125. The delegation of
Ceylon is taking this opportunity of adding its own tribute
to the many that have already, in the course of the general
debate, been paid to the Honourable Angie Brooks on her
election as President of the twenty-fourth session of the
General Assembly. Although the cloistered woman has long
been almost a social symbol of Asia and Africa, it is those
two continents that have given the General Assembly of the
United Nations its only two women Presidents. Like the
illustrious daughter of India, Srimati Vijaya Laxmi Pandit,
who preceded her in the enjoyment of this distinction, the
Honourable Angie Brooks has to her credit a record of
service to her country and to the international community
which makes her a most worthy recipient of the honour
that this Assembly has conferred on her. In doing so, the
United Nations has done honour to her country and to the
entire African people, whose problems and trials, whose
hopes, yearnings, aspirations and strivings figure so
prominently in our deliberations within the United Nations
family, and which are so close to the hearts and minds of all
those who believe that all men are born equal and are
equally entitled to freedom and the right to determine their
own destiny. On behalf of the Government and delegation
of Ceylon, and on my own behalf, I offer the Honourable
Angie Brooks our cordial congratulations on her election as.
President of the General Assembly, and at the same time
should like to assure her of our unstinting co-operation in
the discharge of the arduous functions that she has assumed.
126. It was with a profound feeling of sadness that we of
the Ceylon delegation heard the news of the death of His
Excellency Dr. Emilio Arenales, the able and talented
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, who presided
over this Assembly last year. Despite a grave illness which
he bore with admirable fortitude and composure, he did
not flinch from his responsibilities but carried his task
through to its appointed end. His death a few months after
the close of the twenty-third session brought to an
untimely end a career already marked by brilliant achievement
and full of ample promise. To the delegation of
Guatemala we extend our condolences in the loss that their
country has suffered.
127. We are indebted once again to the Secretary-General,
His Excellency U Thant, for a penetrating and candid
analysis of the international situation contained in the
introduction to his annual report on the work of the
organization [A/7601/Add.1]. The lonely eminence of the
thirty-eighth floor provides, in a spiritual and moral sense, a
view of the world that is denied to others too deeply
involved in its conflicts and aberrations. The Organization
can only at great peril submit the Secretary-General to the
fate of Cassandra. My delegation would like to pay tribute
to him for the patience, zeal and unfaltering faith with
which he continues to serve this Organization and the
highest of all causes: peace and progress.
128. We meet at a time when several important anniversaries
coincide. It is 5O years since the doctrine of
self-determination for subject peoples was enunciated, and
which, while first finding expression in the redrawing of the
boundaries of Europe and in the birth of many new
nations, provided the inspiration and impetus for by far the
greatest adventure of our times: the liquidation of colonial rule.
129. Twenty-five years have passed since the establishment
of the United Nations. It is nearly 10 years since the
General Assembly adopted its historic Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. We
are also reaching the end of the First United Nations
Development Decade and preparing for the inauguration of the Second.
130. Those last three anniversaries should serve as a
reminder and a warning of the imperious challenge that the
three most pressing problems of our times — international
peace and security, the emancipation of subject peoples,
and the economic advancement of developing countries — present
to the United Nations.
131. We celebrate at the same time yet another anniversary,
surpassing the rest in its relevance to the objectives
and purposes of the United Nations and the problems it has
yet to solve. I refer to the centenary of the birth of
Mohandas Gandhi, who, by precept and example, demonstrated
to the world the efficacy of satyagraha as a weapon
against oppression, discrimination and injustice, and whose
life and teachings have left an indelible imprint on the
memory and conscience of man.
132. To us at the United Nations the most important
incident in the historical process was the establishment of
our Organization, the twenty-fifth anniversary of which
falls next year. This is the most appropriate time, therefore,
to survey contemporary history, to reflect on the experiences
of the past, to examine our own and the United
Nations’ achievements and shortcomings and to seek the
means of redeeming our lost opportunities. Elaborate
preparations are being made to celebrate — not in the festive
sense, we hope — the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
establishment of the United Nations. Apart from the visible and
symbolic displays that are customary on such occasions,
there is another form of commemoration, devoid of
pageantry and panache, which the Members of the Organization
should consider. There is a need for a renewal of
faith in the principles and purposes of the Organization and
for an honest pledge to make a greater effort to develop the
United Nations into the living force for peace and international
security that it was meant to be. Any other form
of celebration would only make more obvious our reluctance
to face hard facts — a habit that seems to have become
deeply ingrained in the Organization as a whole.
133. It is easy enough to indulge in platitudinous assessments
that the Organization has not failed using the
argument that its continued existence refutes that charge,
but survival is not a sign of success just as much as lack of
complete success need not necessarily mean total failure. If
we are to hold out to future generations even the remotest
hope of realizing the purposes for which the United Nations
was brought into being, we have to find the means by
which nations and their peoples can free themselves from
the shackles of avarice, mistrust and arrogance.
134. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the
United Nations is also a most suitable occasion for a review
of the Charter and the procedures of the United Nations.
We have had enough time and have acquired enough
experience to judge ourselves.
135. It has been stated here on the highest authority that
a section of the membership is too prone to the belief that
the mere passage of resolutions, actuated more by emotion
than by a sense of realism, is futile and serves only to
imperil the prestige of the Organization. This, in our
opinion, is not the most serious defect in the Organization
nor should only one section of the membership be thus
singled out for censure. Realism does not mean patient
resignation in the sight of intolerable injustice. Emotion is a
poor description of the human reaction to the repeated
frustration of all efforts at curing such injustice.
136. The real damage to the prestige and dignity of the
Organization comes from the practice of adopting declarations,
resolutions and even treaties with all due solemnity
and of immediately thereafter pursuing policies which are
in flat contradiction of the provisions of such instruments.
137. The best examples are the General Assembly resolution
[1762 (XVII)] of 1962 condemning all nuclear-weapon
tests, the August 1963 partial test-ban Treaty with
its firm promise to seek the end of underground tests and
finally the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1968 which was pressed on the membership of
the United Nations with astonishing vigour and speed
mainly on the assurance contained in its article VI. The
world still awaits some sign of the effective measures
relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
nuclear disarmament which were promised in that article.
We cannot be content with declarations by the two
opposing sides that they are ready for these negotiations.
All we are aware of is that there is growing disillusionment
among us regarding the good intentions expressed in article
VI of the non-proliferation Treaty and in the earlier
agreements. This disillusionment is sharpened by the
realization that tests are being conducted for the perfection
of even more elaborate and fiendishly destructive nuclear
weapons and devices and that the partial test-ban Treaty
has been quite ineffective in stopping the development of
offensive nuclear capacity. The international community
can be excused if it has doubts regarding the value of the
assurances repeated by the nuclear Powers of a cessation of
the nuclear arms race. One nuclear Power alone — the United
Kingdom — deserves credit for having ratified the non-proliferation
Treaty with commendable promptitude.
138. Along with the review of the Charter, some of the
procedures of the Organization call for fresh examination.
One example that comes to mind is the established
procedure of ending every discussion with a resolution. Its
futility is most apparent in the Security Council where the
provisions of a resolution at the very moment of its
adoption are given contradictory interpretations which
completely vitiate it and render it nugatory. This
admittedly is 2 symptom of a general malaise afflicting
international relations.
139. We hope that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
United Nations will also see the attainment of real
universality in its membership with the seating of
representatives of the People’s Republic of China in the United
Nations as the only legitimate representatives of that
country and its people. The restoration of the lawful rights
of the people of China will repair an injustice and retrieve a
folly of 20 years’ duration. It will also bring within reach of
fulfilment any hope that remains of real progress in
disarmament or in the elimination of the nuclear danger.
Without the agreement and co-operation of the People’s
Republic of China no progress in these fields can be
achieved. It should be abundantly clear by now that the
representatives of the People’s Republic of China can be
seated in the United Nations only through the exclusion of
the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. It is the
United Nations that has imposed on itself this dangerous
and unrewarding isolation from the people of China.
140. The policy of decolonization has been pursued with a
measure of success but the task is far from complete. In
what we hope is its death throes colonialism has assumed
the evil visage of apartheid and racialism. Those regimes
which pursue these policies must know that they cannot
long prevail despite the comfort and the support they
receive directly or indirectly, clandestinely or openly, from
certain sources.
141. The First United Nations Development Decade was a
great endeavour inaugurated in 1960 with almost evangelistic
fervour but ending in the melancholy realization that
those early hopes have been far from attained.
142. Disarmament, after years of discussion, has produced
an unsatisfactory and inadequate test-ban Treaty and an
equally unsatisfactory and no less inadequate Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has yet failed
to secure the ratifications necessary to bring it into effect.
Scientific research and tests continue to be conducted with
the same hectic desire to establish an absolute superiority
over others without any diminution of the quality or
quantity of weapons of mass destruction. The arms race is
only the outward manifestation of the mistrust and
hostility that exist between nations. It is not by slowing
down the arms race or by reducing the volume or
destructive capacity of weapons that peace can be established
and international security ensured but rather by the
eradication of the factors that create mistrust and hostility.
As the Foreign Minister of Italy very aptly observed this
morning, war must not be considered solely as the result of
lack of military equilibrium. We feel it to be incumbent
upon the major Powers and indeed on all States to search
for a bold and enlightened strategy for peace and for ways
and means of establishing and implementing the principles
of friendly relations and co-operation among States regardless
of their ideological foundations:
143. The same problems continue to plague the world
with varying prospects of mitigation or settlement — the
conflict in the Middle East, the war in Viet-Nam, apartheid
and colonialism.
144. More than two years have passed since the Middle
East war of June 1967 and it is almost two years since the
Security Council unanimously adopted its resolution
242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. That resolution was
acclaimed almost universally as a carefully balanced one but
there is still no definite prospect of its implementation.
Tension in the area grows unabated, bringing the world
time and again perilously close to the brink of war and
disaster. The Secretary-General has in the clearest possible
terms stated that the fighting in the Canal Zone constitutes
virtually a state of active war. His own observation forces,
unarmed and in the line of direct, fire, are exposed to
intolerable dangers, but continue to face them with a
heroism which goes unnoticed in a world where the only
badge of honour is a weapon.
145. Israel’s failure to withdraw from the occupied
territories not only implies a rejection of the proposition
fundamental to the settlement contemplated in Security
Council resolution 242 (1967) that acquisition of territory
by war is inadmissible, but is an obstacle to the creation of
the only conditions in which a just and lasting peace can be
discussed. The use of occupied territory as a form of
hostage in international negotiations is contrary to the
spirit of the Charter.
146. Concern has quite properly been expressed here over
attacks on airports and the hijacking of aircraft. These are
not, however, the most serious features of this problem. We
do not condone such attacks on innocent persons. They are
to be deplored. But in scale, in consequences, and in the
degree of force employed they are diminutive in comparison
with the regular and systematic Israeli attacks on Arab
territory and the trail of death and destruction that these
attacks leave. The Israeli contention is that these reprisals
are in retaliation for the actions of Arab resistance groups.
There are many States Members in this Assembly whose
peoples have suffered the indignity of foreign occupation
and have found in organized resistance the only hope of
deliverance when no help can come from outside. Such
resistance is a matter of right until the alien trespasser is
evicted. Are these demonstrations of resistance, conducted
under the vigilance of an occupying Power, in the shadow
of overwhelming strength, and at the certain risk of
draconian punishment amounting to total devastation of
property and complete evacuation, to be treated as
violations of the cease-fire and as a pretext for terrorizing the
population of the occupied territories? Resistance of this
nature by the population of an occupied territory is a
natural and understandable reaction. A distinction must be
drawn between such acts of resistance and the furious and
frenzied reprisals for which they serve as a mere excuse.
147. Events which in other circumstances should have no
bearing on the Middle East dispute tend to increase its
gravity and enhance the risk of war. I refer to the recent
fire at the Al-Aqsa Mosque which formed the subject of
discussion in the Security Council during September of this
year and ended characteristically with a resolution that was
remarkable more for the support it received than for its
relevance to the issue or for its contribution to a settlement.
The Security Council resolution of 15 September
1969 [271 (1969)] regrettably, in our opinion, skirted the
real issue. The fire at the Al-Aqsa Mosque was neither the
direct nor the indirect consequence of Israeli measures,
which the Security Council has refused to recognize, to
change the status of Jerusalem. It was not the status of
Jerusalem that was the point at issue but the ever present
danger of a grave breach of the peace and of a renewal of
war inherent in a situation that can only be described as the
illegal usurpation of temporal power through war.
148. The cause of peace in the Middle East will not be
served by drawing red herrings like the Security Council
resolution of 15 September 1969 across the trail, but rather
by a determined effort on the part of the United Nations,
and especially the major Powers, to concentrate on the
substance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22
November 1967, and to endeavour to translate it into
action. The two essential features of that resolution are:
first, that Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories in
accordance with the principle that acquisition of territory
by war is inadmissible; and secondly, that there must be a
just settlement of the Palestine Arab refugee problem.
149. Despite the numerous United Nations resolutions
reaffirming the right of the refugees to return to their
homeland or to receive compensation — resolutions which
have received overwhelming support — Israel, far from
complying with them, has taken action to evict Arab residents
from the occupied territories. As we see it, the Palestine
refugee problem is at the heart of the Middle East question.
There can be no approach to a settlement unless the four
major Powers, in the discharge of their primary responsibility
as permanent members of the Security Council, make
it clear to Israel that the Security Council resolution of 22
November 1967 alone contains all those elements that can
bring about a lasting peace, and that it is not subject to any
conditions such as direct negotiations, recognition and
peace treaties which are not specified in it, but may well follow.
150. Peace cannot be ensured in the Middle East by the
redrawing of boundaries, but by a spirit of reconciliation
and tolerance on both sides, by a recognition of the right of
all parties to exist in peace and security and by a permanent
solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees through
full and fair restitution to those dispossessed and displaced
by the act of partition of Palestine. There are no boundaries
that are secure while injustice prevails. The four major
Powers have both the duty and the capacity to bring peace
to the Middle East and to avert a conflagration that could
envelop the world. It rests with them to insist, first, on
Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it now occupies by
the anachronistic right of conquest and, thereafter, on the
implementation of the rest of the terms of the resolution
by all the parties concerned. This can in no sense of the
term be described as an imposition of a settlement on
sovereign Powers.
151. In Viet-Nam, after years of what would now, in
gloomy retrospect, seem to have been senseless slaughter
and destruction, the exemplary and unexceptionable principle
that the people of Viet-Nam must be left free to
determine their own internal affairs and choose their own
political system was ultimately vindicated when the Paris
negotiations were instituted in March 1968. The Paris talks
were possible because the combatants finally realized that a
political settlement was the last hope and that this could be
achieved only if the affairs of Viet-Nam were discussed by
the parties immediately concerned.
152. However, after 18 months of talks, peace like a
wayward wanton taunts the negotiators in Paris and
continues to elude their seemingly avid grasp. The
circumstances were never more favourable for a settlement, and it
would be tragic if the opportunity were frittered away by
excessive obduracy on the part of either side or by a failure
to grasp the realities of the situation.
153. The reduction in the United States commitment of
forces in Viet-Nam and the hope of further reductions in
the level of foreign participation in the war are an
encouraging sign and must be recognized as a contribution,
however small or isolated it may seem to some, towards the
cessation of the conflict and the creation of conditions in
which the covenants of peace could be discussed. If a
military victory is beyond the reach of either party and if
peace cannot be secured except through the imposition of
terms of surrender by one or the other, the only alternative
is a political compromise on terms which would recognize
unequivocally the right of the Viet-Namese people to
determine their own future and to choose for themselves
the type of government they want.
154. The composition of the representation at the Paris
talks is a clear recognition of the position of the National
Liberation Front in the South. Their representation in any
interim administration in the South would be a mere
acceptance of the realities of the situation. The indispensable
ingredients of a settlement are a cease-fire, a temporary
reorganization in the administration of South Viet-Nam
to make it more representative of the will of the
people, the withdrawal of foreign troops and free elections.
Thereafter the final unification of the country would be the
sole responsibility of the leaders of the people of both parts
of that divided nation. We would appeal to all the parties
concerned to adhere scrupulously to the principles and
provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
155. In considering the problems of colonialism, apartheid
and racialism careful attention should be paid to the
Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa proclaimed by the
Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African
States held at Lusaka from 14 to 16 April 1969. There we
have a testament of human equality, human dignity and
self-determination expressed with sober and statesmanlike
restraint and moderation. The Lusaka Manifesto asks for
only one gesture from the white communities of South
Africa — that they declare their commitment to these principles.
If this commitment is made, Africa can be spared the
painful agony and pitiless violence of racial conflict. There
is no lack of assurance in the Lusaka Manifesto of the
determination of its signatories to combine with all groups,
with patience and understanding in building an Africa
where all races will be equal, discrimination outlawed,
vengeance eschewed and the brotherhood of man exalted.
The world will anxiously await the answer of the Governments
of Portugal and South Africa, and of the white rebels
of Southern Rhodesia. If they fail to give a favourable
response to the Lusaka Manifesto, they will be answerable
to all humanity for the consequences.
156. Attention has been drawn to the provisions of
Chapter VIII of the Charter regarding the possibility of
recourse to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action. In this context a system of collective security for
Asia has been specially mentioned. It is a truism that
international peace and security can be ensured only if in
their international relations all Governments accept and
observe the principles of peaceful coexistence between
States irrespective of their social or economic systems,
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
States, renunciation of the threat or use of force in the
settlement of disputes between countries, abstention from
intervention or interference in the internal affairs of
countries, and promotion of mutual interests and co-operation
between States. Those are the five cardinal precepts
which have come to be known as the Pancha Shila of
international relations. They constitute the essence of the
United Nations Charter. They were further elaborated in
the Bandung Declaration of April 1955 on the promotion
of world peace and co-operation. That Declaration contains
all the relevant commandments for a stable international
order. We need only to summon the will and the determination
to adhere to those principles.
157. Schemes of collective security become necessary only
because these principles are ignored. The delegation of
Ceylon looks askance at the idea of dividing the world into
regions for the organization of collective security. The idea
of collective security has always been associated with the
organization of the means of defence against possible
attack. The best examples are NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Others are the South-East Asia Treaty Organization and the
Central Treaty Organization. The Bandung Declaration was
resolutely opposed to such schemes.
158. A collective security scheme in the military sense, as
far as Asia is concerned, would be designed to serve two
purposes: to protect any Asian country from outside attack
or to protect any Asian country or group of countries from
attack by a member of the region. Any such scheme of
security would entail the obligation on the part of its
members to make a contribution in the form of armed
forces and armaments and would result in the diversion of a
portion of their meagre resources from economic development
to meet this obligation. At a time when efforts are
being made to ensure the redundancy of such regional pacts
as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we must question the
prudence of creating a similar scheme for Asia. An Asian
collective security scheme for defence purposes would, if it
embraced all the nations of Asia, be superfluous. If it were
not comprehensive in its membership, it would, far from
promoting security, merely increase insecurity and be a
nuisance. Furthermore, it would be at complete variance
with the principles of non-alignment and, therefore, could
hardly be acceptable to the non-aligned nations of Asia.
159. If, however, the concept of collective security connotes
co-operation between the nations of Asia in trade and
economic development, in cultural promotion and in the
pacific settlement of local disputes and problems, it could
undoubtedly promote security and should be welcomed by
all. It might even enable the continent of Asia to discover
its real identity and, while promoting the material welfare
of its peoples, to undertake a role in international affairs
that would be more in keeping with its priceless moral and
spiritual heritage.
160. While on the subject of Asian security, we must take
note of disturbing trends in the Asian region, including the
Indian Ocean area. The gradual dismantling of the military
establishment of a major Power in that region has led to
speculation on the need for the so-called vacuum to be
filled by other means. We are aware of the installation of
certain logistic arrangements in islands in the Indian Ocean.
Developments of this type are not calculated to promote
security and ease tensions. Many nations in Asia view them
with concern. To seek to prevent such developments within
the Indian Ocean area is not to interfere with the freedom
of the high seas. One of the most precious of all freedoms is
the freedom from fear and that could be ensured if the
Indian Ocean area were declared an area of peace and if all
countries accepted such a declaration and honoured it.
161. The United Nations is on the eve of launching a
Second Development Decade. Profiting by the experience of
the First Development Decade, a strategy for the 70s is
being carefully worked out. One of the vital elements in
this strategy must be the determination of realistic rates of
economic growth for individual nations and for the world
as a whole. These rates must be more than an aspiration.
They must represent not the desirable but the attainable.
They must ensure a proper balance between the needs of
development and the demands of elementary social justice,
ensuring steady progress in that direction. Above all, if the
strategy is to succeed, there must be a firm commitment by
the affluent section of the world to provide the capital
resources and to pursue the financial and economic policies
required for its fulfilment. We do not deny that the
developing nations also have a concomitant obligation. The
report of the Pearson Commission comes at a very
opportune moment. It contains many valuable recommendations.
We trust that it will receive the serious attention that it deserves.
162. An important aspect of the problem of development
is external finance. Ceylon’s experience has shown that
improvement in the gross national product can come
entirely or largely through increases in production for
domestic use, but along with a steady and serious decline in
external resources. Although Ceylon succeeded in 1968
even in exceeding the growth rate of 5 per cent set as the
target for the First Development Decade, the sharp fall in
the export price of our main export commodity, tea,
drastically reduced our import capacity. A growth rate can
be illusory and even precarious if a country’s import
capacity is not maintained and strengthened by stability in
its export prices and by an improvement in such prices.
Where the increase in the gross national product is due
largely to agricultural production for internal needs but is
accompanied by a marked reduction of import capacity,
the diversification of the economy through the development
of industry is rendered almost impossible. We trust
that the strategy for the Second Development Decade will
provide an answer to this problem. We have referred to only
one of the many problems of development.
163. We welcome the agreement just reached within the
International Monetary Fund to create an addition to
international liquidity in the form of special drawing rights,
which has been somewhat profanely dubbed as paper gold,
amounting to $9.5 thousand million over a period of three
years. If that measure is to serve the purpose of assisting
countries faced with chronic balance-of-payment difficulties
the special drawing rights should not be considered a
mere addition to the wealth of all countries. Treated as
such, the arrangement would only have the effect of
making the rich richer and the poor slightly less poor, but
the relative positions of the developed and developing
countries would remain unaltered. This epoch-making
arrangement can, however, have the effect of stimulating
international trade and economic growth within the developing
sectors of the world if there is a commitment and a
willingness on the part of the developed nations to use their
share of the special drawing rights to augment their
contribution to programmes of economic development in
developing countries by releasing a portion of their special
drawing rights or its equivalent in national currencies,
depending on the mechanics of the operation, for the
purpose of multilateral economic aid to developing countries
through institutions such as the International Development
Association.
164. Over the last two years the question of the reservation
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and
the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof underlying the high
seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and
the use of their resources in the interests of mankind, has
come to be recognized as occupying a position of special
importance on the agenda of this Assembly. The mineral
wealth of this area is so vast and its potential so tremendous
as to call for serious and urgent attention by the international
community to measures for its orderly and
efficient exploitation and management with special regard
to the interests and needs of the developing countries of the world.
165. By its resolution 2467 A (XXIII) the General
Assembly established a Committee composed of 42
States with a wide mandate to examine the question and
make recommendations to the General Assembly on its
various aspects. These include the legal principles and
norms which would promote international co-operation in
the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor
and ensure the exploitation of their resources for the
benefit of mankind, as well as the economic and other
requirements which such a regime should satisfy in order to
meet the interests of humanity as a whole. The Committee
was further empowered to study and make recommendations
to the General Assembly on the reservation of the
area for peaceful purposes, taking into account the studies
and international negotiations being undertaken in the field
of disarmament.
166. Assessments regarding the progress that the Committee
has made during the course of the year will vary. The
criterion of achievement is invariably expectation. Though
progress may be regarded by some as being too slow, it is
necessary to bear in mind the immensity of the technical
problems that still remain to be overcome, the novelty of
some of the legal concepts which the Committee has had to
consider, and the diversity of political and economic
interests involved.
167. Speaking as the representative of my Government
and not in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, I
should like to state that in the view of my Government the
sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction must be regarded as the
common heritage of mankind. We do not shrink from that
concept because of its novelty. International law, of all
branches of law, cannot remain static but must develop in
response to the changing needs of the international community
whose interests it is intended to serve. It must be
ready to explore and, if necessary, accept new concepts
that will advance the common good. It must reflect the
social conscience of the international community and stand
ready to give effect to the aspirations of the overwhelming
majority of mankind.
168. The General Assembly in resolution 2467 C (XXIII)
dealt with the question of establishing in due time
appropriate international machinery for the promotion of
the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
area. The nature and form of this machinery and the
programme for its establishment require the most careful attention.
169. Any examination in detail of the various aspects of
the question would not be realistic if there was no
agreement on what constituted the limits of the area of
national jurisdiction. My Government considers it important
that the United Nations should give consideration to
convening, without delay, an international conference to
review the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf, which is of particular significance in
this regard.
170. Meanwhile, it is our hope that all Governments will
co-operate and intensify their efforts within and outside the
Committee on the sea-bed to ensure that the high aims and
purposes set forth in resolution 2467 (XXIII) will be
speedily achieved.
171. A consultative meeting of special representatives of
the Governments of non-aligned countries was held in
Belgrade from 8 to 12 July this year to examine afresh the
role of non-alignment in the present international situation
and to assess the value and function of the policy of
non-alignment in relation to major international issues. It
was in Belgrade in September 1961 that the first Conference
of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries took place. That meeting brought together a
group of countries which were convinced that the cold war
as the political expression of the antagonism between two
power blocs representing diametrically opposed political
and economic ideologies could, with every new accession to
one or the other of the blocs, lead to an intensification of
international tensions with consequences that were too
unpleasant to contemplate.
172. The avoidance of a binding commitment to either of
the blocs through membership of their respective military
organizations was considered a crucial factor. The creation
of a non-aligned group was promoted by the existence of a
large area of common interests shared by those who
assembled in Belgrade in September 1961. Those interests
were concentrated on the very problems which the United
Nations Charter itself recognized as threats to international
peace and security. This community of interests gave the
group a cohesion which could not have been maintained
merely through their aversion to military alliances with the
cold war power blocs. The participants in the Belgrade
meeting had a common concern in the eradication of
colonialism and neo-colonialism, imperialism and racialism
and in general and complete disarmament. They were
pledged to the principle of self-determination and independence
for all subject peoples and to respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States large and
small. They recognized the importance of peaceful coexistence
between States with different social and economic
systems and they all alike realized the need for international
co-operation to improve standards of living in the
developing countries of the world. They considered these
principles and policies the best prescription for international
peace, and security. They did not subscribe to the
proposition that a country was morally obliged to state its
position between two contending parties.
173. Future generations can best judge whether or not the
existence of the non-aligned group at that point of time was
a real contribution to the easing of tensions and to the
avoidance of a major conflict.
174. In 1964, in Cairo, the principles and policies formulated
at Belgrade were reaffirmed and amplified. Five years
have passed since the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or
Government of Non-Aligned Countries and we are now
engaged in a fresh assessment of the role of non-alignment
in international affairs. There is a need to do so, as the cold
war has lost its original character. While the. two major
camps or blocs that existed in 1961 have moved progressively
towards better mutual understanding and to the
establishment of a modus vivendi, new divisions have
occurred where they were least expected.
175. The non-aligned countries must maintain unremitting
vigilance to ensure that such developments will promote
and to hamper those aims and policies which have been
defined as their common concern and which are identical
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
176. Unencumbered by any commitment to the politics of
power, they can, as the United Nations enters this next
phase of its existence, legitimately presume to lead the
nations of the world in the pursuit of what the
Secretary-General has suggested as an appropriate theme for the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization: peace and progress.