Before proceeding
with my remarks, I wish to begin by indicating that my
delegation fully subscribes to the statement delivered
by the presidency of the European Union.
At the outset, Sir, let me express my sincere
congratulations to you on your election to the
presidency of this session of the General Assembly and
my sincere gratitude to Mr. Jean Ping, President at the
fifty-ninth session, for his tireless efforts during a very
crucial year for the United Nations.
With the end of the summit, we have entered a far
more crucial phase, that of the follow-up and
implementation of its outcome and the furtherance of
the progress achieved, especially in terms of those
targets which have been subject to an enforcement road
05-51226 11
map since the Millennium Summit. The realization of
the content of the summit outcome document
(resolution 60/1) in conjunction with reforming the
United Nations, may very well decide the
Organization’s relevance and standing in decades to
come and with it the fate of our attempts to render
effective multilateralism the cornerstone of
international order. Beyond the wide spectrum of
issues covered in the summit’s outcome document, we
must not lose sight of those realities on which the
United Nations must — and is expected to — remain
primarily focused. For these, we must go back to the
genesis of the Organization. In the wake of the Second
World War, a vision emerged to establish a system of
collective security and institutionalized mechanisms
that would ensure the maximization of conflict
prevention and the minimization of the duration and
impact of a conflict.
Not only has the new century inherited many of
the challenges and problems of the previous one, but
new scourges have emerged that jeopardize the
legitimacy and the very existence of our system of
collective security. These require an urgent response
from the international community through an action-
oriented strategy encompassing the appropriate
institutional framework, appropriate decision-making
mechanisms and the efficient implementation of our
commitments. Fulfilling our pledges in a timely
manner is not a responsibility applicable only to
traditional security threats. Terrorism, transnational
crime and many other security deficits require our full
attention in the form of elaborating result-oriented
action plans. Regarding, for instance, weapons of mass
destruction, although we are aware of the inextricable
link between disarmament and non-proliferation, we
have not yet been able to strike the kind of balance that
would allow us to pursue them equally and
simultaneously. And while we have identified
underdevelopment and poverty as key enemies of
stability, this realization is not yet adequately reflected
in our actions.
The assessment of the current state of the world
through the comprehensive report of the Secretary-
General on the work of the Organization, which we
have before us in document A/60/1, leads to the
conclusion that long-standing conflicts, with all their
ramifications, remain a primary source of concern for
the international community. Africa is a prime example
of this. Today more than ever, and rightly so, it remains
at the core of our mobilization. Our endeavour to make
a difference there in terms of conflict resolution,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding and fighting poverty,
underdevelopment and deadly diseases will be the
litmus test of the effectiveness of our commitment to
meet the Millennium Goals.
The Middle East is another test case. In recent
weeks it has been proven that reciprocal gestures have
the capacity to construct common ground, even where
that does not seem on the surface to exist. Israel’s
withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the northern West
Bank is an important development that should lead to
the implementation of the Quartet’s road map. Israel’s
paradigm of removing settlers is one to be followed by
other occupying Powers using settlers as a means of
warfare. Even though the security situation is still
fragile, and even though the political negotiation might
not always be moving forward, the parties are offered a
closed course in the form of the road map, which has
the potential to steadily lead to progress. Furthermore,
we firmly believe that the gathering momentum would
be aided by strict adherence to international law and
international humanitarian law, including the 4 July
2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the construction of the barrier.
Let me now turn to the Cyprus problem. Almost
18 months have elapsed since the April 2004 referenda
on the Annan plan. Let me stress once more that in
rejecting that plan the Greek Cypriots rejected neither
finding a solution that would reunify Cyprus nor the
urgency of achieving this. They rejected that particular
plan because it did not provide for and could not bring
about the reunification of the country, its society, its
economy and its institutions. During this time we have
not remained idle. Our priority has been to revisit the
content, product and shortcomings of the last
negotiation process which led to the referenda.
Simultaneously, emphasis was placed on dispelling
certain misconceptions that were solidified as a result
of the last negotiation process.
One such misconception was that our constant
and keen pursuit of peace and of achieving the
reunification of our country has been diminished or
that we have come to terms with the unacceptable
division of our country which was imposed in 1974 by
the invasion and occupation of 37 per cent of our land.
The second misconception concerns the role of the
United Nations in offering and continuing its good
offices mission mandated to the Secretary-General by
12 05-51226
the Security Council. The Secretary-General’s mandate
for the good offices mission has not come to an end but
has entered a new phase with the end of the referenda.
Regardless of its level of activation at different times,
this mission is an ongoing and sustained process.
Through it we expect the Organization to broker a
negotiated settlement without any arbitration. The
active contribution of the European Union in this
regard would be catalytic. Only an agreed settlement
endorsed by the leadership of the two communities can
be put to referenda. The timetable for seeking a
solution should genuinely and exclusively be
determined by the parameters of the Cyprus problem,
and as such there should be no deadlines embedded in
the process that are dictated by exogenous elements.
We remain committed to holding negotiations under
the umbrella of the United Nations and to working for
the creation of those conditions that will render fruitful
negotiations feasible. In this context we have been
implementing substantial practical measures on the
ground with the aim of building confidence and
promoting the economic development of the Turkish
Cypriots. We hope that enhancing cooperation between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be conducive to
making progress on different aspects of the Cyprus
problem, especially the elements composing its
humanitarian dimension such as the fate of missing
persons and the welfare of those in enclaves.
The divisive character of the most recent plan,
which essentially led to its rejection, epitomized its
remoteness from the essence of the problem. Another
source of great concern is the apparent willingness of
actors involved in the process to concede a
disproportionately large number of politically driven
demands at the expense of those principles that should
govern the solution. It should be clarified that a
settlement should be formulated on the basis of the
concerns and expectations of the people of Cyprus as a
whole and should not aim at accommodating the
interests of foreign Powers on the island. The Cyprus
problem is at a critical juncture. Time may not be
working in favour of reaching a settlement, but we
must keep in mind that we cannot afford any more
failed attempts. We should be particularly cautious but
resolute. Revival of the talks requires thorough
preparation and an honest assessment that the prospect
of success is at least credible. This in turn requires
confirmation that the Turkish political aims have now
changed and that Turkey has reconciled itself to the
fact that achieving a settlement is synonymous with the
concept of a single, reunified State.
We have always hoped that Turkey’s accession
course to the European Union would radically shift its
mentality, a prospect that would mark the single
biggest development in the Cyprus problem in decades.
The fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations emanating from
its accession course to the European Union will ipso
jure rid the Cyprus problem of some of its most
intractable components and facilitate a settlement.
Simultaneously, the existence of the United Nations
negotiating framework cannot serve as a pretext for
postponing or refusing to fulfil these obligations.
For our part, we remain committed to a bizonal,
bicommunal federal Cyprus in line with what we
consider to be the pillars of the survival of this model
of settlement — the high-level agreements, United
Nations resolutions, international law and the acquis
communautaire. We anticipate that these will safeguard
the right of all Cypriots to preserve their fundamental
interests while simultaneously taking into account their
most basic concerns.
Aside from procedure, the time has come to go
back to basics and realize that as long as the basic
aspects of the problem are not truly tackled, progress
will be difficult. Without dealing with the core
components of the problem by putting an end to the
military occupation, the massive violations of human
rights and the plight of the refugees and by effectively
addressing the question of settlers deliberately and
illegally transported to the occupied part of the island,
there can be no solution. At the same time, for progress
to be realized on the ground all secessionist attempts
on Cyprus must be terminated immediately, in
accordance with the relevant Security Council
resolutions, and a single vision based on the unification
of the island must prevail.
Unfortunately, however, we have not been
moving closer to these imperatives. Instead we have
been witnessing for well over a year a tendency to
entrench the faits accomplis on Cyprus, particularly
through an outburst of illegal exploitation of Greek-
Cypriot-owned property in its occupied part.
In establishing the new constitutional and
institutional set-up we should avoid artificial structures
that will require an abnormally long transitional period
to be absorbed by the people and the institutions at a
great socio-economic cost. We visualize that seeking a
05-51226 13
settlement will increasingly centre on and fall under
the establishment of a functional, working democracy
that does not require exceptionally taxing efforts for
basic governance. We also visualize that with Cyprus’s
membership of the European Union taking solid root, a
settlement would encompass an integration of the
currently occupied area to the characteristics of a
European society and the standards of the acquis
communautaire in full harmony with the rest of the
island, and leading to a process of osmosis there.