29. Mr. President, today, as every year at this time, we open a new chapter in the history of the United Nations. We open on a hopeful note with your election as President, for you not only are known and respected by your colleagues throughout the world as an able and distinguished diplomat; you also have the distinction of being the first representative of a country of Eastern Europe to be elected to this high office. We of the United States welcome this development as one further sign of the evolution which has been taking place in the relations among the States of E astern Europe and of other parts of the world. May all Members take this new step as a reminder of the truth which a modern Danish sage has compressed into these words: "Coexistence—or no existence."
30. We congratulate you, Mr. President, and pledge to you our co-operation In the discharge of your difficult and important office.
31. I take this occasion also to pay a tribute to your distinguished predecessor, the President of the Assembly, at its twenty-first session, Ambassador Pazhwak of Afghanistan. We share the admiration of all delegations for the resourcefulness and patience with which he guided us through more meetings of the General Assembly than have been presided over by any other man in the history of this Organization.
32. This annual general debate serves the important purpose of allowing each Member to lay before the entire Assembly, at the outset of our session, its major concerns in the international sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on all the issues on the agenda to which my country attaches importance. This statement will concentrate on certain issues which, in our view, are of transcendent significance to world peace.
33. First among these is the continued tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. For the entire community of nations, the search for peace in Viet-Nam remains a matter of the first priority, for peace in Viet-Nam must be and should he our major concern. Indeed, pursuant to its Charter, the United Nations has the most explicit right and duty to concern itself with this question, as it does with any breach of or threat to the peace anywhere in the world.
34. Holding this conviction as we do, my Government continues to seek the active participation of the United Nations in the quest for peace in Viet-Nam. Every Member and every organ of the United Nations, this Assembly included, shares the Charter obligation of lending its weight and influence to help resolve disputes and conflicts between nations by peaceful means. Today, despite past disappointments, I reiterate our appeal to all Members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to accept that obligation — to use their influence to help bring the Viet-Nam conflict to an end by peaceful means.
35. The representatives who participate in this debate will undoubtedly make observations and offer suggestions as to how this can be brought about. My delegation will listen to them with close attention and respect. As our contribution to the Assembly's discussion of this issue, let me state as precisely as possible the views, and ideas of my Government.
36. Our basic view is one which, I am sure, is shared by the great majority of this Assembly: that this conflict can and should be ended by a political solution at the earliest possible time. A military solution is not the answer. For our part, we do not seek to impose a military solution on North Viet-Nam or its adherents. By the same token, in fidelity to a political solution, we will not permit North Viet-Nam and its adherents to impose a military solution upon South Viet-Nam.
37. The question then naturally arises: By what procedure can a political solution be reached? One well-tested way is the conference table. We are prepared to follow this path at any time — to go to the conference table in Geneva or any other suitable place.
38. There is a second way to pursue a political settlement: through private negotiations or discussions. The United States stands ready to take this route also—and, in so doing, to give assurances that the confidence and privacy of such negotiations or discussions would be fully respected by our Government.
39. It may be that negotiations or discussions might be preceded or facilitated by mutual military restraint, by the scaling down of the conflict, by de-escalation, either with or without a formal cease-fire. This route, too, we are prepared to follow.
40. There is, on the other hand, the danger that the conflict may continue until one side finds the burdens of war too exhausting or too costly, and that the fighting will only gradually end, without negotiations and without an agreed settlement. Certainly this is a grim prospect, for it would mean prolonged conflict and tragedy. It is in essence a military solution, and it is not one we seek. We earnestly hope that it is not the course in which our adversaries will persist. In any event, there will be no slackening in our resolve to help South Viet-Nam, defend its right to determine its own future by peaceful means and free from external force.
41. Committed as we are to a political solution through discussions or negotiations, we regret that, despite many efforts. North Viet-Nam and its adherents have not yet agreed to this objective. But we shall continue in our efforts; and we hope that what we say today may help to bring nearer the time when the two sides will sit down together.
42. It is said by some that Hanoi will agree to begin negotiations if the United States ceases the bombing of North Viet-Nam — that this bombing is the sole obstacle to negotiations. I would note that in its public statements Hanoi has merely indicated that there "could" be negotiations if the bombing stopped. True, some Governments — as well as our Secretary-General and other individuals — have expressed their belief or assumption that negotiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, if the bombings were stopped. We have given these expressions of belief our most careful attention. But no such third party — including those Governments' which are among Hanoi's closest friends — has conveyed to us any authoritative message from Hanoi that there would in fact be negotiations if the bombings were stopped. We have sought such a message directly from Hanoi without success.
43. On its part, the United States would be glad to consider and discuss any proposal that would lead promptly to productive discussions that might bring peace to the area. We do not, however, conceive it to be unreasonable for us to seek enlightenment on this important question: does North Viet-Nam conceive that the cessation of bombing would or should lead to any other results than meaningful negotiations or discussions under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side?
44. Moreover, we believe that we also have a right to address ourselves to those Governments which support Hanoi's cause and which have stated to us their beliefs about Hanoi's intentions and to put this question to them; if the United States were to take the first step and order a prior cessation of the bombing, what would they do or refrain from doing, and how would they then use their influence and power, in order to move the Viet-Nam conflict promptly toward a peaceful resolution? Constructive answers to these questions would aid in the search for peace.
45. In the minds of some, there is a further necessity: namely, to articulate more precisely the principles of an honourable settlement. In the interest of meeting this viewpoint, let me set forth those principles which our Government contemplates in as precise a manner as is possible prior to negotiations — and without in any way pre-conditioning or prejudicing such negotiations.
46. It is widely accepted that the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and 1962 should constitute the basis for settlement. We agree. In our view, this entails the following:
(1) A complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel in both North and South Viet-Nam on a specified date. Such action was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
(2) No military forces, armed personnel or bases to be maintained in North or South Viet-Nam except those under control of the respective Governments.
This would mean withdrawing or demobilizing all other troops, withdrawing external military and related personnel introduced from outside South Viet-Nam, and the evacuation of military bases, as soon as possible under an agreed time schedule. This too was contemplated under the Geneva Agreements.
(3) Full respect for the international frontiers of the States bordering on North and South Viet-Nam, as well as for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
(4) Peaceful settlement by the people in North and South Viet-Nam of the question of reunification, without foreign interference. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
(5) Finally, supervision of all the foregoing by agreed upon international machinery. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.
47. In thus summarizing the central elements of the Geneva Agreements, I note that, as evidenced in the joint communiqué issued at the Manila Summit Conference last 25 October, the Government of South Viet-Nam holds similar views.
48. We make this authoritative statement in the hope that a settlement can be reached by reaffirming the principles of the Geneva Agreements and by making use of the machinery created by those Agreements — including in particular a reconvened Geneva Conference in which all concerned parties can appropriately participate. And we suggest that a further question is in order: Does North Viet-Nam agree that the foregoing points are a correct interpretation of the Geneva Agreements to which it professedly subscribes?
49. To this question let me append this plain statement about the aims of the United States toward North Viet-Nam. The United States has no designs on the territory of North Viet-Nam: we do not seek to overthrow its government, whatever its ideology; and we are fully prepared to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end. By the same token, it remains our view that the people of South Viet-Nam should have the right to work out their own political future by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of self-determination, and without external interference; and that this right too should be respected by all.
50. It is our further view that all South Vietnamese who are willing to participate peacefully in the political life of South Viet-Nam should have an equal chance, as first-class citizens, with full rights in every sense. We do not conceive that any segment of the South Vietnamese people should be excluded from such peaceful participation. We would consider it altogether wise and proper, if this would remove an obstacle to peace, that appropriate assurances on this matter be considered in connexion with a political settlement.
51. It should be noted in this connexion that the Government of South Viet-Nam has stated that it has — and I quote the Government — "no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North"; that it seeks only to resolve its political problems without external interference; and that it is prepared for "reconciliation of all elements in the society" It is also noteworthy that the people of South Viet-Nam have just concluded a peaceful election under a new Constitution, and have made progress in the democratic process.
52. Let me add that my Government remains willing, and indeed has already begun, to make a major commitment of resources in a multilateral co-operative effort to accelerate in all of South-East Asia, the benefits of economic development so sorely needed there. When the conflict is ended and peace is restored, we would hope to see North Viet-Nam included in that effort.
53. In the interest of progress along this road to peace, we earnestly hope that constructive answers to the questions we have raised will soon be forthcoming. We are all too conscious that the present reality is one of grim and harsh conflict — already tragically and unduly prolonged. Surely, if there is any contribution that diplomacy, whether bilateral or multilateral, can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none in this Assembly can in good conscience spare any effort or any labour to make that contribution — no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required. We of the United States stand ready, as we have been, to make that effort and to persist in trying to overcome all obstacles to a settlement.
54. The President of the United States, speaking specifically of Viet-Nam, has said: "We Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us". In the flexible spirit of that statement, and speaking for our Government, I affirm Without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution of the conflict in Viet-Nam.
55. I turn now to the Middle East, a second area of conflict, which is both tragic in itself and dangerous to the peace of the world. The views of the United States on the requirements of peace in the Middle East have been set forth by President Johnson, notably in his statement of 19 June which remains our policy. In that statement my Government appealed to all the parties to adopt no rigid view on the method of bringing peace to the area. Rather, we have emphasized throughout that there is something more basic than methods: the simple will to peace. There must be present on both sides an affirmative will to resolve the Issues, not through the dictation of terms by either side, but through a process of mutual accommodation in which nobody's vital interests are injured. In short, both sides must have the will to work out a political solution; both must be committed to peace; and no appropriate method, such as good offices or mediation, should be excluded.
56. In candour it must be said that, as we all know, such a will to peace was not manifest in the recent fifth emergency special session of the Assembly. It is greatly to be hoped that, after sober reflection by all concerned, a new and better mood will emerge— a mood of reconciliation and magnanimity.
57. Surely the purposes of peace cannot be served if the right of a Member State to its national life is not accepted and respected by its neighbours; nor if military success blinds a Member State to the fact that its neighbours have rights and interests of their own. In realism, it is perhaps not to be expected that reconciliation and magnanimity will appear overnight; but surely enmity must at least give way to tolerance and the will to live together in peace. Once that will is manifest, the terms of settlement can be evolved.
58. The principles which my Government believes can bring peace to the region are these. Each nation in the area must accept the right of others to live. The least that this requires is that all should renounce any state or claim of belligerency, which as long ago as 1951 was found by the Security Council to be inconsistent with peace. Troops must be withdrawn — and withdrawn in a context of peace. For some parties cannot be left free to assert the rights of war while others are called upon to abide by the rules of peace. There must be justice for the refugees. The nations of the area, with the help of the world community, must address themselves at last, with new energy and new determination to succeed, to the plight of those who have been rendered homeless or displaced by wars and conflicts of the past, both distant and recent. Free and innocent passage through international waterways must be assured for all nations. One of the lessons of the recent conflict is that maritime rights must be respected. The wasteful and destructive arms race in the region must be curbed, thereby making more resources available for economic development. The status of Jerusalem must not be decided unilaterally, but in consultation with all concerned and in recognition of the historic interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. The political independence and territorial integrity of all States in the area must be respected. Boundaries must be accepted and other arrangements made, superseding temporary and often-violated armistice lines, so as to afford security to all parties against terror, destruction and war.
59. These are important general principles on which, we believe, rests the peace of the area. While the main responsibility rests with the parties, the United Nations and every Member State, including my own country, must help as best they can in the search for peace; for it is in the highest international interest as well as in the national interests of the parties, that peace should be achieved as soon as possible.
60. As for my own country, our most cherished wish for the Middle East has long been an age of peace in which we could enjoy good relations with every nation of that region. In such a climate of peace there is much that we could do, and would be very glad to do, in cooperation with other Members and with the gifted peoples of the region itself. Regional economic development; the full rehabilitation of the refugees, the desalting of water and the restoration of the desert for human use — these, and not war or armaments, are the works to which my country, and, lam sure, many both in and outside the Middle East, would prefer to devote our energies.
61. I turn now to a third momentous problem: the search for reliable programmes of international disarmament and arms control, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons. Step-by-step progress in this field, which seemed out of reach for so many years, has more recently become a reality. Significant limitations regarding nuclear weapons have been accepted by the nuclear Powers in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, in the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963, and only last year in the Treaty on outer space [see resolution 2222 (XXI), annex].
62. These successive steps have encouraged us to tackle one of the most basic aspects of the nuclear dilemma: the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more nations. This poses one of the greatest dangers to peace and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The longer this problem remains, the graver the danger becomes.
63. My Government has long been very much alive to this danger. In response to it we have given the highest priority in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the objective of a non-proliferation treaty. Last month this long effort culminated in the simultaneous tabling by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, complete in all except its safeguard provisions. The texts of these drafts will he available in document form to all Members of the General Assembly.
64. I must frankly state that complex problems still remain. But we are hopeful that a complete treaty draft, including a generally acceptable safeguard provision, will be presented to this session in time to allow for consideration and action by the Assembly, under whose general direction and guidance this treaty is being negotiated.
65. But I should also say that the presentation of such a completed draft will, of course, not be the end of the process. There will remain the understandable desire of certain non-nuclear countries for assurances against nuclear blackmail. The Assembly, in addition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it will, can make a significant contribution to the treaty's objective of nonproliferation by helping to develop a solution to this related problem.
66. We fully understand that the drafts which have been tabled in Geneva are far too important to admit of hurried consideration by prospective signatories. But neither does this urgent matter admit of procrastination. All concerned Powers, nuclear and nonnuclear alike, should press forward with all practical speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when it unanimously appealed to all States in resolution 2149 (XXI):
"To take all the necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ...
"To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."
67. Our preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty has not diminished my Government's concern over other major problems in the arms-control field. High on the list of these problems is the growing arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Some time ago we expressed to the Soviet Union our interest in an understanding which would limit the deployment of such missiles.
68. In the interim, we in the United States have been obliged to review carefully our strategic position. Our conclusion from this review was that our security, including particularly security against the threat of a missile attack by mainland China, required us to embark upon the construction of a limited antiballistic missile system — and I emphasize the word "limited".
69. No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, should feel that its security is endangered by this decision. On the contrary, to the extent that the United States will be better able to meet its international defensive responsibilities and to respond to appeals from States threatened by nuclear blackmail, the present safety of many other countries may in fact be enhanced.
70. However, we have no illusions that the construction and deployment of missiles of any kind is the preferred road to security. It is not. The events which led to our decision simply underscore the urgent importance of pursuing negotiations on a limitation of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Despite our lack of success thus far, the United States remains ready to open talks on this subject at any time.
71. These developments, moreover, once again demonstrate the urgent need not only for a non-proliferation treaty, but for all the necessary steps toward general and complete disarmament. Let no one imagine that the building or acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap security. True security for all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress in the entire range of arms control and disarmament measures, including control of the strategic arms race, a verifiable comprehensive test-ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will help to build a more secure world for all and perhaps ensure our very survival.
72. The fourth great problem I wish to discuss is that of assuring self-determination and full nationhood to all peoples who still, regrettably, live in colonial subjection. Our Assembly agenda reminds us that the work of ending the colonial age is far from finished. In fact, the hardest problems have remained until the last. That is true, above all, in the southern portion of the African continent, where white minorities have become deeply entrenched in their dominion over black majorities. In much of that area we see not one evil but two evils which, under one guise or another, go hand in hand: colonialism and that particularly cruel offence against human rights, racial discrimination.
73. The opposition of the United States to those twin evils draws strength from two of the deepest elements in our own national life: our historic stand, from our very origins, as an anti-colonial Power and our continuing struggle against racial injustice among our own people. My country, founded on the proposition that all men are created equal and have equal rights before the law — and currently engaged in a vigorous nation-wide programme to make that equality real for all its citizens — cannot, must not, and will not adopt a double standard on what is happening in the southern part of Africa.
74. And I should merely like to say this to the Members of the Assembly: to those who are impatient for redress of grievances we shall show that we sympathize with them and support their objectives, even though we may not always agree on the specific, practical steps to be taken by the international community.
75. To those, on the other hand, who resist all change, we shall continue to insist that the way to preserve peace is not the submergence of legitimate grievances, but their timely redress. And we shall unceasingly bring home to them America's profound conviction that apartheid, like every other form of white supremacy, is, as my predecessor Adlai Stevenson said, "racist in its origins, arrogant in its implementation and, in its consequences, potentially dangerous for all".
76. In conclusion let me say this. During the coming three months the General Assembly will address itself not only to the" questions we have discussed in this statement, but to a vast range of matters affecting the peace and welfare of mankind, both now and in the future. My delegation will seek to participate constructively in the Assembly's many concerns; and on a number of topics of particular interest we shall present proposals of our own.
77. The United States turns to these tasks in a mood of sober determination. Our Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization [A/6701/Add.l] has made clear his view that this has not been a good year for the United Nations; and we agree with that assessment. The fault — to paraphrase the great bard, Shakespeare — lies not in the Organization itself, but in ourselves, its Members; and it is to our own policies that we must ail look if we desire a better future.
78. In serving the cause of a just and peaceful world we are not permitted the luxury of being easily discouraged. Indeed, the most forbidding obstacles are precisely those which should call forth our most persistent efforts. Nor should we look for any alternative to the United Nations, for there is none. Year in and year out, through all the difficulties that may arise, we must strive to be true, both in word and deed, to the permanent pledge of peace and justice which we, as Members, have made to the United Nations and to one another.
79. As this twenty-second session of the General Assembly opens, the United States once again solemnly reaffirms its devotion to that pledge.