculties were represented. 330. We are accused of having granted independence to these people without having provided them with an adequate “élite". It may be so! It might have been better to wait a few years until there were more university graduates to hold the reins of office. But just look at the political map of the region and the political map of the Congo. The very people who today blame us for this lack of wisdom would have blamed us still more for what they would have described as "timidity". The fact is that the Congo had reached such a stage of economic and intellectual development that it would not have been right — that is how we saw it— to deny it emancipation at a time when all its neighbours were achieving political independence. You must not, however, believe that we took no precautions. We were well aware of the danger and we proposed solutions. 331. To fill the gap until the new Congolese universities could supply replacements we left in Africa at the disposal of the Congolese National Government, 10,000 experts, most of whom were university graduates. These doctors, teachers, administrators, magistrates and technicians of every kind, who had brought about the Congo's development, remained in the Congo and — be it noted — were paid, directed and given orders by the Congolese Government, whose officials they were. They were not Belgian officials but officials of the Congolese Government, from which they took orders, thus enabling that Government to carry out its work effectively from the outset. As far as financial assistance was concerned, Belgium proposed to grant $100 million for the financial year 1960 alone. In other words, Belgium was doing all that the United Nations as a whole is asked to do for the year 1960, and it intended to continue that assistance in subsequent years under the terms of the Treaty of Friendship. This should give pause to those who say that we have bled the Congo white. Ten thousand experts and $100 million in one year I Those figures should be borne in mind and measured against the largest scale, that: of the United Nations. 332. What then are the causes of the present appalling crisis? Some of them arise from the internal situation in the Congo and I shall not discuss them now any more than I have done in the past, since, unlike some others, I do not intend to abandon the policy of non-interference which we have strictly observed from the beginning. As for the external causes, as I have already said, there are those who wish you to believe in Belgian machinations, of which there is no proof and which would be directly contrary to our policy —because to suppose that we could have changed our policy after ten days is tantamount to accusing us of insanity. 333. Unfortunately other countries have shown less discretion and it is disturbing to note that now that the Belgian troops who were there on a temporary mission cannot be indicted, criticism is turned against the United Nations. Passing circumstances, however, should not blind us to the main currents of history. No one can deprive us of the honour of having created the Congo, which before we arrived was a mere conglomeration of warring racial groups and tribes. It was we who created it. It is the Congolese people, together with Belgian experts, and nobody else, who have bestowed upon this magnificent country its economic, social and human equipment. It is the Congolese people and the Belgian people, and nobody else, who on 30 June 1960 brought about the independence of the Congo. No crisis, however serious and tragic it may be, can conceal that fundamental fact. As soon as it has re-established order in its internal affairs, the Congo will become that for which its people, together with us, have been preparing for eighty years — a great African Power. 334. In conclusion I shall say the following: Belgium is distinguished by its attachment to the ideals of democracy. From the early Middle Ages our towns were among the first to establish government of the people by the people. Our national Constitution has been described as the most liberal in Europe. It has been copied in some ten other countries. We wished to endow the African territories with democratic institutions based in particular on general education and universal suffrage. In the international community my country was a founder member of the League of Nations and of the United Nations and has actively participated in the work of both, 335. We still believe that international problems can be solved only by general co-operation and Under the influence of a majority. That is the role of the medium-sized Powers. That is why I began my statement by defending the position of the medium-sized and small Powers. 336. Moreover, we are convinced that those States which we represent are united by the same ideals; but in order to realize them they should give their support not to wordy and grandiose programmes but to specific, reasonable proposals, from whichever faction they may emanate. Thus in the second part of our statement we drew a distinction between the final goal of total disarmament and the first steps to be taken towards its achievement, which this Assembly should decide upon, according to the method of work advocated by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 337. Lastly and above all, our long experience has taught us that democracy must be based on reliable information, impartial judgement and tolerance. Hence in my statement on the question of the Congo I have spoken simply, eschewing, I believe, any controversial statements, which I wished to avoid from the start. The peace of the world should not depend on passion but on wisdom. If it can no longer be imposed by force it must be based on tolerance. It is in that spirit that Belgium will continue to support the United Nations in its endeavours.