Let me first of all congratulate Sir Leslie Munro on his election to the office of President of this session of the General Assembly.
18. Each session of the General Assembly is an event of some importance in international political life. This is only natural, since the United Nations, which now embraces eighty-two States, is called upon to solve the problem that is of the greatest importance for all countries and all peoples - that of ensuring a durable peace.
19. I should like to begin by expressing the hope that the General Assembly's twelfth session will mark the much-needed turning point towards a constructive solution of the tasks before us. This of course can be accomplished only by the concerted efforts of the countries represented here. For its part, the Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to achieve this end.
20. We are beginning our work in relatively more favourable circumstances than we did at the previous session. At that time, certain events familiar to all, which were the outcome of the "cold war" and the notorious policy of "negotiation from strength" had led to a serious worsening in international relations. There were moments when the danger of a general military conflagration was acute.
21. Things have now calmed down, but on the whole the international situation remains profoundly abnormal and disturbing. The world is still split up into mutually hostile military groups, between which an atmosphere of sharp distrust prevails. An armaments race such as we have never seen before is in progress, and it is particularly dangerous because it involves mainly the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Disarmament negotiations have been dragging on for many years without any tangible results, and a settlement of even such simple and easily solved problems as the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons is being deferred. Elementary forms of peaceful economic intercourse among peoples have been sacrificed to the "cold war" policy. The military and strategical plans forged by the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc govern even ordinary trade relations between countries.
22. The situation in the Near East, where almost before one military conflict has been settled a new crisis fraught with the danger of fresh hostilities is already gathering to a head, cannot but occasion serious concern.
23. Can the United Nations, which is called upon to guard international peace, look on passively while events take such a turn? Most emphatically not, if we wish to justify people's confidence in it.
24. In the USSR Government's view, it is our common duty to try to prepare and carry out such measures as would avert the possibility of new bloodshed and would allow people everywhere to dedicate themselves fully to peaceful toil. We consider that this is entirely feasible, if only we all start from the same premise: that we all desire peace, not war.
25. First of all, of course, we must renounce any attempt to resolve controversial international problems by force. It will be remembered that, after the Second World War, reliance on the use of force or the threat of force was proclaimed by some States as a principle of international politics; this was the policy of "negotiation from strength" to which I have already referred. This policy has left its sombre mark on the whole development of international relations during the last decade, following upon the successful co-operation of the great Powers which had taken part in the anti-Hitlerite coalition during the Second World War. The creation of aggressive military blocs, unbridled agitation for a new war and even direct acts of aggression, which the world has witnessed more than once since the end of the Second World War - such are the chief manifestations of this policy.
26. What this policy means can best be illustrated by the activity of the North Atlantic bloc, which is today the chief instrument in the preparation of a new war. It cannot be considered accidental that the political and military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, when speaking of the aims of this military alliance, have repeatedly indulged in openly aggressive statements.
27. It would be a mistake to assume that NATO is hostile only to the socialist States. Many countries of the East know from their own experience that this bloc is an alliance of forces directed also against other peoples and inimical to their independence.
28. As soon as the North Atlantic bloc was founded, its participants engaged in an intensive armaments race, forcing other States to join in.
29. In its military preparations, this bloc relies on a wide network of United States military bases situated thousands of kilometres from that country's frontiers. The NATO leaders do not even trouble to hide the purpose of these bases. Incidentally, they ought to bear in mind that with present developments in military technology, these bases are not nearly as important as they were only a few years ago. However, the mere fact that in peace time such military bases exist on foreign soil deepens the mistrust among States and poisons the whole climate of international relations.
30. Lately the situation has become even more dangerous because the North Atlantic bloc has engaged in preparations for an atomic war in Europe. American nuclear weapons are being stockpiled in the territories of the European members of NATO. In May 1957, the NATO Council, meeting at Bonn, decided to equip the armies of member countries with atomic weapons. The end result of such action by NATO, it is not difficult to foresee, can only be an atomic armaments race both in Europe and elsewhere, and a greater danger of atomic war.
31. This danger is further increased by the fact that the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc intend to supply atomic weapons to West Germany, that is, to place such weapons into the hands of the very same forces of German militarism which unleashed the Second World War. Let me recall that only two or three years ago we were assured that atomic weapons would in no case be furnished to the West German army, which was then in process of creation. And what do we see today? These assurances have been forgotten and there is open talk of equipping the West German armed forces with atomic weapons.
32. The role that NATO plays in Europe has been assigned in the Far East to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization - a military bloc organized by the United States - and to the Baghdad Pact in the Near and Middle East. These two military blocs are in fact nothing but branches of NATO. They are tarred with the same brush.
33. The originators of the policy of "negotiation from strength" admit that its purpose is to maintain the world "on the brink of war". There is a good deal of truth in that description. But they should not disregard the incontrovertible fact that, if war breaks out, the aggressor, wherever he may be, will not escape retaliation. Only those who deliberately shut their eyes to present developments in military technology can leave this out of account.
34. For the time being, however, the strategists of the "cold war" and the partisans of the armaments race find it suits their book that world peace should be unstable and that mankind should live in a constant state of tension which might any day lead to a military explosion. They take advantage of this situation to continue to draw enormous profits from the intensified armaments race, to suppress peoples fighting for their national independence and, last but not least, to keep their own allies in the military blocs under subjection,
35. Has this policy effected the solution of a single controversial issue? Has it perchance helped in solving the disarmament problem and removing the threat of atomic war, or in settling the German question? Has it proved capable of ensuring peace and normal conditions in the Middle East? Nothing of the sort.
36. This policy is foreign to the interests of the peoples. It has produced a deep rift in Europe and other continents; and by deliberately exacerbating relations among States, it has transformed the world into something very like a military camp. The territory of dozens of States is covered with a dense network of military airfields, arsenals, barracks and firing grounds, and many million soldiers, equipped with the most modern types of weapons, stand in readiness. You need only imagine this gigantic machinery of destruction being put in motion to have a clear picture of what the final outcome of this policy could be.
37. Can we really resign ourselves to the fact that, twelve years after the end of the war, there are foreign troops in dozens of European, Asian and African countries? This is clearly a most unhealthy situation. The Soviet Union advocates the restoration everywhere of normal peace-time conditions; for its part, it is ready to withdraw its troops from those countries where they are now stationed under the Warsaw Treaty and other international agreements, if the United States and the other Western Powers will withdraw their armed forces from the territories of various European countries. In the Soviet Government's view, foreign troops should also be withdrawn from other States on whose soil they are now maintained on various pretexts.
38. The policy of NATO and its organizers is today the main reason why the world's aspirations towards a lasting peace are still unfulfilled. If we wish to free mankind from the nightmare of a destructive atomic war, we must end this policy once and for all. The Soviet Union, for its part, is a stranger to it. Its foreign policy is based on the desire to maintain peaceful relations with all countries without exception.
39. As soon as the Soviet system had triumphed in Russia - and the peoples of the USSR are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of that event this year - the Government of our country appealed to all the belligerents in the First World War, which was then still raging, immediately to begin negotiations for a just and democratic peace. All the Soviet Government's activities in the international field are governed by the teaching of Lenin, the founder of our State, concerning the need for the peaceful coexistence of States, irrespective of their social systems.
40. We need no foreign territories. Owing to the very nature of the socialist order of society, any desire to seize foreign sources of raw material is fundamentally incompatible with Soviet policy; what is more, our own land has very rich deposits of practically all known types of metals, minerals and fuels. Neither have we any need to fight for markets for our products; our planned economy, which is immune to crises caused by over-production, guarantees a stable and ever-growing domestic market for the products of our industry and agriculture.
41. No social group in the Soviet Union could hope to derive any advantages from war. Our country needs peace, a long and stable peace. The Soviet State is engaged in the execution of a gigantic programme of industrial and agricultural development, the utilization of its natural resources and the improvement of the level of living of the Soviet people - other aims we have none.
42. For the Soviet people it is a point of honour to gain victories in peaceful competition with capitalist countries, including the most advanced. Who would dispute that competition in increasing production of milk, meat and butter is far more useful than competition in the production of nuclear weapons and other means of mass extermination? Nowadays military specialists try to estimate from time to time which of the two Powers, the United States or the Soviet Union, has exploded more atomic or hydrogen bombs, and the explosions of which side are equivalent to more millions of tons of TNT. This, of course, is competition of a kind, but one to which we are opposed. In its place we propose a competition in the transformation of nature, in bending its forces to the will of man and for peaceful purposes. It is precisely such a competition, not an armaments race, which should settle the argument about the advantages and drawbacks of different social systems.
43. In viewing the question from this angle, we are well aware that some sectors of our economy still suffer from shortcomings which we shall have to do a great deal of work to remove. But we have faith in our latent powers. Our confidence in our success springs from our knowledge of the Soviet people’s creative enthusiasm and the great advantages of a planned socialist economy. Needless to say, we have no objection if those whom we are inviting to this competition enter it with the same confidence in their own chances.
44. All this, of course, does not remove the differences existing between the two social systems, or the ideological dispute between them. The differences and the dispute exist - we must admit that as an immutable fact. But should they be allowed to interfere with peaceful toil and the peaceful competition of States? In the Soviet Government’s view, there is no reason why they should.
45. Today more than one-third of the population of the globe lives under the socialist system. There can no longer be any question of recognition or nonrecognition of its existence by States belonging to the other system, any more than there could be of recognizing or refusing to recognize the fact that the earth revolves around the sun. The simple truth is that if States do not want a new world war, they must maintain with each other, not temporary relations permeated with mistrust and hostility, but truly peaceful relations. There is no other way out, no other possibility exists.
46. To how that the need for the peaceful co-existence of States and its benefits are recognized not only by the representatives of socialist States, allow me to read an extract from a letter sent in November, 1941, by Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to Stalin, then head of the Soviet Government. This letter said: "The fact that Russia is a Communist State and Britain and the United States are not, and do not intend to be, is not any obstacle to our making a good plan for our mutual safety and rightful interests." It is difficult not to agree with this judicious appraisal of the situation. It is commonly known that such a great United States leader as the late President Roosevelt took the same view on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
47. The choice now before mankind is this: either stable peace and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their social systems and ideologies, or atomic war, or, at best, an anguished wait for the outbreak of such a war and ruinous rearmament, absorbing an ever greater share of humanity’s wealth and toil.
48. Whatever hostile propaganda may say about us abroad, we, the Soviet people, assume that in the present circumstances war is not inevitable. That position was substantiated at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite all the efforts of those advocating the "negotiation from strength" policy, the principles of peaceful cooperation are being increasingly applied in relations between States. At the Bandung Conference, twenty-nine Asian and African countries proclaimed their adherence to such principles. These principles are fully endorsed by the Soviet Union, whose foreign policy is based on them.
49. I should also like to cite, as a not unworthy example, the way in which the principles of peaceful coexistence are being applied in the relations between the Soviet Union and such countries as India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and a number of others, which have chosen the road of peaceful development and refuse to participate in military blocs. With these States the Soviet Union has good, friendly relations on the sound basis of genuine mutual respect and strict non-intervention in each other’s domestic affairs. The Soviet Government is ready to develop such relations with all States pursuing the same objectives.
50. To broaden international co-operation still further and to reduce international tension, the Soviet delegation is placing before the General Assembly a draft declaration [A/3673] concerning the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States. It is proposed in this declaration that the General Assembly should call upon States to base their mutual relations on the following principles: "(a) Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; "(b) Non-aggression; "(c) Non-intervention in one another's domestic affairs on any economic, political or ideological grounds whatsoever; "(d) Equality and mutual benefit; and "(e) Peaceful coexistence."
51. The adoption toy the General Assembly of a declaration containing these or similar provisions, and its application, would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the strengthening of universal peace.
52. Perhaps the most important question before the Assembly at this session is the disarmament problem,
53. The problem of disarmament as a means of averting war has faced mankind for several decades now. In many countries of the world, disarmament has been one of the most important planks in the platform of the political parties closest to the people. The call for disarmament was taken up by the great masses of the people, when the experience of two world wars showed them the outcome of armaments races. But the problem of disarmament has never been so vital and so urgent as in our day, when the explosion of a single hydrogen bomb can destroy all life over a radius of hundreds of kilometres, when rockets can carry atomic warheads to any part of the globe. All this shows how vigilant the peoples should be, if they do not wish to be plunged into the maelstrom of atomic war.
54. As far back as its first session, in 1946, the General Assembly expressed itself in favour of a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons [resolution 41 (1)]; it has repeatedly reaffirmed that decision. But those Member States upon which agreement on disarmament primarily depends have so far failed to achieve any practical results. Far from slowing down, the armaments race is gaining momentum and is becoming increasingly dangerous.
55. The Soviet Government considers that the situation which has arisen in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission is altogether abnormal. The Sub-Committee is at present the only body in which disarmament problems are being considered, and if no progress is being made there, none is being made anywhere.
56. What important developments have occurred in the disarmament talks during the past few months? There will probably be wide agreement that the most striking feature of that period was the fact that the Soviet Government, in an attempt to reach an agreement acceptable to all concerned, made significant concessions on a number of controversial issues to the other members of the Sub-Committee - the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada.
57. The Soviet Union favours a radical solution of the disarmament problem. We desire a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditure. We favour a complete and unconditional prohibition of the use and production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of these weapons.
58. The Governments of the aforementioned Western Powers state that they are not prepared to enter into such an agreement on disarmament and, in particular, that they cannot agree to prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Consider the statement made from this rostrum yesterday by Mr. Dulles [680th meeting]. Instead of associating his country with those who are demanding the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, he waxed almost lyrical in his praise of some types of these weapons.
59. Having regard to the position taken by the Western Powers, and being desirous of ending the deadlock on the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government submitted a proposal on partial disarmament measures. The Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on such measures should provide for the following.
60. First, armed forces should be reduced in three stages, as proposed by the United States Government, to the following levels: for the United States and the Soviet Union, to 2,500,000 men at the first stage, 2,100,000 at the second stage and l,700,000 at the third stage; for the United Kingdom and France, 750,000 men at the first stage, 700,000 at the second stage and 650,000 at the third stage.
61. Secondly, conventional armaments should be reduced by 15 per cent or, as proposed by the United States Government, by means of the reciprocal submission of specific lists of armaments to be reduced. There would be a reduction of military budgets by 15 per cent in the first stage.
62. Thirdly, States should give a solemn undertaking to renounce the use of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons, including aerial bombs, rockets with atomic and hydrogen warheads, whatever their effective range, and atomic artillery. Such an undertaking would be a first step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and would come into effect during the first stage of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.
63. Fourthly, consideration should be given to the question of abolishing military bases on foreign soil with a view to reaching agreement in the first instance on the bases which can be abolished during the first stage of disarmament.
64. Fifthly, an agreement should be concluded on the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany, as well as on the reduction of United States, British and French forces stationed in the territories of States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and of Soviet forces stationed in the territory of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.
65. Sixthly, the States parties to the agreement should adopt appropriate measures to end war propaganda.
66. The Soviet Government further considers that the States parties to the agreement on partial disarmament measures should undertake to make every effort to reach agreement on the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.
67. The Soviet Government took another step to meet the views of the Governments of the Western Powers in regard to the use of aerial photography.
68. Since the 1955 Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Western Powers have made agreement on disarmament conditional upon the adoption of a scheme for aerial inspection by means of aerial photography. The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated its position on this question. I would remind representatives that is was fully defined by Mr. Khrushchev in a conversation with the President of the United States on the very day Mr. Eisenhower submitted his proposal on aerial photography to the Geneva conference.
69. Aerial photography can neither ensure control of disarmament nor prevent aggression. Flights by aircraft of one State over the territory of another cannot prevent a surprise attack by an aggressor. With world conditions as they are, would people feel more secure if military aircraft belonging to a foreign State were to fly continuously overhead and over their country's vital centres in order to gather reconnaissance data? They obviously would not. It is equally clear that aerial photography alone is completely and utterly incapable of solving the disarmament problem, and no cheap propaganda by the enthusiastic advocates of the method can conceal this fact.
70. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, being desirous of overcoming the new obstacle to a disarmament agreement raised by the Western Powers, expressed its willingness to give the aerial photography method a practical trial at the time other partial disarmament measures were carried into effect. We proposed that, as a first step, agreement should be reached on aerial inspection in a specific zone in Europe where the principal armed forces of the opposing military groups are deployed, and also in the Far East.
71. However, these proposals were not accepted by the Governments of the Western Powers. They responded by proposing alternative zones of aerial inspection, which would place the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies at a disadvantage vis à vis the members of NATO and which were, therefore, unacceptable.
72. Thus, neither the Soviet Union's acceptance of the proposal for agreement on partial disarmament measures, nor its agreement to the use of aerial photography, prompted the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada to make concessions and come to terms, if only on individual aspects of disarmament.
73. Does this mean that an agreement cannot be reached here and now on effective and practicable measures to prevent surprise attack and on the execution of initial measures to reduce conventional armament and prohibit atomic weapons? No, it does not. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation would like to recall the USSR Government's proposals for the establishment of control posts at railway stations, at ports, on highways and at airfields. We submitted a specific proposal on this subject to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. However, the other members of the Sub-Committee took a negative attitude towards our proposal, resorting here again to their favourite method: they told us that the proposal, while sound in principle, would be acceptable only if certain conditions were fulfilled. From the discussion it became clear that the proposal was in fact being rejected, since its acceptance was made contingent upon the acceptance by the Soviet Union of other disarmament proposals made by the Western Powers which would certainly not lead to agreement.
74. We put the following question to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France: has the time not come to abandon the method of negotiation in which one begins by saying that the proposal is sound in principle, and then goes on to link it with other questions still in dispute and hedge it about with a series of unacceptable preliminary conditions, thus reducing its significance to nil? That is precisely the procedure that has been followed in regard to the proposal on control posts, on atomic weapons testing and many others.
75. Asa rule, this position is camouflaged by demands for the proper control of disarmament. However, we feel that those who incessantly discuss control, obscuring with their talk the substance of the problem of ending the armaments race, do not themselves believe that control, as they understand it, is really the heart of the matter. How can control be enforced in territories extending over millions of square kilometres and how can concealed weapons be detected there even with the aid of aerial photography? It cannot be done. To claim that such control can be exercised is absurd.
76. We are not in the least opposed to control, but we want it to be effective and practicable. We are opposed to the utter hypocrisy of the Western Powers’ position on the question of control. We are opposed to control and the execution of measures to prevent surprise attack being used as a pretext for increasing suspicion and mistrust in international relations We are against substituting talk of control for the settlement of the disarmament problem, and that is precisely what the Western Powers are doing. It can scarcely be regarded as fortuitous that, in the statement he made yesterday, the Secretary of States of the United States spoke more in terms of a limitation of armaments than of disarmament.
77. All that I have said about the Western Powers' attitude to disarmament issues fully bears out the conclusion that their proposals, which Mr. Dulles praised so highly here, cannot provide a basis for agreement.
78. A modicum of confidence is required for any progress in disarmament. If one party to the disarmament negotiations prepares to attack the other, continues to stockpile nuclear weapons, objects to their prohibition and elimination and even to the suspension of nuclear weapons testing, if normal economic relations do not exist among nations, how can the problem be solved by any form of control, particularly one on which no reliance could be placed?
79. How can we speak of any sort of comprehensive control, of carrying out flights and aerial photography over the entire territory of retain countries, when the NATO military leaders make no attempt to conceal the fact that the forces of the bloc are preparing for war and that their headquarters needs fuller information about the territories of the socialist States, particularly the Soviet Union?
80. Many examples could be given to illustrate the degree of mistrust and suspicion prevailing in relations among States. The United States, for instance, has literally cordoned itself off in order to keep representatives of Soviet economic, cultural and scientific organizations out of its territory. Moreover, not every American can obtain permission to visit the Soviet Union, not to mention China, which even United States correspondents, who are well-known for their energy and resourcefulness, find it difficult to visit with the State Department's blessing. Similar examples could be given with respect to the United Kingdom and a number of other countries.
81. Confidence, and more confidence, the cessation of war propaganda and the establishment of normal economic relations among States, which the Chairman of the Japanese delegation aptly discussed yesterday [680th meeting] and without which confidence is inconceivable - these are more essential now than ever before. If these conditions were fulfilled, there would be room for control. I would particularly stress the importance of economic relations among Stages, which have been disrupted on vitiated.
82. It became quite evident during the discussion of disarmament in the Sub-Committee that the Governments of the Western Powers were taking a wrong approach to the problem. They are seeking a disarmament agreement which would be to their advantage but detrimental to the security of others. To negotiate in that way is to doom the talks to failure from the outset.
83. The Soviet delegation submits for the General Assembly’s consideration a memorandum [A/C.1/793] by the Soviet Government on partial measures in the field of disarmament, which sets out the Soviet Union’s main proposals on this problem. Moreover, our delegation is submitting a new proposal [A/3674] to which the Government of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to draw the General Assembly’s attention. In view of the fact that the Western Powers are not at present prepared to agree to the complete renunciation of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that the Powers possessing such weapons should assume a solemn undertaking not to use these weapons, say, for a period of five years. If a broad agreement on the problem of disarmament has not been concluded by the end of that period, the matter can then be reconsidered.
84. The extent to which the international atmosphere would improve if agreement were reached in this matter can readily be appreciated. It would greatly facilitate the solution of other disarmament problems relating to atomic and conventional armaments. The Soviet Government believes that this question should be considered separately and that its solution should not be made contingent upon that of other disarmament questions. Given a genuine desire for progress in disarmament, initial agreement on at least some issues should be possible.
85. The question of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons calls for special attention. The Soviet Government fully associates itself with the demands voiced in the parliaments of many countries, including India, Japan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Yugoslavia, with the resolution adopted by the World Peace Council at Colombo, with the recent decision taken by the British Trades Union Congress, and with the opinion of prominent physicists, chemists and biologists in many countries, that test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs should be discontinued immediately. The Soviet Government proposes that the question of discontinuing such tests should be considered a separate item and that an agreement should be concluded without delay on the basis of the following provisions [A/3674]: “1. Tests shall be suspended as of 1 January 1958 for a period of two to three years; “2. An international commission, which shall submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly, shall be established to observe whether States fulfil their obligations to suspend tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons; “3. Under the direction of the aforementioned international commission, check points shall be established by mutual agreement in the territory of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and its possessions and in the Pacific Ocean area, including Australia."
86. Why is it important that an agreement for the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be concluded as early as possible? First, it would make it possible to remove the danger of injury to human health due to radioactive fallout and atomic radiation. Secondly, it would slow down the atomic and hydrogen weapons production race and prevent the development of new, even more terrible and destructive types of weapons, which is the specific purpose of test explosions. Thirdly, and this is particularly important, the renunciation of test explosions would be a first practical step towards the main goal - the absolute and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Finally, who can deny that if the great Powers succeeded in reaching an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons testing, that fact in itself would do much to bring about a general relaxation of the international political atmosphere and would facilitate agreement on other disarmament issues?
87. All that is needed to bring about the suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing is a willingness on the part of each of the three Powers possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons, that is, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, to discontinue such testing. Furthermore, the present state of scientific knowledge rules out breaches of such an agreement, since any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, in whatever part of the world it might occur, would immediately be detected and recorded.
88. How were our proposals on this matter received by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom? Verbally they acknowledge the need to discontinue nuclear testing, but in practice they are obstructing agreement. It is true that we were told recently in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to suspend tests for an initial period of twelve months. That proposal is rather ironic, as this period is approximately the time required to prepare for a new test. Yet so many conditions are attached to their acceptance even of this measure that it is deprived of any significance. The Western Powers contend that the question of discontinuing nuclear weapons testing cannot be considered independently at all, but must form an integral part of a general agreement on disarmament.
89. Thus one unsettled problem is tied to other unsettled problems, on which, furthermore, there is at present no prospect of agreement on account of the Western Powers’ refusal to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapons. All this goes to show that the United States and the United Kingdom simply do not wish to reach agreement on outlawing nuclear weapons testing. This was also apparent from yesterday’s statement by Mr. Dulles, which was in effect a defence of the need to continue the testing and further development of such weapons.
90. It should be noted in passing that until we submitted the proposal on control posts I have just mentioned, we were usually asked how an agreement to outlaw nuclear weapons testing could be accepted when no provision was envisaged for verifying compliance with this agreement. It was obvious even at the time that this demand was primarily a pretext for delaying agreement, since explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs are easily detected even in existing circumstances, when there are no special international control posts for the purpose. But now that a proposal to establish such posts has been made, it might have been thought that this objection had been met and that an obstacle to agreement on the question of tests had thus been removed. In reality, however, this is far from true. Further excuses for avoiding agreement are now being sought.
91. It would, of course, be quite acceptable in certain quarters if the Soviet Union alone discontinued nuclear testing, while others continued to conduct them. Few people, however, can be so naive as seriously to believe that one of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons would agree to take such a step unilaterally, thereby placing itself at a disadvantage in relation to the others.
92. It is obvious that the Soviet Union cannot take the risk of endangering its security. We want the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom to discontinue all atomic weapons testing at one and the same time. In our view, this is the only fair and reasonable proposal. After all, no one would have anything to lose from the discontinuance of nuclear tests except those who are unwilling to halt the nuclear armaments race and are deliberately trying to bring about an atomic war.
93. We should like to hope that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will change their position on this matter. The General Assembly, for its part, should use its authority to urge the immediate discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
94. The situation which has developed as a result of the disarmament talks may be summed up by saying that the negotiations that have been in progress in the United Nations for over ten year shave proved fruitless and that the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are patently failing to carry out the tasks assigned to them. Is there actually one less atomic bomb in the world today as a result of their labour? No; we are all fully aware that such weapons are constantly Increasing in number and in destructive power. Were any international agreements concluded which have given the world one less division, one less regiment, or one less soldier? No; no such agreement as yet exists. There has been a reduction in the strength of the armed forces of certain States, but that has been a unilateral action taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
95. It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that the negotiations are being used as a screen to conceal the continuing armaments race. We know in advance that our partners in the negotiations will dispute that conclusion. The Russian saying that the truth is unpalatable has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, our conclusion is based on the facts.
96. Whatever views the various Members of the General Assembly may have about the causes of the deadlock on disarmament, we must all soberly consider what the consequences of the present situation may be if no solution is found. The absence of an agreement even on partial measures of disarmament means that the arms race, particularly the production of weapons of mass destruction, will continue. Still more atomic and hydrogen bombs an rocket devices will be produced and this will modify our former ideas even of atomic and hydrogen warfare, for the problem of delivering weapons of mass destruction to any point on the globe has now been solved.
97. I do not think that anyone will suspect the Soviet delegation of trying to exaggerate or cause undue alarm. All of us here are well aware that military technology is developing along precisely these lines. What will the consequence of all this be, if the problem of disarmament is not solved? Simply this: that the Powers possessing nuclear weapons and rocket devices will build up stockpiles of increasingly destructive armaments. One does not need the imagination of an H.G. Wells to visualize the world a few years hence if the armaments race is not halted. Only those who have lost touch with reality or who irresponsibly gamble with the fate of nations can fail to appreciate the gravity of such a situation.
98. Hindenburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the German imperial forces in the First World War, once said that, in the final period of that conflict, when soldiers were being switched from one front to another by the million, he felt as if he was playing a game of chess. He did not see the human beings and the countless casualties behind the numbers. The same is true of those who today are gambling recklessly with the fate of tens and hundreds of millions of people by blocking all paths to an agreement on disarmament.
99. One of the factors preventing agreement on disarmament is the narrow and unrepresentative composition of the Sub-Commttte of the Disarmament Commission. Whole continents, such as Asia and Africa, are not represented in that body. How, indeed, can the Sub-Committee’s work be expected to achieve positive results, when four of its five members are representatives of countries belonging to the military bloc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the instigator of the armaments race?
100. In the view of the Soviet Government, it is high time to enlarge the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee by securing the participation of representatives of countries which are opposed to the "cold war" policy, which pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence and which really cherish the goal of disarmament. We are glad that the Government of India takes a similar stand on this matter.
101. The privacy in which the Sub-Committee has been compelled to work and the atmosphere of artificial secrecy surrounding its activities should also be abandoned. The Soviet Union is in favour of conducting the disarmament talks in the full light of publicity. The confidential nature of the Sub-Committee's work obviously suits the advocates of the "cold war", despite the fact that the settlement of the disarmament problem is a matter of concern to all countries and peoples.
102. The following case illustrates the unenviable position in which the partisans of this method of conducting the disarmament negotiations have placed themselves. As everyone knows, the subject of China, which means the People's Republic of China, is taboo as far as present United States foreign policy is concerned. In defiance of the dictates of common sense, that Government is excluded from the disarmament talks and consequently the question of China's armed forces is not discussed in the Sub-Committee; it cannot be in the absence of representatives of that country. Yet, as this issue is in fact of interest to our partners in the negotiations, they periodically raise the question of what is to be done about China, for, they contend, reductions cannot be made in the armaments of the Powers which would not apply to China.
103. Thus, on the one hand they seek to ignore China, and, on the other, they are unwilling to settle the disarmament problem without China. Clearly, the opponents of recognition for the People's Republic of China, who are also the opponents of an end to the armaments race, have become enmeshed in the web which they themselves have spun.
104. We sincerely desire the General Assembly to hold a serious discussion of the question of disarmament in order to facilitate agreement on that problem.
105. All this does not mean that we underestimate the value of negotiations among a limited number of participants and even of negotiations of a confidential character. We are always in favour of such negotiations when they serve a purpose. But what if this procedure achieves negative rather than positive results? Then a different procedure must obviously be adopted, that of publicity and the participation in the negotiations of a large number of States.
106. It is sometimes said that a more hopeful atmosphere has developed in the Sub-Committee, that Mr. Stassen is in an optimistic frame of mind, that there is no need to hurry, that we should be satisfied with the present atmosphere or climate in the Subcommittee, and so forth. This brings to mind the story of the man who replied to complaints about the weather by saying "Better bad weather than no weather at all". But this or that frame of mind is scarcely an adequate criterion for disarmament negotiations. The success of such negotiations must be measured by practical results, and not by the feelings of one or another of the negotiators. The practical results achieved to date are not worth the paper on which the records of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are printed.
107. The Soviet Government is doing everything in its power to achieve agreement on disarmament issues at the earliest possible date. At the same time, we wish to make it absolutely clear that as long as the United States, the United Kingdom and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization persist in evading an agreement on disarmament and in refusing to outlaw atomic and hydrogen weapons and to discontinue test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs, as long as they continue to increase the fighting strength of their armed forces, the Soviet Union, in close co-operation with its allies, Including those which are members of the defensive Warsaw Treaty, will take all the necessary steps to protect its security,
108. Since the end of the Second World War, many nations have freed themselves from a colonial or semi-colonial system of government and have embarked on the road of independent national development. The peoples of scores of Asian and African countries, who until recently were denied not only national independence but even the essential conditions for a normal existence, are exerting a new and important influence on the international scene.
109. Nevertheless, millions upon millions of people are living in countries which still have the status of colonies. The Governments of certain Powers, being unable to halt the progress of the struggle for national liberation, are resorting to arms in order to maintain or restore their rule over the colonial peoples. At this very moment, while we are sitting here in this hall, the blood is being shed in many parts of the world of people whose only crime is a desire for a free and independent existence. In our opinion, it is the duty of the United Nations to put an end to foreign military intervention in the lives of the peoples of those countries and to protect their legitimate nationa1 rights. The Soviet Union has always condemned the colonial system as utterly unjust and oppressive.
110. The Assembly cannot fail to note that the situation in the Near and Middle East still remains tense. This is largely due to the incessant interference by the NATO Powers in the domestic affairs of the peoples of that area.
111. The facts are a matter of common knowledge. Quite recently, Egypt was the victim of aggression. The attack on that country was a crucial test for all the forces of peace. It might well have led to the outbreak of a widespread military conflict with grave consequences for the nations. The Egyptian gamble failed because the forces of peace proved stronger than the forces of war. By going to Egypt's defence, the United Nations played a role of considerable importance in that affair.
112. Today, as the whole world can see, it is Syria which has been selected as the victim of imperialist intrigues. Crude political and economic pressure is being applied to that country, plots are being hatched against its Government, and it is threatened more and more frequently of late with direct military intervention.
113. Why has all this come about? Because the people and Government of Syria are not willing to submit to foreign dictation and refuse to allow their country to be drawn into aggressive blocs. The best possible proof - if more were needed - that the Eisenhower- Dulles doctrine is completely at variance with the interests of the peoples of the Middle East is provided by the activities of the United States in relation to Syria.
114. Those responsible for organizing acts of provocation against Syria are trying to throw dust into the eyes of honest people. They have invented two versions of the facts, one more absurd than the other. The first is that Syria is allegedly threatening its neighbours. If that is it, then why have those neighbours or the United States not taken the matter to the United Nations, and referred it to the Security Council with a view to removing the threat? the organizers of the acts of provocation against Syria know that there is no truth to the story. That is why they have not laid the matter before the United Nations.
115. The second version is that the Near and Middle East are threatened in some way by the Soviet Union. Yet since there is in reality no such threat, as the inventors of this fantasy are well aware, there is nothing plausible that they can say on that score. It is true that, according to them, individuals who are not acceptable to Washington have been appointed to some public posts in Syria. But why should such questions be decided in Washington rather than in Syria, and what have they to do with the Soviet Union?
116. The organizers of the provocation with regard to Syria are alleging ever more noisily that the Soviet Union has dangerous plans concerning the Near and Middle East. They see danger in the fact that the USSR is opposed to the subjection of the countries of the Near and Middle East to foreign dictation, that it is opposed to foreign intervention in the affairs of those States and that it is in favour of the development and strengthening of their independence. It would appear, according to Mr. Dulles, that the Arab countries' struggle for liberation from all foreign dependence and their refusal to submit to orders from outside constitute "extreme nationalistic ambitions". We, however, consider not only that there is nothing extreme about this but also that the desire to preserve its national independence is the indisputable and inalienable right of every people and that this desire is in full conformity with the solemn principles of the United Nations.
117. The Soviet Union holds this view because it follows from the very nature of its foreign policy, and because the strengthening of the independence of the countries in that area and their complete liberation from the consequences of colonialism are essential for the maintenance and strengthening of peace in that area.
118. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent and observe from afar the attempts that are being made to turn the Near and Middle East, an area adjacent to its own territory, into a permanent hotbed of armed conflict. The organizers of these conflicts must understand that the Soviet Union cannot view such a state of affairs impassively, since its own security is affected.
119. We can express nothing but satisfaction at the friendly relations which have been established between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. But we do not for a moment consider that this should hinder the maintenance of good relations - between the Arab countries and other States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. We ourselves wish to maintain good relations with the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
120. We should like to ask the following questions of those who are spreading fabrications about the Soviet Union's alleged intrigues in the Near and Middle East.
121. Who is trying to lay hands on the natural wealth of the Near and Middle East, the Soviet Union or the United States? The answer is clear. This is the work of the United States monopolies, and first and foremost the oil monopolies.
122. Who is plotting against the Governments of the countries of the Near and Middle East? For the answer to this question we need look no further than the recent statement by the Syrian Government.
123. Who is sending special envoys to the Near and Middle East to put increased pressure on Syria and flagrantly interfere in its domestic affairs? The United States, not the Soviet Union.
124. Who is setting some of the Near and Middle Eastern States against others, in an attempt to find submissive tools to carry out the plot against the independence of first one and then another Arab State? The United States is doing this.
125. If we turn to the facts, we shall see that they utterly demolish the arguments of those who seek to discredit the Soviet Union's policy with regard to the Near and Middle Eastern countries; we shall also see who really is attempting to turn this region into a powder-keg.
126. In the plans of those who are trying to place a new yoke of colonial oppression on the countries of the Near and Middle East and to attach these countries to aggressive military groups such as the Baghdad Pact, not least important are attempts to set some countries of that region against others and, moreover, to find among them persons willing to be tools in the hands of the foreigner. It must be admitted that there are politicians in some countries who are apparently prepared to follow this dangerous path. Their line of reasoning must be as follows: the stifling of certain independent Arab States may perhaps prevent the strengthening of the patriotic forces in those countries, and in Eastern countries generally, which are not to the liking of certain foreign circles.
127. These persons are obviously victims of mendacious propaganda, which is spread in the hope that it will give gullible people the idea that certain Arab States, especially States with a monarchic form of government, would even gain by the execution of such plans. But I would ask these people and these politicians: is not Yemen a monarchy? And yet, look at what is being done to that State. The Soviet Government believes that good sense will prevail and that these people will not embark upon a dangerous course.
128. There are also people, both in the West and in the East, who consider that events in the Near and Middle East, however serious, are local in character and that there is no need to be unduly concerned about them. But this is a dangerous illusion. If it was difficult to localize military conflicts in the past, it is particularly dangerous to harbour such illusions now. We would therefore ask those who are unceasingly brandishing the torch of war in the Near and Middle East whether they are able to foresee where the flames of war will spread if they are kindled there.
129. How can the situation in the Middle East be improved? The Soviet Government's proposals in this connexion are well known. They provide, in particular, that the Governments of the four Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR, should renounce the use of force in the Near and Middle East and all intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of that region. I would ask you, what is wrong with these proposals? Why should we not declare our renunciation of the use of force and of intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of that region? Nevertheless, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have refused to accept those proposals. The Soviet Government considers that the approval of these principles in one form or another by the General Assembly might do much to improve matters in an area where the situation today is justly causing alarm.
130. The Assembly did useful work at its last session in raising its voice in defence of Egypt. It would do well if it did the same on this occasion too, raising its authoritative voice in defence of the independence of yet other States of the Near and Middle East and strongly condemning the dangerous policy which certain Powers are pursuing with regard to the countries of that area.
131. There are certain politicians in the West, especially in the United States, who express disappointment at the Soviet Union’s position on important international problems, including that of the situation in the Near and Middle East. They say that recently they have been expecting a softening of the USSR position, but, according to them, it seems that the Soviet Union’s position remains firm. To these politicians we say this: In the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union has always maintained and will always maintain a firm position, if by that is meant our adherence to principles and our consistency.
132. There are many other urgent questions, among them some relating to the European situation, which must be settled in the interest of security. In this connexion, I would recall our proposal, which we of course maintain, for the dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. There is no need to expatiate on the fact that such a step would lead to fundamental changes in the international situation, especially the situation in Europe. It would promote the creation of conditions conducive to real trust between States and to the settlement of the outstanding international problems of our time.
133. The Soviet Government is convinced that real security for Europe should be sought through collective measures to be taken for this purpose, rather than through the conversion of the European continent into an arena of dangerous competition between opposing military groups. The Soviet Government’s proposals with regard to collective security in Europe are well known. We have upheld them and will continue to uphold them, as a sure means of strengthening European security.
134. We also maintain the Soviet Government’s proposal for the conclusion of a treaty between the participants of NATO and the participants of the Warsaw Treaty system, under which they would assume the obligation to refrain from the use of force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means. The conclusion of such a treaty would do a great deal to improve the whole international situation, and, primarily, the situation in Europe. It would promote the establishment of a system of collective European security, since only such a system can turn Europe from the hotbed of war it has often been in the past into a firm bastion of international peace and security.
135 It is time for our Organization to reach agreement on the question of defining aggression. For at least ten years this question has been kicked around like a football from one committee to another and from one session of the General Assembly to another. As we all know, however, there is as yet no generally accepted definition of aggression. Agreement on this question might exercise a restraining influence on potential aggressors and in that way would serve the cause of peace and of the United Nations, which is in duty bound to preserve the peace.
136. One of our Organization's most important tasks is to ensure broad and free economic relations among nations. In order to live in peace, the peoples must trade with one another, since free international trade is the soundest basis for the development of peaceful and friendly relations among States. All countries, great and small, need one another to some extent. That is why the Charter calls for international cooperation in solving the economic problems with which nations are faced, and why a number of organs have been established within our Organization to promote the achievement of this aim. Could the founding States of the United Nations, which adopted the Charter at San Francisco, have envisaged such a monstrous situation with regard to the development of economic relations, especially international trade, as that which we are witnessing today? Of course not, as you very well know.
137. For many years now, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other United Nations organs have been concerned with questions of economic co-operation. Hundreds of meetings have been devoted to this subject and whole volumes of records and resolutions have been compiled. But can we say that as a result of all this the cause of economic cooperation among nations has made any appreciable progress? Unfortunately, we cannot.
138. The state of international trade is a matter of particular concern at the present time. The policy of the "cold war” has cast its black shadow on this sphere of international co-operation also. Traditional commercial ties between nations have been broken. The attempts of the United States and other NATO countries to undermine the economy of the socialist States by hampering trade with them have resulted in a situation in which ordinary trade matters are settled, not in commercial institutions or business offices, but at NATO military staff headquarters.
139. Of course, the plans for weakening the socialist countries by an economic blockade are built on sand. History records many instances where individual States or whole coalitions of Powers have attempted to employ economic blockade as a means of imposing their will upon other States. These attempts have never been successful.
140. I would remind you that at one time an attempt was made to squeeze the Soviet Union in the vise of an economic blockade. What was the final result? We not only successfully overcame the difficulties artificially created for us, but were able to overtake and outstrip many leading capitalist countries, and we are continuing to make steady progress in our economic development. At the same time, we have adequately developed the domestic production of types of goods which we were previously interested in obtaining from the Western countries.
141. The attempts which are still being made at the present time to impose an economic blockade on countries which, in size, population and industrial production, represent one third of mankind are quite ridiculous.
142. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the Western countries are the ones which are suffering most from the embargo policy they are now pursuing, since this policy deprives the business circles of these countries of large and reliable markets. It would seem that in many Western countries people are already coming to the conclusion that the policy of artificially restricting trade with the socialist countries does not justify itself. The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and some other countries recently decided to relax the restrictions on trade with the People's Republic of China. This is undoubtedly a step forward in removing the obstacles to the development of international economic co-operation.
143. It is to be hoped that further progress will be made in this direction and that good sense, dictated by sound economic interests, will prevail over the shortsighted political calculations of the advocates of the "cold war".
144. The promotion of economic co-operation between states is an extremely complicated matter, especially in the circumstances which now prevail. It seems to us that, in order to solve this problem successfully, it would be useful to convene conference of all interested States to discuss in detail the most important problems of international co-operation in the various spheres of economic life. At such a world economic conference, agreement could also be reached on the establishment of a permanent organ within the United Nations to deal with trade problems. After all, an international economic conference was convened after the First World War. Why should this not be done now?
145. The foundations of our Organization were laid in the terrible years of the most destructive war in history. The establishment of the United Nations was an expression of the peoples determination to ensure peace and security, to affirm the principle of the equal rights of nations large and small and to develop friendly co-operation among all States. Unfortunately, many of the principles on which the United Nations was based were subsequently violated and the United Nations has to a great extent been turned into an arena for the "cold war".
146. Given the desire, much could be done to enhance the role of the United Nations in solving the most important international problems.
147. In the first place, attempts to turn the United Nations into an instrument of the policy of any Power or group of Powers must renounced.
148. For example, what has the action of the NATO Powers in insisting on dragging into the agenda of the General Assembly such an obviously provocative item as the so-called "question of Hungary" in common with the purposes of the United Nations with regard to ensuring peace and international co-operation? This action can have no other purpose than to inflame passions artificially and to create an atmosphere of discord and hostility among the peoples. The time has come to realize that Hungary has had its say and that that is what must be taken into account. Whether certain people like it or not, the Hungarian people will follow the course of building socialism. The sooner the fuss about the "question of Hungary" is brought to an end, the better it will be both for the authority of the United Nations and for the cause of peace.
149. In the second place, it is essential to strengthen the United Nations in every way and to enhance the authority and importance of its organs, rather than to weaken the Organization by establishing various blocs and military alliances. It is no secret, for example, that attempts have lately been made to minimize the role of such an important organ of the United Nations as the Security Council. And yet the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of International peace and security.
150. Thirdly - and this is a matter of major importance - it is now high time to settle the longstanding question of restoring the People's Republic of China to its lawful rights in the United Nations. The Government of the People's Republic of China is the only legal government representing the Chinese people. It is the authority of the United Nations that has suffered most from the fact that the voice of the great Chinese people has not yet been heard here, as no important international issue can in fact be settled today without taking into account the position of the People's Republic of China.
151. The continued absence from our midst of the lawful representatives of the Chinese people is mainly attributable to the position the United States Government has taken in this matter, and to the pressure it has exerted upon a number of countries. It has so far seen fit to take the line that a country which has a population of hundreds of millions and in which the lawful government, supported by the whole Chinese people, has its seat, is not China, but that China is a small portion of Chinese territory - the island of Taiwan - where the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which was expelled from China by the people, has taken refuge under the protection of the United States armed forces. It is difficult to find any sense in this, and we think that before long even the Americans will ask themselves in amazement how it was possible to take such a strange position in regard to a State inhabited by one quarter of the entire population of the globe.
152. The delegation of the Soviet Union believes that the twelfth session of the General Assembly is in a position to make a substantial contribution to the relief of international tension and the strengthening of peace. We all, of course, realize that it would not be possible to settle all outstanding international issues, or even the most important of them, all at once at this session. But let us single out the most urgent ones, those whose solution is imperative. Even if we cannot find a complete and final solution, let us at least take the first steps toward solving them and pave the way for further action.
153. In this statement, the Soviet delegation has mentioned some of these urgent problems and has tried to outline a course which might lead to their solution. The main proposals of the Government of the USSR, mentioned in this statement, are submitted as separate documents for consideration by the General Assembly.
154. In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the work of this session will be marked by fruitful co-operation among all delegations in the interests of peace.